



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

WIDENER LIBRARY



HX JUR2 %

LIBRARY OF GREEK AUTHORS

Ep
82
380

PLATO

GORGIAS

LODGE

GINN & COMPANY

1
Gp 82.380



HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

LIBRARY OF THE

Classical Department,

HARVARD HALL.

31 August, 1891.

COLLEGE SERIES OF GREEK AUTHORS
EDITED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF
JOHN WILLIAMS WHITE AND THOMAS D. SEYMOUR.

O

PLATO
=
G O R G I A S

EDITED
ON THE BASIS OF DEUSCHLE-CRON'S EDITION

BY
GONZALEZ LODGE
BRYN MAWR COLLEGE

BOSTON, U.S.A., AND LONDON
PUBLISHED BY GINN & COMPANY

1891

Gp 82.380

1891, August 31.
Mass. A. P. C.

ENTERED AT STATIONERS' HALL.

COPYRIGHT, 1890, BY

JOHN WILLIAMS WHITE AND THOMAS D. SEYMOUR.

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

TYPOGRAPHY BY J. S. CUSHING & Co., BOSTON, U.S.A.

PRESSWORK BY GINN & Co., BOSTON, U.S.A.

PREFACE.

THIS edition is based on Deuschle-Cron's fourth edition, Leipzig, 1886, but the original has been treated with considerable freedom.

In more than sixty cases, where the text varies from that of Cron, the readings of Schanz have been adopted. A few conjectures have been introduced, but the editor has endeavored to follow a middle course between those who do not allow emendations, and those who, like Schanz, employ them too freely.

The introduction is a free rendering of the original, with additions.

The commentary will be found to differ materially from the German, especially in grammatical matters. The editor has not thought it advisable to deviate from the line of literary interpretation adopted by the German editor, but the exact study, which has been bestowed of later years in the United States upon the subject of Greek Syntax, has rendered it possible to make this part of the book to a certain extent American.

The appendix, which is much more extensive than that of the German edition, will be found to contain, in addition to the register of textual variations, much matter which could not be inserted in a commentary, but which students should know.

Much assistance has been drawn from other editions, especially those of Hirschig and Thompson. Woolsey's edition also has been in the hands of the editor.

The editor is under great obligations to Professor Gildersleeve, who examined the commentary in manuscript and made many

valuable suggestions. Those who may use the book will share the editor's regret, that owing to delay in the printing he was unable to avail himself fully of Professor Gildersleeve's kind offer to read and criticise the proof-sheets.

The edition owes much also to Professor Seymour, who has read all the proof, and has cheerfully given the editor the benefit of his scholarship and editorial experience.

Reference is made throughout to Riddell's *Digest of Platonic Idioms* (Rid.), printed with his edition of the *Apology* (Oxford, 1877). Occasional references are made to Madvig's *Griechische Syntax*, and to Meisterhans' *Grammatik der Attischen Inschriften*.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE, October, 1890.

INTRODUCTION.

1. THE BEGINNINGS OF RHETORIC.¹

THE mighty impulse which the Hellenic spirit, throughout the whole extent of the Hellenic nationality, received from the successful result of the great conflict waged by the might of the people against the overwhelming power of the Barbarians, had made Athens, the city which had distinguished itself beyond all others by the sagacity and self-sacrificing courage of its citizens, the centre of all the intellectual effort and life of Greece. Poetry, which in conjunction with its sister arts had not become merely inseparably associated with all religious and national feasts, but had acquired also a recognized position in every-day life, obtained by the new and especially brilliant productions of this period a much wider influence upon the culture and public life of the people. Meanwhile the political activity and progress of the time was pushing forward with rapid and irresistible strides to the development of Prose, to which up to this time the artistic genius of the Greeks had been less directed than to Poetry. With the fortunes of this new medium of human thought were inseparably connected those of a new department of Literature, — History, — which had its real beginning, artistically considered, in that magnificent work whose worthy subject was the famous struggle between the Greeks and the Barbarians, so remote in its origin, so long in its duration, so momentous in its character, so fortunate in its result. An inexhaustible opportunity for practice in the art of public speaking was afforded by the assemblies of the people and the courts of law. From these

¹ Principal source: *Συναγωγή τεχνῶν* sive *artium scriptores ab initiis usque ad editos Aristotelis de rhetorica libros*. Composuit L. Spengel, Stuttgartiae, 1828. — In addition: Westermann, *Geschichte der Beredsamkeit*

in Griechenland und Rom. Leipzig, 1833. — Volkmann, *Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer in systematischer Uebersicht*, 2d ed. Leipzig, 1886, — and especially Blass, *Die Attische Beredsamkeit*, 1², Leipzig, 1887.

were derived two varieties of political oratory, the Forensic (τὸ συμβουλευτικόν or τὸ δημηγορικόν) and the Judicial (τὸ δικανικόν γένος). Very soon it became the duty of those most noted for their talents in speaking, to deliver speeches in honor of those citizens who had fallen in battle for their country. Hence Aristotle in his Theory adds to the two varieties already mentioned a third, — τὸ ἐπιδεικτικόν γένος.

2 But it was not in accordance with the intellectual character of the Greek people to rest content with a merely practical skill in the employment of language. They rather, by virtue of their disposition towards investigation and science, turned their attention to the discovery of the means through which speech might attain its greatest power, and thereby be the more likely to bring about any desired result. The unprejudiced mind could not but see that this oratorical success was not always due to a deeper insight and more thorough knowledge of the question at issue. Consequently their attention was directed to the formal side of the art, and thus the first rude beginnings, naturally empirical, were made of a Theory, *i.e.* of a scientific conception, which claimed for itself the ability to communicate to others the skill and knowledge which had been acquired, or in other words, to teach to others this new art, so useful, nay, almost indispensable for practical life.

3 That such an art should find ready acceptance and cultivation in Athens is but natural. We need only refer to the orator Antiphon, who both as the founder of a school of oratory and as a composer of written speeches, as well as from his political activity, exercised a wide influence there. But Athens was not the earliest home of this art. That honor belongs to Sicily. Under similar circumstances the beginnings of oratory would probably have been made simultaneously in Attica and Sicily. But in the latter country the conditions were somewhat different. The population was very composite, given to disputation, and less fully organized than that of Athens. Besides, the severe measures of the tottering tyrants to preserve their power had caused many changes in the ownership of land and the rights of property. Consequently the overthrow of the tyranny was

followed by a perfect tempest of litigation out of which oratory emerged as a fully established art. Its invention is ascribed to Corax, — a man who had taken a leading part in the political upheavals and governmental changes of his country, but who in the new order of things devoted himself to the teaching of Rhetoric — especially that in use in the courts — of which he composed also a short ‘*techne*.’ His pupil and successor was Tisias, who, according to the story,² used his newly acquired skill in speaking to defeat his teacher in a lawsuit, — a course of action which could not but show the tendency of the new art, and which drew down a scathing rebuke from the judge.³ Tisias had many pupils who afterwards became famous; among them Lysias and Isocrates, as well as Gorgias, after whom this dialogue is named.

2. GORGIAS’ LIFE AND ACTIVITY.⁴

Gorgias was the son of Charmantides⁵ of Leontini. The year 4 of his birth as well as that of his death is uncertain. Apollodorus and Quintilian state that he lived to the age of 109, while others allow him only 105 years. Quintilian also says that he outlived Socrates, a statement which may or may not be confirmed by *Apol.* 19 e.⁶ With these data alone to build on, it is not strange that authorities have been unable to agree on the dates to be assigned for his birth and death. We may assume that he was born between 492 and 483 B.C. and died between 384 and 375.⁷ Of his family and early life and training we have very scanty notices. We hear of a sister married to a certain Deicrates and of a brother Herodicus. It is likely that he early became acquainted with the teachings as well as the dia-

² Spengel, p. 26.

³ The indignant exclamation *κακοὶ κόρακος κακὰ φέει*.

⁴ See Foss, *De Gorgia Leontino*, Hallae, 1828. Frei, *Quaestiones Protagoraeae*, Bonnae, 1846.

⁵ The inscription on a statue of Gorgias at Olympia reads *Χαρμαντίδου Γοργίας Λεοντίνος*. Suidas and Pausanias give it wrongly as *Καρμαντίδου*.

⁶ Sittl, *Gesch. d. Gr. Lit.* ii. 36 n. thinks that Quintilian’s statement may be based on Socrates’ words.

⁷ Foss gives the dates 496–388; Deuschle, 492–384; Frei, 483–375, which is agreed to by Zeller, Diels, and Susemihl; Fränkel, 487–379; Unger, 507–500. Blass thinks Gorgias was born probably before 480. *Att. Bered.* i. p. 47 n.

lectic of the Eleatic school, as we may judge from the fact that he employed their arguments in his philosophic work. It was reported in antiquity that he had been a pupil of Empedocles, and it is probable that he wrote a philosophic treatise in the spirit of the Empedoclean theory. His natural gifts, however, as well as the spirit of the times, inclined him to the newly invented art of speech. And if Empedocles was really the inventor, as Aristotle declares, it is probable that he gained some light from him. Tradition made him also the pupil of Tisias as already mentioned, but Blass does not believe in the truth of the story. It is certain that he soon became a formidable rival of Tisias. He gained a great reputation in his native city as an orator and teacher of rhetoric, and many students flocked to his lectures. Among these was his truest follower Polus, who accompanied him on his travels afterwards. Soon came an opportunity for him to make his art felt and his name famous outside of his country. The inhabitants of Leontini were hard pressed by the Syracusans, and in their distress sent Gorgias as ambassador to Athens in 427 B.C. to plead the claims of kinship and to beg assistance. Gorgias was eminently successful in his mission.⁸ The Athenians—the most loquacious people of Greece—were charmed by the magic of his graceful eloquence. Never before had they heard an orator who was such a master of form as Gorgias, or whose words fell so sweetly and melodiously upon the ear. Consequently he was soon able to return to Leontini and announce the prosperous issue of his mission. But he did not stay. The poison of Athenian life had penetrated, and he was drawn back. He had recognized also that the field was more favorable there for the practice of his profession than in Sicily. The Athenians were seized with enthusiasm for him. Crowds of young men and older men also of the best families in the state

⁸ *Hippias Mai.* 282 b Γοργίας τε γὰρ οὗτος ὁ Λεοντίνιος σοφιστὴς δεῦρο ἀφίκετο δημοσίᾳ οἰκοθεν πρεσβεύων, ὡς ἱκανώτατος ὢν Λεοντίνων τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν τε τῇ δῆμῳ ἔδοξεν ἄριστα εἰπεῖν, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐπιδείξεισιν ποιούμενος καὶ

συνὸν τοῖς νέοις χρήματα πολλὰ εἰργάσατο καὶ ἔλαβεν ἐκ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως. Thucydides does not mention the name of Gorgias in his account of the matter (iii. 86), but Diodorus does (xii. 53).

crowded around him and paid gladly extraordinary sums for the privilege of hearing his instructions. The days on which he lectured they called festivals. His phrases were compared to gleaming torches, and Plato⁹ himself goes so far as to compare him with the Homeric Nestor, the ἡδυεπὴς λιγύς Πυλίων ἀγορητής.

Gorgias was especially happy in the discourses he delivered⁵ for display, or on festive occasions, called ἐπιδείξεις, and found many occasions to show his ability. But he also came forward as a teacher of oratory and found a ready body of pupils among the higher classes. See *Apol.* 19 e, *Gorg.* 449 b. He does not, however, appear to have remained very long at Athens despite his success. This may have been due to the fact that Athens soon became the resort of a numerous company of Sophists, whose mutual relations were not always pleasant, and the bustle and instability of Athenian life may have become somewhat irksome to a man now well advanced in years. He therefore soon left Athens,—though he must have returned thither several times. He travelled considerably, but when or where, we cannot with certainty state. We only know that he discussed in Olympia, before the concourse of assembled Greeks, with great applause, a purely national theme,—afterwards treated by many others,—the ‘Eastern question.’¹⁰ The most of his time, however, he spent in Thessaly, for which he seems to have conceived a great fondness. There the tyrants, especially those of Larissa, honored him, and the rich young nobles became infatuated¹¹ with him and flocked in great crowds to hear his teaching.¹² Among his pupils were Meno, one of Cyrus’ generals

⁹ *Phaedr.* 261 b. It is likely also that the fact that Gorgias, like Nestor, ‘saw three generations of men,’ had something to do with this comparison.

¹⁰ Philostr. *Epis.* 73, ii. p. 257 K. Blass, i. § 54.

¹¹ The expression γοργιδεῖν, which we find applied to this infatuation, is probably of later origin, and has some allusion to the story of the charmed Gorgon head.

¹² *Meno* 70 b τούτου δὲ ὁμῶν αἰτιὸς ἐστὶν Γοργίας (i.e. that the Thessalians, especially those of Larissa, are so noted for their wisdom). ἀφικόμενος γὰρ εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐραστὰς ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ εἴληφεν Ἀλεναδῶν τε τοὺς πρώτους, ὧν ὁ σὸς ἐραστὴς ἐστὶν Ἀρστικῆπος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Θετταλῶν. καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἔθος ὑμᾶς εἴθικεν ἀφόβως τε καὶ μεγαλοκρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐάν τις τι ἔρηται, ὥσπερ εἰκὸς τοὺς εἰδότες, ἅτε

in the march of the Ten Thousand, Proxenus, another of these generals, and Aristippus, an Aleuad, and of noted Athenians, at least Philostratus, Thucydides, Critias, and Alcibiades, besides the celebrated teachers Isocrates and Antisthenes. Gorgias was not a cheap teacher; his charge was 100 minæ for each pupil. It seems, therefore, strange that he should have left only 1000 staters, or 200 minæ, behind him when he died; that too, when he had neither wife nor family to spend his money for him. But although he lived simply, he loved parade and to make an imposing display in public. In imitation of the priestly garb of his old master, Empedocles, he used to wear a purple mantle and golden sandals.¹³ It is said also that he had a golden statue of himself set up at Delphi, at the dedication of which he delivered a great oration.¹⁴ Otherwise even his enemies could find nothing in his manner of life to criticise, and were obliged to feel the highest respect for him. To his simple manner of life is attributed the fact that he not only reached a very great old age, but retained his bodily freshness and vigor until the end. Anecdotes are related of him to show his preference for old age instead of a disgust at it.¹⁵ When finally his death was approaching, — a death which was without sickness and rather like a falling asleep, — he is said to have murmured, ‘Now Sleep is beginning to conduct me to his brother Death.’

- 6 Gorgias left behind him various writings, six speeches — he seems not to have written a work on rhetoric — and a philosophical treatise *περὶ φύσεως ἡ περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος*. It is not certain that any of these have come down to us. It is true that we possess two declamations which pass under Gorgias’ name, the Encomium of Helen and the Defence of Palamedes; but the genuineness of these speeches cannot yet be said to be beyond question.¹⁶ We

καὶ αὐτὸς παρέχων αὐτὸν ἐρωτῶν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ ὅτι ἂν τις βούληται.

¹³ Aelian, *V. H.* xii. 32.

¹⁴ Whether Gorgias had it set up, or it was set up in his honor by friends, and whether it was solid gold or only gilt, are questions not yet set-

tled. Cf. Blass, i.² 58, n. 1, where the authorities are given.

¹⁵ Blass, i.² 51, ns. 6, 7.

¹⁶ In his first edition Blass restricted himself to the view that these speeches were either genuine, or had been designedly counterfeited, inclining rather to the latter alternative.

also know the contents and arguments of the philosophical treatise from two sources.¹⁷ Gorgias tries to prove: 1, that nothing exists; 2, if anything exists, it cannot be recognized or known; 3, even if it could be known, it cannot be communicated by words. To prove these statements he employs two modes of proof, — one of his own invention, and the other an adaptation of the arguments of the Eleatics.¹⁸ If one considers the result desired only, there appears to be a contradiction between the theory of Gorgias and his actual practice. How, we may ask, can a man come forward as an orator and profess to teach the art of speaking (or communication) who denies the possibility of communicating knowledge? On closer examination, however, the inconsistency disappears. What Gorgias attempted to prove was, in the first place, the impossibility of objective existence or of a knowledge of such existence; in the second place, granted that there was such a thing as existence and a knowledge of it, the impossibility of bringing this fact by means of speech to the knowledge of others. He was not, however, bound by this view to deny the appearance of existence, or the possibility of conception and opinion. On the contrary, he rests the proof of his second point just on this argument, that the existent is of itself not a matter of thought, because, otherwise what every one thinks must exist, and this would do away with the possibility of a false conception. He denied, therefore, that there was any connexion between human thought and conception, and existence, but he by no means denied the existence of conceptions. Hence the use of the art of speech must be on the supposition that the art of speech is designed to inspire in the hearers, without any reference to the

In his second edition, p. 79, n. 1, he distinctly abandons his earlier position, saying he was too much influenced by the spirit of the times, and comes out squarely on the side of the genuineness of the speeches. Diels had done the same in 1884, *Ber. d. Ber. Akad.*

¹⁷ Pseudo-Aristoteles *de Gorgia*, c. 5. 6, and Sextus Empiricus, *adv. Math.*

vii. 65–87. These two versions do not agree in all respects, and have been made the subject of careful study lately by O. Apelt in *Rhein. Mus.* 43. 202–219. Apelt shows that the account of Aristotle must be held as more accurately giving the mode of argument of Gorgias than that of Sextus Empiricus.

¹⁸ Apelt, p. 204 f.

actual existence, simply those conceptions which will be useful to the design of the speaker. In addition, however, the speaker is at liberty so thoroughly to acquire the power of expression that he may be able, by the perfection of form, to awaken in his hearers feelings of pleasure and assent.

- 7 Such, then, was Gorgias' view of Rhetoric. The contents, or subject of the speech, were a matter of indifference to him; the form was the great object. Hence he undertook to speak on any subject whatever, no matter whether he was acquainted with it or not. He challenged his hearers to put to him any question they pleased, and pledged himself to speak concerning it better and more elegantly¹⁹ than any one else, and at whatever length might be desired.²⁰ Through the art of speech he undertook to make the great appear small, the small great, the old new, the new old; in short, to make anything appear its exact opposite. He cared nothing for the real nature of anything, but only sought to make it assume some particular appearance. His pupils were to acquire the same skill in the use of form, and to this end he imparted to them certain rules and artistic conceptions, or a technique of speech. Of course the most of his directions applied to the outward form merely; and his great merit lies in the fact that he was the first to direct attention to this side of oratory. He was the first to recognize the importance of figures of speech, and is said to have invented the names 'antithesis,' 'paronomasia,' 'pariosis' (or repetition of the same expression in different connexions), etc. He loved to give a poetic coloring to his ideas, and he laid especial weight on the symmetrical balancing (*ισοκωλία*) and rhythmical swing of his clauses. Probably, however, because he was a pioneer, he did not reach the degree of perfection in his treatment of form, which either himself, or the laws of symmetry and beauty demanded. His metaphors were

¹⁹ *Gorg.* 447 c, *Cic. de Or.* i. 22. 103 (Gorgias) permagnum quiddam suscipere ac profiteri videbatur cum se ad omnia de quibus quisque audire vellet, esse paratum denun-

tiaret. Cf. also iii. 32. 129, *de Fin.* ii. 1. 1.

²⁰ *Gorg.* 449 c, *Phaedr.* 267 b (Τείσιας Γοργίας τε) συντομίαν τε λόγων καὶ ἄπειρα μήκη περὶ πάντων ἀνεύρου.

often harsh and bald, and his affectation of distinctly poetic words and phrases drew upon him the ridicule of later critics.²¹ He could not get beyond a certain uniformity; for example, he seems to have considered the mere division into two corresponding or opposing halves to be entirely sufficient for symmetry. In short, the means at the command of Rhetoric were still too limited for perfection. But Gorgias nevertheless exercised an immense influence upon the later Attic literature, and his merit cannot be over-estimated, in awakening in the Greek mind the consciousness that the laws of beauty should prevail in every literary effort, in prose as well as in the domain of poetry. His example was followed by many men of high literary importance. Besides those already mentioned, the influence of Gorgias can be traced in Antiphon, Thucydides, Critias, the dramatist Agathon, Aeschines, and others.

3. AIM AND PRINCIPLE OF THE DIALOGUE.

The culture of the time in which the activity of Gorgias fell 8 is called the Sophistical. Its peculiar characteristic lies in the fact that it denied the reality of knowledge, morality, and justice, and admitted only an appearance of knowledge, morality, and justice, or rather, declared to be true, moral, and just only that which appeared so subjectively, to this person or that, — and this, of course, was different with every different individual. Gorgias, it is true, looked down upon the Sophists with scorn, and refused to be classed with them;²² but this scorn was not directed against the immoral view of life which the Sophists held, in looking towards the appearance, and not the reality; for, as we have seen from the sketch just given of his teaching, he agreed with them in this; what he found ridiculous was that the others who called themselves Sophists should claim to teach wisdom and virtue, or human culture, while imparting knowledge of every variety. For him there was but one art, which was the

²¹ See references in Blass, p. 64.

²² *Meno* 95 c καὶ Γοργίου μάλιστα ταῦτα ἔγχαμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔν ποτε αὐτοῦ τοῦτο (ἀρετὴν διδάσκειν) ἀκούσας ὑπι-

σχυρομένου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν κατα-
γελᾷ, ὅταν ἀκούσῃ ὑπισχυρομένων· ἀλλὰ
λέγειν οἴεται δεῖν ποιεῖν δεινούς. The
feeling is shared by Callicles.

essence of all arts, and made all knowledge unnecessary, the acquisition of the so-called virtue needless; namely, the art of speech or Rhetoric. But the Sophists also were well aware of the great value of a ready command of language, for it was this on which their mental superiority over others rested; and the most important of them, *e.g.* Protagoras and Prodicus, had paid great attention to linguistic investigation. Hence Gorgias, in point of fact, came to their assistance with his art of speaking; for it was just in so far as he declared the contents of the speech a matter of indifference, and laid the greatest emphasis on the development and perfection of form, that the art of speaking became the means of commending to the minds of others, according to the pleasure of the speaker, an appearance of truth, morality, and justice. Thus behind Rhetoric, so defined, lay hidden the worst and most dangerous form of Sophistic. For it not only urged the man who employed it to the practical accomplishment of any design, no matter how arbitrary, but provided him with the means best suited to it. Under the constitutional government of the majority of Hellenic states, a man's success in politics depended largely upon his ability to address an audience with readiness and force. This ability Gorgias professed to give by his new art of speaking. But when thus equipped what else could his pupils expect or strive for by means of their new weapon but the highest possible power in the state? And by power, what else could they understand but the power of doing whatever they pleased and of managing affairs according to their own caprice? And only then would the orator have achieved his object most completely when he had succeeded in raising himself to a tyranny and putting his fellow-citizens under his feet. Such was in reality the necessary aim of this rhetorical training; for it recognized beside itself no other knowledge as legitimate, and not only offered itself no moral view of state relations, but even declared the knowledge of justice to be useless, inasmuch as it was the office of the orator to decide first for himself what justice was, and then to make use of the art of speaking to compel from others the acknowledgment and acceptance of his view.

Now of course Gorgias did not recognize these necessary consequences of his principles, much less did he declare them. He did not even seem to see the close relationship of his efforts with those of the other Sophists. And this was one reason, perhaps, why so many of the cultured men of the period who were seeking certain practical ends in politics — that is, the rising statesmen — flocked so eagerly to hear him. Behind their praise of Rhetoric they concealed their sympathy with Sophistic. It was not long, however, before they ventured to proclaim their designs openly. For the moral sense of the period was declining so rapidly that but few, at least in Athens, its home, were disposed to object to the new culture. Plato therefore rendered the Athenian state a great service when he drew off the mask from this influential art of appearances, and showed it in its true nature as a form of Sophistic, and the worst form, too, because the emptiest. He had inherited likewise from his master Socrates the calling of scientifically destroying Sophistic in all its forms, and the founding and defence of a moral view of life in opposition to it. His theory of Ethics, as can be abundantly recognized from the dialogue before us, was already fully developed in its essential characteristics, and was quite strong enough to carry through this struggle successfully. If, however, the opposition in which Ethics stood to this so-called Rhetoric and its results was to be entirely understood, and if it was to be brought out a victor over its opponent, then it was necessary to lay quite bare the immoral principles on which Rhetoric rested, whether any one of his rhetorically trained contemporaries was acquainted with the real bearing of those principles or not. The aim of that method of training was seen to be the domination of the individual's caprice, wantonness, or arbitrary will. This assumes as the true principle of action, since it denies the validity of the existing laws of the state, the so-called law of nature, so widely defended by the Sophists, which is nothing more nor less than the law of the stronger. But this principle also can be traced to a far deeper-lying spring, the source of all immoral views of life; namely, the idea that the guide of a man's action should be not his mental but his sensual nature, and the therefrom resulting

impulses and passions. Satisfaction of these, therefore, or in other words, sensual enjoyment, is obedience to this law of nature, which was synonymous with happiness according to the spirit of the times. The idea of happiness is common to both the moral and immoral views of life; but they look at it in different lights, and define it differently in consequence. Plato conceived happiness to lie in the absolute freedom of the mental and spiritual nature of man from the domination of sense. His opponents, on the other hand, looked upon this Platonic freedom as a matter of no consequence, and held that happiness could be reached only when the sensual nature was as free as possible, and could hurry without restraint from pleasure to pleasure. This opposition was the chief motive which led Plato to the composition of this dialogue, with which he may be said to have entered the lists in his contest with the tendency of the age.

- 10 To this motive for the composition of the dialogue must be added certain external causes which are of value for its correct understanding. The trial and condemnation of Socrates in open court had really been a contest between the old and dominant system and the new ethical theory. In this conflict Ethics experienced a defeat at the hands of its enemy, which showed that it must not extend its operations too far into the domain of political life. If it was to conquer, it must be in the domain of scientific and philosophical investigation and criticism. The Socratic theory of Ethics was confined to the teaching of virtue to the individual. Plato widens the circle of investigation. He starts the question, What relation does the Socratic ethical theory hold to the state, and has the dominant political principle any real justification in opposing it? If, as is to be supposed, the death of Socrates gave a mighty impulse to these investigations of the young philosopher, it must have led him to a sharper limitation and deeper conception of the department of science which he had entered. Another probable supposition may be added. Plato must have undergone much unfavorable criticism for holding himself aloof from all political activity, and making philosophy his calling; for the cultured men of his time looked upon politics

as the only worthy pursuit for a free man. And Plato may have wished to defend himself against such attacks.

Plato was led, therefore, both by sincere differences of opinion 11 as well as by external circumstances, to make the question of the false and true theories of life—the former claimed and taught by the rhetorical culture of the time, the latter by philosophy—the subject of discussion for a public treatise. We should not, accordingly, expect in the *Gorgias* a full criticism of Rhetoric from all sides, for the various rules which it laid down for the correct arrangement of a speech have no place here; but we must also not lose sight of the fact that the discussion of the moral question already mentioned necessarily involves also the question as to the real nature and principles of Rhetoric. We cannot, therefore, consider Rhetoric as the general subject of the dialogue, as the *περὶ ῥητορικῆς* which the manuscripts affix to the title would indicate. Rhetoric enters into the discussion only as far as its relation to actual life is concerned; that is, so far as it was the means through which the business of the state was conducted. Now because, according to the general view, the duties of the citizen began, continued, and ended in politics, Rhetoric soon claimed and was admitted to be the real art of life. In this way, then, the consideration of Rhetoric may easily and naturally be made the occasion for a consideration, also, of the more general question of the true principle of life. This hand-in-hand consideration can, however, only continue to a certain degree, for the opposition of the two questions soon becomes evident as the discussion proceeds. The proper opposite to Rhetoric is Philosophy; but just as the former is represented by politics, the latter also appears in the form of ethics. Plato shows first, that real, genuine politics can only be founded upon the same ethics which prescribes the rules of life for the individual man; secondly, that the individual is only justified in turning his attention to politics, when he has made himself ethically perfect; and thirdly, that he must enter politics only in order to discharge his duty to his fellow-citizens,—in a word, only to make them better. In this way, philosophy becomes also the true art of life, not merely for the individual, but also for the association of individuals

which is called a state. The aim of the false art of life is to satisfy the caprices of an ever-changing passion; that of the true, is to bring about the supremacy of the good. Hence Plato undertook in this dialogue to set forth scientifically the distinction that exists between the good and the pleasant.²³

4. SCENERY OF THE DIALOGUE.

A. *Persons.*

- 12 In the artistic development and arrangement of a dialogue in which alone, as an artistic form of prose, it can be opposed to the poetic drama, a matter of the utmost importance is the choice of the characters which are to carry on the conversation. That it is not those who give their names to the dialogues who are to be considered as the chief characters, is shown by a cursory glance over the various works of Plato. None of these works bears the name of Socrates, although (or rather because) not in one only, but in the majority of them, he is the leading character, *i.e.* the one whom the author makes the exponent of his own opinions, feelings, and efforts. Thus in our dialogue, likewise, Plato has assigned this role to his beloved teacher. He is throughout the leader of the conversation, for even the sections which seem to form exceptions to this rule serve only to show the inability of any one else to fill this position. In the most intimate connexion with this skill of Socrates stands the moral feeling, which he defends with especial emphasis and earnestness against a very different method. He shows himself here, as in other dialogues, to be a man in whom reason and will, thought and action, have been blended, by conscientious effort, into an almost ideal harmony. According to 461 c, we must suppose him to be already well advanced in life.
- 13 Compared with Socrates, all the other characters who take part in the dialogue fall somewhat into the background, because no single one has been chosen to bear alone the role of respondent,

²³ The various opinions of modern commentators are well discussed in the introduction to Cope's translation of the *Gorgias*. They agree, gener-

ally, with the view expressed by Cron. Cope bases his opinion on 527 b, c, which seems to be an explicit statement of the results of the dialogue.

which is divided, but unequally, between three persons. Hence it is that Gorgias cannot be called the leading character next to Socrates, as may be said of Protagoras in the like-named dialogue, but he rather has a position analogous to that of Laches in the dialogue which bears his name. The fact, however, that he is less prominent in this dialogue than his importance would seem to require, is more than balanced by the marked respect which all parties to the discussion show him, as a man of upright aims and high attainments. For even though his theory did contain the germ of that immoral view of life which Plato made it his business to combat, yet it was only an undeveloped germ, and his whole life had been so honorable, and had borne testimony to such a high degree of moral feeling, according to the general Greek conception, that he could scarcely be held responsible for the results which were first drawn by his pupils and followers. As far as he was himself concerned, he only desired to be a master of language and of speaking, with skill to communicate to others also the art which he had practised with so much success. It was his fault that he had no clear insight into the nature of this art, and did not notice the inconsistency in which it involved him as regards his own moral feelings and opinions. The immoral principles which naturally corresponded to the art which he practised were championed not by him, but by his followers. He himself, the aged master, retires with unimpaired dignity from the discussion, in which he has shown no dialectical skill, it is true, but still a certain appreciation of dialectical methods. With him, Socrates reaches his aim without difficulty. But even when he has been defeated he does not take offence, but still shows a lively interest in the investigation, and when the excitement or sensitiveness of his pupils threatens to put an end to it, he comes to the rescue, and by his personal dignity causes its continuance.

Polus is one of the pupils of Gorgias, and assumes immediately 14 after him his position as respondent in the discussion. As regards the facts of his life, we know that he was born in Acragas, a Sicilian city of great wealth and power, and was therefore a countryman of the celebrated philosopher and statesman Empedocles. He became a disciple of the new school of rhetoric, and

attached himself to Gorgias, whom he also accompanied on his travels, partly still to profit from his instruction, partly to obtain some reputation for himself by his dexterity in the handling of words. In this way he had now come with him to Athens. He is still young, as Plato emphasizes, but doubtless, according to 462 b, had already composed his treatise on Rhetoric.²⁴ But we must not look upon this so-called *τέχνη* as a theory based upon acknowledged principles. For such a work Polus was much more incapable than Gorgias. He had only learned from him the means of dazzling the minds of his hearers, a species of word-jugglery²⁵ in the practice of which he had obtained considerable readiness. The picture which Plato draws of him shows him to be an immature young man, not yet beyond the phrases of his student life, the height of whose self-conceit is only to be measured by the shallowness of his performances. He has absolutely no appreciation of dialectical methods; hence he has to be instructed in them repeatedly by Socrates, only to make the same mistakes again.²⁶ In moral questions he displays weakness and uncertainty.²⁷ He cannot deny a certain innate feeling for a moral standard in human actions (*τὸ καλόν*); and yet all his efforts are directed to the acquisition and possession of external power. Whenever this comes before his vision in all its glitter, he is filled with admiration for it, and overlooks entirely the immoral means which are employed in the attainment of his end. The examples of good and bad rulers, of well-ordered and lawless government, which his own country furnished, have taught him nothing. Nay, rather, his own case serves to show most clearly how small a foundation of truth lies in the admission wrung from Gorgias, that some knowledge of the principles of right and morality was an indispensable necessity for his instruction in rhetoric.

²⁴ Chronological accuracy is hardly to be demanded.

²⁵ In *Phaedr.* 267 b he is said to be the inventor of such devices of *εὐέπεια* as *διπλασιολογία*, *γνωμολογία*, *εἰκονολογία*, and artistic word-coinage after the fashion of Licymnius. See Thompson's note on this passage.

²⁶ What Socrates says with unmistakable irony of the pupils of Gorgias in *Meno* 70 b, applies excellently to Polus: *καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἔθος ὑμᾶς εἶθικεν (Γοργίας), ἀφόβως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἑάν τις τι ἔρηται, ὥσπερ εἰκὸς τοὺς εἰδότες κτέ.*

²⁷ Cf. 470 c.

The small formative power of this instruction is well shown by the case of the trained disciple himself, while the opposition of its pretended aims to all moral principles is clearly brought out by the inconsistency and self-contradiction displayed in the views which he advances. For a refutation of these false views, nothing further is necessary than the exposition of the few remnants of truth still remaining in them. From what has been said, we can easily appreciate the importance of the character of Polus for the artistic development of the dialogue.

Next in importance to Polus is Callicles, who, however, stands 15 in a different and much freer relation to Gorgias, although he may also in a certain sense be looked upon as his pupil. Of the circumstances of his life we know nothing more than can be gathered from this dialogue. He must have been of noble rank and rich, else Gorgias would hardly have been staying at his house. He seems to be abreast of the culture and spirit of his age, is versed in the poets, and wholly devoted to politics. From 515 a, we judge that he must have entered practical life not long before; and we may accordingly consider him as a man in the early prime of life. He is no theorist, like the other two, but a practical politician; not a teacher, but a statesman, who from his past life has drawn much useful experience, and now prosecutes his designs with definite purpose. For him the art of speech is only that for which it was intended, — namely, the means of acquiring a high position in public life. Since he was already fully in possession of the training of the period, he was well adapted to disclose all the principles on which his view of life was founded, and in accordance with which he was now pursuing his public career. Hence he represents the materialistic tendency, which recognizes profit only in enjoyment, only in the sensual pleasures, and scorns as an antiquated prejudice all acting in conformity with moral principles. But his materialism is by no means either coarse or effeminate; it is joined with a delicate culture and an energetic spirit; at least, he would wish it so. Hence he appears as an aristocrat (*καλὸς κἀγαθός* in its political sense) and despiser of the ignoble crowd, while at the same time he holds himself aloof from philosophy, because it makes men unpractical

and unfits them for great efforts and designs. As a practical orator, he possesses a perfect mastery of form, and knows not only how to utter his sentiments with rhetorical swing and force, but also how to defend them with spirit, wit, and (what Polus could not do) with arguments of logical sequence. Socrates is able to defeat him only by contrasting with the false view the better and true one, and supporting the latter by all the means of positive dialectic at his command. Of course Callicles' point of view does not permit him to acknowledge his defeat by dialectic; for he despises its methods from the outset, believes that he has advanced far beyond it, and professes to find the position occupied by Socrates one which has been long abandoned by thinking men. He is complete in himself, and entirely self-sufficient, and therefore becomes annoyed that Socrates should wish to awaken him out of his security or abase his self-confidence. This is the reason that he continually (482 c, 491 a, 499 b) speaks as if he were vastly beyond Socrates; that he makes really unreasonable objections to Socrates' method of argument (497 a, 511 a); that in his irritation he tries to withdraw from the discussion, or declares that he continues it only out of courtesy (501 c, 505 c, 510 a, 516 b); and that while he finally (513 c) admits the correctness of Socrates' teachings, he refuses to accept it for himself. With this, at the same time, the personal good will which he expresses (486 a) for Socrates agrees. But this is due really to his courteous disposition or to circumstances, rather than to genuine respect and appreciation. How much it is worth, is clearly shown by what Socrates says in 487 c.

- 16 On Socrates' side we find Chaerephon. Xenophon (*Mem.* I. 2. 48) numbers him among those friends of Socrates who in their intercourse with him had none but the purest motives and designs. In his nature there was something enthusiastic, even flighty, and this caused the surname *μανικός* to be applied to him as well as to Apollodorus.²⁸ In *Apol.* 21 a Socrates himself relates the story

²⁸ *Charm.* 153 b Χαίρεφών δέ, ἄτε καὶ μανικὸς ὢν, ἀναπηδήσας ἐκ μέσων ἔθει πρὸς με. For the application of the name to Apollodorus, cf. *Sym.* 173 d,

where, in a description of his character, we find these words, καὶ ὁπόθεν ποτὲ ταύτην τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔλαβες τὸ μανικὸς καλεῖσθαι, οὐκ οἶδα ἔγωγε.

that Chaerephon had the boldness to demand of the oracle at Delphi whether any man were wiser than Socrates. In the same passage, it is mentioned that he was among those banished under the government of the Thirty. Soon after his return he died, not living to see the trial of his master. He is made an object of ridicule by Aristophanes,²⁹ along with Socrates, inasmuch as he was looked upon as his master's model pupil. Hence it is fitting that he should appear here with Socrates. He is, even though he has only an unimportant part to play, the representative of Socrates' followers and friends, and thus far serves to offset Polus. He understands the Socratic method and knows how to employ it skilfully, while Polus was but a clumsy imitator of the external features of his master's style. Hence while Polus places himself if not above his master, at least on an equal plane, Chaerephon shows throughout a heart-felt love and subordination to Socrates.

B. Place.

As regards the place³⁰ where we are to assume that this dialogue took place, Plato does not give us any such definite information as he does in other dialogues, for example, in the *Crito*, *Phaedo*, or *Protagoras*. Only certain expressions in the introductory conversation between Callicles, Socrates, and Chaerephon show clearly the negative fact, that we are not to look upon the house of Callicles as the scene of the *Gorgias*. This follows first of all from the words of Callicles in which he invites Socrates and Chaerephon to come to his house to listen to a lecture similar to the one which Gorgias has just held. Since, however, the preceding words of Socrates and Chaerephon show that they have come to the spot where the festal exhibition has just taken place, and that the lecture promised by Callicles can only be intended for some later time, and is so understood and courteously put aside by Socrates, and since, on the other hand,

²⁹ *Ar. Nub.* 104, 503 *et al.*

³⁰ The view advocated here by Cron is discussed at great length in the *Beiträge*, pp. 25-36. The view formerly received is that the dialogue was held in the house of Callicles.

Schleiermacher was the first to oppose this, and he was followed by Woolsey, Cron, and later by Kratz. In addition to the German critics, the house of Callicles is assumed also by Thompson (?) and Cope.

the discussion is immediately opened in the name of Socrates by Chaerephon, without any intimation of a pause or change of place, which would hardly be consistent with the simple setting of the dialogue, therefore it follows of necessity that the whole discussion takes place in the very spot where Gorgias had just held his splendid harangue. But since the house of Callicles, where Gorgias is staying as a guest, cannot be the scene of this harangue, we must lay aside any idea of a private dwelling, such as is the scene of the *Protagoras*, and imagine the scene of the *Gorgias* to be, perhaps, one of the gymnasiums so often mentioned in Plato's writings, which owing to its size and arrangement, was well adapted for such exhibitions before a large number of hearers, with the view of drawing pupils. Other persons, beside those already named, must also have been present at this discussion as silent listeners, as we can assume from several passages;³¹ and the use of *θόρυβος* in 458 c seems to indicate that their number was considerable.

C. Time.

- 18 The time³² at which the dialogue is to be conceived as taking place must be determined by the different allusions which occur in the course of it. These unfortunately refer to events so various that their dates mutually exclude each other; and the author seems to have allowed himself almost a poet's license. We must, therefore, from all these different allusions, try to select that especial circumstance which would be likely to have made the deepest impression upon the minds of contemporaries; and having decided upon this, we have a good basis from which to assume a date for the dialogue. The most important event alluded to is the death of Pericles (503 c), which compels us in any case to assume a time different from that which the mention in the *Protagoras* of Pericles and his sons as living, causes us to assume for

³¹ 447 c, 455 c, 458 c, 473 e, 490 e. See note on 455 c.

³² A complete discussion of the various views regarding the supposed date of the *Gorgias* is given in Cron's *Beiträge*, pp. 35-47. Since that time

(1870) there has been but little discussion. Hirschig (1873) does not agree with Cron, — nay, does not even mention his view; Thompson (1871) and Schmelzer (1883) do not touch the question.

that dialogue. At first sight the addition of the adverb *νεωστί*, "lately," seems to go far towards fixing the date, but the indefiniteness of *νεωστί* (see the note) and its entirely relative meaning forbid us to trust to it as a backward limit of time. The fact that Gorgias came from Leontini to Athens as ambassador in 427, Ol. 88. 1, also gives us no certain help, for we have no reason to suppose that he was only *once* at Athens—rather the contrary—and in the passage there is no definite allusion to that especial period. Still, the assumption that we have to imagine the period of this apparently first acquaintanceship of the Athenians with Gorgias as the time of our dialogue, would harmonize well enough with the above-mentioned allusion to Pericles's death, and also with the circumstance, that in 472 a, Nicias and Aristocrates are referred to as living, of whom we know that the former perished in the expedition against Syracuse, and the latter was one of the condemned³³ after the battle of Arginusae. This allusion prevents us from setting the date of the dialogue later than 413, and at the same time weakens the value of the otherwise especially noteworthy passage in 473 e, where Socrates speaks of his unskilfulness in political matters as shown by his conduct in the assembly. The mention of his office as senator and the duty of *ἐπιψηφίζων* reminds us strikingly of the chronologically exact account of this same occurrence in the *Apology*. But Plato has avoided an express reference to the historical event mentioned there, perhaps designedly, in order not to give any too definite chronological background to his story. Hence we may possibly, if not probably, consider that he is alluding to some other event than the celebrated trial of the impeached generals, and need not be compelled to hold to the year 405 as the supposed time of our dialogue. The citations from the *Antiope* of Euripides, which was brought out in 410, need not cause us any trouble either, since it is just in such matters that Plato allows himself the greatest liberties, as is shown by the celebrated anachronism in the *Protagoras*, the mention of the *Ἄγριοι* of Pherecrates.³⁴

³³ *Apol.* 32 b.

³⁴ This play was brought out in 420, while the supposed time of the

Protagoras is put at 432 or 433 by most editors. See Towle-Sauppe's *Introd.* pp. 6 f.

- 19 The important references seem therefore to point to a period of time included between the years 427 and 413.³⁵ Other allusions to circumstances and events also agree with this assumption. Thus in 481 *a*, Alcibiades, who was born in 450, and Demus, son of Pyrilampes, are contrasted, — the former as the sweetheart of Socrates, the latter as that of Callicles. Again, in 519 *a*, there is an allusion to the political activity of Alcibiades. Finally in 470 *a* we find a reference to Archelaus, who seized the kingdom of Macedon in 414, as a ruler who was now at the height of his fortune, the admiration and envy of the world. To fix the date more definitely within this period seems to be a matter of impossibility. If we assume it to be nearer to 413, we do not attach so much weight to the reference to the death of Pericles as it apparently deserves. If from other grounds we desire to keep the year 427 for the visit of Gorgias to Athens which we are now discussing, the reference to Archelaus adds another anachronism to the one already mentioned of the *Antiope* of Euripides. Such an anachronism, it is true, would not be more strange than the well-known one in the *Symposion*, where the violence shown the Mantineans by Sparta, fifteen years after the death of Socrates, is mentioned at a banquet, at which Socrates is represented as being a guest; but the rise of the kingdom of Macedon could not but have a very important bearing on the politics of Greece, and it is likely that the Athenians regarded, even at this early day, the intrusion of a new force into the political arena as more momentous than even the death of Pericles. This reference would then be a clear indication for the time when the star of the Macedonian king was already in the ascendant.
- 20 Certain other references to persons and facts are also found, such as the mention of the painters Polygnotus and Zeuxis in 448 *b*, 453 *c*, and of the dithyrambic poet Cinesias in 501 *e*, but these are not definite enough to be exactly dated, and therefore need not be taken into consideration in the present question.

³⁵ Zeller, in an article *Über die Anachronismen in den Platonischen Gesprächen* (*Abhandlungen der Berliner Akademie*, 1873), places the assumed date before 420, and Susseihl seems

now (*Bursian's Jahresbericht*, i. 5) to hold the same view. Cf. his *Kleine Beiträge zur Literaturgeschichte in Fleckeisen's J. J.* cxv. pp. 793 ff., and *Bursian's Jahresbericht*, xix. p. 144.

5. PLAN OF THE DIALOGUE.³⁶

The plan of the dialogue would depend of course on the object 21 which the author had in mind. The third section of this Introduction has already shown that that object was to make clear and emphasize the opposition from the moral point of view between Rhetoric, as the generally recognized medium of political activity and ambition, and Philosophy, the true calling and aim of a man's life, as claimed by Socrates. This contrast is, however, not made prominent at once, but is the subject of the discussion with Callicles, which must therefore be considered as the most important part of the dialogue. This is preceded by the conversation of Socrates with Gorgias and Polus, which although it is divided between the two persons, is still shown clearly to be practically a single discussion. For not only are the discussions with these two persons outwardly united by the forwardness of Polus, whose pushing egotism is only equalled by his dialectical incapacity, but they betray also an internal connexion in their subject-matter, inasmuch as they both treat the question as to the nature and value of rhetoric, and both likewise are marked by vagueness of idea and uncertainty of moral feeling in the answers given it. This vagueness and uncertainty is in striking contrast to the reckless decision with which Callicles announces and defends his principles, — a contrast, too, which must be the more mortifying to Gorgias and Polus, since they, as theorists and teachers, are opposed to the mere practical statesman, who, however, of himself more than overbalances both the others together. In like manner, the discussion with Callicles, as its subject is more important, has a much wider compass than both the preceding together. A certain parallelism with the previous double discussion is also very apparent, in the fact that the discussion with Callicles is broken nearly in the middle by the

³⁶ Bonitz (*Platonische Studien*, Wien, 1858, i. p. 33) well says: "It can hardly be doubted any longer that the substance and object of the whole dialogue is given in the question, 'Is

Philosophy in the Platonic sense, or is political Rhetoric, in the condition in which it at that time actually was, a worthy calling for life?' " See Cron, *Beiträge*, 47-85.

interruption caused by Callicles' refusal to take part further in the discussion; owing to which refusal and because no one else is willing to enter the lists,⁸⁷ Socrates is compelled to answer his own questions in Callicles' place, until he succeeds in drawing him again into the conversation. With this section the dialectical development reaches its highest point; now begins that change (*μετάβασις*) which in the poetical drama is denoted by the term *περιπέτεια*, — the catastrophe; for up to this point the opponents of Socrates' view of life and its duties, in the case both of the individual in private and of the public aggregations of individuals into a state, have been continually increasing their efforts, partly owing to the growing heat of argument, partly also because they have had to call all their resources to their aid; now, however, a relaxation takes place — they have failed in the opposition — and it only remains for Socrates to expound more fully the theory which he has defended so successfully. Very effectively as far as the chief object of the dialogue is concerned, and also with admirable artistic feeling, the author makes Socrates begin this final section with a resumé of the results obtained in the conversation with Callicles. But inasmuch as the latter, in accordance with his deeply rooted manner of thinking and living, even at the last moment obstinately clings to his view of what the true man ought to do, Socrates finds it necessary to show the universal and eternal application of his theory, the inevitable and decisive victory of truth over error, in an independent section. In striking contrast with the dialectical sharpness and accuracy of the previous discussions, this conclusion appears couched in the guise of a mythical story. There is, however, a special fitness in this, for its religious coloring causes the whole exposition to appeal with convincing power to the feelings of the reader, and goes far to prepare him for the earnest and solemn warning with which the dialogue closes. This conclusion, short in compass, in contents and form intensely oratorical, serves also to preserve the due artistic proportions of the work; for it corresponds to the short introductory conversation between Callicles, Socrates, and

⁸⁷ 505 d ζη. τίς οὖν ἄλλος ἐθέλει; sc. ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι.

Chaerephon. And just as this introduction, through the medium of the question which Chaerephon propounds to Gorgias, and which Polus presses forward to answer, leads naturally and gradually to the progressively developing scientific discussion,—so this discussion through the medium of this mythologically colored λόγος is led over to the concluding exhortation in which we, whose eyes are opened, can see clearly the power and warmth of deep moral conviction.

Simple as is the setting of the *Gorgias*, it yet belongs among the greatest, from the point of view of artistic perfection, of the dialogues of Plato.³⁸ For, aside from the absorbing interest of the question discussed, one can hardly fail to notice as he reads, both in the choice and characterization of persons (ἦθος), and also in the progressive development of the discussion, how completely all the requirements of art are satisfied, thus making the *Gorgias* as a prose work fit to challenge comparison with any of the works of the poetical drama.

6. SUMMARY OF THE DIALOGUE.³⁹

Introduction. Preliminary conversation on the scene of Gorgias' 22 just concluded speech. Socrates desires to have some conversation with Gorgias. Callicles invites him to his house for the purpose. Socrates bids Chaerephon ask Gorgias what he professes to be.

³⁸ In the *Introd. to Apol.* § 52, Dyer-Cron divides the dialogues of Plato into three classes, according to their setting: (1) the simplest form, which 'has no introduction or preamble, but is a dialogue, with occasional interruptions from interested bystanders, in which one of the parts is taken throughout by the same speaker, usually Socrates, while the other may be successively assumed by various persons.' Then the narrated dialogues: (2) those 'without preface, and with no account of the persons to whom

the narrative or reading is made, or (3) those introduced by a short dialogue between the narrator and his friends, who soon become his attentive listeners.' Typical examples are *Gorgias*, *Republic*, and *Phaedo*.

³⁹ This summary, which is not found in Cron's edition, is drawn from Deuschle's *Dispositionen der Apologie und des Gorgias von Platon* (2d ed. by Cron, Leipzig, 1867), and adapted to the short skeleton of the dialogue which is given by Cron in his *Beiträge* (Leipzig, 1870), pp. 73 ff.

Discussion. 447 d-527 a.

- I. 447 d-481 b. Dialogue between Socrates and Gorgias and Polus. What is Rhetoric, and what is its power?

Introduction. 447 d-448 d. Chaerephon puts the question to Gorgias. Polus pushes forward and attempts to answer the question, of what art Gorgias is master, by praising the art.

- A. 448 d-461 c. Dialogue between Socrates and Gorgias. Attempt to define the nature of Rhetoric and its relation to moral principles, — with self-contradictory results.

Introduction. 448 d-449 d. Socrates shows the error into which Polus has fallen. Definition of his art, Rhetoric, by Gorgias. Socrates insists upon a discussion according to dialectical methods.

1. 449 d-457 c. Attempt to obtain a definition of Rhetoric.

a. 449 d-453 a. Determination of the specific class to which Rhetoric must be assigned.

a. 449 d-451 a. First attempt at definition. But the characteristic is too general and only external.

β. 451 a-453 a. Second attempt at definition. Rhetoric (with its varieties) is classed under the specific idea *πειθώ*.

- b. 453 a-457 c. An examination of the definition just obtained.

a. 453 a-455 a. Its meaning.

aa. up to 454 c. Determination of the object to which the *πειθώ* is directed, — right and wrong.

ββ. up to 455 a. Determination of the nature of the *πειθώ*, — pretence without knowledge.

β. 455 b-457 c. Its compass.

aa. up to 456 c. Indefinite extension of the field of Rhetoric.

ββ. up to 457 c. Admission of the possibility of a misuse of the power Rhetoric gives.

2. 457 c-461 c. Proof of the contradiction between Gorgias' conception and presentation.

Transition. 457 c-458 e. Question as to the continuation of the discussion.

- a. 458 e–460 d. A definite statement of Gorgias' view.
 - a. up to 459 c. In general, the orator need have no knowledge of the matters on which he speaks.
 - β. up to 460 d. In the special case of right, however, he must be able as well as desirous to know it.
(This involves an inner contradiction.)
- b. 460 d–461 c. Proof of the (external) contradiction between this definitely stated view and the admission made above of the possibility of a misuse of Rhetoric.
- B. 461 c–481 c. Dialogue between Socrates and Polus. Value of Rhetoric according to the standard of moral principle.

Transition. 461 c–462 b. Polus objects to Socrates' method. Socrates exacts a condition in regard to the manner of conducting the discussion.

 - 1. 462 b–468 e. Exposition of the real nature, and little value of Rhetoric (in general).
 - a. 462 b–466 a. The real nature of Rhetoric.
 - a. 462 b–463 d. Vain attempt of Polus to lead the discussion by propounding the questions himself. General characterization of Rhetoric.
 - β. 463 e–466 a. Complete presentation and exposition of Socrates' view of the nature of Rhetoric.
 - b. 466 a–468 e. From this determination of the nature of Rhetoric is deduced the result that it is of little value.
 - a. 466 a–467 c. Polus questions unskilfully. Socrates declares as a consequence of the definition the entire weakness of Rhetoric.
 - β. 467 c–468 e. Socrates takes control of the discussion and proves this consequence from the difference between βούλεσθαι and δοκείν.
 - 2. 468 e–479 e. Declaration of the moral principles which serve as the standard for this judgment.

Transition. 468 e–470 c. A discussion in which the meaning of Polus is formulated (by a limitation) in opposition to the principle enumerated by Socrates.

 - a. 470 c–474 a. Negative portion. Vain attempt of Polus to combat the moral principles of Socrates.

- a. 470 c–472 d. Vain attempt of Polus to refute the proposition, ‘If any one do wrong, he is not happy.’ — Criticism of the argument by Socrates.
 - β. 472 d–474 a. Vain attempt of Polus to refute the proposition, ‘He who suffers punishment for a wrong committed is happier than he who escapes such punishment.’ — Criticism of the argument by Socrates.
 - b. 474 b–479 e. Positive portion. Socrates brings forward his proofs.
 - a. 474 b–475 e. Proof of the proposition, ‘Doing wrong is a greater evil than suffering wrong.’
 - β. 476 a–479 e. Proof of the proposition, ‘To remain without punishment for a wrong committed is the greatest possible evil.’
- Conclusion. 480 a–481 b. Results in regard to the employment of Rhetoric
- a. For protection of one’s self or one’s friends.
 - β. For the injury of one’s enemies.
- 23 II. 481 b–522 e. Dialogue between Socrates and Callicles. What is the true theory in life, — the rhetorical-political or the philosophical-ethical?
- Introduction. 481 b–482 c. Callicles recognizes that the ethical theory of life advocated by Socrates and the ordinary practice of men are diametrically opposed. Socrates shows that all human effort should be the outcome of a harmony of the soul in thought and action.
- A. 482 c–505 c. Negative portion. Exposition and reputation of the rhetorical-political theory of life (Attack and Defence).
 - 1. 482 c–495 a. Exposition of the rhetorical-political theory of life.
 - a. 482 c–486 d. General exposition. Commendation of the political, rejection of the philosophical calling.
(Rhetorical part.)
- Introduction. 482 c–e. Criticism of the manner of procedure which Socrates has followed towards Polus and Gorgias.

a. 482 e-484 c. Opposition between natural right and legal right.

aa. up to 483 c. Explanation of the nature of both and of the origin of the latter.

ββ. up to 484 c. Alleged proofs of the right of the stronger, drawn from history and from Pindar.

β. 484 c-485 e. Opposition between political and philosophical activity.

aa. up to 485 a. Objections to the latter.

ββ. up to 485 e. Its usefulness is limited to a preparation for political activity.

Conclusion. 485 e-486 d. Recommendation of the rhetorical-political activity for Socrates, on the ground of the danger which threatens him.

Transition. 486 d-488 b. Socrates shows the importance of the question under discussion and the conditions which allow the hope of a satisfactory result.

b. 488 b-495 a. Exposition of the view of Callicles from the point of view of its leading principle in a dialectical discussion.

a. 488 b-491 b. (Preparatory portion.) Test of the proposition as to the right of the stronger.

aa. up to 489 b. First limitation of the stronger, to that which is more powerful in bodily strength or greater in mass.

ββ. up to 491 b. Second limitation to that which is more clever.

β. 491 b-495 a. Disclosure of the fundamental principle of the theory of Callicles.

aa. 491 c-492 d. In general. The essence of happiness and the end of human effort is the satisfaction of the desires, however great they may be.

ββ. 492 d-495 a. In particular. Passion of itself without limitation, or the pleasant, is the good.

2. 495 a-505 c. Refutation of the theory of Callicles as shown in its fundamental principle.

a. 495 a-499 b. Refutation of the theory that pleasure is the chief end of man. Arguments against the identity of the pleasant and the good.

a. 495 a-497 d. Direct proof.

β. 497 d-499 b. Indirect proof.

Transition. Acknowledgment that only a part of man's desires are good, the other part being evil.

b. 499 b-505 c. Deduction of the immediate consequences of that principle.

a. 499 b-501 d. Determination of a general antithesis, to serve

aa. up to 500 d. As a standard of judgment in regard to human actions.

ββ. up to 501 d. As a means of determining the principles which underlie human occupations.

β. 501 d-505 c. Application of it to special occupations.

aa. up to 502 d. To the varieties of music and poetry.

ββ. up to 505 c. To Rhetoric in particular. The standard of judgment for the actions of the statesman.

B. 505 c-522 e. Dialectical exposition of the philosophical-ethical theory of life, as opposed to the rhetorical-political.

1. 505 c-513 c. This theory must determine the life of the individual. Ethics *per se*.

a. 505 c-508 c. Positive arguments to show that this theory must determine the life of the individual.

a. up to 507 c. The teaching of virtue for its own sake.

β. up to 508 c. The teaching of virtue in relation to the attainment of happiness.

b. 508 c-513 c. Negative justification. Refutation of the objection that life according to philosophical principles must make a man incapable of helping himself.

a. up to 511 a. Determination of what true self-help is: Defence against wrong doing, not wrong suffering.

β. up to 513 c. Refutation of the idea which lies at the basis of this objection, viz. that under any circumstances a man should try to live as long as he can.

2. 513 c-521 a. Application of the ethical principle to Politics.

a. 513 c-517 a. Empirical determination of the business of the statesman

a. 513 c-515 c. By establishing the preliminary conditions which must be fulfilled.

β. 515 c-517 a. By a criticism of the most celebrated Athenian statesmen, from the point of view of their skill as displayed in the results of their efforts.

b. 517 a-521 a. Logical confirmation of this judgment

a. 517 a-519 b. By a distinction between the true art of statesmanship and that which is only time-serving (pretended).

β. 519 b-521 a. By the demonstration of the necessary connexion which exists between the statesman's course of action, and the behavior of the citizens toward him. Analogy between Rhetoric and Sophistic.

Conclusion and transition, 521 a-522 e. Choice between the two kinds of statesmanship. Callicles commends the time-serving or flattering art with regard unto the danger of death which would otherwise threaten. Socrates declares himself as one who under existing circumstances intends, as far as possible, to practise the true statecraft in spite of the danger of death which threatens.

III. 523 a-527 a. Epilogue. Mythical exposition of the object, 24 after death, to which the efforts of a man should be directed in life.

A. 523 a-524 b. Myth of the origin of the judgment of the souls of the dead, and how this is conducted.

B. 524 b-527 a. Results.

a. up to 525 b. The nature of death and the form in which the soul appears after death.

b. up to 527 a. The condition of the soul after death, under a system of rewards and punishments, in accordance with each man's life in this world.

Conclusion. Recapitulation of the leading contents of the dialogue, and exhortation of Callicles.

7. TIME OF COMPOSITION OF THE DIALOGUE.

25 This must of course be distinguished from the time assumed for the meeting of Socrates, Gorgias, and Callicles (§§ 18 ff.). Hence to determine it, the very anachronisms which offer so much difficulty in determining the assumed time are often of great value. This is not so much the case, however, in the *Gorgias* as in some other dialogues, since, leaving out of account the anachronisms, no ground exists for assuming the date of composition to be before 405. Nay, rather, the subject and whole tone of the work, as shown in the many passages which must strike every reader as plain allusions to the fate of Socrates as an already accomplished fact, compel the assumption of some time subsequent to this tragic event. But that it was written not very long after Socrates' death is shown by the evident traces of moral indignation in the references to the existing government and the actions of prominent statesmen. This assumption would fix the date as shortly after the composition of the *Apology* and *Crito*.⁴⁰ This is supported, though one could hardly say confirmed, by the statement of Athenaeus, that Gorgias was still living when this dialogue was brought out.⁴¹

⁴⁰ This is the view generally adopted. The majority of the editors are content to give this period, rather than a definite date. Thompson puts it at 395, and Cope in the period between 395-388. The most recent treatment of the question is by S. Sudhaus in *Rhein. Mus.* xliv. pp. 54-63, who thinks that the *Gorgias* is

directed against Isocrates, who is represented by Callicles, and is a kind of reply to the *Πρὸς Νικοκλέα* (377 B.C.). Isocrates, on this view, defends himself against the strictures of the *Gorgias* in the *Νικοκλής* (375 B.C.). Hence the date of the composition of the *Gorgias* must be 376.

⁴¹ Athenaeus xi. 113 (505 d).

ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΚΑΛΛΙΚΛΗΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΧΑΙΡΕΦΩΝ, ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ,
ΠΩΛΟΣ.

Stephens I. p. 447.

Ι. ΚΑΛΛΙΚΛΗΣ. Πολέμου καὶ μάχης φασὶ χρῆναι, ὦ Σώ-
κρατες, οὕτω μεταλαγχάνειν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄλλ' ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον κατόπιν ἐορτῆς ἤκομεν
καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν ;

5 ΚΑΛ. Καὶ μάλα γε ἀστείας ἐορτῆς. πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ
καλὰ Γοργίας ἡμῖν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐπεδείξατο.

447 I. 1. **πολέμου καὶ μάχης**: Socrates
a and Chaerephon come just after Gor-
gias has finished his lecture. Calli-
cles receives them with a jest, the
point of which lies in the οὕτω. In
the double expression, the more gen-
eral precedes, as is natural, the more
definite. — **μεταλαγχάνειν**: occurs also
in *Rep.* 429 a with ἐπιστήμης, and *Leg.*
873 c with ἀσχύνης. It is rare.

3. **τὸ λεγόμενον**: in appos. with
the sentence. See G. 137, 3; H.
626 b. — **κατόπιν ἐορτῆς**: proverbial,
like post festum. This would call
up to the Greek mind their public ex-
hibitions, and the banquets with which
they closed. Here is probably also
an allusion to the extravagant enthu-
siasm which led the Athenians to
designate as festivals those days on

which Gorgias lectured. See *Introd.* 447
§ 4 fin. a

5. **καὶ μάλα γ' ἀστείας**: Hirschig
remarks the frequency of such an-
swers as these, which avoid the repe-
tition of the last word of the preced-
ing question. Cf. *Theaet.* 168 e ἀλλ'
οὐ τοι σοῦ γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἔμεινον, *Crat.*
391 b. — **ἀστείας**: properly *belonging to*
a city. It became an adj. of quality
inasmuch as city festivals and cele-
brations are naturally superior to
those of the country. It is used here
in a good sense, though it may also
mean "cited."

6. **ἐπεδείξατο**: the aor. is necessi-
tated by the time-limit (ὀλίγον πρό-
τερον). — **ὀλίγον πρότερον**: the first
word is an acc. of extent; the second
is adverbial.

Ση. Τούτων μέντοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, αἴτιος Χαιρεφῶν ὄδε,
ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἀναγκάσας ἡμᾶς διατρίψαι.

ΧΑΙΡΕΦΩΝ. Οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ
10 ἰάσομαι. φίλος γάρ μοι Γοργίας, ὥστ' ἐπιδείξεται ἡμῶν,
εἰ μὲν δοκεῖ, νῦν, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, εἰσαυθίς.

ΚΑΛ. Τί δέ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν; ἐπιθυμῇ Σωκράτης ἀκούσαι
Γοργίου;

ΧΑΙ. Ἐπ' αὐτό γέ τοι τοῦτο πάρεσμεν.

15 ΚΑΛ. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν βούλησθε παρ' ἐμὲ ἦκειν οἴκαδε,
παρ' ἐμοὶ γὰρ Γοργίας καταλύει, καὶ ἐπιδείξεται ὑμῶν.

447 7. **τούτων**: the pl. refers to the
a fact and its consequences. — **ὄδε**: is
deictic. — **ἐν ἀγορᾷ**: the omission of
the art. shows that this was a phrase
like 'in town,' 'on change.' By this
time, *ἀγορά* had come in Athens to
mean simply the exchange, or market-
place, where people assembled not for
public debate (that was in the *Pnyx*),
but for business. It was a favorite
resort of Socrates, since there the
concourse of people offered him the
best opportunity for prosecuting his
god-given vocation (cf. *Introd.* to
Apol. § 25, and *Apol.* 33 a ff.). Cf.
Xen. Mem. i. 1. 10 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκείνός
γε ἀεὶ μὲν ἦν ἐν τῇ φανερῇ· πρῶτ' τε
γὰρ εἰς τοὺς περιπάτους καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια
ἦεν καὶ πληθούσης ἀγορᾶς ἐκεῖ φανερός
ἦν, κτέ. — **ἀναγκάσας**: the literal
meaning is not to be pressed. Chaere-
phon as the constant companion of
Socrates took the liveliest interest in
all his actions.

b 9. **οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα**: shows the asyn-
deton of ordinary conversation. —
ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἰάσομαι: prob. contains
some allusion to the story of Tele-
phus, who when wounded by Achilles
received from the oracle the assur-
ance δ τρώσας (καὶ) ἰάσεται. The

myth was made the subject of a noted 447
tragedy by Euripides. b

10. **ὥστε ἐπιδείξεται**: *ὥστε*, when com-
bined with the ind., can for all prac-
tical purposes be treated as if it were
compounded of *οὕτως* and *τέ*. Cf. Lat.
itaque. See on 458 d. — **ἐπιδείξεται**:
here used absolutely in the same sense
as above. The fut. has two sides, one
corresponding to each condition; thus
it is equiv. to (1) *ἐθέλει ἐπιδείκνυσθαι εἰ
δοκεῖ*, and (2) *ἐπιδείξεται ἐὰν βούλῃ*. Cf.
a different case in 502 b, with note.

12. **τί δέ**: the question shows that
Chaerephon had not anticipated any
great eagerness on Socrates' part.

14. **ἐπ' αὐτό**: the pronoun is em-
phatic. See on 458 a. The empha-
sis is heightened by *γέ*.

15. **ὅταν βούλησθε κτέ.**: contains
an invitation, the basis of which is
given by the clause with *γάρ*. The
original conclusion of the condition
was to be *ἐπιδείξεται*, but in the course
of the *γάρ* clause the speaker lost
sight of this and continued with the
co-ordinate construction. — **παρ' ἐμὲ
ἦκειν οἴκαδε**: this shows that the
speakers are neither in nor before
the house of Callicles. On the place
of meeting, see *Introd.* § 17.

Σο. Εὖ λέγεις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις. ἀλλ' ἄρα ἐθελήσειεν ἂν ἡμῖν διαλεχθῆναι; βούλομαι γὰρ πυθέσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ, τίς ἢ δύναμις τῆς τέχνης τοῦ ἀνδρός, καὶ τί ἐστὶν ὃ ἐπαγ- 20 γέλλεταιί τε καὶ διδάσκει· τὴν δὲ ἄλλην ἐπίδειξιν εἰσαυθίς, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ποιησάσθω.

| Καλ. Οὐδέν οἶον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐν τούτῳ ἦν τῆς ἐπιδείξεως· ἐκέλευε γοῦν νυνδὴ ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι τις βούλοιο τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων, καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα 25 ἔφη ἀποκρινεῖσθαι.

Σο. Ἡ καλῶς λέγεις. ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐροῦ αὐτόν.

447 17. ἐθελήσειεν ἂν: Socrates uses the ^c opt. with ἂν a great deal, esp. when he first meets a person. It is the mood of courtesy, but not of argument. In this dialogue the opt. preponderates at the beginning, but the subjv. overtakes it in the argumentative passage 471, 472; while in the whole dialogue the proportion of subjv. to opt. is 3 to 2.

18. διαλεχθῆναι: emphasized in order to contrast Socrates' method with the ἐπίδειξις of Gorgias.

19. δύναμις (vis): i.e. the power and inner meaning of the art, with which the ἐπάγγελμα should correspond,—the scope or compass.—ἐπαγγέλλεται κτέ.: cf. *Apol.* 33 b ὡν μήτε ὑπεσχόμεν μᾶθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξα. ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι is the regular word in Greek for 'advertise,' 'profess.'

20. τὴν δὲ ἄλλην ἐπίδειξιν: it does not follow from this that Socrates considered the διαλεχθῆναι as a kind of ἐπίδειξις. It is only an example of the idiomatic Greek usage of ἄλλος, which does not include but excludes the word with which it is connected. Cf. 473 c πολιτῶν καὶ ἄλλων ξένων, *Apol.* 36 b. See G. 142, 2, n. 3; H. 705. We must use a circumlocution,

or another word, in English. In Cal. 447 licles' answer, however, the attributive force is regained.

21. ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις: const. closely with εἰσαυθίς, as referring to the invitation of Callicles to come to his home.

22. οὐδέν οἶον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν: there is nothing like asking the man himself. The articular infinitive is a favorite with Plato. He uses it most commonly in the acc. The nom. comes next in frequency, with the gen. a close third. The dat. is much less frequent. The pr. tense occurs nine times oftener than the aor., showing a great advance on Pindar. See *Am. Jour. Phil.* III. 193–201.

23. αὐτῷ: on account of its meaning ("the master," Kr. 51. 5, 4; H. 681 c) is placed in this emphatic position. On the matter itself see *Introd.* § 7, and the passage from *Meno* quoted *Introd.* n. 12. Auditors are present also at the following dialogue (cf. *Introd.* § 17 fin.).—ἐκέλευε: imperf., because the same bidding or invitation was given to the different members of the group. *He bade us all.*

26. καλῶς λέγεις: expresses more satisfaction than εὖ λέγεις just before.

ΧΑΙ. Τί ἔρωμαι;

ΣΩ. Ὅστις ἐστίν.

ΧΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις;

- 30 ΣΩ. Ὡςπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανεν ἂν ὑποδημάτων δημιουργός, ἀπεκρίνατο ἂν δήπου σοι ὅτι σκυτοτόμος· ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὡς λέγω;

II. ΧΑΙ. Μανθάνω καὶ ἐρήσομαι. Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Γοργία, ἀληθῆ λέγει Καλλικλῆς ὅδε, ὅτι ἐπαγγέλλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅτι ἂν τίς σε ἐρωτᾷ;

ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ. Ἀληθῆ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν· καὶ γὰρ νυνδὴ αὐτὰ 448
ἐ ταῦτα ἐπηγγελλόμεν, καὶ λέγω ὅτι οὐδεὶς μέ πω ἡρώτηκε
| καινὸν οὐδὲν πολλῶν ἐτῶν.

) ΧΑΙ. Ἡ που ἄρα ῥαδίως ἀποκρινεῖ, ὦ Γοργία.

ΓΟΡ. Πάρεστι τούτου πείραν, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, λαμβάνειν.

ΠΛΑΟΣ. Νῆ Δία· ἂν δέ γε βούλῃ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐμοῦ.

447 27. τί ἔρωμαι: deliberative subjunctive.

28. ὅστις ἐστίν: ὅστις is regularly used to ask the question 'who' after a neg. (cf. 524 e, 526 b); but in all cases it may be used to express the idea of quality. See on 453 b.

30. ὥςπερ ἂν . . . ἀπεκρίνατο ἂν: ὥςπερ ἂν εἰ is phraseological, and the second ἂν comes in unconsciously with the conditional apodosis. The use of the aor. with ἂν in the apodosis, following an imperf. with εἰ in the protasis, where both refer to the same sphere of time, is not uncommon. In Plato, according to GMT. 414, it appears to be confined to such phrases as εἶπον ἂν, ἀπεκρινάμην ἂν. But similar constructions with other verbs are found in Dem., Aristoph., Soph., Eur., Xen., etc. Cf. Dem. xix. 162, Ar. Eq. 507.—δημιουργός: see on 452 a.

II. 1. μανθάνω: one example suffices 447
to make the idea of Socrates clear to
Chaerephon; two are not enough for
Polus. This is, however, due to the
fact that Chaerephon is familiar with
Socrates' methods, while they are
new and strange to Polus.

2. ἀποκρίνεσθαι κτέ.: this is the
τί of Socrates' question above in c.
The tense shows that it is a general
standing announcement.

7. ἢ που ἄρα κτέ.: spoken in a 448
wondering, admiring tone which ex-
pects an answer. "Surely, then, you
must have but little difficulty in re-
plying, Gorgias." The irony lies in
(the inferential) ἄρα as well as in
ῥαδίως. On the pushing nature and
insolence of Polus, see Introd. § 14.
What is said generally in *Meno* 70 b
(see Introd. n. 12) of the pupils of
Gorgias applies excellently to him.

9. ἐμοῦ: by a very natural shift,

10 Γοργίας μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπειρηκέναι μοι δοκεῖ· πολλὰ γὰρ ἄρτι διελήλυθεν.

ΧΑΙ. Τί δέ, ὦ Πῶλε; οἶει σὺ κάλλιον ἂν Γοργίου ἀποκρίνασθαι;

ΠΩΛ. Τί δέ τοῦτο, ἐὰν σοί γε ἱκανῶς;

15 ΧΑΙ. Οὐδέν· ἄλλ' ἐπειδὴ σὺ βούλει, ἀποκρίνου.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐρώτα.

ΧΑΙ. Ἐρωτῶ δὴ. εἰ ἐτύχανε Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων ὦν τῆς τέχνης ἥσπερ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἡρόδικος, τίνα ἂν αὐτὸν ὠνομάζομεν δικαίως; οὐχ ὅπερ ἐκείνου;

20 ΠΩΛ. Πάνν γε.

ΧΑΙ. Ἰατρὸν ἄρα φάσκοντες αὐτὸν εἶναι καλῶς ἂν ἐλέγομεν.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΧΑΙ. Εἰ δέ γε ἥσπερ Ἀριστοφῶν ὁ Ἀγλαοφώντος ἢ ὁ
25 ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ἔμπειρος ἦν τέχνης, τίνα ἂν αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς ἐκαλοῦμεν;

ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον ὅτι ζωγράφον.

ΧΑΙ. Νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ τίνος τέχνης ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν, τίνα
ἂν καλοῦντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς καλοῦμεν;

30 ΠΩΛ. ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, πολλαὶ τέχναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν

448 after τοῦτον. — 'Gor. You may try the experiment if you please, Chaerephon. Pol. Yes, 'egad, and upon me too, if you like, Chaerephon.' Cope.

10. καὶ ἀπειρηκέναι: gives the ground of Polus' offer. Possibly he may also wish to intimate that Gorgias may now fairly retire, and yield the field to another.

b 14. τί δέ τοῦτο: sc. διαφέρει. "What difference does this make?" Cf. 497 e. Polus does not wish to slight his master, but only to win admiration for himself.

18. Ἡρόδικος: this brother of Gorgias (see Introd. § 4) must not be confounded with another physician of the same name who came from Selymbria (*Rep.* iii. 406 a, *Phaedr.* 227 d, *Prot.* 316 d), and was famed as the first to insist upon the value of gymnastics for health.

19. ὅπερ: after τίνα by an easy transfer to the actual idea, — 'name.'

24. Aristophon's brother was the celebrated painter Polygnotus of Thasos.

30. Polus speaks as from a book — c perhaps from his own book (462 b).

| ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως ἡρῆσθαι· ἐμπειρία μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην, ἀπειρία δὲ κατὰ τύχην. ἐκάστων δὲ τούτων μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἄλλοι | ἄλλων ἄλλως, τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων οἱ ἄριστοι· ὦν καὶ Γοργίας
35 ἐστὶν ὁδε, καὶ μετέχει τῆς καλλίστης τῶν τεχνῶν.

III. Σπ. Καλῶς γε, ὦ Γοργία, φαίνεται Πῶλος παρεσκευασθαι εἰς λόγους· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὁ ὑπέσχετο Χαιρεφῶντι οὐ ποιεῖ.

Γορ. Τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες;

5 Σπ. Τὸ ἐρωτώμενον οὐ πάνυ μοι φαίνεται ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

Γορ. Ἀλλὰ σύ, εἰ βούλει, ἐροῦ αὐτόν.

| Σπ. Οὐκ, εἰ αὐτῷ γε σοὶ βουλομένῳ ἐστὶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ ἂν ἥδιον σέ. δῆλος γάρ μοι Πῶλος

⁴⁴⁸ He overdoes the use of those figures, with which Gorgias also was accustomed to amuse himself, e.g. 'paronomasia' (κατὰ τέχνην . . . κατὰ τύχην) and other phonetic figures in regard to the names of which theorists themselves were not at one. He uses the poetic αἰῶνα instead of βίον. His statements are indefinite and cloudy, and finally he brings forward a wholly general attribute — as Socrates proves in *e* by the distinction between ποῖα and τίς — of the matter in question, instead of its name. To speak of rhetoric as καλλίστη τῶν τεχνῶν is furthermore dialectically inappropriate, although it well agrees with the artistic design by drawing attention thus early to this idea. For other examples of similar mannerisms, see the speeches which go under the name of Gorgias (e.g. in the appendix to Blass' edition of Antiphon), and which, whether genuine or not, show

admirably the peculiarities of the ⁴⁴⁸ Gorgianic school. ^c

III. 1. *παρασκευάσθαι εἰς*: equipped *d* for. The phrase is a military one; hence λόγους is almost equiv. to the later λογομαχίαν, 'disputation.' The reference is to the readiness with which Polus begins his harangue.

4. *τί μάλιστα*: how so, pray? To Gorgias' view the question has been well answered.

8 f. οὐκ . . . ἀλλά: the construction is colloquial. οὐκ is to be translated *no*! The following clause with γέ serves to give the reason for οὐκ, "that is, if." The negative color of the whole complex causes the speaker to ground his position by ἀλλὰ where one would more naturally find γάρ. It is not necessary to fill out the ellipsis with ἂν ἥδιον σέ either in Greek or English.

9. δῆλος γάρ μοι: on the personal construction, see on 449 b.

10 καὶ ἐξ ὧν εἶρηκεν, ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν μᾶλλον
μεμελέτηκεν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι. e

ΠΛ. Τί δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες;

Σ. Ὅτι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐρομένου Χαιρεφῶντος τίνος Γοργίας
ἐπιστήμων τέχνης, ἐγκωμιάζεις μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν τέχνην
15 ὥσπερ τινὸς ψέγοντος, ἥτις δέ ἐστιν οὐκ ἀπεκρίνω.

ΠΛ. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπεκρινάμην ὅτι εἷη ἡ καλλίστη;

Σ. Καὶ μάλα γε. ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς ἡρώτα ποῖα τις εἷη ἡ
Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς καὶ ὄντινα δέοι καλεῖν τὸν Γορ-
γίαν· ὥσπερ τὰ ἐμπροσθέν σοι ὑπετείνατο Χαιρεφῶν καὶ
20 αὐτῷ καλῶς καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἀπεκρίνω, καὶ νῦν οὕτως εἰπέ 448
τίς ἡ τέχνη καὶ τίνα Γοργίαν καλεῖν χρή ἡμᾶς. μᾶλλον
δέ, ὦ Γοργία, αὐτὸς ἡμῖν εἰπέ, τίνα σε χρή καλεῖν ὡς τίνος
ἐπιστήμονα τέχνης.

ΓΟΡ. Τῆς ῥητορικῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες.

25 Σ. Ῥήτορα ἄρα χρή σε καλεῖν;

ΓΟΡ. Ἀγαθόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ δὴ ὁ γε εὐχομαι εἶναι,
ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος, βούλει με καλεῖν.

Σ. Ἀλλὰ βούλομαι.

448 11. διαλέγεσθαι: the most unassum-
d ing name by which Socrates can char-
acterize his practice, so completely
the reverse of the commonly used
rhetoric. The inf. is an acc. verbal
noun.

e 15. ὥσπερ τινὸς ψέγοντος: equiv.
to ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἔψεγε.

19. ὑπετείνατο: cf. the Eng. use of
'lay down a proposition or principle'
to serve as analogy for future guid-
ance. Note the asyndeton which ap-
pears somewhat harsh, but is not
uncommon in clauses with ὥσπερ. Cf.
Aleib. I. 108 d τί οὖν τὸ κατὰ ταύτην
ὀρθῶς γινόμενον ἐστίν; ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἐγώ
σοι τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἔλεγον ὀρθῶς,

τὴν γυμναστικὴν, καὶ σὺ δὴ οὖν οὕτως 448
ἐνταῦθα τί φής; e

21. Socrates accepts tentatively 449
the statement which has been so con-
tinually advanced, that ῥητορικὴ is a
species of art, in order to proceed with
the discussion. The correctness of
this statement is brought under ques-
tion later. a

26. ἀγαθόν γε: the self-satisfaction
of Gorgias is so great that he speaks
like a Homeric hero. Note the con-
descension (perhaps unconscious) in
the following κάλει δὴ (you may call
me so, then), of which, however, So-
crates takes no notice. — εἰ δὴ: if...
really.

ΓΟΡ. Κάλει δῆ.

30 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλους σε φῶμεν δυνατόν εἶναι ποιεῖν; ὃ

ΓΟΡ. Ἐπαγγέλλομαί γε δὴ ταῦτα οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοθι.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐβελήσαιοις ἄν, ὦ Γοργία, ὥσπερ νῦν δια-
 λεγόμεθα, διατελέσαι τὸ μὲν ἐρωτῶν, τὸ δ' ἀποκρινόμενος,
 35 τὸ δὲ μῆκος τῶν λόγων τοῦτο, οἷον καὶ Πῶλος ἤρξατο, εἰς-
 αὐθις ἀποθέσθαι; . . . ἀλλ' ὅπερ ὑπισχνεῖ, μὴ ψεύσῃ; ἀλλὰ
 ἐβέλησον κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΓΟΡ. Εἰσὶν μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔναι τῶν ἀποκρίσεων
 ἀναγκαῖαι διὰ μακρῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιείσθαι· οὐ μὴν
 40 ἀλλὰ πειράσομαί γε ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων. καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ
 τοῦτο ἐν ἔστιν ὧν φημι, μηδένα ἂν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἐμοῦ τὰ
 αὐτὰ εἰπείν.

449 32. ἄλλοθι: on these travels, see

^b Introd. § 5. The vagueness of the adverb stamps the whole statement as somewhat boastful.

35. τὸ δὲ μῆκος τῶν λόγων: Socrates does not mean that the answers should be restricted to a certain length; but he wishes to exclude those answers which, instead of keeping strictly to the question under discussion, branch off and lose themselves in different trains of thought. By using καὶ before Πῶλος, Socrates gives us to understand that he fears something similar from Gorgias.

36. εἰσαυθις ἀποθέσθαι: put off till another time. — ὅπερ ὑπισχνεῖ: with reference to 447 e.

38. εἰσὶν κτέ.: though Gorgias speaks like a master, with the air of authority, he would still like to leave a way of escape open for himself, — which unfortunately his boastful ἐπάγγελμα has rendered impossible, although he had not yet distinctly promised to speak with brevity.

39. ἀναγκαῖαι . . . ποιείσθαι: the 449

personal construction proceeds from the 'prolepsis' of the subject of the inf., — a common occurrence with δίκαιος and δῆλος. The real subject of the infinitive is then ἐνίας τῶν ἀποκρίσεων. Of this construction Plato affords other examples. Cf. *Meno* 79 d ἀπόκρισιν τὴν διὰ τῶν ἐτι ζητουμένων . . . ἐπιχειροῦσαν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, *Phaedo* 92 d τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκόντων τὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιουμένοις λόγοις. In translation the adj. must be made neuter, or a circumlocution must be used. "There are certain answers in which it is necessary for one to deliver himself more at length." See H. 944 a; Rid. § 230.

40. διὰ βραχυτάτων: simply a circumlocution for the superlative adv., and accordingly const. with ὡς acc. to the usual rule. Kr. 49, 10, 1; H. 661 a. In the next sent., ἐν seems to have much the same force as διὰ here.

41. μηδένα ἂν . . . εἰπείν: the use of μή here is not to be considered as due

8 Σα. Τούτου μὴν δεῖ, ὦ Γοργία· καὶ μοι ἐπίδειξαι αὐτοῦ
 | τούτου ποιῆσαι, τῆς βραχυλογίας, μακρολογίας δὲ εἰς-
 45 αὐθις.

Γορ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω, καὶ οὐδενὸς φήσεις βραχυλογω-
 τέρου ἀκοῦσαι.

IV. Σα. Φέρε δὴ· ῥητορικῆς γὰρ φῆς ἐπιστήμων τέχ-
 νης εἶναι καὶ ποιῆσαι ἂν καὶ ἄλλον ῥήτορα· ἡ ῥητορικὴ α
 | περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει οὐσα; ὥσπερ ἡ ὑφαντικὴ περὶ
 | τὴν τῶν ἱματίων ἐργασίαν· ἥ γάρ;

5 Γορ. Ναί.

Σα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν μελῶν ποιήσιν;
 Γορ. Ναί.

Σα. Νῆ τὴν Ἥραν, ὦ Γοργία, ἄγαμαί γε τὰς ἀποκρί-
 σεις, ὅτι ἀποκρίνει ὡς οἶόν τε διὰ βραχυτάτων.

10 Γορ. Πάνυ γὰρ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιεικῶς τοῦτο
 ποιεῖν.

Σα. Εὖ λέγεις. ἴθι δὴ μοι ἀπόκριναι οὕτως καὶ περὶ
 τῆς ῥητορικῆς, περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη;

Γορ. Περὶ λόγους.

449 to indir. disc. which would require οὐ,
 c but as being in an inf. clause which
 is in apposition with εἰ.

IV. 1. ῥητορικῆς γὰρ κτέ.: γὰρ in-
 troduces the reason for the question
 which is announced in the challeng-
 ing phrase, φέρε δὴ. Hence the posi-
 tion of the causal clause.

d 3. περὶ τί: 'περὶ with acc., ordi-
 narily of action; περὶ with gen., ordi-
 narily of thought or speech; but thought
 or speech may be considered as action,
 and shifts are not uncommon.' B.L.G.
 Cf. περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς below (12).

8. νῆ τὴν Ἥραν: Socrates rarely
 uses the same oath twice in the same
 dialogue. Cf. νῆ τὸν κύνα 466 c, μὰ

τὸν— 466 e, ΔΓ 470 e, 516 d, τὸν κύνα 449
 τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν 482 b, τὸν Ζῆθον d
 489 e. See on 463 d.

9. ὅτι ἀποκρίνη: the explanatory
 clause freq. borders on the causal, as
 here.

10. πάνυ ἐπιεικῶς: fairly well. In
 this self-laudation, Gorgias has in view
 only the form of his answers without
 reference to their connexion with the
 subject-matter. He only wants to show
 that he is a master of brachylogy,
 and therefore answers in the shortest
 formulae of affirmation and negation.

13. ἐπιστήμη: not really different
 from τέχνη, inasmuch as the orator
 is ἐπιστήμων ῥητορικῆς τέχνης.

15 Σδ. Ποίους τούτους, ὦ Γοργία; ἄρα οἱ δηλοῦσι τοὺς ^e
| κάμνοντας, ὡς ἂν διαιτώμενοι ὑγιαίνειν;

Γορ. Οὐ.

| Σδ. Οὐκ ἄρα περὶ πάντας γε τοὺς λόγους ἡ ῥητορική
ἐστω.

20 Γορ. Οὐ δῆτα.

| Σδ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγειν γε ποιεῖ δυνατούς.

Γορ. Ναί.

Σδ. Οὐκοῦν περὶ ὧνπερ λέγειν, καὶ φρονεῖν;

Γορ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

25 | Σδ. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἣν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἡ ιατρικὴ περὶ τῶν ⁴⁵⁰
| καμνόντων δυνατούς εἶναι φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν;

Γορ. Ἀνάγκη.

Σδ. Καὶ ἡ ιατρικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, περὶ λόγους ἐστίν.

Γορ. Ναί.

30 | Σδ. Τοὺς γε περὶ τὰ νοσήματα;

Γορ. Μάλιστα.

Σδ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ γυμναστικὴ περὶ λόγους ἐστὶν τοὺς
περὶ εὐεξίαν τε τῶν σωμάτων καὶ καχεξίαν;

⁴⁴⁹ 15. ποίους τούτους: the acc. instead
^e of the nom. on account of the proximity
of λόγους. The const. of the pre-
vious clause is continued. — τοὺς κάμ-
νοντας: an example of one of the
most common kinds of anticipation,
where the subj. of the dependent
sent. is drawn forward under the
government of the leading verb.

18. οὐκ ἄρα περὶ πάντας κτέ.: ac-
cordingly the definition of Gorgias is
too wide. Cf. *Prot.* 312 d ἴσως ἂν, ἣν
δ' ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, οὐ μέντοι ἱκανῶς
γε· ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἔτι ἡ ἀπόκρισις ἡμῶν
δεῖται περὶ τοῦ δ' σοφιστῆς δεινὸν ποιεῖ
λέγειν.

23. οὐκοῦν περὶ ὧνπερ λέγειν, καὶ

φρονεῖν: sc. ποιεῖ δυνατούς with each ⁴⁴⁹
clause. Apparently Socrates makes
no immediate use of this point, so that
^e it might appear unnecessary. But by
contrasting thought with speech he
thus at the beginning of the discus-
sion emphasizes the importance of the
contents as opposed to the form, a
distinction on which he subsequently
bases his refutation of Gorgias.

26. δυνατούς εἶναι (sc. ποιεῖ from ⁴⁵⁰
⁴⁴⁹ e): on the difference between ἄρα ^a
and ἄρα οὐ, where an affirmative an-
swer is expected, see on 479 c.

33. εὐεξίαν τε . . . καὶ καχεξίαν:
opposites are regularly connected by
τε . . . καί.

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.

35 ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, ὧ Γοργία, οὕτως ἔχουσιν· ἐκάστη αὐτῶν περὶ λόγους ἐστὶν τούτους, οἱ τυγ- b
χάνουσιν ὄντες περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, οὐ ἐκάστη ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη.

ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δὴ ποτε τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας οὐ ῥητορικὰς
40 καλεῖς, οὐσας περὶ λόγους, εἴπερ ταύτην ῥητορικὴν καλεῖς,
ἢ ἂν ᾗ περὶ λόγους;

ΓΟΡ. Ὅτι, ὦ Σώκратες, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν περὶ
χειρουργίας τε καὶ τοιαύτας πράξεις ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πᾶσά
ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, τῆς δὲ ῥητορικῆς οὐδὲν ἐστὶν τοιοῦτον
45 χειρούργημα, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ ἡ κύρωσις διὰ λό- c
γων ἐστίν. διὰ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ τὴν ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ἀξιῶ εἶναι
περὶ λόγους, ὀρθῶς λέγων, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι.

V. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν μανθάνω οἷαν αὐτὴν βούλει καλεῖν;

450 36. ἐκάστη: when the second clause
b explains the first, the asyndeton is but little felt.

37. ἡ τέχνη: const., in spite of the article, not with ἐκάστη, but with οὐ. This is the pred. while ἐκάστη is subject. "Of which each (art) is the art."

41. ἡ ἂν ᾗ: the indef. rel. sentence is necessary, owing to the very general character of Gorgias' statements hitherto. — ταύτην: as referring to ἡ ἂν ᾗ is also indefinite. "If this you call rhetoric—any art which has to do with discourses."

43. ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν: this phrase occurs in Plato 77 times (GMT. 777, 1). The ὡς is not to be considered as final, as in the Eng. 'so to speak,' but is rather comparative, in the meaning 'in a word,' though it is often convenient to translate by 'so to speak.' It is closely connected with the following πᾶσα, as in 456 a with ἀπάσας,

450 d with οὐδενός, *Phaedo* 78 e with 450
οὐδαμῶς. Cf. Kr. 55, 1, 2. Its force is shown by its opposition to ἀκριβεί
λόγῳ in *Rep.* i. 341 b ποτέρως λέγετε τὸν ἔρχοντα, τὸν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἀκριβεί λόγῳ, and its employment here shows the inability of Gorgias to give a clear and sharp definition of his art.

45. κύρωσις: accomplishment, consequently effect, power. This unusual word, which Thucydides vi. 103 uses in the meaning decision, resolution, determination, is replaced below in e by the equally unusual κύρος. More common is the verb κυροῦν confirm and κυροῦσθαι bring to pass, 451 b, c. Cf. also ἄκυρος void, inoperative, *Crito* 50 b, *Prot.* 356 d.

47. ὀρθῶς λέγων ὡς ἐγὼ φημι: this c addition is also characteristic of his self-confidence.

V. 1. ἄρ' οὖν μανθάνω κτέ.: this question is put without any expecta-

τάχα δὲ εἴσομαι σαφέστερον. ἀλλ' ἀπόκριναι· εἰσὶν ἡμῖν τέχνηαι. ἥ γάρ;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

- 5 ΣΩ. Πασῶν δέ, οἶμαι, τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν μὲν ἐργασία τὸ πολὺ ἐστὶν καὶ λόγου βραχέος δέονται, ἔνιαι δὲ οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς τέχνης περαίνονται ἂν καὶ διὰ συγῆς, οἷον γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ἄλλαι πολλάι. τὰς τοι- δ α
αὐτάς μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, περὶ ἧς οὐ φῆς τὴν ῥητορικὴν
10 εἶναι· ἥ οὐ;

ΓΟΡ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

- ΣΩ. Ἐτεραι δέ γέ εἰσι τῶν τεχνῶν αἱ διὰ λόγου πᾶν περαίνουσι, καὶ ἔργον ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἥ οὐδενός προσ-
| δέονται ἥ βραχέος πάνν, οἷον ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ
15 καὶ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ πεττεντικὴ γε καὶ ἄλλαι πολλὰι τέχ-
ναι, ὧν ἔνιαι σχεδόν τι ἴσους τοὺς λόγους ἔχουσι ταῖς
πράξεσιν, αἱ δὲ πολλὰι πλείους, καὶ τὸ παράπαν πᾶσα ἡ

450^c tion of an answer. *οἶαν* is used, and not *τίνα*, because there is no inquiry after the name of the art (which for the moment is considered satisfactory), but after its nature or kind, which must now be more clearly defined. In the following methodical discussion Socrates makes clear what was present, but in a confused form, in Gorgias' mind. The question now is as to the *means* of the *κύρωσις*. The ground of distinction is formed by the contrast so familiar to the Greeks between *λόγος* and *ἔργον* (*λέγειν* and *πράττειν*). Cf. *Apol.* 32 a.

5. τῶν μὲν: in part. apposition with *πασῶν*. See H. 624 d. The correlative is *ἐτεραι δέ* (12), while *ἐνιαι δέ* is to be connected with *δέονται* as one division of the τῶν μὲν, and as correlative with the implied subject (*αἱ*

μὲν) of *δέονται*. Below we find ἡ . . . 450^c ἥ instead.

7. τὸ τῆς τεχνῆς: the business, function of the art. See H. 730 b.

9. οὐ φῆς: on the adhaerent *οὐ δ* see GMT. 384; H. 1028.

14. ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ: arithmetic is the theoretical science of numbers; logistic, the practical art of reckoning. See the following chapter. On the omission of the article, see Kr. 58, 2, 1; H. 660 a; and note on 469 d.

15. πεττεντικὴ: seems to be a general name for various games which were played on a board with pieces, whether dice or checkers. The addition of γέ indicates that the member of the series is not usually classed with the others; cf. *Crito* 47 b ταύτην αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον κτέ.

πρᾶξις καὶ τὸ κῦρος αὐταῖς διὰ λόγων ἐστίν. τῶν τοιού-
των τινά μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν τὴν ῥητορικὴν. e

20 ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΟ. Ἄλλ' οὗτοι τούτων γε οὐδεμίαν οἰμαί σε βούλε-
σθαι ῥητορικὴν καλεῖν, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως εἶπες,
ὅτι “ἡ διὰ λόγου τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορικὴ ἐστίν,” καὶ
ὑπολάβοι ἂν τις, εἰ βούλοιο δυσχεραίνειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις,
25 “τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἄρα ῥητορικὴν, ὦ Γοργία, λέγεις;”
ἀλλ' οὐκ οἰμαί σε οὔτε τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν οὔτε τὴν γεωμε-
τρικὴν ῥητορικὴν λέγειν.

ΓΟΡ. Ὅρθως γὰρ οἶε, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ δικαίως ὑπο- 451
λαμβάνεις.

VI. ΣΟ. Ἴθι νῦν καὶ σὺ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἣν ἡρόμην
διαπέρανον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ῥητορικὴ τυγχάνει μὲν οὔσα τούτων
τις τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν τὸ πολὺ λόγῳ χρωμένῶν, τυγχάνουσι
| δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τοιαῦται οὔσαι, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, ἡ περὶ τί ἐν

450 18. αὐταῖς . . . ἐστίν: cf. below in
e ὅ ἡ διὰ λόγου τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα.

22. οὐχ ὅτι: not but that, although.
— τῷ ῥήματι: as far as actual words
are concerned; “but you could not
have earnestly meant it.”

24. ὑπολάβοι ἂν τις: regular for-
mula for introducing an objection; cf.
Apol. 20 c. The opt. is potential. —
δυσχεραίνειν: in the proper sense of
dyscherēs, treat harshly, i.e. to make
difficulties. Cf. 483 a κακουργεῖς ἐν
τοῖς λόγοις. Remark the delicate
irony of the words ἀλλ' οὐκ κτέ.,
which consists in this, that Socrates
apparently passes very gently over
the contradiction which exists be-
tween the words and the actual mean-
ing of the teacher of oratory.

451 28. ὀρθως γὰρ οἶε: acknowledges
a and accepts the suggestion made by
Socrates. Note the oratorical swing

in the addition of δικαίως ὑπολαμβάν- 451
εις, which serves also to preserve the
dignity of the master who is ever
ready to encourage good work in the
pupil.

VI. 1. ἴθι: is simply an encourag-
ing interjection like φέρε δὴ 449 c. —
καὶ σὺ: acknowledges the courtesy of
Gorgias' preceding words. — τὴν ἀπό-
κρισιν ἣν ἡρόμην: is brachylogic for
τὴν ἀπόκρισιν τοῦ ἐρωτήματος ὃ ἡρόμην.

2. διαπεραίνειν: denotes the suit-
able conclusion which Gorgias ought
to make to his answer, by establish-
ing some distinction characteristic of
rhetoric. Socrates assumes then a
little ironically that this object has
already been almost attained. Since,
however, he wishes in what follows
to make clear that two or more arts
can belong to the same species and
yet be entirely distinct from one an-

5 λόγοις τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορική ἐστιν. ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις
 με ἔροιτο ὧν νυνδὴ ἔλεγον περὶ ἡστυανοσύνης τῶν τεχνῶν.
 “ὦ Σώκρατες, τίς ἐστὶν ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη;” εἵποιμ’ ἂν
 αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ σὺ ἄρτι, ὅτι τῶν διὰ λόγου τις τὸ κῦρος
 ἔχουσάν· καὶ εἴ με ἐπανέροιτο· “τῶν περὶ τί;” εἵποιμ’ ἂν
 10 ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὸ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττόν, ὅσα ἂν ἐκάτερα
 τυγχάνη ὄντα. εἰ δ’ αὖ ἔροιτο· “τὴν δὲ λογιστικὴν τίνα
 καλεῖς τέχνην;” εἵποιμ’ ἂν ὅτι καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶ τῶν λόγῳ τὸ
 πᾶν κυρουμένων· καὶ εἰ ἐπανέροιτο· “ἡ περὶ τί;” εἵποιμ’
 ἂν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συγγραφόμενοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα
 15 καθάπερ ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ ἢ λογιστικὴ ἔχει· περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ
 γάρ ἐστι, τό τε ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ περιττόν· διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦ-
 του, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πῶς ἔχει πλήθους
 14 ἐπισκοπεῖ τὸ περιττόν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον ἢ λογιστικὴ. καὶ εἴ

451 other, it is necessary for him to give
 a and compare several examples.

6. ἂν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον: logically follows τεχνῶν.

b 9. τῶν περὶ τί: the sentence would be correctly filled out thus: τῶν περὶ τί διὰ λόγου τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσάν. The use of τῶν, both here and in the following answer, shows that the inquiry is directed to the function of a class. On the other hand ἡ περὶ τί; just below inquires after the function of the individual art. As an example of Plato's ποικιλία, notice the variety in the expressions ἐν λόγοις τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα, διὰ λόγων τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα and λόγῳ κυρουμένων.

10 f. ὅσα ἂν τυγχάνη: however great each happen to be, i.e. to any magnitude you please.

14. ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν δήμῳ συγγραφόμενοι. Socrates refers to those who bring forward motions in the assembly of the people or have them recorded by the γραμματεῖς to be then

communicated to the assembly, at 451 the command of the president, by the herald. If there was a previous motion either of the senate or an orator on the same subject before the body, instead of recording and reading the common preamble of both motions, the words τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ ἢ βουλή (or whatever the name of the proposer was) were employed, followed by the modification or amendment. This corresponds in a general way to our ‘amend after the words,’ etc.

17. πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα κτέ.: ‘the relative as well as the absolute properties.’ Cope. The reckoning can only be made with odd and even numbers; hence πρὸς αὐτὰ means even to even, etc.; πρὸς ἄλληλα, even to odd, etc. The definition of λογιστικὴ runs thus in *Charmides* 166 a ἡ λογιστικὴ ἐστὶ που τοῦ ἄρτιου καὶ περιττοῦ ἐπιστήμη, πλήθους ὅπως ἔχει πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα. The pl. must be construed according to the sense, not the form.

τις τὴν ἀστρονομίαν ἀνέροιτο, ἐμοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι καὶ αὕτη
 20 λόγῳ κυροῦται τὰ πάντα, "οἱ δὲ λόγοι οἱ τῆς ἀστρο-
 μίας," εἰ φαίη, "περὶ τί εἰσω, ὦ Σώκρατες;" εἵποίμ' ἂν
 ὅτι περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀστρων φορὰν καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης,
 πῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα τάχους ἔχει.

ΓΟΡ. Ὁρθῶς γε λέγων σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

25 ΣΩ. Ἰθι δὴ καὶ σύ, ὦ Γοργία. τυγχάνει μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἡ
 ῥητορικὴ οὖσα τῶν λόγῳ τὰ πάντα διαπραττομένων τε καὶ
 κυρουμένων τις ἢ γάρ;

ΓΟΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ τῶν περὶ τί; (τί) ἔστι τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων,
 30 περὶ οὗ οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, οἷς ἡ ῥητορικὴ χρῆται;

ΓΟΡ. Τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων, ὦ Σώ-
 κρατες, καὶ ἄριστα.

VII. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ', ὦ Γοργία, ἀμφισβητήσιμον καὶ τοῦτο
 λέγεις καὶ οὐδέν πω σαφές. οἶμαι γάρ σε ἀκκοεῖναι ἐν
 τοῖς συμποσίοις ἀδόντων ἀνθρώπων τοῦτο τὸ σκολιόν, ἐν

451 19. ἀνέροιτο: sc. τίς ἐστιν, the sub-
 c ject of which is given in the proleptic
 accusative. Cf. Prot. 351 e τὴν ἡδονὴν
 αὐτὴν ἐρωτῶν εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἐστιν.

d 25. Ἰθι σύ: the rest of the sentence
 is to be supplied from the preceding
 words of Gorgias. The clause with
 γάρ gives the basis of the following
 question. Cf. 449 e, d.

30. περὶ οὗ: according to analogy
 we should expect περὶ δ. But cf. a
 similar shift in 453 b and e with
 πειθώ. See also 491 a and note on
 449 d.

31. τὰ μέγιστα. Gorgias, like Po-
 lus, finds it extremely hard to come
 out of the rut into which he has
 fallen, and give a scientific definition
 of his art.

e VII. 3. The scolion was a pecu-

liar kind of drinking-songs, παροίτια, 451
 sung at banquets. The one here al-
 luded to is mentioned by Plato in
Euthyd. 279 a, *Phileb.* 48 d, *Legg.*
 631 c, 661 a. It probably was com-
 posed by Simonides, although accord-
 ing to some it was by Epicharmus.
 After Bergk's (*Poet. Lyr. Gr.* iii. 645)
 rhythmical changes the words acc. to
 the Scholiast read as follows:

Ἵγυαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἀνδρὶ θνατῷ,
 δεύτερον δὲ φυὰν καλὸν γενέσθαι,
 τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως,
 καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἡβᾶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων.

The last line of the scolion is omitted
 by Socrates, because, for his argu-
 ment, only those advantages can be
 cited which involve the practice of
 some art.

ᾧ καταριθμοῦνται ἄδοντες, ὅτι ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστόν ἐστιν,
5 τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καλὸν γενέσθαι, τρίτον δέ, ὥς φησιν ὁ
ποιητὴς τοῦ σκολιοῦ, τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀκήκοα γάρ· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

15 ΣΩ. Ὅτι σοι αὐτίκ' ἂν παρασταῖεν οἱ δημιουργοὶ τού- 452
των ὧν ἐπῆνεσεν ὁ τὸ σκολιὸν ποιήσας, ἱατρός τε καὶ
10 παιδοτρίβης καὶ χρηματιστής, καὶ εἴποι πρῶτον μὲν ὁ
ἱατρός ὅτι "ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐξαπατᾷ σε Γοργίας· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν
ἡ τούτου τέχνη περὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,
ἀλλ' ἡ ἐμή." εἰ οὖν αὐτὸν ἐγὼ ἐροίμην· "σὺ δὲ τίς ὧν
ταῦτα λέγεις;" εἴποι ἂν ἴσως ὅτι "ἱατρός." "τί οὖν λέγεις;
15 ἡ τὸ τῆς σῆς τέχνης ἔργον μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν;" "πῶς
[γὰρ οὐ, " φαίη ἂν ἴσως, " ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑγίεια; τί δ' ἐστὶν ὁ

451 4. καταριθμοῦνται: the advantages
e are arranged according to their value
in the enumeration. Instead of an
object the clause with *ἔτι* follows,
introducing the dir. discourse.

452 8. δημιουργοί: the word is found as
a early as Homer and denotes all who
carry on a business which is public
and useful to the people; as, physi-
cians, soothsayers, singers, goldsmiths.
Later, the expression was extended
to free manual laborers, without, how-
ever, losing any of its respectability.
Hence it corresponds to our use of
the word 'master' (master-workman,
master-mason). Cf. 455 b. It is
noteworthy that only such things are
enumerated as, like the assumed re-
sult of rhetoric, were reckoned among
external advantages; for rhetoric,
according to the view of Gorgias,
should procure in the state either high
office or honors. Hence the scolon
is very applicable. Socrates brings
forward the physician, the body-
trainer, and the banker, in order to

contrast with the subjective judgment 452
of Gorgias the subjective opinions of
others, and thus to show the subjec-
tivity of the answer.

10. παιδοτρίβης: the body-trainer
for boys taught in the gymnastic
schools (παλαίστραι). He is often con-
founded with the γυμναστής, whose
proper office was the scientific treat-
ment of the whole subject of bodily
exercises, and whose field was the
public γυμνάσια, where he instructed
grown men in general and also those
who were training for the games
(ἀθληταί). Both the παιδοτρίβης and
the γυμναστής are often mentioned
alongside of the physician, since the
nurture and care of the body was
their common aim. Cf. *Crito* 47 b.
—εἴποι πρῶτον: the ἂν before παρα-
σταῖεν is felt as extending over the
whole sentence.

16. ὑγίεια: if the word is sound, b
it must be taken as an absolute addi-
tion to the proper question which
ends with ὦ Σώκρατες. The diffuse-

μείζον ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώποις ὑγείας;” εἰ δ’ αὖ μετὰ τοῦτον ὁ
 παιδοτρίβης εἶποι ὅτι “θαυμάζοιμι τᾶν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ
 αὐτός, εἴ σοι ἔχοι Γοργίας μείζον ἀγαθὸν ἐπιδειξάι τῆς
 20 αὐτοῦ τέχνης ἢ ἐγὼ τῆς ἐμῆς.” εἶποίμ’ ἂν αὖ καὶ πρὸς τοῦ-
 τον· “σὺ δὲ δὴ τίς εἶ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, καὶ τί τὸ σὸν ἔργον;”
 “παιδοτρίβης,” φαίη ἂν, “τὸ δ’ ἔργον μού ἐστιν καλοῦς τε
 καὶ ἰσχυροῦς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰ σώματα.” μετὰ δὲ
 τὸν παιδοτρίβην εἶποι ἂν ὁ χρηματιστής, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, πάνν
 25 καταφρονῶν ἀπάντων· “σκόπει δὴτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐάν σοι
 | πλούτου φανῇ τι μείζον ἀγαθὸν ὃν ἢ παρὰ Γοργίᾳ ἢ παρ’
 ἄλλῳ ὁτφούν.” φαῖμεν ἂν οὖν πρὸς αὐτόν· “τί δὲ δὴ; ἢ
 σὺ τούτου δημιουργός;” φαίη ἂν. “τίς ὢν;” “χρηματισ-
 τῆς.” “τί οὖν; κρίνεις σὺ μέγιστον ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθὸν
 30 εἶναι πλούτον;” φήσομεν. “πῶς γὰρ οὐκ;” ἐρεῖ. “καὶ
 μὴν ἀμφισβητεῖ γε Γοργίας ὅδε τὴν παρ’ αὐτῷ τέχνην
 μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ αἰτίαν εἶναι ἢ τὴν σήν,” φαῖμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς.
 δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔροιτ’ ἂν· “καὶ τί ἐστίν α
 τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν; ἀποκρινάσθω Γοργίας.” ἴθι οὖν νομί-
 35 σας, ὦ Γοργία, ἐρωτᾶσθαι καὶ ὑπ’ ἐκείνων καὶ ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ,

⁴⁵² b ness of the whole passage favors the view that the construction must not be rigidly pressed here.

18. τᾶν: for τοι ἂν, as we frequently find μεντᾶν for μέντοι ἂν. Cf. *Apol.* 29 a δεινὸν τὰν εἶη.

18 f. καὶ αὐτός: like et ipse, “likewise,” while recognizing the claims of the physician, shows also a consciousness of his own importance as compared with Gorgias. This calls forth in the reply the address ὦ ἄνθρωπε, which indicates some degree of contempt and surprise.

c 25. The very mode of speaking declares the pride of wealth. — δῆτα: with the inv. makes the claim for

recognition more urgent than the sim-
 ple δῆ. Kr. 69, 20; H. 1037, 6.—
 εἰάν: whether, introducing the indir.
 question. But Goodwin (GMT. 493,
 680) denies that εἰάν can ever mean
 ‘whether,’ insisting that every ex-
 pression like the present is condi-
 tional. The side-thrust at Gorgias is
 very appropriate, as he himself re-
 ceived much money from his teach-
 ing and lived magnificently upon it.

31. ἀμφισβητεῖ: affirms (in contra-
 diction of his opponent), “disputes
 this and says.”

33. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο: adverbial acc. d
 H. 600 a; 719 b.

ἀπόκριναι τί ἐστὶν τοῦτο ὃ φῆς σὺ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ σὲ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ.

ΓΟΡ. Ὅπερ ἐστίν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν καὶ αἴτιον ἅμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώ-
40 ποῖς, ἅμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει ἐκάστω.

ΣΑ. Τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΓΟΡ. Τὸ πείθειν ἑγὼ γ' οἶόν τ' εἶναι τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν ο
δικαστηρίῳ δικαστὰς καὶ ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ βουλευτὰς καὶ
ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐκκλησιαστὰς καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ ξυλλόγῳ παντί,
45 ὅστις ἂν πολιτικὸς ξύλλογος γίγνηται. καίτοι ἐν ταύτῃ
τῇ δυνάμει δοῦλον μὲν ἔξεις τὸν ἱατρὸν, δοῦλον δὲ τὸν

452 37. αὐτοῦ: shift from the rel. to
d the leading clause. G. 156; H. 1005.

39 f. αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις: the pronoun emphasizes personal freedom as opposed to power over others. In thus stating the aim and purpose of all the sophists' efforts, Gorgias (acc. to Plato) fails completely to notice the mutual contradiction of the two members.

40. τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν: Heindorf desires τῶν ἄλλων, which would better accord with the ordinary usage. Still the indefiniteness of the expression may not be without object in showing the inexactness of thought which naturally prevailed at a time when the art of speaking was just being brought within the reach of all.

e 42. Construe ἔγωγε (λέγω) τὸ οἶόν τε εἶναι πείθειν κτέ. — οἶόν τε: expresses 'position,' οἶος 'disposition.' Gildersleeve, *Am. Jour. Phil.* vii. 165.

44. καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ ξυλλόγῳ (sc. τῶν πολιτῶν): is paraphrased with a limitation in the following clause. In this division of the various kinds of bodies in which the orator would have occasion to display his powers

we see the basis of the three chief 452 varieties of oratory (γένη, genera) e which are generally recognized by later critics. The first, τὸ δημηγορικόν (συμβουλευτικόν, deliberativum), was employed ἐν τε τοῖς βουλευτηρίοις καὶ ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις. The second, τὸ δικανικόν (iudiciale), was employed ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις. The germ of the third, τὸ ἐπιδεικτικόν, which was not distinguished by Anaximenes, can be discerned in the words καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ ξυλλόγῳ κτέ. This last was first defined by Aristotle, who used as the basis of his division the oratorical characteristics of the several varieties, not the place of their delivery, as Gorgias does here.

45. ἐν δυνάμει κτέ.: "the possession of this power will involve the servitude of the physician," etc.

46. δοῦλον. This expression seems to be Gorgias' own, as is to be gathered from the passage in *Philebus* 58 a, cited by Heindorf. Protarchus says there: ἤκουον μὲν ἑγώ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκάστοτε Γοργίου πολλὰ κίς, ὥς ἡ τοῦ πείθειν (δύναμις) πολλὸν διαφέρει πασῶν τεχνῶν· πάντα γὰρ ὑφ' αὐτῇ

παιδοτρίβην· ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς οὗτος ἄλλω ἀναφανήσεται χρηματιζόμενος καὶ οὐχ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ σοὶ τῷ δυναμένῳ λέγειν καὶ πείθειν τὰ πλήθη.

VIII. Σο. Νῦν μοι δοκεῖς δηλῶσαι, ὦ Γοργία, ἐγγύτατα τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἦντινα τέχνην ἡγεῖ εἶναι, καὶ εἴ τι 453 ἐγὼ συνίημι, λέγεις ὅτι πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική, καὶ ἡ πραγματεία αὐτῆς ἅπασα καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς 5 τοῦτο τελευτᾷ· ἡ ἔχεις τι λέγειν ἐπὶ πλέον τὴν ῥητορικὴν δύνασθαι ἢ πειθῶ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ποιεῖν;

Γορ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς ἱκανῶς ὀρίζεσθαι· ἐστιν γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῆς.

Σο. Ἀκουσον δὴ, ὦ Γοργία. ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι, ὡς

452 δοῦλα δι' ἐκόντων ἄλλ' οὐ διὰ βίας ποιοῖτο, καὶ μακρῷ ἀρίστη πασῶν εἴη τῶν τεχνῶν.—The Gorgianic balancing δοῦλον μὲν . . . δοῦλον δέ gives a certain dignity to the words.

47. οὗτος: is scornful, as in *Cratylus* 45 a.—The thought is expressed first positively, then negatively, then again (by a kind of apostrophe—since σοὶ cannot be considered as addressed to Socrates) positively. Gorgias cannot refrain from again declaring more distinctly what he has already indicated by ἄλλω. Cf. 464 c ἡ κολακευτικὴ αἰσθημένη, οὐ γνοῖσα λέγω ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη, where, however, the same device is of value in giving more clearness to the statement.

49. τὰ πλήθη: sc. in the different assemblies.

VIII. 1. ἐγγύτατα: more definitely. The answer given comes nearer to being an answer indeed.

453 2. πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἡ ῥητορική: this definition which Socrates has gathered from Gorgias' verbiage, was not invented by Plato, but was apparently well known in Athens at the

time.—πειθοῦς: to be understood in 453 a passive sense, as πειθῶ ποιεῖν below shows.

4 f. εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾷ: instead of the regular εἰς, occasionally ἐν and πρὸς are used with but little difference of meaning.

5. τι: is not the object of λέγειν, but is probably to be construed with ἔχειν somewhat as follows, *have you any reason to say*. The object of λέγειν is contained in the following ἐπὶ πλέον . . . δύνασθαι ("its power extends further than"), with which indeed Hirschig construes τι.

9. εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι: is occasionally found construed with the inf. like an ordinary verb of perception, even in cases where there is no intervening clause as here to attract a following inf. Cf. Xen. *Hell.* ii. 2. 2 Λύσανδρος τοὺς φρουροὺς . . . ἀπέπεμπεν εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας . . . εἰδὼς ὅτι ὅσῳ ἂν πλείους συλλεγῶσιν εἰς τὸ ἄστυ, βᾶλλον τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἐνδείαν ἔσσεσθαι. Owing to the shift in the construction, ἐγὼ is left absolute at the beginning of the sentence.

10 ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἄλλω διαλέγεται βουλόμε- b
 νος εἰδέναι αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ὅτου ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, καὶ ἐμὲ
 εἶναι τούτων ἓνα · ἀξίῳ δὲ καὶ σέ.

ΓΟΡ. Τί οὖν δῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ νῦν. ἐγὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς πειθῶ,
 15 ἥτις ποτ' ἐστὶν ἢν σὺ λέγεις καὶ περὶ ὧν τινων πραγμάτων
 ἐστὶν πειθῶ, σαφῶς μὲν εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι οὐκ οἶδα, οὐ μὲν ἄλλ'
 ὑποπτεύω γε ἢν οἶμαί σε λέγειν καὶ περὶ ὧν · οὐδὲν μέντοι
 ἦττον ἐρήσομαι σε, τίνα ποτὲ λέγεις τὴν πειθῶ τὴν ἀπὸ
 τῆς ῥητορικῆς καὶ περὶ τίνων αὐτὴν εἶναι. τοῦ ἔνεκα δῆ. c
 20 αὐτὸς ὑποπτεύων σέ ἐρήσομαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγω ; οὐ
 σοῦ ἔνεκα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου, ὥα οὕτω προῆλθῃ, ὡς μάλιστ' ἂν
 ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ποιοῖ περὶ ὅτου λέγεται. σκοπεῖ γὰρ εἴ
 σοι δοκῶ δικαίως ἀνερωτᾶν σε. ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύχανόν
 σε ἐρωτῶν τίς ἐστί τῶν ζωγράφων Ζεῦξις, εἴ μοι εἶπες ὅτι

453 10. εἴπερ κτέ.: the leading idea of
 b the pred. lies in the participle.

13. τί οὖν δῆ: inquires what is to
 follow from the admission of the
 statement.

14. τὴν πειθῶ: proleptic.

15. ἥτις ποτ' ἐστίν: but ἢν οἶμαι is
 used below, according to the rule that
 δεῖς is required after a negative,
 while it may occur — though δεῖς is
 regular — with a positive. Cf. 447 d,
 and see Morris on Thuc. i. 136. 4. —
 ἢν σὺ λέγεις: indispensable addition
 to ἥτις. On περὶ ὧν τινων, see on 451 d.

19. τοῦ ἔνεκα δῆ: an example of
 the 'rhetorical question' which De-
 mosthenes uses to great advantage.
 Rid. § 325 cites also from *Gorgias*
 457 e, 458 a, 487 b.

c 20 f. οὐ σοῦ ἔνεκα: in this answer
 we have merely an indefinite contrast
 between person and thing; which is
 much more clearly defined below in

457 d κατὰ φθόνον οἴονται τὸν 453
 ἑαυτῶν λέγειν and ε οὐ πρὸς τὸ c
 πρᾶγμα φιλονικοῦντα λέγειν . . .
 ἀλλὰ πρὸς σέ. Socrates guards him-
 self against any suspicion that he may
 be influenced by personal feelings in
 his criticism of Gorgias. Cf. 454 c.

21. ὡς: not to be joined with μά-
 λιστα as a superlative phrase, but
 correlative with οὕτω.

23. ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ: introduces fre-
 quently, as an illustration of a gen-
 eral principle, a supposed case sim-
 ilar to it. It is easy to add a second
 hypothetical clause, not coördinated
 with the first, but which, combined
 with the apod., has the first as a com-
 mon protasis. Cf. below, 468 d, and
Apol. 27 d.

24. Zeuxis, the celebrated painter
 and contemporary of Socrates, was a
 native of Heraclea in Lower Italy.
 He was the pupil of Apollodorus,

25 ὁ τὰ ζῶα γράφων, ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν δικαίως σε ἡρόμην ὁ τὰ
 ποῖα τῶν ζῶων γράφων καὶ ποῦ;

ΓΟΡ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλοι εἰσὶ ζωγράφοι γρά- α
 φοντες ἄλλα πολλὰ ζῶα;

30 ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

⁴⁵³ who, by a more delicate appreciation
^c and application of the principles of
 light and shade in painting, greatly
 furthered the development of the art,
 and obtained for himself the sur-
 name of 'Sciagraph.' The paintings
 of Zeuxis, who belonged to the Ionic
 school, were noted for their delicacy
 and fine coloring. Besides the Hel-
 ena which he painted for the Crotoni-
 ates (Cic. *de Inv.* ii. 1. 1), his most
 celebrated picture was the Penelope,
 wherein he depicted with great suc-
 cess pure matronly modesty. The
 story of his contest with his rival
 Parrhasius is well known.

25. ζῶα: a general expression for
 every kind of pictures.

26. καὶ ποῦ: Socrates wishes here
 to make clear that if we wish to de-
 fine an object exactly, i.e. so as to
 make it easily recognizable, it is not
 sufficient to give the characteristic
 which it has in common with other
 objects, but rather it is necessary to
 mention that characteristic which be-
 longs to it alone and distinguishes it
 from all other objects. So, for ex-
 ample, it is not sufficient to say that
 Zeuxis is a painter, i.e. one who either
 paints or has painted pictures; but in
 order to distinguish him from other
 painters, who also paint or have
 painted pictures, we must state more
 nearly the kind of pictures which he
 has painted (ποῖα), as 'he who painted
 the Helena or the Penelope.' But

even this is not entirely sufficient, for ⁴⁵³
 there are still other painters who have ^c
 painted these same objects; but when
 we say, 'he who painted the Helena
 in Croton (ποῦ),' we have definitely
 defined Zeuxis. ποῦ could also, and
 more naturally, refer to the scene of
 his labors, — where he had his studio.
 We must note (1) that δ τὰ ζῶα γρά-
 φων is only the common designation
 of all painters, by which they are
 distinguished from the λόγους or νό-
 μους or συγγραμματα γράφοντες, (2) that
 δ γράφων can and must be under-
 stood in the same way in which we
 so often understand δ ἀδικῶν, δ κρατῶν,
 etc., i.e. as a generic word, not limited
 in time (H. 827), (3) that ποῖος is
 often scarcely to be distinguished
 from τίς (cf. Xen. *Anab.* iii. 1. 14
 ἐγὼ οὖν τὸν ἐκ ποίας πόλεως στρατηγὸν
 προσδοκῶ ταῦτα πράξειν; ποίαν δ' ἡλι-
 κίαν ἐμαντῶ ἐλθεῖν ἀναμένω;). With
 these points understood, we see that
 the present example suffices to show
 that to define rhetoric as πειθοῦς δη-
 μιουργός, i.e. ἡ τὴν πειθὴ ἀπεργαζομένη
 τέχνη is insufficient, so long as the
 πειθὴ wrought by it is not more ex-
 actly specified in order to distinguish
 it from that wrought by other arts
 which come under the same general
 definition. Cf. moreover the answer
 of Gorgias, below, 454 b, which cor-
 responds to the example before us
 exactly, even as far as the ποῦ is
 concerned.

Σο. Εἰ δέ γε μηδεὶς ἄλλος ἢ Ζεῦξις ἔγραφε, καλῶς ἂν σοι ἀπεκέκριτο ;

Γορ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;

Σο. Ἴθι δὴ καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπέ· πότερόν σοι
35 δοκεῖ πειθῶ ποιεῖν ἢ ῥητορικῇ μόνῃ ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι τέχναι ;
λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· ὅστις διδάσκει ὅτιοῦν πράγμα, πότε-
ρον ὁ διδάσκει πείθει, ἢ οὐ ;

Γορ. Οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα πείθει.

40 Σο. Πάλιν δὴ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγωμεν ὥνπερ ο
νυνδὴ· ἢ ἀριθμητικῇ οὐ διδάσκει ἡμᾶς, ὅσα ἐστὶν τὰ τοῦ
ἀριθμοῦ, καὶ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἄνθρωπος ;

Γορ. Πάνυ γε.

Σο. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πείθει ;

45 Γορ. Naί.

Σο. Πειθοὺς ἄρα δημιουργὸς ἐστὶν καὶ ἡ ἀριθμητικῇ.

Γορ. Φαίνεται.

Σο. Οὐκοῦν ἕάν τις ἐρωτᾷ ἡμᾶς, ποίας πειθοὺς καὶ
περὶ τί, ἀποκρυνόμεθα· πού αὐτῷ ὅτι τῆς διδασκαλικῆς
50 τῆς περὶ τὸ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ τὸ περιττὸν ὅσον ἐστίν. καὶ τὰς 454

453 31. ἔγραφε: were a painter.

d 38. οὐ δῆτα (sc. οὐ πείθει) ἀλλὰ κτέ.: chiasitic with the question preceding. The affirmative of the first member of the question is made much more emphatic by the previous express denial of the second member, which must therefore itself be emphatically uttered. Usually the answer does not follow so closely the words of the question; cf. below, 501 c, and *Parm.* 128 a οὕτω λέγεις ἢ ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς καταμανθάνω; Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ καλῶς συνήκας ὅλον τὸ γράμμα δ βούλεται. Different, however, are 454 a, b, and 496 d, below. Cf. *Rid.* § 305.

40. ὥνπερ: on the omission of the prep. see *Kr.* 51, 11, 1; *H.* 1007. Cf. below, 517 c ἐν παντὶ τῷ χρόνῳ ὃν διελεγόμεθα, *Apol.* 27 d. So in *Lat.*, e.g. *Nep. Cim.* 3.

41 f. τὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ: the properties of number. Cf. τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, τὰ τοῦ βίου. See on 450 c.

50. τὸ περιττὸν: in such combinations the article is usually omitted with the second member, and only inserted when the two members are to be looked upon as more distinct. Cf. above, 451 b with c, and 454 e, 455 a; see *Kr.* 58, 2, 1. — ὅσον: sing. because each antecedent is of equal value.

ἀλλας ἅς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τέχνας ἀπάσας ἔξομεν ἀποδεῖξαι
πειθοῦς δημιουργοὺς οὕσας καὶ ἡστυνός καὶ περὶ ὅτι ἡ οὐ;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΟ. Οὐκ ἄρα ῥητορικὴ μόνη πειθοῦς ἐστὶν δημιουργός.

55 ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΙΧ. ΣΟ. Ἐπειδὴ τοῖνυν οὐ μόνη ἀπεργάζεται τοῦτο τὸ
ἔργον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλαι, δικαίως ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ ζωγράφου
μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπανερóιμεθ' ἂν τὸν λέγοντα, "ποίας δὴ πει-
θοῦς καὶ τῆς περὶ τί πειθοῦς ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐστὶν τέχνη;"

5 ἡ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον εἶναι ἐπανερέσθαι;

ΓΟΡ. Ἐμοιγε.

ΣΟ. Ἀπόκριναι δὴ, ὦ Γοργία, ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ
οὕτω.

ΓΟΡ. Ταύτης τοῖνυν τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῆς
10 ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις, ὥσπερ καὶ
ἄρτι ἔλεγον, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἃ ἐστὶ δίκαιά τε καὶ ἄδिका.

ΣΟ. Καὶ ἐγὼ τοι ὑπώπτειν ταύτην σε λέγειν τὴν πειθῶ
καὶ περὶ τούτων, ὦ Γοργία· ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ θαυμάζῃς, ἐὰν

453 Neither *δσον ἐστίν*, nor *ἴσα ἐστίν*, above,
e conflict with the passage 451 b, c.

454 3 f. *ποίας πειθοῦς καὶ τῆς περὶ τί*:

a cf. above, *ποίας πειθοῦς καὶ περὶ τί*.

4. *τέχνη*: no one need be disturbed by the substitution of *τέχνη* for *δημιουργός*, as the two words have kindred ideas. There is also no appreciable difference between *ποίας* here and *ἡστυνός* a few lines above. Cf. 453 e, and see on 453 c.

b 6. *ἔμοιγε*: the form of the question shows that an affirmative answer is expected.

9. *ταύτης*: draws attention to the earlier explanation in 452 e, from which is drawn (*τοῖνυν*) the following definition, which in form follows as an epexegetis to *ταύτης τῆς πειθοῦς*.

The definition answers the *ποῖον* as far as the external matters of persons (speakers) and place are concerned, and is used by Socrates (c) in order to obtain a definition that characterizes the nature of the *πειθῶ*. Gorgias does not use *ὄχλοις* with the disparaging feeling which it sometimes has, but as a general word for assemblies.
11. *περὶ τούτων κτέ.*: answers the question *περὶ τί* 4, above. On the change of case, cf. 449 d.

13. *ἀλλ' ἵνα κτέ.*: this sentence is a good example of those curious anacolutha which occur so often in the conversation of ordinary life, where a slight emphasis on a single word may perhaps change the whole construction, and cause the speaker to lose

ὀλίγον ὕστερον τοιοῦτόν τί σε ἀνέρωμαι, ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν ^c
 15 δῆλον εἶναι, ἐγὼ δ' ἐπανερωτῶ. ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω, τοῦ ἐξῆς
 ἔνεκα περαίνεισθαι τὸν λόγον ἐρωτῶ, οὐ σοῦ ἔνεκα, ἀλλ'
 ἵνα μὴ ἐθιζόμεθα ὑπονοοῦντες προαρπάξιν ἀλλήλων τὰ
 λεγόμενα, ἀλλὰ σὺ τὰ σαντοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὅπως ἂν
 βούλη περαίνης.

20 Γορ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ μοι δοκεῖς ποιεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σο. Ἰθι δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα. καλεῖς τι μεμα-
 θηκέναι.

Γορ. Καλῶ.

Σο. Τί δέ; πεπιστευκέναι;

25 Γορ. Ἐγωγε.

Σο. Πότερον οὖν ταῦτόν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι μεμαθηκέναι ^a
 καὶ πεπιστευκέναι, καὶ μάθησις καὶ πίστις, ἢ ἄλλο τι;

Γορ. Οἶομαι μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο.

Σο. Καλῶς γὰρ οἶε, γνώσει δὲ ἐνθύνδε. εἰ γάρ τις σε

⁴⁵⁴
^b himself in a network of clauses, of which, while the idea is clear enough, the grammatical construction is hopeless. The idea here is this: "I thought you meant that, but still I asked; and you must not be surprised if I again ask something which seems to be evident enough; for it is absolutely essential for our argument that we proceed upon definitely expressed statements, and not upon mere suspicions, which may prove to be misunderstandings." In the construction the speaker proceeds well enough until he is thrown off the track by ἐγὼ δ' ἐπανερωτῶ. The use of this seemingly independent clause (it is really, together with δοκεῖ μὲν, in dependence on ὅ) causes him to branch off, in the clause ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω, in order to explain the reason

for his repeated questioning, and at ⁴⁵⁴
 the same time to reiterate one of the ^b
 fundamental principles of dialectic.

15. ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω: refers to 453 b.

17. ὑπονοεῖν: "to form a pre-opinion of what another is likely to think on a subject without his having expressed himself," to impute to him certain views, and thereby to forestall his explaining himself.

18. ὑπόθεσιν: is a plan or principle which Gorgias has laid down for himself, and which conditions the direction in which (κατὰ) the thesis is to be developed until the end is reached (περαίνης).

21. Ἰθι δὴ κτ.: see on ταύτης, in b, above.

29. καλῶς γὰρ οἶε: see on 451 a. d. Note the difference in tone of Gorgias' answer, as compared with 450 c.

30 ἔροιτο · “ἄρ’ ἔστιν τις, ὃ Γοργία, πίστις ψευδῆς καὶ ἀληθῆς;” φαίης ἂν, ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι.

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δ’; ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ψευδῆς καὶ ἀληθῆς;

ΓΟΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

35 ΣΩ. Δῆλον γὰρ αὖ ὅτι οὐ ταῦτόν ἐστιν.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθὴ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἱ τέ γε μεμαθηκότες πεπεισμένοι εἰσὶν καὶ οἱ πεπιστευκότες.

ΓΟΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

40 ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν δύο εἶδη θῶμεν πειθοῦς, τὸ μὲν πίστιν παρεχόμενον ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, τὸ δ’ ἐπιστήμην;

ΓΟΡ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Ποτέραν οὖν ἡ ῥητορικὴ πειθῶ ποιεῖ ἐν δικαστηρίοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις περὶ τῶν δικαίων τε καὶ
45 ἀδίκων; ἐξ ἧς τὸ πιστεύειν γίγνεται ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἡ ἐξ ἧς τὸ εἰδέναι;

ΓΟΡ. Δῆλον δήπου, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἐξ ἧς τὸ πιστεύειν.

⁴⁵⁴ 31. φαίης ἂν: has the force of an affirmative. You would say ‘yes’; so οὐ φημι often means I say ‘no,’ I deny. See Kr. 64, 5, 4.

33. ἐπιστήμη: from ἐπίστασθαι to understand, i.e. properly, correct understanding, knowledge. This takes the place of μάθησις, which strictly denotes the process of learning, whose result is ἐπιστήμη, because this idea better suits the above opposition between μεμαθηκέναι and πεπιστευκέναι.

35. δῆλον γὰρ αὖ: confirms the distinctness of the two ideas which Socrates had already affirmed much more positively than Gorgias.

37. πεπεισμένοι: so far as the inward conviction is concerned, μάθησις

and πίστις agree; objectively, however, they are very different, for μάθησις involves the acquisition of knowledge, while ignorance is the necessary concomitant of πίστις.

40. βούλει οὖν κτί.: Socrates now proceeds to analyze (διαίρεσις, divisio) the general definition in order to obtain that special definition (ὁρισμός, definitio) which, according to the requirements of logic, must include, together with the statement of genus (τὸ γένος, genus proximum) also the addition of the characteristic (διαφορὰ εἰδοποιός, differentia specifica) which separates it from other species of the same genus.

Σα. Ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, πειθοῦς δημιουργός 455
ἐστὶν πιστευτικῆς ἀλλ' οὐ διδασκαλικῆς περὶ τὸ δίκαιόν τε
50 καὶ ἀδίκον.

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

Σα. Οὐδ' ἄρα διδασκαλικὸς ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐστὶν δικαστηρίων
τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄχλων δικάων τε πέρι καὶ ἀδίκων, ἀλλὰ
πειστικὸς μόνον. οὐ γὰρ δήπου ὄχλον γ' ἂν δύναίτο το-
55 σοῦτον ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ διδάξαι οὕτω μεγάλα πράγματα.

ΓΟΡ. Οὐ δῆτα.

23X. Σα. Φέρε δῆ, ἴδωμεν τί ποτε καὶ λέγομεν περὶ τῆς
ῥητορικῆς· ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ τοι οὐδ' αὐτός πω δύναμαι κατα- b

⁴⁵⁵ 48. ἡ ῥητορικὴ κτέ.: the first definition which had its origin in the technic of the rhetorical schools (see on 453 a) has now acquired a more exact and complete expression by the help of this dialectical investigation. Note the change from *περὶ τῶν δίκαιων* to *περὶ τὸ δίκαιον*. Cf. 454 b, e.

— 54. *πειστικός*: able to persuade. Equiv. to *ικανὸς πείθειν*, as *διδασκαλικός* to *διδασκαλίαν παρέχων* or *ικανὸς διδάσκειν*. Neither this nor *πιστευτικός* used above can properly be construed with the genitive. With *διδασκαλικός*, however, we find examples, as *Euthyphr.* 3 c Ἀθηναίους οὐ σφόδρα μέλει, ἂν τινα δεινὸν οἴωνται εἶναι μὴ μέντοι διδασκαλικὸν τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας. See *Kr.* 47, 26, 9; *H.* 754, b. In the addition of *μόνον* lies a gentle intimation of some defect, the result of which for the estimation of rhetoric appears more plainly later.

55. *ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ*: draws attention to a great defect of the Athenian judicial system. It was often impossible to present before the court a clear exposition of the points at issue,

as the speeches were limited to a certain length, which was carefully measured by the *κλέψυδρα*, — a practice which Socrates also complains of in *Apol.* 19 a *ἐπιχειρητέον ὑμῶν ἐξελέσθαι τὴν διαβολὴν ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε, ταύτην ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ*, and 37 a *ὑμᾶς τοῦτο οὐ πείθω· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον διειλέγεσθαι*.

X. 1. *φέρε δῆ κτέ.*: introduces a new discussion designed to test the definition just obtained, which, although from the point of view of form it satisfies excellently the double requirement made above in 454 a, still leaves some uncertainty as to the exact meaning of Gorgias. Hence the question, 'What do we really mean thereby?' Socrates professes to be not yet quite certain himself (οὐδ' αὐτός), notwithstanding that he has contributed the most to the more close definition of the *ποῖον*. His doubts are directed especially to the *περὶ τί* as it has been just defined according to the specifications made by Gorgias. This discussion forms the transition to the examination of the true value and ethical tendency

- νοῆσαι ὅτι λέγω. ὅταν περὶ ἱατρῶν αἰρέσεως ᾗ τῇ πόλει
 σύλλογος ἢ περὶ ναυπηγῶν ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς δημιουργ-
 5 γικοῦ ἔθνους, ἄλλο τι ἢ τότε ὁ ῥητορικὸς οὐ συμβουλευ-
 σει; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐν ἐκάστη αἰρέσει τὸν τεχνικώτατον
 δεῖ αἰρεῖσθαι. οὐδ' ὅταν τειχῶν περὶ οἰκοδομήσεως ἢ
 λιμένων κατασκευῆς ἢ νεωρίων, ἀλλ' οἱ ἀρχιτέκτονες· οὐδ'
 αὖ ὅταν στρατηγῶν αἰρέσεως πέρι ἢ τάξεώς τινος πρὸς
 10 πολεμίους ἢ χωρίων καταλήψεως συμβουλὴ ᾗ, ἀλλ' οἱ
 στρατηγικοὶ τότε συμβουλευέουσιν, οἱ ῥητορικοὶ δὲ οὐ·
 ἢ πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Γοργία, τὰ τοιαῦτα; ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αὐτὸς τε
 φῆς ῥήτωρ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλους ποιεῖν ῥητορικούς, εὖ ἔχει τὰ
 τῆς σῆς τέχνης παρὰ σοῦ πυνθάνεσθαι. καὶ ἐμὲ νῦν νό-
 15 μισον καὶ τὸ σὸν σπεύδειν· ἴσως γὰρ καὶ τυγχάνει τις
 τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων μαθητῆς σου βουλόμενος γενέσθαι, ὥς
 ἐγὼ τινὰς σχεδὸν καὶ συχνούς αἰσθάνομαι, οἱ ἴσως αἰσχύ-

455 of rhetoric. On the use of καὶ in
 a questions, cf. Xen. *Hell.* iii. 3. 11 τέλος
 αὐτὸν (τὸν Κινάδωνα) ἤροντο (οἱ ἔφοροι)
 τί καὶ βουλόμενος ταῦτα πράττει, *what*
purpose he actually had in so doing.

b 3. ὅταν περὶ κτέ.: on the whole
 passage, cf. *Prot.* 319 b. — ἱατρῶν
 αἰρέσεως: during the rise of philos-
 ophy in Greece, a science of medi-
 cine also gradually developed, which
 became hereditary among the priests
 of Aesculapius. Among these va-
 rious schools arose; as in Cos,
 Cnidus, Rhodes, and in several cities
 of Magna Graecia. After a while it
 became customary for a state to take
 a noted physician into the public ser-
 vice; as Democedes, who was hired
 one year by the Aeginetans, the sec-
 ond by the Athenians, and the third by
 Polycrates of Samos (*Hdt.* iii. 131).

5. ἔθνους (from the same root as ἔθος,
 εἶωθα): denotes a class of people drawn

into association either for the purposes 455
 of habitation or from force of custom b
 (calling, trade). For δημιουργοὶ see
 on 452 a. In such formulae as ἄλλο
 τι ἢ and οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ the copula is
 frequently omitted. See H. 1015 b.

7. οὐδ' ὅταν: is in close connexion
 with ἄλλο τι ἢ τότε ὁ ῥητορικὸς οὐ
 συμβουλευέσει.

12. ἢ πῶς λέγεις κτέ.: intimates
 that possibly Gorgias will not accept
 this limitation of rhetoric.

13. εὖ ἔχει: it is proper, it is in order. c
 Cf. *Phaedo* 107 a εἰ δὴ τι Σιμμία...
 ἔχει λέγειν, εὖ ἔχει μὴ κατασιγήσαι. —
 τὰ (not τὸ) τῆς τέχνης: because the
 question is no longer as to the nature
 of the art, but as to its claims and
 effects, one by one.

15. τὸ σὸν σπεύδειν: consult your
 interest.

17. τινὰς σχεδὸν καὶ συχνούς: Cron
 would take this in its entirety as almost

νουντ' ἄν σε ἀνέρεσθαι · ὑπ' ἐμοῦ οὖν ἀνερωτῶμενος νόμι- d
 στον καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἀνερωτᾶσθαι · “τί ἡμῖν, ὦ Γοργία,
 20 ἔσται, εἴαν σοι συνῶμεν; περὶ τίνων τῇ πόλει συμβου-
 λεύειν οἰοί τε ἐσόμεθα; πότερον περὶ δικαίου μόνον καὶ
 ἀδίκου ἢ καὶ περὶ ὧν νυνδὴ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν;” πειρῶ
 οὖν αὐτοῖς ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

Γορ. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ σοι πειράσομαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σαφῶς
 25 ἀποκαλύψαι τὴν τῆς ῥητορικῆς δύναμιν ἅπασαν · αὐτὸς
 γὰρ καλῶς ὑφηγήσω. οἶσθα γὰρ δήπου ὅτι τὰ νεώρια
 ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τείχη τὰ Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἡ τῶν λιμένων κατα- e
 σκευὴ ἐκ τῆς Θεμιστοκλέους συμβουλῆς γέγονεν, τὰ δ' ἐκ
 τῆς Περικλέους, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ τῶν δημιουργῶν.

30 Σο. Λέγεται ταῦτα, ὦ Γοργία, περὶ Θεμιστοκλέους ·
 Περικλέους δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἤκουον ὅτε συνεβούλευεν ἡμῖν
 περὶ τοῦ διὰ μέσου τείχους.

Γορ. Καὶ ὅταν γέ τις αἵρεσις ᾗ ὧν δὴ σὺ ἔλεγες, ὦ 456

455 equivalent to “quite a number”; but
 c it seems better to give each word its
 rights, *some, I had almost said many*. In
Phaedo 58d παρῆσαν τινες καὶ πολλοί γε,
 we have almost the reverse of the pres-
 ent case; that is, the higher estimate is
 asserted, while in the present passage
 it is denied. The hope of obtaining pu-
 pils is the greatest spur to the Sophist
 to continue a discussion which cannot
 but be unpleasant to him. It serves
 also to draw out his true sentiments.

d 24. ἄλλ' ἐγὼ κτέ.: Gorgias allows
 himself to be led on by the exam-
 ples which Socrates has brought for-
 ward, and which seem to him excel-
 lently adapted (hence καλῶς ὑφηγήσω)
 to make clear the efficacy of his art.
 He therefore tries to prove for it as
 great as possible a scope, and thereby
 entirely loses sight of his former
 definition of the περὶ τί.

28. τὰ δέ: without a preceding τὰ 455
 μέν, to complete and correct the state- e
 ment. See Kr. 50, 1, 12.

29. ἐκ τῶν δημιουργῶν: “in accord-
 ance with the architects,” instead of
the advice of the architects. Other
 striking examples of such compres-
 sion are *Prot.* 358 c οὐδ' ἔστι τοῦτο
 ἐν ἀνθρώπου φύσει, ἐπὶ δ' οἴεται κακὰ
 εἶναι ἐθέλειν ἰέναι ἀντὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν,
Xen. Cyr. iii. 3. 41 χώραν ἔχετε οὐδὲν
 ἤττον ἐντιμον τῶν πρωτοστατῶν for τῆς
 τῶν πρωτοστατῶν.

30. λέγεται ταῦτα κτέ.: this ad-
 mission of Socrates seems to Gorgias
 to confirm his assumption, and to im-
 ply that Socrates was not in earnest
 in his opposition. At the death of
 Themistocles, Socrates was about
 four years old.

33. ὦν . . . ἔλεγες: sc. at 455 b. So- 456
 crates makes for the moment no ob- a

Σώκρατες, ὁρᾷς ὅτι οἱ ῥήτορες εἰσιν οἱ συμβουλευόντες
35 καὶ οἱ νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας περὶ τούτων.

Σο. Ταῦτα καὶ θαυμάζων, ὦ Γοργία, πάλαι ἐρωτῶ,
ἥτις ποτὲ ἡ δύναμις ἐστὶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς. δαιμονία γάρ
τις ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται τὸ μέγεθος οὕτω σκοποῦντι.

XI. Γορ. Εἰ πάντα γε εἰδείης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ὡς ἔπος
εἰπεῖν ἀπάσας τὰς δυνάμεις συλλαβοῦσα ὑφ' αὐτῇ ἔχει.
μέγα δέ σοι τεκμήριον ἐρῶ· πολλάκις γὰρ ἤδη ἔγωγε b
μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἱατρῶν εἰσελθὼν

456 jection to Gorgias' course, thus stim-
a ulating him to the detailed statements
which follow.

35. νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας: the verb
νικᾶν is construed with various ac-
cusatives which belong to the 'cog-
nate' class, as Ὀλυμπιάδα, παγκράτιον,
ψήφισμα, etc. G. 159 R.; H. 716 a.

36. πάλαι ἐρωτῶ: for the pres. with
πάλαι, see H. 826; G. 200, n. 4, and
cf. the similar Lat. use of jam diu
with the present (Gildersleeve, Gr.
§ 221).

37. δαιμονία: has become by this
time so weakened as to mean simply
wonderful, extraordinary. Cf. the sim-
ilar weakening of strong words in
English; e.g. 'awful.' — τις: by add-
ing to the vagueness, enhances the
vastness of the power, like the Lat.
quidam. Cf. Cic. ad Fam. x. 12.
1 idque contigit meritorum
tuorum in rem publicam ex-
imia quadam magnitudine,
owing to the rather exceptional great-
ness, etc.

XI. 1. εἰ πάντα γε εἰδείης: Socra-
tes' object is finally attained, and
Gorgias, lulled completely by this
ironical expression of admiration,
bursts forth into an eloquent lauda-
tion of his art, and a defence of it

against all censure. The omission of
the apodosis gives to the sentence
the effect of an exclamation. Such
a usage is also common in Eng-
lish.

2. ἀπάσας τὰς δυνάμεις: may be
a compression of ἀπασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν
τὰς δυνάμεις. Of course συλλαβοῦσα
is only a figure of speech, though
Gorgias claims his rhetoric to be the
art of all arts. In his exposition he
contents himself with a pair of ex-
amples only. That this view is really
due to Gorgias is shown by the pas-
sage in *Philebus*, quoted on 452 e.

4. τῶν ἄλλων: with whom he was b
on like terms of intimacy. The fol-
lowing passage gives the two leading
departments of the physician's pro-
fession — pharmacy, φάρμακον πικεῖν,
and surgery, τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι παρασχέιν
— which in ancient times, as is also
the case to a large degree at present,
were frequently united by the same
practitioner. The knife and the cau-
tery, as the two leading instruments
of the surgeon's profession, are often
mentioned together. Cf. 480 c, 521 e;
Prot. 354 a; Aesch. Ag. 848 ὅτε δὲ
καὶ δεῖ φαρμάκων παιωνίῳ, ἥτοι κέναντες
ἢ τέμοντες εὐφρόνως | πειρασόμεθα πῆμ'
ἀποστρέψαι νόσον.

5 παρά τῶν τῶν καμνόντων οὐχὶ ἐθέλοντα ἢ φάρμακον πιεῖν
 ἢ τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι παρασχεῖν τῷ ἱατρῷ, οὐ δυναμένου τοῦ
 ἱατροῦ πείσαι, ἐγὼ ἔπεισα, οὐκ ἄλλη τέχνη ἢ τῇ ῥητορικῇ.
 φημὶ δὲ καὶ εἰς πόλιν ὅπῃ βούλει ἐλθόντα ῥητορικὸν ἄν-
 10 δρα καὶ ἱατρόν, εἰ δέοι λόγῳ διαγωνίζεσθαι ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ
 ἢ ἐν ἄλλῃ τινὶ συλλόγῳ, ὁπότερον δεῖ αἰρεθῆναι ἱατρόν, c
 οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φανῆναι τὸν ἱατρόν, ἀλλ' αἰρεθῆναι ἂν τὸν
 εἰπεῖν δυνατόν, εἰ βούλοιτο. καὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλον γε δη-
 μιουργὸν ὄντιναοῦν ἀγωνίζοιτο, πείσειεν ἂν αὐτὸν ἐλέσθαι
 ὁ ῥητορικὸς μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλος ὅστισοῦν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστω
 15 περὶ οὗτου οὐκ ἂν πιθανώτερον εἴποι ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἢ ἄλλος
 ὅστισοῦν τῶν δημιουργῶν ἐν πλήθει. ἡ μὲν οὖν δύναμις

456 6. παρασχεῖν: cf. *Apol.* 33 b καὶ
 b πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρω-
 τᾶν. As here 475 d, *Prot.* 348 a.
 See *Kr.* 55, 3, 21.

8. ὅπῃ βούλει: more exactly we
 should expect *ὅποι*, and some of the
 inferior Mss. have it here. But the
 ideas of 'where' and 'whither' are
 often confounded in Greek, while in
 Eng. 'where' has become the rule
 for 'whither' in ordinary conversa-
 tion. The remark here is very fitting
 in the mouth of Gorgias, in view of
 his extensive travels. Cf. *Intro.* §§
 4, 5.

c 11. οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φανῆναι: cf. *Xen.*
Mem. i. 2. 52 ἀναπειθόντα οὖν τοὺς νέους
 ὡς αὐτὸς εἴη σοφώτατος, καὶ ἄλλους ἱκα-
 νώτατος ποιῆσαι σοφούς, οὕτω διατιθέναι
 τοὺς ἑαυτῷ συνόντας, ὥστε μηδαμοῦ παρ'
 αὐτοῖς ἄλλους εἶναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν. Also
Phaedo 72 c. Similarly in Latin. Cf.
Cic. de Fin. v. 30. 90 tantam vim
 esse virtutis ut omnia, si ex
 altera parte ponantur, ne ar-
 pareant quidem and ii. 28. 90
 Socrates voluptatem nullo

loco numerat. Compare also the 456
 exactly similar Eng. colloquialisms, c
 'to be nowhere,' and 'to be left
 quite out of sight.'

11 f. τὸν εἰπεῖν δυνατόν: λέγειν is
 more usual; but the same difference
 which exists between *ελεγε* and *ελεξε*
 or *ειπε* exists also between their in-
 finitives. So here *εἰπεῖν* means to
 make or deliver a speech. Cf. *Prot.*
 329 a τάχ' ἂν καὶ τοιοῦτους λόγους
 ἀκούσειεν ἢ Περικλέους ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς
 τῶν ἱκανῶν εἰπεῖν.

16. ἐν πλήθει: though properly
 much more general in its meaning
 than *ἐκκλησίᾳ* or *συλλόγῳ* used above,
 is probably employed only for the
 sake of variety. The distinct and
 definite statement with which Gorgias
 closes his characterization (ἡ μὲν οὖν
κτέ.) brings up to his mind the
 thought that perhaps some might
 object to the indiscriminate employ-
 ment of such an art. He is thus led
 to a defence of it which is so injudi-
 cious that it affords the adversary
 the very best weapons for attack.

τοσαύτη ἐστὶν καὶ τοιαύτη τῆς τέχνης · δεῖ μέντοι, ὧς ὡ-
 κρατες, τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ ἀγω-
 νίᾳ. καὶ γὰρ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ πρὸς α
 20 ἅπαντας χρῆσθαι ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι ἔμαθε πυκτεῖν τε καὶ
 παγκρατιάξω καὶ ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι, ὥστε κρείττων
 εἶναι καὶ φίλων καὶ ἐχθρῶν · οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα τοὺς φίλους
 27 δεῖ τύπτειν οὐδὲ κεντεῖν τε καὶ ἀποκτείνουσαι. οὐδέ γε μὰ
 Δία εἴαν τις εἰς παλαιστραν φοιτήσας, εἰ ἔχων τὸ σῶμα
 25 καὶ πυκτικὸς γενόμενος, ἔπειτα τὸν πατέρα τύπτῃ καὶ τὴν
 μητέρα ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν οἰκείων ἢ τῶν φίλων, οὐ τούτου
 ἕνεκα δεῖ τοὺς παιδοτρίβας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις διδά-
 σκοντας μάχεσθαι μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων.
 ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ παρέδωσαν ἐπὶ τῷ δικαίως χρῆσθαι τού-
 30 τοις πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἀμυνόμε-

456 18. τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ: carried away
 d by the excitement of his own thoughts,
 Gorgias forgets the caution which he
 had hitherto exercised in his conver-
 sation with Socrates, as well as the
 definition of rhetoric which the two
 had agreed upon above, and is led to
 set forth his art quite in the manner
 of the Sophists (the Eristics), as a
 means of defence and offence; a
 weapon which, though it required the
 use of the mind instead of the body,
 the lips instead of the arms, was no
 less a department of the science of
 fighting than boxing or the other exer-
 cises of the soldier. Some Sophists
 — e.g. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus
 — were at the same time teachers of
 fencing. Boxing, πυκτεῖν, which, in
 connexion with παλαίειν, or wrestling,
 formed the παγκρατιάξω, went be-
 yond the range of ordinary gymnas-
 tics, and belonged to the peculiar art
 of the athletes. Fighting in full ar-

mor (ὀπλομαχία) was not followed as
 a profession until after the Pelopon-
 nesian War. As in all these exer-
 cises, so in rhetoric the great ob-
 ject was not public, but private, not
 advantage to the community, but ad-
 vancement for the individual.

20. ἔμαθε: the unexpressed sub-
 ject, as of χρῆσθαι, is the indefinite
 'one.'

23. ἀποκτείνουσαι: if one gets as
 far as the κεντεῖν, it is but a short
 step to the ἀποκτείνουσαι.

24. φοιτήσας: φοιτᾶν is the regu-
 lar word for attendance at a school;
 hence φοιτητής, a 'scholar.' — εἰ ἔχων
 τὸ σῶμα: not merely by the gift of
 nature, but also, as πυκτικὸς γενόμενος,
 by education.

29. παρέδωσαν: used like tradere e
 in the sense 'impart, or transmit by
 teaching.' The object (afterwards
 taken up in τούτοις) is to be supplied
 from the sense of what precedes.

νους, μὴ ὑπάρχοντας · οἱ δὲ μεταστρέψαντες χρῶνται τῇ⁴⁵⁷
 ἰσχύι καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ οὐκ ὀρθῶς. οὐκοῦν οἱ διδάξαντες
 πονηροί, οὐδὲ ἡ τέχνη οὔτε αἰτία οὔτε πονηρὰ τούτου
 ἔνεκά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὴ χρώμενοι, οἶμαι, ὀρθῶς. ὁ αὐτὸς
 35 δὴ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς. δυνατὸς μὲν γὰρ πρὸς
 ἅπαντάς ἐστιν ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ περὶ παντὸς λέγειν, ὥστε
 πιθανώτερος εἶναι ἐν τοῖς πλήθεσιν ἔμβραχυ περὶ ὅτου ἂν
 βούληται · ἀλλ' οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον τούτου ἔνεκα δεῖ οὔτε ^b
 τοὺς ἱατροὺς τὴν δόξαν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ὅτι δύναιτο ἂν τοῦτο
 40 ποιῆσαι, οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργούς, ἀλλὰ δικαίως καὶ
 τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ. ἐὰν δέ,

⁴⁵⁷ 31. μὴ ὑπάρχοντας: an integral
^a part of the subst. inf. clause;
 hence the μὴ. ὑπάρχειν has here
 its primitive meaning, *to be the first*
cause, to be there to begin with, as
 opposed to ἀμύνεσθαι. Cf. *Leg.* ix.
 879 d μῆτε γὰρ ὑπάρχων μῆτε ἀμυνό-
 μενος τὸ παράπαν τολμάτω πληγαῖς τὸν
 τοιοῦτον νοουθετεῖν. ἔρχειν is also simi-
 larly used in *Leg.* ix. 869 c ἀμυνόμενος
 ἔρχοντα χειρῶν πρότερον, but with a
 different feeling. The asyndeton of
 two opposites is not unfrequent. —
 μεταστρέψαντες: which is regularly
 transitive (e.g. *Rep.* ii. 367 a μετα-
 στρέφοντες αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν, utrius-
 que vim pervertentes) is used
 here absolutely in the sense *revers-*
ing the matter. Cf. *Hom.* β 67 θεῶν δ'
 ὑποδείσατε μῆνιν, | μὴ τι μεταστρέψωσιν
 (cause a reverse) ἀγασσάμενοι κακὰ
 ἔργα.

32. τῇ ἰσχύι: corresponds to εὖ
 ἔχων τὸ σῶμα, as τέχνη to πνευματικὸς
 γινόμενος, so that both are considered
 dependent upon training. — οὐκ ὀρθῶς:
 a case of litotes.

34. οἱ μὴ χρώμενοι: equiv. to οἱ ἂν
 μὴ χρῶνται ὀρθῶς. Hence the μὴ.

35 f. πρὸς ἀπαντας: as above,⁴⁵⁷
 456 d. ^a

37. ἔμβραχυ: denotes what is other-
 wise expressed by ὡς ἐν βραχεί (συν-
 ελόντι) εἰπεῖν, and shows that the fol-
 lowing περὶ ὅτου ἂν βούληται is abso-
 lutely without limitation.

38. οὐδέν κτέ.: the dangerousness ^b
 of the art is to be offset by the natu-
 ral feeling of equity which will com-
 pel each of the two aspirants to leave
 uninjured the public position which
 both desire, as well as the δόξα, which
 is the orator's continual and chief
 aim. — οὐδέν τι: strengthens the
 negation. Cf. the Eng. 'none the
 more.' The acc. of this neg. is used,
 but never the dat. with the compara-
 tive.

39. ὅτι: is correlative with τούτου
 ἔνεκα. For the following double καί,
 see on 457 e.

41. ἐὰν δέ κτέ.: shows again the
 opposition of practice to theory. Gor-
 gias continually recurs to the same
 thoughts, as if the rolling swell
 (ὄγκος) of words could conceal the
 poverty of ideas. This belongs to
 the mimetic element of the dialogue.

οἶμαι, ῥητορικὸς γενόμενός τις κᾶτα ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ ἀδικῇ, οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα δεῖ μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ δικάῃ χρεία
 45 παρέδωκεν, ὁ δ' ἐναντίως χρήται. τὸν οὖν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ^c
 χρώμενον μισεῖν δίκαιον καὶ ἐκβάλλειν καὶ ἀποκτείνουσαι, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα.

XII. Ση. Οἶμαι, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ σὲ ἔμπειρον εἶναι πολλῶν λόγων καὶ καθεωρακέναι ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅτι οὐ ῥαδίως δύνανται περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσωσιν διαλέγεσθαι διορισάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαθόντες καὶ διδάξαντες
 5 εἰ ταυτοὺς οὕτω διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνουσίας, ἀλλ' ἐὰν περὶ α
 του ἀμφισβητήσωσιν καὶ μὴ φῇ ὁ ἕτερος τὸν ἕτερον ὀρθῶς λέγειν ἢ μὴ σαφῶς, χαλεπαίνουσί τε καὶ κατὰ

457 42. κᾶτα : as well as κᾶπειτα, is
 b often used after a partic. as if it were following a finite verb.

c XII. 1. οἶμαι : the asyndeton shows that Socrates himself is not overpleased.—ἐμπειρον : sc. by having taken part in them either as speaker or listener.

2. λόγων : employed here as the general word including both the public speech as well as the private conversation, which is more properly διάλογος. Cf. Prot. 335 d ἐὰν σὺ ἐξέλθῃς, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔσονται ἡμῖν οἱ διάλογοι with 337 a χρῆ τοὺς ἐν τοιοῖσδε λόγοις παραγιγνομένους κοινοὺς μὲν εἶναι ἀμφοῖν τοῖν διαλεγόμενοι ἀκροατάς. The word συνουσία is similarly used in 461 b.—καθεωρακέναι : the compound verb, as compared with the simple, shows that the opinion has been gained by a consideration of a number of cases. Cf. 465 d.

3. δύνανται : sc. οἱ λέγοντες or οἱ διαλεγόμενοι, from the preceding λόγων.—διαλέγεσθαι : belongs to ἐπι-

χειρήσωσιν. The οὕτω sums up and 457
 re-emphasizes the preceding partici-
 c ples, on which lies the chief weight.

4. διορισάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους : “after having, by mutually giving and receiving information, defined to each other's satisfaction the nature of the question under discussion.”—μαθόντες and διδάξαντες : stand to each other as active and passive ; they denote the means by which the disputants have been enabled to define the question at issue (διορισάμενοι), and are hence subordinate to the preceding participle. Plato rather likes such collocations of active and passive ideas. Cf. d below, εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες, and 462 a.

7. ἢ μὴ σαφῶς : an afterthought. d Had it been present originally in Socrates' mind, he would have said μὴ ὀρθῶς ἢ κατέ. ; but not being present, the negative was attracted to the verb of saying, by the regular Greek rule. Looking at it in this light, it is not necessary (with Cron) to supply a

φθόνον οἶονται τὸν ἑαυτῶν λέγειν, φιλονικούντας ἀλλ' οὐ
 ζητοῦντας τὸ προκείμενον ἐν τῷ λόγῳ· καὶ ἔνιοί γε τελευ-
 10 τῶντες αἰσχιστα ἀπαλλάττονται, λοιδορηθέντες τε καὶ
 εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν τοιαῦτα, οἷα καὶ
 τοὺς παρόντας ἄχθεσθαι ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν, ὅτι τοιούτων
 ἀνθρώπων ἡξίωσαν ἀκροαταὶ γενέσθαι. τοῦ δὴ ἔνεκα
 λέγω ταῦτα; ὅτι νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς σὺ οὐ πάνυ ἀκόλουθα
 15 λέγειν οὐδὲ σύμφωνα οἷς τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγες περὶ τῆς

⁴⁵⁷ second φῆ from the preceding μὴ φῆ, which would hardly come under the head of the simple following the compound. — χαλεπαίνουσι: the pl. occurs here as it did with ἀμφισβητήσωσιν above, because from ὁ ἕτερος τὸν ἕτερον we naturally draw the idea "both." Cf. in Latin, Cic. de Fin. iii. 2. 8 quod cum accidisset, ut alter alterum necopinato videre, etc., and the expression for 'both' in the Romance languages. — The use of the pronouns throughout this long sentence is both interesting and instructive; ἀλλήλους, ἑαυτούς, ἕτερος, ἕτερον, ἑαυτῶν, σφῶν αὐτῶν (bis). The distinction between reciprocal and reflexive is sometimes very narrow.

8. φιλονικούντας κτέ.: when both reproach each other thus, they place themselves on the same level as participants in a disputatious contest, where each seeks his own honor, not the truth, as Socrates shows in *Phaedo* 91 a, where he contrasts the φιλοσόφως and φιλονικῶς ἔχοντες, and says of the latter, *ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητήσωσιν, ὅπῃ μὲν ἔχει περὶ ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ, οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ὅπως δὲ ἂν αὐτοὶ ἔθεντο ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παρούσιν τοῦτο προθυμούνται.* Cf. e, below, on πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα. They bear it hardly, and think

that out of envy, envy of themselves, the opponent said it, actuated by a factious spirit, and not by a desire to search into the matter before them in the discussion.

10. λοιδορηθέντες κτέ.: the two following participles, though logically co-ordinate with λοιδορηθέντες, really give its two sides.

11 f. οἷα . . . ἄχθεσθαι ὑπὲρ: the use of the acc. with the infin. after forms of οἶος is very rare, and seems to be an extension of the personal use of the infin. with οἶος. See GMT. 759; Madv. 186 c, and note on 452 e. Cf. *Apol.* 23 e Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν κτέ. We soon feel anger and indignation for one whom we consider abused.

14. οὐ πάνυ ἀκόλουθα: 'not quite consistent.' Cope.—ἀκόλουθα: denotes the naturally following result; σύμφωνα, the inner agreement of two statements standing in juxtaposition. Cf. *Xen. Anab.* ii. 4. 19 νεάνισκος δέ τις . . . εἶπεν, ὥς οὐκ ἀκόλουθα εἴη τὸ ἐπιθήσεσθαι καὶ λύσειν τὴν γέφυραν, *Lach.* 193 e τὰ ἔργα οὐ συμφωνεῖ τοῖς λόγοις. Plato delights in applying musical terms to logical conditions; hence the frequency of συμφωνεῖν and διαφωνεῖν, as also of συναΐδειν, συναΐδος. Cf. 461 a, 482 b.

ρητορικῆς. φοβοῦμαι οὖν διελέγχειν σε, μή με ὑπολάβῃς
οὐ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα φιλονικοῦντα λέγειν τοῦ καταφανὲς
γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς σέ. ἐγὼ οὖν, εἰ μὲν καὶ σὺ εἰ τῶν
ἀνθρώπων ὥνπερ καὶ ἐγώ, ἡδέως ἂν σε διερωτῶν· εἰ δὲ 458
20 μή, ἐφῆν ἄν. ἐγὼ δὲ τίνων εἰμί; τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ἐλεγ-
χθέντων, εἴ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, ἡδέως δ' ἂν ἐλεγχάντων, εἴ
τίς τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγοι, οὐκ ἀηδέστερον μεντὰν ἐλεγχθέν-
των ἢ ἐλεγχάντων· μείζον γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡγοῦμαι,
ὅσῳπερ μείζον ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι κακοῦ
25 τοῦ μεγίστου ἢ ἄλλον ἀπαλλάξαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι το-

457 16. φοβοῦμαι: has here a double
e reference, (1) to an action to be per-
formed (inf.); (2) to an effect to be
avoided (μὴ with subjv.). Cf. Xen.
An. i. 3. 17 ἐγὼ γὰρ ὀκνοῖν μὲν ἂν εἰς
τὰ πλοῖα ἐμβαλεῖν ἢ ἡμῖν δοίη, μὴ ἡμᾶς
ταῖς τριήρεσι καταδύσθαι, φοβοίμην δ' ἂν
τῷ ἡγεμόνι φ' δοίη ἔπεισθαι, μὴ ἡμᾶς
ἀγᾶθρ' ὅθεν οὐκ ἔσται ἐξελθεῖν. In the
first we have the will-side of the
fear; in the second, the apprehen-
sion.

17. οὐ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα: the neg.
οὐ is regular with the inf. of the in-
dir. discourse.—πρὸς: denotes the
end which the subject has in view. In
the present case this is paralleled by
τοῦ with the infin.,—one of the many
Greek modes of expressing finality
(H. 960; GMT. 798). With πρὸς σέ
also the main idea of the πρὸς is that
of hostile purpose; the hostility, how-
ever, does not lie in the πρὸς, but in
the general tone. In a certain sense
φιλονικεῖν might also be applied to
Socrates, as his search for truth was
a continual struggle throughout his
whole life.

18 f. καὶ σὺ . . . καὶ ἐγώ: when the
second member of a comparison is
contained in a relative clause with

ὅσῳπερ or ὥσπερ, the Greek idiom re- 457
quires καὶ in both members.

21. ἡδέως ἂν ἐλεγχάντων . . . λέγοι: 458
of these two conditional clauses the
first is logical, the second ideal. The
present conversation is a practical
example of Socrates' view; hence the
logical conditional form is used for
the practical present case. The rest of
the sentence follows naturally in the
opt. as being rather theoretical, and
applicable to some other time than
the present. The participles repre-
sent the same tenses of the optatives.

22. οὐκ ἀηδέστερον κτέ.: cf. 506 c
καὶ με ἐὰν ἐξελέγχεαι, οὐκ ἀχθεσθήσομαι
σοι, ὥσπερ σὺ ἐμοί, ἀλλὰ μέγιστος εὐε-
ργέτης παρ' ἐμοί ἀναγεγράφει.

23. μείζον γὰρ αὐτό: the correla-
tive to ὅσῳπερ is wanting, as is often
the case. αὐτὸ is always emphatic;
the unemphatic pronoun is τοῦτο.

25. οὐδὲν κτέ.: Socrates was con-
vinced that correct views determine
the will and actions, and that sin and
error are due to lack of knowledge.
Hence instruction, if it carry convic-
tion with regard to what is good and
true, must also bring about moral
improvement. Cf. what he says in
Apol. 28 a δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μάθω, παύ-

σοῦτον κακὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅσον δόξα ψευδὴς περὶ ὧν ὁ
 τυγχάνει νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ὦν. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ σὺ φῆς
 τοιοῦτος εἶναι, διαλεγόμεθα. εἰ δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ χρήναι ἑάν,
 ἐῷμεν ἤδη χαίρειν καὶ διαλύωμεν τὸν λόγον.

- 30 Γορ. Ἀλλὰ φημὶ μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς
 τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷον σὺ ὑφηγεῖ· ἴσως μέντοι χρῆν ἐννοεῖν
 καὶ τὸ τῶν παρόντων. πάσαι γάρ τοι, πρὶν καὶ ὑμᾶς
 ἐλθεῖν, ἐγὼ τοῖς παροῦσι πολλὰ ἐπιδειξάμην, καὶ νῦν
 ἴσως πόρρω ἀποτενούμεν, ἢ διαλεγόμεθα. σκοπεῖν οὖν
 35 χρὴ καὶ τὸ τούτων, μή τις αὐτῶν κατέχομεν βουλομέ-
 νους τι καὶ ἄλλο πράττειν.

XIII. ΧΑΙ. Τοῦ μὲν θορύβου, ὦ Γοργία τε καὶ Σώ-
 κρατες, αὐτοὶ ἀκούετε τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν, βουλομένων

458 σομαι ὁ γε ἄκων ποιῶ, and the cele-
 a brated phrase ascribed to him, οὐδεὶς
 ἔκων ἀμαρτάνει.

26. δόξα ψευδῆς: the force of οἶμαι
 extends over the whole sentence, and
 we should therefore logically expect
 δόξαν ψευδῆ. But by the use of the
 nom. Socrates holds the object up
 to view like an image.

b 28. εἰ δὲ καί: the contrast would
 rather be given by the harsh εἰ δὲ
 μή, but Socrates modifies it with his
 usual courtesy.

29. τὸν λόγον: in the same sense
 as in 457 d, above.

31. ὑφηγεῖ: indicate, sc. by your
 words and example. Gorgias recon-
 sider his assent by the expression
 χρῆν ἐννοεῖν. With χρῆν and εἴδει the
 opposition is to the inf., not to the
 obligation. By giving his reason,
 Gorgias stimulates himself to change
 from 'we ought to have' to 'we
 must' (σκοπεῖν οὖν χρή).

32. καὶ ὑμᾶς: as contrasted with
 the others, who had come earlier.

34. ἀποτενούμεν: to be completed 458
 according to 465 e συχρὸν λόγον ἀπο- c
 τέτακα and 466 a. So frequently, e.g.
 Prot. 335 c, 336 c, 361 a.

35. μή τις: is connected, in a
 loose kind of epexegetis, with τὸ ταύ-
 των, and hence also depends on σκο-
 πεῖν. For the ind., cf. Lach. 196 c,
 ὁρῶμεν μὴ Νικίας οἴεται τι λέγειν, Ly-
 sis 216 c ἐτι δὲ καὶ τότε σκεψόμεθα μὴ
 ἡμᾶς λανθάνει τὸ φίλον ὡς ἀληθῶς οὐδὲν
 τούτων ὄν.

XIII. 1. τοῦ μὲν θορύβου: here we
 recognize the importance of the silent
 listeners, whose presence we infer
 from such remarks as this, and who
 serve at this juncture to keep the
 discussion going. Next to them is
 Chaerephon, who here acts as their
 spokesman, and answers the βουλομέ-
 νους τι καὶ ἄλλο πράττειν. The θόρυβος
 simply denotes a rather loud expres-
 sion of protest against the apparent
 purpose of Gorgias, and of pleas-
 ure in the continuation of the dia-
 logue.

St. I. p. 458.

ἀκούειν, εἴαν τι λέγητε· ἐμοὶ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μὴ γένοιτο
τοσαύτη ἀσχολία, ὥστε τοιούτων λόγων καὶ οὕτω λεγο-
5 μένων ἀφεμένῳ προϋργαίτερόν τι γενέσθαι ἄλλο πρᾶτ-
τειν.

ΚΑΛ. Νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ α
αὐτὸς πολλοῖς ἤδη λόγοις παραγενόμενος οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ πώ-
ποτε ἦσθην οὕτως ὥσπερ νυνί· ὥστ' ἐμοιγε, κἂν τὴν
10 ἡμέραν ὅλην ἐθέλῃτε διαλέγεσθαι, χαριεῖσθε.

ΣΟ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει,
εἴπερ ἐθέλει Γοργίας.

ΓΟΡ. Αἰσχρόν δὴ τὸ λοιπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται ἐμέ
γε μὴ ἐθέλειν, αὐτὸν ἐπαγγειλάμενον ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι τις βού-

458 3. μὴ γένοιτο κτέ.: a most em-
c phatic denial in the form of a wish.
The sentiment is similar to that of
Pindar (*Isth.* i. 1 f.), alluded to in
Phaedr. 227 b οὐκ ἂν οἶε με κατὰ Πίν-
δαρον καὶ ἀσχολλας ὑπέρτερον πρᾶγμα
ποιήσασθαι τὸ σὴν τε καὶ Λυσίου διατρι-
βὴν ἀκοῦσαι.

d 7. Callicles is very eager to get
the conversation directed to his own
more especial field—politics. Hence
his support of Chaerephon's protest,
which he emphasizes by the addi-
tion of the expression καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ
αὐτός, where the καὶ μὲν approximates
closely in force to καὶ μὴν.

8. οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ: commonly equiv.
to haud scio an, sometimes, as
here, to haud scio an non. On
εἰ in this double meaning, see Kr. 65,
1, 8.

9 f. ὥστε . . . χαριεῖσθε: compare
with ὥστε . . . πρᾶττειν, a few lines
above.

11. τό γ' ἐμόν: has almost the
same force as ἐγώ, only less personal.
Like the phrases with περί and ἀμφί,
it became very common in later

Greek. Cf. *Rep.* vii. 533 a ἐπεὶ τό γ' 458
ἐμὸν οὐδὲν ἂν προθυμίας ἀπολείποι with
Symp. 210 a ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἐγώ, καὶ
προθυμίας οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω. Kr. 43, 4,
26.

13. αἰσχρόν: note that Gorgias is
impelled to a continuation of the dia-
logue only by regard for his own
honor. This motive was especially
strong with the Sophists; cf. *Prot.*
352 d αἰσχρόν ἐστιν ἐμοὶ σοφίαν μὴ
οὐχὶ πάντων κρείττον φάναι. With
αἰσχρόν and similar words which im-
ply a negation, it is more usual to
find μὴ οὐ. GMT. 817. It is also
more common to employ the dat. of
reference, instead of the acc. with the
infinitive. Rid. § 183.—τὸ λοιπόν:
not 'furthermore,' with Kr. 46, 3, 2,
but "finally," "in conclusion," after
those present have expressed their
desires.

14. ἐπαγγειλάμενον: for the mean-
ing, see on 447 c. Here it acquires
almost the force of "challenge," since
the subject of the inf. must be sup-
plied out of the following ὅτι τις βού-
λεται.

15 λεται. ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ τουτοισί, διαλέγου τε καὶ ἐρώτα ὅτι ε
βούλει.

Σπ. Ἄκουε δὴ, ὦ Γοργία, ἃ θαυμάζω ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις
ὑπὸ σοῦ· ἴσως γάρ τοι σοῦ ὀρθῶς λέγοντος ἐγὼ οὐκ
ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνω. ῥητορικὸν φῆς ποιεῖν οἷός τ' εἶναι,
20 εἴαν τις βούληται παρὰ σοῦ μανθάνειν.

Γορ. Ναί.

Σπ. Οὐκοῦν περὶ πάντων ὥστ' ἐν ὅλῳ πιθανὸν εἶναι
οὐ διδάσκοντα ἀλλὰ πείθοντα;

Γορ. Πάνν μὲν οἶν.

459

25 Σπ. Ἐλεγές τοι νυνδὴ ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ τοῦ
ιατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται ὁ ῥήτωρ.

Γορ. Καὶ γὰρ ἔλεγον, ἐν γε ὅλῳ.

Σπ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὅλῳ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν;
οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἐν γε τοῖς εἰδόσι τοῦ ιατροῦ πιθανώτερος
30 ἔσται.

Γορ. Ἀληθὴ λέγεις.

Σπ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τοῦ ιατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται, τοῦ
εἰδότος πιθανώτερος γίγνεται;

Γορ. Πάνν γε.

35 Σπ. Οὐκ ιατρός γε ὦν. ἦ γάρ;

458 23. οὐ διδάσκοντα: the regular
e neg. with ὥστε is μή. The οὐ here
may be due to the φῆς above, which
throws an indir. disc. coloring over
the whole. See Gildersleeve, *Am.*
Jour. Phil. vii. 174.

459 27. ἐν γε ὅλῳ: Gorgias wishes
a to protect himself by a restriction
which, while it defers, for a brief in-
terval, his defeat, shows plainly the
weakness of his professions. See
the criticism of Socrates which fol-
lows.

28. ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσι: the reason

for a change of neg. such as occurs 459
in this and the following clauses is
often hard to perceive. Here it
seems to be the oscillation from gen-
eric to particular, which is going on
continually in Socrates' mind. Hav-
ing made his general point with μή,
he recurs to the case under discus-
sion with οὐ. So ὁ δὲ μὴ ιατρός . . .
ἀνεπιστήμων (cf. before, ἐν τοῖς μὴ
εἰδόσι), but ὁ οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι.
It would be possible, but not so good,
to take the latter cases as examples
of adhaerent οὐ.

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ μὴ ἱατρός γε δήπου ἀνεπιστήμων ὢν ὁ ἱατρός ἐπιστήμων.

ΓΟΡ. Δῆλον ὅτι.

40 ΣΩ. Ὁ οὐκ εἰδὼς ἄρα τοῦ εἰδότος ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι πιθανώτερος ἔσται, ὅταν ὁ ῥήτωρ τοῦ ἱατροῦ πιθανώτερος ᾖ. τοῦτο συμβαίνει ἢ ἄλλο τι;

ΓΟΡ. Τοῦτο ἐνταῦθά γε συμβαίνει.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀπάσας τέχνας ὡσαύ-
45 τως ἔχει ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ ἡ ῥητορική; αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πράγματα οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὴν εἰδέναι ὅπως ἔχει, μηχανὴν δέ τινα πει-
θοὺς ἡύρηκέναι, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον
εἰδέναι τῶν εἰδότων;

XIV. ΓΟΡ. Οὐκοῦν πολλὴ ῥαστώνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται, μὴ μαθόντα τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, ἀλλὰ μίαν ταύτην, μηδὲν ἐλαττοῦσθαι τῶν δημιουργῶν;

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἐλαττοῦται ἢ μὴ ἐλαττοῦται ὁ ῥήτωρ τῶν
5 ἄλλων διὰ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν, αὐτίκα ἐπισκεψόμεθα, εἴαν τι

459
b 42. τοῦτο συμβαίνει ἢ ἄλλο τι: according to the position of ἄλλο τι before or after the ἢ the latter to be translated "than" or "or."

43. ἐνταῦθά γε: Gorgias notices the danger of such a concession, but still thinks he can limit the force of the argument to the single case. Perceiving this, Socrates immediately extends his statement to make it apply καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀπάσας τέχνας.

45 f. πράγματα . . . μηχανὴν πειθοῦς: Socrates never lets slip an occasion to emphasize the essential opposition of the aim of rhetoric to the truth of facts, an opposition admitted, indeed, by the Sophists themselves. Cf. the statement of Tisias in *Phaedr.* 272 d

ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀληθείας μετέχειν δέοι . . . τὸν μέλλοντα ἱκανῶς ῥητορικὸν εἶναι.

XIV. 1. πολλὴ ῥαστώνη: Gorgias is continually wandering away from the discussion of the nature of rhetoric to the praise of it, and being set right again by Socrates, who, while he brings back the discussion to the subjects which Gorgias had declared to be the proper province of rhetoric, is at the same time paving the way for an examination of its moral value.

5. διὰ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν: sc. μὴ μαθόντα κτέ. — αὐτίκα ἐπισκεψόμεθα: a formula for getting rid of a side issue like *εἰσαυθὺς σκεψόμεθα Prot.* 357 b. — τι: is adverbial.

ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγου ἤ · νῦν δὲ τόδε πρότερον σκεψώμεθα, ἄρα α
 τυγχάνει περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ αἰσχροὺν
 καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν οὕτως ἔχων ὁ ῥητορι-
 κὸς ὡς περὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὧν αἱ ἄλλαι
 10 τέχναι, αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰδώς, τί ἀγαθὸν ἢ τί κακὸν ἐστὶν ἢ
 τί καλὸν ἢ τί αἰσχροὺν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, πειθῶ δὲ περὶ
 αὐτῶν μεμηχανημένος, ὥστε δοκεῖν εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς ἐν
 οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰδότος; ἢ ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖ ε
 προεπιστάμενον ταῦτα ἀφικέσθαι παρὰ σὲ τὸν μέλλοντα
 15 μαθήσεσθαι τὴν ῥητορικὴν; εἰ δὲ μή, σὺ ὁ τῆς ῥητορικῆς
 διδάσκαλος τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν διδάξεις τὸν ἀφικνούμενον
 — οὐ γὰρ σὸν ἔργον — ποιήσεις δ' ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖν
 εἰδέναι αὐτὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ εἰδότα καὶ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸν
 εἶναι οὐκ ὄντα; ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐχ οἷός τε ἔσει αὐτὸν
 20 διδάξαι τὴν ῥητορικὴν, ἐὰν μὴ προειδῇ περὶ τούτων τὴν
 ἀλήθειαν; ἢ πῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει, ὦ Γοργία; καὶ πρὸς 460
 Διός, ὥσπερ ἄρτι εἶπες, ἀποκαλύψας τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπέ
 τίς ποθ' ἢ δύναμις ἐστὶν;

✱ Γορ. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐὰν τύχη μὴ
 25 εἰδώς, καὶ ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μαθήσεται.

Σο. Ἐχε δὴ · καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις. ἐάνπερ ῥητορικὸν σύ

459 d 6. πρὸς λόγον: to the advantage of our discourse. But little different from πρὸς λόγον. Cf. Prot. 351 e ἐὰν πρὸς λόγον δοκῇ εἶναι τὸ σκέμμα. — τόδε: draws the attention in advance to the series of closely interconnected questions, introduced by ἄρα, which, by their very intimate relation one to another, oppose, with a certain importunity, Gorgias' continual wandering and vagueness, and also, by their delicate allusion to the somewhat extravagant expression used above (455 d), have a decidedly ironical

tinge, which is rendered more apparent by the doubtful οἶμαι of Gorgias' d answer. — ἄρα: see on 476 a.

14. προεπιστάμενον: the partic. is e again the most important part of the statement, as in 457 c, 453 b.

15. τῆς ῥητορικῆς: this passage differs from 455 d only in arrangement.

26. ἔχε δὴ: a request to pause, 460 whereby the point reached is declared to be an important one, which merits further consideration. Cf. Prot. 349 d ἔχε δὴ . . . ἄξιον γὰρ τοι a

τινα ποιήσης, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸν εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ
ἀδिका ἥτοι πρότερόν γε ἢ ὕστερον μαθόντα παρὰ σοῦ.

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.

30 ΣΟ. Τί οὖν; ὁ τὰ τεκτονικὰ μεμαθηκὼς τεκτονικός, ἢ οὐ; ^b

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΟ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ τὰ μουσικὰ μουσικός;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΟ. Καὶ ὁ τὰ ἱατρικὰ ἱατρικός, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτω κατὰ
35 τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὁ μεμαθηκὼς ἕκαστα τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷον
ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἕκαστον ἀπεργάζεται;

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΟ. Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ τὰ δίκαια
μεμαθηκὼς δίκαιος;

40 ΓΟΡ. Πάντως δήπου.

ΣΟ. Ὁ δὲ δίκαιος δικάειά που πράττει;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΟ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν [ρήτορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι, τὸν ^c
δὲ] δίκαιον βούλεσθαι (ἀεὶ) δίκαια πράττειν;

⁴⁶⁰ ἐπισκέψασθαι ὃ λέγεις. When thus
^a used, *ἔχειν* is of course intransitive.
H. 810.

28. ἥτοι . . . ἢ: or at least. In English we should naturally use *γέ* with the second member. Cf. *Apol.* 27 *αὐτοὺς δαίμονας ἥτοι θεοὺς γε ἡγούμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας.*—*παρὰ σοῦ*: const. with *ὕστερον μαθόντα* alone; *πρότερον* with *εἰδέναι*.

^b 30. τὰ τεκτονικά: "the principles of building."

34 f. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον: according to the same principle (analogy). "The argument which follows is to our notions sophistical enough. Not so, however, from the Socratic point of view, according to which every virtue is a form of knowledge, and

every vice the result of ignorance." ⁴⁶⁰
Thompson. See on 458 a. ^b

43. οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη κτέ.: a few lines ^c
below is found a repetition of the first clause of this sentence, in almost the same language, where, too, the statement is natural, and is used as a basis for a further deduction; here, on the contrary, it is out of place, and besides, is not followed up at all in the next sentence. These reasons have led to the omission of the bracketed words, by which we get a clearly logical argument, as follows: "The just man performs just actions." "Yes." "Must he not therefore wish always to perform just actions?" "Apparently." "The just man will never, then, wish to perform unjust actions," etc.

45 ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται γέ.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ γέ δίκαιος ἀδικεῖν.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Τὸν δὲ ῥητορικὸν ἀνάγκη ἐκ τοῦ λόγου δίκαιον εἶναι.

50 ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀδικεῖν.

ΓΟΡ. Οὐ φαίνεται γέ.

XV. ΣΩ. Μέμνησαι οὖν λέγων ὀλίγῳ πρότερον, ὅτι οὐ δὲ τοῖς παιδοτρίβαις ἐγκαλεῖν οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, ἐὰν ὁ πύκτης τῇ πυκτικῇ χρήται τε καὶ ἀδικῇ; ὡσαύτως δὲ οὕτως καὶ ἐὰν ὁ ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥητορικῇ ἀδίκως
5 χρήται, μὴ τῷ διδάξαντι ἐγκαλεῖν μηδὲ ἐξελαύνειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρωμένῳ τῇ ῥητορικῇ; ἐρρήθη ταῦτα ἢ οὐ;

ΓΟΡ. Ἐρρήθη.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γε ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος φαίνεται, ὁ ῥητορικὸς, οὐκ
10 ἂν ποτε ἀδικήσας. ἢ οὐ;

ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις γε, ὦ Γοργία, λόγοις ἐλέγετο, ὅτι ἡ ῥητορικὴ περὶ λόγους εἶη οὐ τοὺς τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου· ἢ γάρ;

460 XV. 1. λέγων: equiv. to ὅτι ἔλε-
d γες, that you were saying.

2. οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν: when two verbs which govern different cases are construed with but one object, it is customary to construe this object with the nearer verb. Cf. below (5).

3. χρήται τε καὶ ἀδικῇ: the co-ordination of the two ideas by τε . . . καὶ brings into greater prominence the impropriety of thus misapplying otherwise useful skill, than the more usual ἀδίκως χρήται of the following clause.

6. ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι: the μηδὲ
ἐξελαύνειν is a result which may or
may not follow the ἐγκαλεῖν, accord-
ing to circumstances. The real op-
position is between τῷ διδάξαντι and
τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, hence the second is put
in the same case as the first, although
the acc. would be required by ἐξελαύ-
νειν. Cf. Prot. 327 a πᾶς πάντα ἐδί-
δασκε καὶ ἐπέπληττε τὸν μὴ καλῶς
αὐλοῦντα.

10. ἂν ποτε ἀδικήσας: represents e
the same tense of the optative.

15 Γορ. Ναί.

Σο. Ἐγὼ τοῖνυν σοῦ τότε ταῦτα λέγοντος ὑπέλαβον, ὡς οὐδέποτε ἂν εἴη ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἀδικον πρᾶγμα, ὃ γ' αἰεὶ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖται· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἔλεγες, ὅτι ὁ ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥητορικῇ καὶ ἀδίκως
20 χρῶτο, οὕτω θαυμάσας καὶ ἡγησάμενος οὐ συνᾶδεν τὰ 461 λεγόμενα ἐκείνους εἶπον τοὺς λόγους, ὅτι, εἰ μὲν κέρδος ἡγοῖο εἶναι τὸ ἐλέγχεσθαι ὥσπερ ἐγώ, ἄξιον εἶη διαλέγεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἂν χαίρειν· ὕστερον δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπισκοπομένων ὁρᾷς δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι αὐτὸ ὁμολογεῖται τὸν ῥητορικὸν
25 ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἀδίκως χρῆσθαι τῇ ῥητορικῇ καὶ ἐθέλειν ἀδικεῖν. ταῦτα οὖν ὅπη ποτὲ ἔχει, μὰ τὸν κύνα, ὦ Γοργία, οὐκ ὀλίγης συνουσίας ἐστὶν ὥστε ἱκανῶς διασκέψασθαι.

XVI. Πολ. Τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὕτω καὶ σὺ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς δοξάζεις ὥσπερ νῦν λέγεις; ἢ οἶει, ὅτι Γοργίας

460 17. ὃ γι: gives the basis of the statement. The neuter may be due to the πρᾶγμα immediately preceding (H. 631 a), or it may simply be used ad sensum. Cf. 465 d.

461 20. οὕτω: under these circumstances.

a See on 503 d. — συνᾶδεν: a musical term. See on 457 e.

24. ὁρᾷς δὴ καὶ αὐτός: properly the following clause should be independent, stating the conclusions reached in the investigation; but by bringing it under the government of the inserted ὁρᾷς κτέ. an appeal is again made to the fairness of the opponent. Cf. *Apol.* 24 d ὁρᾷς, ὦ Μέλητε, ὅτι σιγᾷς, ib. 31 b νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοί, ὅτι οἱ κατήγοροι κτέ.

b 26. μὰ τὸν κύνα: cf. 466 c, 482 b, *Apol.* 22 a. Socrates is rather fond of this formula of asseveration, possibly out of aversion to any light

handling, even of the Greek divinities. See on 463 d. 461 b

27. οὐκ ὀλίγης συνουσίας: a delicate allusion to 458 c, which shows Socrates' fine feeling in not insisting on a discussion which must be unpleasant and also humiliating to Gorgias. The word συνουσία is elsewhere employed so as to include the discourses (*διαλογοί*), e.g. *Prot.* 310 a τί οὖν οὐ διηγήσω ἡμῖν τὴν ξυνουσίαν; i.e. in the sense of the Eng. "meeting."

XVI. 1. On Polus, who here again thrusts himself into the discussion, see note to 448 a, and *Introd.* § 14. — καί: belongs, according to the sense, with δοξάζεις. *Is what you say also really your opinion?* We should expect a second καί with ὥσπερ, according to usage. See on 457 e. Others construe καί with σὺ.

2. ἢ οἶαι: or do you think. The

ἡσχύνθη σοι μὴ προσομολογῆσαι τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα
μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ τὰ δίκαια εἰδέναι καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ,
5 καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔλθῃ ταῦτα εἰδὼς παρ' αὐτόν, αὐτὸς διδάξῃ,
ἔπειτα ἐκ ταύτης ἴσως τῆς ὁμολογίας ἐναντίον τι συνέβῃ ἐν
τοῖς λόγοις, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ ἀγαπᾷς, αὐτὸς ἀγαγὼν ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα
ἐρωτήματα—ἐπεὶ τίνα οἶε ἀπαρνήσεσθαι μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ
αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἄλλους διδάξῃ; ἀλλ'
10 εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄγειν πολλὴ ἀγροικία ἐστὶ τοὺς λόγους.

Σο. ὦ κάλλιστε Πῶλε, ἀλλὰ τοι ἐξεπίτηδες κτώμεθα
ἐταίρους καὶ υἱεῖς, ἵνα, ἐπειδὰν αὐτοὶ πρεσβύτεροι γιγνώ-
μενοι σφαλλώμεθα, παρόντες ὑμεῖς οἱ νεώτεροι ἐπανορ-
θῶτε ἡμῶν τὸν βίον καὶ ἐν ἔργοις καὶ ἐν λόγοις. καὶ α

⁴⁶¹ second question repeats the first in a
^b varied form. Both questions are
'rhetorical,' expecting no answer, and
express a protest against the idea
that the art of rhetoric has anything
to do with a knowledge of what is
right.

4. μὴ οὐχὶ . . . εἰδέναι κτέ.: two
negs. after ἡσχύνθη μὴ προσομολογῆσαι,
on account of the negative force of
the expression. Cf. *Prot.* 352 c, d.
See H. 1034 b, and on 458 d. The
construction is the same as that after
ἀπαρνήσεσθαι below, which is followed
by a double neg. because the question
τίνα οἶε veils the assertion οὐδεὶς.
οὐχὶ is merely more emphatic than
οὐ.

5. εἰ μὴ ἔλθῃ ταῦτα εἰδὼς: more
logically, εἰ μὴ ἔλθῃ ταῦτα μὴ εἰδὼς.—
διδάξῃ: depends upon some verb of
saying to be supplied from προσομο-
λογῆσαι. The asyndeton with ἔπειτα
instead of καί (cf. *Apol.* 23 c) is
not uncommon, and the clause is to
be construed in dependence on ὅτι
(because). By this time, however,
Polus' flow of words has run away

with him; he has only energy enough ⁴⁶¹
left to hurl at Socrates the words ^b
τοῦθ' ὃ δὴ ἀγαπᾷς, before he abandons
his struggling sentence altogether and
starts afresh. Such passages as this
show Plato to have been no mean
dramatist.

6. ἴσως: gives expression in pass-
ing to the hint that perhaps the con-
tradiction was not so clearly deduced
from Gorgias' words as Socrates sup-
posed. The whole sentence, however,
shows Polus' complete inability to
grasp the real point at issue.

10. ἀγροικία: is the reverse of παι-
δεία. By this very criticism, Polus
betrays that he is himself just as
lacking in the polish of a gentleman,
which he denies to Socrates, as in sci-
entific knowledge.

11. ὦ κάλλιστε: the epithet suits
the pompous rhetor excellently.

12. υἱεῖς: the addition of the word
"sons," though not strictly necessary,
is quite natural, especially among
people where the support of the par-
ent by the son was so strictly enjoined
as among the Greeks.

15 νῦν εἴ τι ἐγὼ καὶ Γοργίας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σφαλλόμεθα, σὺ παρὼν ἐπανόρθου· δίκαιος δ' εἶ· καὶ ἐγὼ ἐθέλω τῶν ὁμολογημένων εἴ τί σοι δοκεῖ μὴ καλῶς ὁμολογήσθαι, ἀναθέσθαι ὅτι ἂν σὺ βούλῃ, εἰάν μοι ἐν μόνον φυλάττῃς.

20 Πηλ. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

37 Σα. Τὴν μακρολογίαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἣν καθέρξης, ἥ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησας χρῆσθαι.

Πηλ. Τί δέ; οὐκ ἐξέσται μοι λέγειν ὅποσα ἂν βούλωμαι;

25 Σα. Δεινὰ μεντὰν πάθοις, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ Ἀθήναζε ἀφικόμενος, οὗ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πλείστη ἐστὶν ἐξουσία τοῦ λέγειν, ἔπειτα σὺ ἐνταῦθα τούτου μόνος ἀτυχήσῃς. ἀλλὰ ἀντίθεσ τοι· σοῦ μακρὰ λέγοντος καὶ μὴ ἐθέλοντος

461 d 15. ἐγὼ καὶ Γοργίας: besides being the Greek idiom, the initial position of ἐγὼ softens the supposition for Gorgias. The Latin has the same position.

16. δίκαιος δ' εἶ: the sense is to be supplied from what precedes. Cf. *Lach.* 180 d εἴ τι ἔχεις τῷδε τῷ σαντοῦ δημότῃ ἀγαθὸν συμβουλευσαι, χρὴ συμβουλευέιν· δίκαιος δ' εἶ. The regular neg. of the inf. after δοκεῖ would be οὐ. μὴ is here due to the conditional color. For the personal const. see on 449 c.

18. ἀναθέσθαι: the figure is drawn from the draughts-board; it is the regular word for 'taking back' a move. Similarly, *Prot.* 354 e ἄλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀναθέσθαι ἐξεστίν, εἴ πῃ ἔχετε ἄλλο τι φάναι.

20. τί τοῦτο λέγεις: equiv. to τί ἐστὶ τοῦτο ὃ λέγεις. Kr. 57, 3, 6; H. 1012 a.

21. εἰάν καθέρξης: as it were, by a dam or a fence.

22. χρῆσθαι: because in μακρολο- 461 για the orator has at his disposal all the devices of his art.

25. Ἀθήναζε: Athens was noted as a πόλις φιλόλογος (*Leg.* I. 641 e), and freedom of speech (*παρρησία*) was held to be the fundamental principle of a democratically governed state. Cf. *Dem. Phil.* iii. 3 ὑμεῖς τὴν παρρησίαν ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων οὕτω κοινὴν οἰεσθε δεῖν εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει ὥστε καὶ τοῖς ξένοις καὶ τοῖς δούλοις αὐτῆς μεταδεδῶκατε.

26. τῆς Ἑλλάδος: is the part. gen. dependent upon οὐ. The Eng. would find ἐν with the dat. more natural. — ἔπειτα: after all. GMT. 856.

28. ἀντίθεσ: equiv. to but consider on the other hand; lit. put in opposition. — σοῦ μακρὰ λέγοντος κτέ.: Socrates makes a similar remark in *Prot.* 335 c, when he really prepares to leave the gathering rather than waste his time in words.

τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὐ δευὰ ἂν αὐτὸ ἐγὼ πάθοιμι,
 30 εἰ μὴ ἐξέσται μοι ἀπιέναι καὶ μὴ ἀκούειν σου; ἀλλ' εἴ τι 462
 κήδει τοῦ λόγου τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ ἐπανορθώσασθαι αὐτὸν
 βούλει, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ἀναθέμενος ὅτι σοι δοκεῖ, ἐν
 τῷ μέρει ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενος, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ τε καὶ
 Γοργίας, ἔλεγχέ τε καὶ ἐλέγχου. φῆς γὰρ δήπου καὶ σὺ
 35 ἐπίστασθαι ἅπερ Γοργίας· ἦ οὐ;

Πολ. Ἐγώ γε.

Σο. Οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ κελεύεις σαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν ἐκάστοτε
 ὅτι ἂν τις βούληται, ὥς ἐπιστάμενος ἀποκρίνεσθαι;

Πολ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

40 Σο. Καὶ νῦν δὴ τούτων ὁπότερον βούλει ποίει, ἐρώτα ἢ
 ἀποκρίνου.

XVII. Πολ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. καὶ μοι ἀπόκριναι,
 ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπειδὴ Γοργίας ἀπορεῖν σοι δοκεῖ περὶ τῆς
 ῥητορικῆς, σὺ αὐτὴν τίνα φῆς εἶναι;

Σο. Ἄρα ἐρωτᾶς ἥντινα τέχνην φημί εἶναι;

5 Πολ. Ἐγώ γε.

Σο. Οὐδεμία ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Πῶλε, ὥς γε πρὸς σέ
 τάληθ' εἰρήσθαι.

462 31. κηδεσθαι: implies personal interest in the matter.

32. ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον: is to be taken with the following clause, ἀναθέμενος.

34. φῆς γὰρ δήπου: by quoting his own vaunting words against him, Socrates compels Polus also to adopt the dialectic form. — δήπου: throws a tinge of irony into the question.

b XVII. 1. ταῦτα: is simply the proposition which Socrates makes, and the words ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα is a formula of acceptance. — ἀλλά: well then, is often thus used in answers. After an imv., as here in Soph. El.

376 ff., ΗΛ. Φέρ' εἰπέ δὴ τὸ δεινόν... 462
 XP. ἀλλ' ἐξερῶ τοι πᾶν ὅσον κάτοιδ' ἐγώ. b

3. τίνα φῆς εἶναι: though assuming it as self-evident that rhetoric is a τέχνη, Polus is compelled, in commencing, to put his question quite generally. Socrates, in his answer, confines himself simply to deducing the consequences of Gorgias' admissions. The substitution of ἥντινα for τίνα is according to the strict rule, which, however, is not rigorously adhered to.

6 f. ὥς... εἰρήσθαι: cf. Rep. x. 595 b ὥς πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρήσθαι. The active εἰπεῖν is more common. See Adv. 151; H. 956; GMT. 777. 2.

Πολ. Ἀλλὰ τί σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι;

Σο. Πρᾶγμα ὃ φῆς σὺ ποιῆσαι τέχνην ἐν τῷ συγγράμ-
10 ματι ὃ ἐγὼ ἔναγχος ἀνέγνω. c

Πολ. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

Σο. Ἐμπειρίαν ἔγωγέ τινα.

Πολ. Ἐμπειρία ἄρα σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι;

Σο. Ἐμοιγε, εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις.

15 Πολ. Τίνος ἐμπειρία;

Σο. Χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας.

Πολ. Οὐκοῦν καλὸν σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι, —
χαρίζεσθαι οἷόν τε εἶναι ἀνθρώποις;

Σο. Τί δέ, ὦ Πῶλε; ἤδη πέπυσαι παρ' ἐμοῦ, ὅτι φημὶ
20 αὐτὴν εἶναι, ὥστε τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς, εἰ οὐ καλὴ μοι a
δοκεῖ εἶναι;

Πολ. Οὐ γὰρ πέπυσμαι ὅτι ἐμπειρίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν φῆς
εἶναι;

Σο. Βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ τιμᾷς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι, σμικρόν
25 τί μοι χαρίσασθαι;

⁴⁶² 9. ὃ φῆς σὺ ποιῆσαι τέχνην: is to
^b be explained according to 448 c πολ-
λαί τέχναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν
ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως ἡρήμεναι, accord-
ing to which an art arises from expe-
rience. Polus, however, has by this
time forgotten his own words. — ἐν
τῷ συγγράμματι: see on 448 c and
Introd. § 14.

^c 13. ἐμπειρία: here not an empirical
science, but merely a dexterity ac-
quired by much practice. Cf. 463 b.
The following question is no advance
on his first one, and seems to show
that Polus has no definite plan.

16. χάρις: is the grace which
causes pleasure, and depends princi-
pally on the person of the orator;
ἡδονή, the pleasure with which the

hearer is inspired by his speech. ⁴⁶²
Quintilian (*Inst. or.* ii. 15. 24) trans-
lates the expression by the words c
peritia gratiae ac voluptatis.
Polus has not yet heard the specific
difference which distinguishes rhetoric
from other ἐμπειρίαι of the same class.
Hence he again falls into the same
error in his question as he did in his
answer above, 448 c. In this way,
however, the conversation is again
turned to the consideration of the
value of rhetoric.

20. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο: see on 452 c. d
— εἰ οὐ κτέ.: οὐ because Polus ex-
pects an affirmative answer. — εἰ:
whether.

24. τιμᾷς: equiv. to καλὸν φῆς εἶναι
or περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, as in *Crito* 47 a.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἐροῦ νῦν με, ὁψοποιία ἥτις μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐρωτῶ δὴ, τίς τέχνη ὁψοποιία;

ΣΩ. Οὐδεμία, ὦ Πῶλε.

30 ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ τί; φάθι.

ΣΩ. Φημὶ δὴ, ἐμπειρία τις.

ΠΩΛ. Τίνος; φάθι.

ΣΩ. Φημὶ δὴ, χάριτος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας, ὦ Πῶλε. ^e

ΠΩΛ. Ταῦτόν δ' ἐστὶν ὁψοποιία καὶ ῥητορικὴ;

35 ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς γε, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς μὲν ἐπιτηδεύσεως μόριον.

ΠΩΛ. Τίνος λέγεις ταύτης;

ΣΩ. Μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἢ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν· ὁκνῶ Γοργίου ἔνεκα λέγειν, μὴ οἷται με διακωμῶδεῖν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ
40 ἐπιτήδευμα· ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἣν 463
Γοργίας ἐπιτηδεύει, οὐκ οἶδα· καὶ γὰρ ἄρτι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ἐγένετο, τί ποτε οὗτος ἡγείται· ὁ δ' ἐγὼ καλῶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν, πράγματός τινός ἐστι μόριον οὐδενὸς τῶν καλῶν.

45 ΓΩΡ. Τίνος, ὦ Σώκρατες; εἰπέ, μηδὲν ἐμὲ αἰσχυνθεῖς.

462 — τὸ χαρίζεσθαι: pres. for the habit.

d — χαρίσασθαι: aor. for the single example.

e 34. ταῦτόν δ' ἐστίν: with surprise and disgust. Polus overlooks the fact that there can be two orders belonging to the same species.

37. τίνος . . . ταύτης: in close connexion with what precedes. See on 461 d and 449 e.

38. μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἢ: it is not necessary to supply a verb of apprehension, though that is the idea suggested by μὴ with the subjv. GMT. 309; H. 867. The employment of the

form here is an attempt to conciliate. In 486 c, 509 a καὶ εἰ ἀγροικότερόν τι εἰπεῖν ἐστίν, Socrates has laid aside all idea of conciliation, and speaks the truth with boldness. ἄγροικος is opposed to ἀστεῖος, and means rude (see on 447 a). It is to be taken in connexion with the reproof administered by Polus in 461 c. Truth often incurs the reproach of ἀγροικία. Note that Socrates still preserves towards Gorgias his courtesy and respect.

44. οὐδενός: explanatory of τινός. 463

45. μηδὲν ἐμὲ αἰσχυνθεῖς: cf. Hom. ^a γ 96 μηδέ τί μ' αἰδόμενος μειλίσσαιο.

XVIII. Σο. Δοκεῖ τοῖνυν μοι, ὦ Γοργία, εἶναι τι ἐπι-
 τήδευμα τεχνικὸν μὲν οὐ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀν-
 δρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς προσομιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις·
 καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐγὼ τὸ κεφάλαιον κολακείαν. ταύτης μοι **b**
 5 δοκεῖ τῆς ἐπιτηδεύσεως πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα μόρια εἶναι,
 ἐν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὀψοποιική· ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι τέχνη, ὡς δὲ ὁ
 ἐμὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἔστιν τέχνη, ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή.
 ταύτης μόριον καὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἐγὼ καλῶ καὶ τὴν γε
 κομμωτικὴν καὶ τὴν σοφιστικὴν, τέτταρα ταῦτα μόρια ἐπὶ **c**
 10 τέτταρσιν πράγμασιν. εἰ οὖν βούλεται Πῶλος πυνθάνε-
 σθαι, πυνθανέσθω. οὐ γάρ πω πέπυσται, ὅποῖόν φημι
 ἐγὼ τῆς κολακείας μόριον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν
 λέληθα οὐπω ἀποκεκριμένος, ὃ δὲ ἐπανερωτᾷ, εἰ οὐ καλὸν
 ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἀποκρινούμαι πρότερον,

463 XVIII. 2. ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς
 α κτέ.: in this characterization, Socrates includes all the good that can be said of the art of rhetoric. It requires cleverness in perceiving and distinguishing between various relations, hardihood to work before the eyes of the world, and skill in dealing with men. — στοχαστικῆς: is originally connected with shooting and throwing, but is often metaphorically used. With this definition, cf. Isoc. c. *Soph.* 294 d ταῦτα δὲ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας δεῖσθαι καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς ἔργον εἶναι. In regard to courage in speaking, cf. Cic. *de Or.* i. 26. 121.

b 4. κολακείαν: the Greek word means more than the English "flattery." Under it is included everything whose aim is the agreeable rather than the good.

5. ἐπιτηδεύσεως: notice the variety in the use of the words ἐπιτήδευσις and ἐπιτήδευμα, which are to be

distinguished as πράξις and πρᾶγμα, 463 the one being a concrete manifestation of the other.

7. ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή: these words are but little distinguished. The first denotes, as has already been said (on 462 c), the result obtained by practice; the latter is more especially that which is derived from work without any definite object or clear consciousness. So rhetoric is called in *Phaedrus* 260 e ἄτεχνος τριβή, and in 270 b τριβὴ καὶ ἐμπειρία. See on 462 c.

9. κομμωτική: is not only finery c in dress, but also hair-curling, ointments, cosmetics, etc. Cf. Quint. ii. 15. 25 manganum artificium, qui colorem fuco et verum robur inani sagina mentiuntur. The addition of γέ emphasizes the examples newly thought of.

13. εἰ οὐ: see on 462 d.

14 ff. ἀποκρινούμαι... πρὶν ἂν ἀποκρίνωμαι: after the model of the anticipatory conditional. πρὶν, "before,"

15 εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρὸν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν, πρὶν
 ἂν πρῶτον ἀποκρίνωμαι ὅτι ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, ὦ
 Πῶλε· ἀλλ' εἶπερ βούλει πυθέσθαι, ἐρώτα, ὅποιον μῦριον
 τῆς κολακείας φημί εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν.

Πολ. Ἐρωτῶ δὴ, καὶ ἀπόκριναι, ὅποιον μῦριον.

20 Σο. Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν μάθοις ἀποκριναμένου; ἔστιν γὰρ ἡ α
 ῥητορικὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολιτικῆς μορίου εἰδῶλον.

Πολ. Τί οὖν; καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν λέγεις αὐτὴν εἶναι;

Σο. Αἰσχρὸν ἔγωγε· τὰ γὰρ κακὰ αἰσχροῦ καλῶ·
 ἐπειδὴ δεῖ σοι ἀποκρίνασθαι ὡς ἤδη εἰδοῦτι ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω.

25 Γορ. Μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐδὲ αὐτὸς
 συνίημι ὅτι λέγεις.

Σο. Εἰκότως γε, ὦ Γοργία· οὐδὲν γάρ πω σαφὲς λέγω, e
 Πῶλος δὲ ὅδε νέος ἐστὶ καὶ ὀξύς.

⁴⁶³ takes the inf.; "until," the indic.
 c subjv. or opt., according to the sphere
 of time. See Gildersleeve, *Am. Jour.*
Phil. ii. 465 ff.

d 20. ἄρ' οὖν κτέ.: the question im-
 plies doubt, and is intended to stimu-
 late Polus' attention; but for some
 cause, probably dulness, he merely
 renews his previous question.—The
 meaning of εἰδῶλον is made clear by
Theaet. 150 e ψευδῇ καὶ εἰδῶλα περὶ
 πλείονος ποιησάμενοι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

23. τὰ γὰρ κακὰ κτέ.: that which
 according to its nature can be char-
 acterized as ἀγαθόν, must be esteemed
 καλόν. If, however, it is κακόν, then
 it must be esteemed αἰσχρόν.

24. ὡς ἤδη εἰδοῦσι: is a stinging re-
 buke to Polus.

25. μὰ τὸν Δία, εἰλλ' ἐγὼ κτέ.:
 Socrates' words implied that Polus
 was either too dull or too careless
 to understand him. Gorgias, while
 tacitly admitting Polus' incompete-
 ncy, tries to smooth over his de-

feat by confessing to his own inability ⁴⁶³
 to catch Socrates' meaning as it is at
 present stated. If the master, αὐτός, d
 cannot understand, the pupil may be
 pardoned for the same fault. Polus,
 though defeated in his attempt to
 rout Socrates (461 b ff.), only re-
 tires to recover breath before making
 a final effort (466 a).—μὰ τὸν Δία:
 is a real asseveration, used designedly
 by Gorgias, who is too much of a
 gentleman to indulge in oaths,—this
 being the only instance in this dia-
 logue. It is significant that Polus,
 in spite of his heat, is likewise only
 once (473 a) betrayed into the com-
 mon ναὶ μὰ Δία. Callicles uses oaths
 roundly enough, but restricts himself
 to νῆ τοὺς θεούς, ναὶ μὰ Δία, and μὰ Δία.
 On Socrates' habit, see on 449 d, 461 b.

28. Πῶλος δὲ . . . ὀξύς: in this re- e
 mark Socrates both apologizes for
 and explains the reason of the ob-
 scurity of his statements; but it is,
 at the same time, an excellent char-

Γορ. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν ἔα, ἐμοὶ δ' εἰπέ, πῶς λέγεις
30 πολιτικῆς μορίου εἰδῶλον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν.

Σο. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι, ὃ γέ μοι φαίνεται
εἶναι ἡ ῥητορικὴ· εἰ δὲ μὴ τυγχάνει ὃν τοῦτο, Πῶλος ὁδε
ἐλέγξει. σῶμά που καλεῖς τι καὶ ψυχὴν;

Γορ. Πῶς γάρ οὐ;

464

35 Σο. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τούτων οἶει τινὰ εἶναι ἑκατέρου εὐεξίαν;

Γορ. Ἐγώ γε.

Σο. Τί δέ; δοκοῦσαν μὲν εὐεξίαν, οὖσαν δ' οὐ; οἷον
τοιόνδε λέγω· πολλοὶ δοκοῦσιν εὖ ἔχειν τὰ σώματα, οὓς
οὐκ ἂν ῥαδίως αἰσθοιτό τις ὅτι οὐκ εὖ ἔχουσιν ἄλλος ἢ
40 ἱατρός τε καὶ τῶν γυμναστικῶν τις.

Γορ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Σο. Τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγω καὶ ἐν σώματι εἶναι καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ,
ὅτι ποιεῖ μὲν δοκεῖν εὖ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἔχει
δὲ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον.

463 acterization of the impetuosity and
e heat of Polus, whether he be the
questioner or the respondent. It also
contains an allusion to the name it-
self (*πῶλος a colt, filly*).

464 a 35. The division of *κολακεία* given
above was made without specifying
the standard of division, and only
enumerates the different varieties.
Socrates now, at Gorgias' instance,
reduces the whole subject to a regu-
lar system, by referring *κολακεία* back
to a higher species, *θεραπεία*, on the
basis of a distinction according to
reality and appearance. Now, since
θεραπεία has for its object the *εὐεξία*
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, we get two more points
of view: (1) that of the *object* (*ἀνθρώ-
που*), as composed of *body* and *soul*;
and (2) that of the *treatment*, as being
either *positive* or *negative*.

37. *οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω*: is a formula 464
for introducing an example or a spe-
cial case in illustration of a general
statement.

38. *εὖ ἔχειν τὰ σώματα*: τὰ σώματα
here, as well as τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν
below, is acc. of specification. H.
718 a.

42. *τὸ τοιοῦτον*: the article is used
on account of its reference to what
has just been described. This is
more definitely given in the *ὅτι* (rela-
tive) clause which follows.

43. *ἔχει δὲ κτέ.*: in this change of
subject lies no ambiguity either to
the Greek mind or to us. It was, be-
sides, a regular way in Greek of ex-
pressing "although." The subject is
the same indefinite one which must
be supplied as the object of the pre-
ceding *ποιεῖ*. See on 466 d.

4445 ΓΟΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

XIX. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ σοι, ἐὰν δύνωμαι, σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξω ὃ λέγω. δυοῖν ὄντων τοῖς πραγμάτων δύο λέγω τέχνας· τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ πολιτικὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ σώματι μίαν μὲν οὕτως ὀνομάσαι οὐκ ἔχω σοι, μιᾶς δὲ οὐσης τῆς τοῦ σώματος θεραπείας δύο μόρια λέγω, τὴν μὲν γυμναστικὴν, τὴν δὲ ἰατρικὴν· τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἀντιστροφον μὲν τῇ γυμναστικῇ τὴν νομοθετικὴν, ἀντίστροφον δὲ τῇ ἰατρικῇ τὴν δικαιοσύνην. ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν δὴ ἅλληλαις, ἅτε περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὔσαι, ἐκάτεραι τούτων, ἣ τε ἰατρικὴ τῇ γυμναστικῇ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῇ νομοθετικῇ, ὅμως δὲ διαφέρουσιν τι ἁλλήλων. τεττάρων δὲ τούτων οὐσῶν, καὶ αἰεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπευουσῶν τῶν μὲν

464 XIX. 2. δυοῖν κτέ.: the dual in Plato's time is fast fading out, and he uses it as an artistic feature. It disappears entirely before the close of the fourth century B.C. Notice the asyndeton.

4. μίαν ὀνομάσαι: like ἐνὶ ὀνόματι καλεῖν, προσαγορεύειν. — οὕτως: is idiomatically used, "thus briefly" or "thus at the moment." See on 503 d. — οὐκ ἔχω: I am not in position, regularly takes the aor. infinitive.

6 f. ἀντίστροφον μὲν . . . ἀντίστροφον δέ: an example of 'anaphora.' — ἀντίστροφον: denotes a part corresponding to a similar part on the opposite side of the symmetrical whole. The function of gymnastic and nomothetic is to lay down, each in its own department, certain positive directions whereby the constitution of the subject under treatment is preserved and improved. The arts of healing and the administration of justice seek in practice to put a stop to the disregard of these directions, and to

restore the normal condition. According to their object, therefore, medicine and gymnastic, as well as the making and administration of law, all belong to the same class, ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν δὴ ἅλληλαις.

8. δικαιοσύνη: is used here in the same sense as δικαστική 520 b below; why, it is hard to understand. It may have been chosen in view of the earlier definition of the object of rhetoric in 454 b, 455 a. The ἰατρική is beyond cavil good; on the contrary, δικαστική is susceptible of a bad construction, whereas here there was need of no doubtful word. Though not customary, there is no reason why δικαιοσύνη should not be understood as the practical exercise of that character of the δίκαιος, which for an Athenian was naturally to be found in the δικαστική. The word, then, means here "administration of justice." That the word is genuine is shown by Quintilian's translation iustitia in ii. 15. 28.

τὸ σῶμα, τῶν δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἢ κολακευτικὴ αἰσθομένη, οὐ
 γνοῦσα λέγω, ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη, τέτραχα ἑαυτὴν διανεί-
 15 μασα, ὑποδύσα ὑπὸ ἑκαστον τῶν μορίων, προσποιεῖται
 εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ὑπέδου, καὶ τοῦ μὲν βελτίστου οὐδὲν α
 φροντίζει, τῷ δὲ αἰεὶ ἡδίστῳ θηρεύεται τὴν ἄνοιαν καὶ
 ἐξαπατᾷ, ὥστε δοκεῖ πλείστου ἀξία εἶναι. ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν
 τὴν ἱατρικὴν ἢ ὀψοποιικὴν ὑποδέδυκεν καὶ προσποιεῖται τὰ
 20 βέλτιστα σιτία τῷ σώματι εἶδέναι, ὥστ' εἰ δέοι ἐν παισὶ
 διαγωνίζεσθαι ὀψοποιόν τε καὶ ἱατρὸν ἢ ἐν ἀνδράσιν
 οὕτως ἀνοήτοις ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, πότερος ἐπαίει περὶ τῶν
 χρηστῶν σιτίων καὶ ποινηρῶν, ὁ ἱατρὸς ἢ ὁ ὀψοποιός, λιμῷ
 ἂν ἀποθανεῖν τὸν ἱατρὸν. κολακειάν μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ καλῶ,
 25 καὶ αἰσχροὺς φημι εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃ Πῶλε — τοῦτο γὰρ 465
 πρὸς σέ λέγω — ὅτι τοῦ ἡδέος στοχάζεται ἄνευ τοῦ βελ-
 τίστου· τέχνην δὲ αὐτὴν οὐ φημι εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐμπειρίαν,

464 13 f. αἰσθομένη and γνοῦσα: are
 c distinguished both as regards the ob-
 ject and the manner of their activity.
 γνῶσις is directed to the nature, which
 is only comprehended by thought; αἰσθησις
 is merely the visual percep-
 tion of the outward form or effects,
 the cause of which, lying in the na-
 ture of the object, is not compre-
 hended. By ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη the
 idea of αἰσθομένη is not merely re-
 peated, but also more exactly defined.
 Similarly, 452 e, and in a different or-
 der 521 d, e. On the heaping up of
 participles and their subordination,
 see Kr. 56, 15 with notes.

15. ὑποδύσα: as it were under a
 cloak or mask by which its real na-
 ture is concealed. The usage is bor-
 rowed from the stage; cf. Luc. Pisc.
 33. The simple acc. with this verb
 is not uncommon.

d 17. θηρεύεται τὴν ἄνοιαν: the ap-

plication of the figure of the hunt to 464
 those arts which seek only the appear- d
 ance, is frequent in Plato, and most
 developed in the *Sophistes*. With
 the same employment of abstract for
 concrete Demosthenes expresses him-
 self, *Ol.* ii. 7 τὴν γὰρ ἐκάστων ἄνοιαν
 αἰεὶ τῶν ἀγνοούντων αὐτὸν ἐξαπατῶν καὶ
 προσλαμβάνων οὕτω πύξῃθῃ.

22. ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες (sc. εἰσιν): in
 such comparisons the nom. is as com-
 mon as the attracted case. Madv.
Syn. 20, 3. — ἐπαίει περὶ κτέ.: this
 otherwise poetic verb is used several
 times by Plato. Cf. 518 c; *Apol.*
 19 c; *Crit.* 47 b, 48 a; *Lach.* 186 e.
 It also takes the acc. Kr. 68, 31, 2.

25 f. τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς σέ λέγω: 465
 brings up again Polus' persistent ef- a
 forts to make Socrates say that rhet-
 oric was καλόν (462 c, 463 d, e).

26. στοχάζεται: here equiv. to aim
 at; above 464 c in the derived mean-

ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα ὧν προσφέρει, ὅποι' ἅττα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὥστε τὴν αἰτίαν ἐκάστου μὴ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν.
30 ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην οὐ καλῶ, ὃ ἂν ᾗ ἄλογον πρᾶγμα· τούτων δὲ πέρι εἰ ἀμφισβητεῖς, ἐθέλω ὑποσχεῖν λόγον.

XX. Τῇ μὲν οὖν ἰατρικῇ, ὥσπερ λέγω, ἡ ὀψοποιικὴ ^b κολακεία ὑπόκειται· τῇ δὲ γυμναστικῇ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τούτον ἡ κομμωτικὴ, κακοῦργός τε οὔσα καὶ ἀπατηλὴ καὶ ἀγεννὴς καὶ ἀνελεύθερος, σχήμασιν καὶ χρώμασιν καὶ λειότητι καὶ ἐσθήσει ἀπατῶσα, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀλλότριον κάλλος ἐφελκομένους τοῦ οἰκείου τοῦ διὰ τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἀμελεῖν. ἵν' οὖν μὴ μακρολογῶ, ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι — ἤδη γὰρ ἂν ἴσως ἀκολουθή-

⁴⁶⁵ ing guess at. — ἀνευ τοῦ βελτίστου: is ^a brachylogic. Without regard to what is best.

28. ὧν προσφέρει: denotes the means which each employs, and whereby it works upon others.

29. ὥστε . . . μὴ ἔχειν: the μὴ could very well be omitted, but Greek usage sanctions the redundancy.

31. ὑποσχεῖν λόγον: to render account. Cf. *Prot.* 338 d πάλιν οὗτος ἐμοὶ λόγον ὑποσχετό.

^b XX. 1. ὀψοποιικὴ: is not attributive to κολακεία, but the latter is predicate with ὑπόκειται, as *flattery*. Hence the point of the following κατὰ λόγον.

2. ὑπόκειται (equiv. to ὑποτίθεται): is not used in the sense which we elsewhere find, *lie at the foundation of*, as in *Prot.* 349 b ἐκαστῶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ὑπόκειται τις ἴδιος οὐσία, but like ὑποδέδουκεν above, 464 d.

3. κακοῦργος κτέ.: these four adjectives go in pairs. The two first describing the nature of κολακεία per se, contain the κακόν of it; the first is more general, the second adds the special (*Kr.* 69, 32, 2), at the same

time emphasizing the result for the ⁴⁶⁵ world at large. The second pair contains the αἰσχρόν, the verdict on the value of such skill. The following participle, with its datives, defines more narrowly ἀπατηλή.

8. οἱ γεωμέτραι: the word denotes "mathematicians" in general. So e.g. Theodorus of Cyrene is continually called γεωμέτρης in the *Theaetetus*. Higher arithmetic also is included under geometry, because the Greeks employed geometrical methods to represent the higher relations of numbers. In the following proportion, we are reminded at once of an arithmetical formula; while the Greeks were reminded of the due proportion of lines and figures, in accordance with the development of mathematical science among them. The relations of the ideas can, by means of this threefold division into pairs, be brought into a simple but complete scheme. See on 464 a above. — ἤδη γὰρ κτέ.: mathematics was looked upon by Plato as a preparation for 'dialectic.'

σαις — ὅτι ὁ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικὴν, τοῦτο ὁψο-
 10 ποικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικὴν· μᾶλλον δὲ ὧδε, ὅτι ὁ κομμωτικὴ c
 πρὸς γυμναστικὴν, τοῦτο σοφιστικὴ πρὸς νομοθετικὴν,
 καὶ ὅτι ὁ ὁψοποικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικὴν, τοῦτο ῥητορικὴ πρὸς
 δικαιοσύνην. ὅπερ μέντοι λέγω, διέστηκεν οὕτω φύσει·
 ἅτε δ' ἐγγὺς ὄντων φύρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα
 15 σοφισταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅτι χρήσονται
 οὔτε αὐτοῖς οὔτε οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τούτοις. καὶ

465 9. δ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικὴν :
 b in this formula ἐστὶ is always want-
 ing.

c 10. μᾶλλον δέ: introduces a com-
 parison equally true, but more to the
 point of the argument (cf. 449 a), by
 the completion of the proportions al-
 ready worked out, and by their ex-
 tension to the whole system of ideas
 thus far developed. — It might seem
 strange that sophistic is paired with
 nomothetic, and not with philosophy.
 Philosophy, however, is the science of
principles in general, while in this dia-
 logue only *ethical* and *political* princi-
 ples are discussed. These latter, how-
 ever, the law-giver must make use of,
 —i.e. must be a philosopher, as is
 proved in the much more comprehen-
 sive and thorough discussion in the
Republic.

13. ὅπερ λέγω: refers, as it always
 does, to a previous statement; here
 to 464 c, where the close relationship
 of the τέχναι, which have to do with
 the same object (*body* and *soul*) was
 spoken of. This idea is here ex-
 pressed by the words ἅτε δ' ἐγγὺς ὄν-
 των, which recall at once the expres-
 sion above, ἅτε περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὔσαι.
 The subject of διέστηκεν is not ex-
 pressed, but is a general one, to be
 taken out of the preceding propor-
 tions, which embrace all τέχναι and

ἐμπειρίαι, and the same subject must 465
 be thought of with ὄντων. On account c
 of the position of ἅτε ἐγγὺς ὄντων
 the δέ is drawn away from the sec-
 ond member of the contrast, φύρον-
 ται. — φύσει: means the essential pe-
 culiarity, actual nature, of the ideas.
 Instead of these, however, with φύ-
 ρονται we have the persons introduced
 who employ and practise the τέχναι
 and ἐμπειρίαι, and who from ignorance
 of their true nature bring them into
 activity at the same time, and thus
 mix together matters which, properly
 considered, are quite distinct.

14. ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ: probably denotes
 the soul as the place of action, and
 περὶ ταῦτά the moral questions treated,
 both of which are reckoned together
 above (464 c) in the expression περὶ
 τὸ αὐτό. Socrates restricts himself to
 the two ἐμπειρίαι to which ῥητορικὴ
 belongs, inasmuch as the object of
 the whole investigation is only an
 exact understanding of the nature of
 rhetoric. This passage is referred to
 below, in 520 a. — Plato can explain
 more accurately the relation of so-
 phistic and rhetoric to each other,
 because he was the first to explain
 the difference scientifically, whereas
 Gorgias, though he was unwilling
 to be reckoned among the sophists,
 could give no reason therefor.

γὰρ ἂν, εἰ μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι ἐπεστάται, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ α
αὐτῷ, καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ ταύτης κατεθεωρεῖτο καὶ διεκρίνετο ἢ τε
ὀψοποιικὴ καὶ ἡ ἱατρικὴ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα ἔκρινε σταθ-
20 μόμενον ταῖς χάρισι ταῖς πρὸς αὐτό, τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου
ἂν πολὺ ᾔην, ὦ φίλε Πῶλε — σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἔμπειρος, —
ὁμοῦ ἂν πάντα χρήματα ἐφύρετο ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἀκρίτων ὄν-
των τῶν τε ἱατρικῶν καὶ ὑγιεινῶν καὶ ὀψοποιικῶν. ὁ μὲν
οὖν ἐγὼ φημι τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι, ἀκρίκας · ἀντίστροφον
25 ὀψοποιίας ἐν ψυχῇ, ὡς ἐκείνω ἐν σώματι. ἴσως μὲν οὖν
ἄτοπον πεποίηκα, ὅτι σε οὐκ ἔων μακροὺς λόγους λέγειν
αὐτοὺς συχρὸν λόγον ἀποτέτακα. ἄξιον μὲν οὖν ἐμοὶ συγ-

465
d 17. ἐπεστάται: we have to imagine
such ἐπιστάται as, like the κυβερνήτης,
παιδοτρίβης, ποιμὴν, are at the same
time ἐπιστήμονες. Cf. Prot. 312 d,
where the sophist is defined as ἐπι-
στάτης τοῦ ποιεῖν δεινὸν λέγειν, i.e.
ἐπιστάμενος ποιῆσαι κτέ., a definition
which furnishes, at the same time, an
example for the φύρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ
καὶ περὶ ταῦτα σοφιστὴς καὶ ῥήτωρ
above.

18. κατεθεωρεῖτο: cf. 457 c. Here
is meant a thorough critical exami-
nation from a higher point of view.

20. τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου: see on
450 c, 453 e, and Kr. 47, 5, 10. Anaxa-
goras, the friend of Pericles, agreed
with the Atomic school and Empedo-
cles, in holding that, in their original
condition, the elements or atoms (ac-
cording to him, unlimited in number,
but of a certain definite quality) were
mixed all together, without any defi-
nite arrangement. Into this confu-
sion order was introduced by νοῦς, or
the thinking spirit; or at least, this
spirit gave the impulse towards it.
His thesis describing the primitive
condition of matter was this: ὁμοῦ

πάντα χρήματα ᾔην. Cf. Dyer-Cron, 465
Intro. to *Apol.* § 10.

21. τούτων: perhaps with an inten-
tional ambiguity. — Gorgias himself
was not entirely without philosophical
culture. See Intro. § 6. But as
to Polus, we have no information.

23. τῶν τε ἱατρικῶν καὶ ὑγιεινῶν:
both expressions are frequently con-
nected to denote the same idea, both
subjectively and objectively. Now,
since ὑγιεινόν is that which ὀφείλει
ἐμποιεῖ (*Rep.* iv. 444 c) and ἱατρικὴ is
ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ, the latter must
perforce be the art whose object is
to restore the body to a healthy con-
dition.

23 f. ὁ μὲν οὖν κτέ.: with this the
discussion returns to the point which
had given occasion to the above di-
gressions (δὲ περὶ μέντοι).

25. ἐκείνω: refers to ὀψοποιία. The
employment of a neuter demonstra-
tive or relative referring to an an-
tecedent in the masculine or feminine
adds to the generalness of the con-
ception. Cf. 463 b, 460 e. But ἐν
σώματι may have had some influence.

27. μὲν οὖν: here, as also in ἴσως

St. I. p. 465.

γνώμην ἔχειν ἐστίν. λέγοντος γάρ μου βραχέα οὐκ ἐμάν-
 θανες, οὐδὲ χρήσθαι τῇ ἀποκρίσει, ἣν σοι ἀπεκρινάμην,
 30 οὐδὲν οἷός τ' ἦσθα, ἀλλ' ἐδέου διηγῆσεως. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ
 ἐγὼ σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου μὴ ἔχω ὅτι χρήσωμαι, ἀπότεινε
 καὶ σὺ λόγον, εἰ μὲν δὲ ἔχω, ἔα με χρήσθαι· δίκαιον γάρ. 466
 καὶ νῦν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀποκρίσει εἴ τι ἔχεις χρήσθαι, χρῶ.

XXI. Πλ. Τί οὖν φῆς; κολακεία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἡ
 ῥητορικὴ;

Σπ. Κολακείας μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε εἶπον μόριον. ἀλλ' οὐ
 μνημονεύεις τηλικούτος ὢν, ὦ Πῶλε; τί τάχα δράσεις;

5 Πλ. Ἄρ' οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι ὡς κόλακες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
 φαῦλοι νομίζεσθαι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ῥήτορες;

Σπ. Ἐρώτημα τοῦτ' ἐρωτᾷς ἢ λόγου τινὸς ἀρχὴν λέ-
 γεις;

Πλ. Ἐρωτῶ ἔγωγε.

10 Σπ. Οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.

465 μὲν οὖν and δ μὲν οὖν just preceding,
 οὖν does not denote sequence, but adds
 force to the statement about to be
 made in view of what has already
 been said. — ἐμοί: hints a contrast.

466 XXI. 1. τί οὖν φῆς: Polus braces
 a himself, and assumes again the office
 of questioner; but shows, by the
 vagueness (cf. above, 462 c with note)
 and inappropriateness of his question,
 that he is either singularly inatten-
 tive or stupid. Hence he receives a
 sharp rap over the knuckles with the
 admonition that his question had been
 some time settled (465 d).

4. τί τάχα δράσεις: is taken by
 Cron to mean "what can you possi-
 bly (τάχα) bring forward?" i.e. in
 the course of the discussion. The
 scholiast understood it as meaning
 "what will you do presently," when
 you get old, as we see by the addition

πρεσβύτης γενόμενος. Probably it is 466
 but an exclamation of wonder and
 surprise; our colloquial "What'll you
 do next?"

5. ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι: is to be con-
 nected with φαῦλοι νομίζεσθαι. In spite
 of his qualification, Polus proceeds to
 put as bad a color on his assumed view
 of Socrates as possible, by adding ἀγα-
 θοὶ (cf. 449 a) to ῥήτορες. Cf. 469 a.
 He does not aim at a refutation of
 Socrates; with him the question is
 still not the true nature of Rhetoric,
 but its value and power in the state.

7. ἐρώτημα κτέ.: probably Socrates
 only wishes to show that, from the
 point of view of dialectic, the preced-
 ing question is so inappropriate that he
 is obliged to look upon it as a merely
 rhetorical one, by which Polus only
 states his own sentiments. Cf. below c.

10. οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι: much more b

Πηλ. Πῶς οὐ νομίζεσθαι; οὐ μέγιστον δύνανται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν;

Ση. Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ δύνασθαι γε λέγεις ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ.

15 Πηλ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ λέγω γε.

Ση. Ἐλάχιστον τοίνυν μοι δοκοῦσιν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει δύνασθαι οἱ ῥήτορες.

Πηλ. Τί δέ; οὐχ, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτεινύασιν τε ὃν ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλ-
20 λουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς;

Ση. Νῆ τὸν κύνα, ἀμφιγνοῶ μέντοι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐφ' ἐκά-
στου ὧν λέγεις, πότερον αὐτὸς ταῦτα λέγεις καὶ γνώμην
σαυτοῦ ἀποφαίνει, ἢ ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾷς.

Πηλ. Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε σέ ἐρωτῶ.

25 Ση. Εἶεν, ὦ φίλε· ἔπειτα δύο ἅμα με ἐρωτᾷς;

Πηλ. Πῶς δύο;

Ση. Οὐκ ἄρτι οὕτω πῶς ἔλεγες, ὅτι ἀποκτεινύασιν οἱ ῥή-
τορες οὓς ἂν βούλωνται, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, καὶ χρή-
ματα ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ἐξελαύνουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν
30 δοκῇ αὐτοῖς.

Πηλ. Ἐγωγε.

⁴⁶⁶ crushing than φαῦλοι νομίζεσθαι.
^b "They are not considered at all,"
"they have no value whatever." On
νομίζεσθαι, cf. Ar. Nub. 962 δ' ἐγὼ (ὁ
δίκαιος λόγος) τὰ δίκαια λέγων ἤνθουν
καὶ σωφροσύνην ἐνένομιστο ("was in high
repute").

15. μέν: almost equiv. to μὴν,
indeed.—δή: equiv. to just. "But
that is indeed just what I do (γε)
say."

^c 18. ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι: by this com-
parison Polus endeavors to emphasize
the importance of his art, careless of

the fact that he thereby detracts ⁴⁶⁶
from its moral value. He employs ^c
his strongest expression of power ac-
tually used (ἀποκτεινύασιν), not even
using the circumlocution οἱ οἱ τ' εἰσίν.
In spite of his following reassertion,
however, the question is really only a
rhetorical one, in which he voices his
own statements. See on ^a above.

21. νῆ τὸν κύνα: see on 461 ^b.—
ἀμφιγνοῶ . . . λέγεις: "I am in doubt
at every word you say." Cope.

25. εἶεν: "very well," accepts the
issue.

XXII. Σο. Λέγω τοίνυν σοι, ὅτι δύο ταῦτ ἐστὶν ἐρω-
τήματα, καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαί γέ σοι πρὸς ἀμφοτέρα. φημί
γάρ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐγὼ καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους
δύνασθαι μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν σμικρότατον, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ
5 ἔλεγον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν ὧν βούλονται ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν·
ποιεῖν μέντοι ὅτι ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι.

Πολ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι;

Σο. Οὐχ, ὥς γέ φησω Πῶλος.

Πολ. Ἐγὼ οὐ φημι; φημί μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε.

10 Σο. Μὰ τὸν — οὐ σύ γε, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι φῆς
ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ.

Πολ. Φημί γὰρ οὖν.

Σο. Ἀγαθὸν οὖν οἶε εἶναι, εἰάν τις ποιῇ ταῦτα, ἃ ἂν
δοκῇ αὐτῷ βέλτιστα εἶναι, νοῦν μὴ ἔχων, καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς
15 μέγα δύνασθαι;

Πολ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

Σο. Οὐκοῦν ἀποδείξεις τοὺς ῥήτορας νοῦν ἔχοντας καὶ

466
d XXII. 4. δύνασθαι μὲν: the cor-
relative has μέντοι, which is much
stronger than δέ.

e 5. ὧν βούλονται: is a circumlocution
for the part. gen.; hence the indica-
tive. — ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν: see on 450 b.

7. οὐκοῦν κτέ.: Polus is surprised
that Socrates should see any differ-
ence in the two phrases.

9. οὐ φημι (nego): repeats οὐχ,
ὡς φησι. Polus does not understand
Socrates, who has in mind the results
of the admission that the possession
of power is a good. The question is
merely rhetorical, with an accent of
astonishment.

10. μὰ τόν: the omission of the
divinity occurs not infrequently. Cf.
Ar. Ran. 1374 μὰ τόν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδ' ἔν,
εἰ τις ἔλεγέ μοι τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων, ἐπιθό-

μην κτέ. H., 723 a, says that the deity 466
is omitted with humorous effect; but
it is much more likely here that So-
crates is a little vexed, but stops at
once any exhibition of it. The Scho-
liast's note, εὐλαβείας χάριν, may be
interpreted as indicating this motive,
or the motive assigned to Socrates on
461 b. — φῆς: with a clear reference
to Polus' previous statements in b,
which he is thus led to reiterate.

12. γὰρ οὖν: is frequently found
thus in phrases of acquiescence.

17. οὐκοῦν ἀποδείξαις κτέ.: the fut.
in neg. questions forms a lively ex-
pression for urgent demand. Kr. 53,
7, 4; H. 844 a. — The pred. noun with
the supplementary partic. follows the
same rule of agreement, as with the
supplementary infinitive.

τέχνην τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἀλλὰ μὴ κολακείαν, ἐμὲ ἐξελέγξας; 467
 εἰ δέ με ἑάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, οἱ ῥήτορες οἱ ποιοῦντες ἐν ταῖς
 20 πόλεσιν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ τύραννοι οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν
 τοῦτο κεκτηθήσονται. ἡ δὲ δύναμις ἐστίν, ὡς σὺ φῆς, ἀγα-
 θόν, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν ἄνευ νοῦ ἃ δοκεῖ καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς κακὸν
 εἶναι· ἡ οὐ;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

25 ΣΩ. Πῶς ἂν οὖν οἱ ῥήτορες μέγα δύναιτο ἡ οἱ τύραν-
 νοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἰ μὴ Σωκράτης ἐξελεγχθῇ ὑπὸ Πώ-
 λου ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται;

ΠΩΛ. Οὗτος ἀνὴρ —

ΣΩ. Οὐ φημι ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ἃ βούλονται· ἀλλὰ μ' ἔλεγε.

30 ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἄρτι ὠμολόγεις ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς βέλ-
 τιστα εἶναι, τούτου πρόσθεν;

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ νῦν ὁμολογῶ.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκοῦν ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται;

ΣΩ. Οὐ φημι.

⁴⁶⁷ 18. ἐξελέγξας: the refutation con-
^a sists in the proof, and the proof is
 at the same time a refutation. We
 must not insist on the priority of the
 aorist participle (H. 856 b); but the
 complex is to be considered, and from
 that point of view it would make no
 difference whether we had ἀποδείξεις
 ἐξελέγξας or ἀποδείξας ἐξελέγξας.

21. ἡ δὲ δύναμις κτέ.: contains one
 of the propositions on which Socra-
 tes bases the statement made above
 (466 e) and afterwards repeated, πῶς
 ἂν . . . μέγα δύναιτο. The other pro-
 position is that the possession by the
 orators of the power of doing what
 they please is not a good possession.

26. ἐξελεγχθῇ: in the pregnant
 sense. "If by a refutation of the
 position taken he be not convinced."
 Cf. 482 b.

28. οὗτος ἀνὴρ —: 'aposiopesis.' ⁴⁶⁷
 Polus is so astonished that he does ^b
 not know what to say. The com-
 plete exclamation (always without
 the article) occurs 489 b. Cf. 505 c.
 Polus' astonishment, as well as stupid-
 ity, are still more evident in the words
 which follow, σχέτλια λέγεις καὶ ὑπερ-
 φυᾶ. σχέτλιος is taken from Homer,
 where, however, it is only used of
 persons (except rarely in the Odyss-
 sey); ὑπερφυῆς is not unknown in
 Attic, but occurs in Plato (except
 here and 477 d) only in the adverbial
 form.

31. τούτου πρόσθεν: can, of course,
 be considered as a gloss on ἄρτι, but
 it heightens the effect, from a mimetic
 point of view, as well by its meaning,
 "a moment ago," as by its position
 at the end of the sentence.

35 Πολ. Ποιούντες δὲ ἂ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς ;

Σολ. Φημί.

Πολ. Σχέτλια λέγεις καὶ ὑπερφυᾶ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σολ. Μὴ κατηγορεῖς, ὦ λῶστε Πῶλε, ἵνα προσείπω σε κατὰ σέ· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐμέ ἐρωτᾶν, ἐπίδειξον ὅτι
40 ψεύδομαι, εἰ δὲ μή, αὐτὸς ἀποκρίνου.

Πολ. Ἄλλ' ἐθέλω ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὅτι λέγεις.

XXIII. Σολ. Πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦτο βούλεσθαι, ὃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἐκάστοτε, ἢ ἐκείνο, οὗ ἔνεκα πράττουσιν τοῦθ' ὃ πράττουσιν ; οἷον οἱ τὰ φάρμακα πίνοντες παρὰ τῶν ἱατρῶν πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσιν
5 τοῦτο βούλεσθαι, ὅπερ ποιῶσιν, πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ ἀλγεῖν, ἢ ἐκείνο, τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὗ ἔνεκα πίνουσιν ; d

Πολ. Δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ὑγιαίνειν.

Σολ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ πλείοντές τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρηματισμὸν χρηματιζόμενοι οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονται, ὃ ποι-
10 οῦσιν ἐκάστοτε· τίς γὰρ βούλεται πλεῖν τε καὶ κινδυνεύειν καὶ πράγματ' ἔχειν ; ἀλλ' ἐκείνο, οἶμαι, οὗ ἔνεκα πλέουσιν, πλούτειν· πλούτου γὰρ ἔνεκα πλέουσιν.

⁴⁶⁷ 35. *δέ*: almost equiv. to "although."

^b It is often used in the second of clauses thus connected to emphasize the opposition.

38. *ὦ λῶστε Πῶλε*: 'paronomasia' in Polus' style. See on 448 c.

^c 41. *ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ*: expresses curiosity, rather than a desire for information. Socrates, as leader of the discussion, makes at once an advance, by fixing a very important distinction.

XXIII. 2 f. *ὃ ἂν πράττωσιν*, *ὃ πράττουσιν*: the former is generic, the latter is a circumlocution. A few lines below *ὅπερ ποιῶσιν* is

the special case, explanatory of ⁴⁶⁷ τοῦτο.

4. *πίνοντες παρὰ κτέ.*: the preposition is personal; "from the hands of."

8. *οἱ πλείοντες*: the merchants (*ἐμ- d ποροι*) who engage in transmarine trade. Notice the confusion of the order, in which we can see the natural freedom of conversation. The subject of *ἐστίν* is *οὐ τοῦτο ὃ ποιῶσιν*, the predicate *ὃ βούλονται*. The subject *οἱ πλείοντες* floats until the plural verb appears. The neg. in *οὐκοῦν* is not felt here. H. 1048 a (β).

11. *πράγματ' ἔχειν*: is passive to *πράγματα παρέχειν*.

Πολ. Πάνυ γε.

Σα. Ἄλλο τι οὖν οὕτω καὶ περὶ πάντων, εἴν τις τι
15 πράττει ἔνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται, ὃ πράττει, ἀλλ'
ἐκείνω, οὐ ἔνεκα πράττει;

Πολ. Ναί.

2. Σα. Ἄρ' οὖν ἔστιν τι τῶν ὄντων, ὃ οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἀγαθὸν γ'
ἔστιν ἢ κακὸν ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν;

20 Πολ. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σα. Οὐκοῦν λέγεις εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ
ὑγίειαν καὶ πλούτον καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, κακὰ δὲ τάναν-
τία τούτων;

Πολ. Ἐγώ γε.

25 Σα. Τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ ἄρα τοιάδε λέγεις, ἃ
ἐνίστε μὲν μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἐνίστε δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐνίστε 468
δὲ οὐδετέρου, οἷον καθῆσθαι καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ τρέχειν καὶ
πλεῖν, καὶ οἷον αὐτὸ λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα;
οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις; ἢ ἄλλ' ἅττα καλεῖς τὰ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε
30 κακὰ;

Πολ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα.

Σα. Πότερον οὖν τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα ἔνεκα τῶν ἀγαθῶν
πράττουσιν, ὅταν πράττωσιν, ἢ τὰ ἀγαθὰ τῶν μεταξὺ;

Πολ. Τὰ μεταξὺ δήπου τῶν ἀγαθῶν.

467 14. ἄλλο τι: 'ἄλλο τι ἢ challenges
d an affirmation with respect to some
special portion of the sentence; ἄλλο
τι challenges an affirmation with
respect to the whole sentence which
follows it.' Riddell, § 22.

e 18. ὅρ' οὖν ἔστιν κτέ.: see a more
detailed investigation of this theory
in *Lysis*. Cf. 216 d δοκεῖ μοι ὥσπερ
εἶναι τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ, τὸ μὲν ἀγαθόν,
τὸ δὲ κακόν, τὸ δ' οὐτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε
κακόν.

20. πολλὴ ἀνάγκη: the answer is 467
not according to the form of the pre-
ceding question, but according to the
sense, as if οὐδὲν ἔστι τῶν ὄντων had
preceded.

21 f. σοφίαν, ὑγίειαν, πλούτον: types
of the three great classes of property,
— mental, physical, and material.

25. ἄρα: for position, see on 472 d.

28. αὐ: on the other hand. To 468
actions are opposed things, which, how-
ever, belong to a similar category.

35 Σο. Τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες καὶ βαδίζομεν, ὅταν βα-
 δίζωμεν, οἴομενοι βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσταμεν,
 ὅταν ἐστῶμεν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· ἥ οὐ;

Πολ. Ναί.

36 Σο. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποκτείνουμεν, εἴ τινα ἀποκτείνουμεν, καὶ
 40 ἐκβάλλομεν καὶ ἀφαιρούμεθα χρήματα, οἴομενοι ἅμεων
 εἶναι ἡμῶν ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἥ μή;

Πολ. Πάνυ γε.

Σο. Ἐνεκ' ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ
 ποιούντες.

45 Πολ. Φημί.

XXIV. Σο. Οὐκοῦν ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἃ ἕνεκά του ποιού-
 μεν, μὴ ἐκεῖνα βούλεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐκείνω, οὗ ἕνεκα ταῦτα
 ποιούμεν;

Πολ. Μάλιστα.

5 Σο. Οὐκ ἄρα σφάττειν βουλόμεθα οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ
 τῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἀπλῶς οὕτως, ἀλλ'
 εἰ μὲν ὠφέλιμα ἢ ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν αὐτά, βλα-
 βερὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βουλόμεθα. τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ βουλόμεθα,
 ὥς φῆς σύ, τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ οὐ βουλόμεθα,
 10 οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ. ἦ γάρ; ἀληθῆ σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, ὦ Πῶλε,
 ἦ οὐ; τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνεις;

468 36. βέλτιον: sc. than its opposite.
 b When the comparison is self-evident,
 the Greek, like the English, fre-
 quently omits the second member.

c XXIV. 2. ἐκεῖνα, ἐκεῖνο: the im-
 mediate repetition of the same pro-
 noun with different reference is re-
 markable. — ταῦτα: refers back to §.

5. σφάττειν: is purposely substi-
 tuted as a harsher word for ἀποκτε-
 νύναι. It implies that the person
 killed is defenseless: "to slaughter

like an ox." — ἀπλῶς οὕτως. thus sim- 468
 ply, "without limitation," as one would c
 have to assume if the view of Polus
 is to stand. Cf. Prot. 351 c οὐκ οἶδα
 ἀπλῶς οὕτω, ὡς σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, εἰ ἐμοὶ ἀπο-
 κριτέον ἐστίν, ὡς τὰ ἡδέα τε ἀγαθὰ
 ἐστὶν κτέ. Cf. 464 b.

11. τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνεις: a challenge
 in the form of a question, because
 Polus hesitates to answer. He is
 beginning to feel concerned for his
 fondly cherished view and bold state-

Πολ. Ἀληθῆ.

Σο. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ταῦτα ὁμολογοῦμεν, εἴ τις ἀποκτείνει
τινὰ ἢ ἐκβάλλει ἐκ πόλεως ἢ ἀφαιρεῖται χρήματα, εἴτε τύ-
15 ραννος ὢν εἴτε ῥήτωρ, οἰόμενος ἄμεινον εἶναι αὐτῷ, τυγχά-
νει δὲ ὃν κάκιον, οὗτος δήπου ποιεῖ ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· ἢ γάρ;

Πολ. Ναί.

Σο. Ἀρ' οὖν καὶ ἃ βούλεται, εἴπερ τυγχάνει ταῦτα κακὰ
ὄντα; τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνεις;

20 Πολ. Ἀλλ' οὐ μοι δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται.

54 Σο. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος μέγα δύναται ἐν τῇ
πόλει ταύτῃ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἀγαθόν τι κατὰ
τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν;

Πολ. Οὐκ ἔστιν.

25 Σο. Ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, λέγων ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπον
ποιούντα ἐν πόλει ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ μὴ μέγα δύνασθαι μηδὲ
ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται.

Πολ. Ὡς δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο ἐξεῖναί σοι

468 ments. The same form recurs a few
c lines below, where Polus is just clearly
recognizing his defeat. These arti-
fices belong to the dramatic side of
the dialogue, and take the place of
the tedious repetitions which weary
us in the narrative form; e.g., in
Prot. 360 c, d *συνέφη* — *ἐπένευσεν* —
καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔτι ἐπένευσεν — *πάνυ μόγισ*
ἐνταῦθα ἐπένευσεν — *οὐκέτι ἐνταῦθα οὐτ'*
ἐπινεύσαι ἠθέλησεν εἰς γὰρ τε.

d 13. *εἴπερ ταῦτα ὁμολογοῦμεν*: is
the general premiss, while what fol-
lows up to *οὐ κάκιον* is the special ap-
plication of this to tyrants and ora-
tors. For the structure, see on the
similar case in 453 c.

15. *αὐτῷ*: is said from the stand-
point of the critic, although referring
to the subject of *οἰόμενος*. The Greek

does not cling to the reflexive. Kr. 468
51, 2, 5; H. 684 a.

15 f. *τυγχάνει δὲ κτέ.*: is connected
with the participle as an independ-
ent clause, — a usage common after
relatives. Kr. 59, 2, 6. 9; H. 1005.
The Eng. idiom requires 'although'
or 'whereas.'

21 f. *ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ*: in this c
undefined city of which they were
speaking, the abode of the tyrant or
orator under criticism (*ὁ τοιοῦτος*).

25. *ὅτι ἔστιν*: that it is possible.
There need not be in all cases a
conflict between what one wishes and
what seems best, but the possibility
of a single case is enough for Socra-
tes' argument.

28. *ὡς δὴ σύ κτέ.*: is quite ironic;
as if you would not! It is really a com-

ποιεῖν ὅτι δοκεῖ σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον ἢ μή, οὐδὲ ζηλοῖς
30 ὅταν ἴδῃς τινὰ ἢ ἀποκτείναντα ὃν ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀφελόμε-
νον χρήματα ἢ δήσαντα.

Σο. Δικαίως λέγεις ἢ ἀδίκως;

Πολ. Ὅπότερ' ἂν ποιῇ, οὐκ ἀμφοτέρως ζηλωτόν ἐστιν; 469

Σο. Εὐφήμει, ὦ Πῶλε.

35 Πολ. Τί δή;

Σο. Ὅτι οὐ χρή οὔτε τοὺς ἀζηλώτους ζηλοῦν οὔτε τοὺς
ἀθλίους, ἀλλ' ἐλεεῖν.

Πολ. Τί δέ; οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν περὶ ὧν ἐγὼ λέγω
τῶν ἀνθρώπων;

40 Σο. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Πολ. Ὅστις οὖν ἀποκτείνουσιν ὃν ἂν δόξῃ αὐτῷ, δικαίως
ἀποκτείνύς, ἀθλιος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι καὶ ἐλεεινός;

Σο. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε, οὐδὲ μέντοι ζηλωτός.

Πολ. Οὐκ ἄρτι ἀθλιον ἔφησθα εἶναι;

45 Σο. Τὸν ἀδίκως γε, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ἀποκτείναντα, καὶ ἐλεεινόν ὃ
γε πρὸς· τὸν δὲ δικαίως ἀζήλωτον.

Πολ. Ἡ που ὃ γε ἀποθνήσκων ἀδίκως ἐλεεινός τε καὶ
ἀθλιός ἐστιν.

Σο. Ἦττον ἢ ὁ ἀποκτεινύς, ὦ Πῶλε, καὶ ἦττον ἢ ὁ
50 δικαίως ἀποθνήσκων.

Πολ. Πῶς δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες

468 parison, "it is just as true as the fact
e that," etc. By this fling Polus seeks
to evade confession of his defeat.

31. δήσαντα: equiv. to εἰς τὸ δεσ-
μωτήριον ἀγαγόντα.

33. ζηλωτόν: enviable. By an easy
469 shift, the personal idea is transferred
a to the action itself.

34. εὐφήμει (fave lingua): says
Socrates, because the denial of all

moral principles implied in the words 469
of Polus seems to him like a sin a
against divinity. Cf. Prot. 330 d.

39. τῶν: the art. with incorporated
antec. is Platonic. Kr. 51, 12, n.

41. δικαίως: is slipped in unfairly
by Polus. Cf. 466 a.

46. πρὸς: is the only preposition b
that occurs at all frequently in Attic
prose as an adverb.

Σα. Οὕτως, ὡς μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν τυγχάνει ὃν τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

Πολ. Ἡ γὰρ τοῦτο μέγιστον; οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μείζον;

55 Σα. Ἡκιστά γε.

Πολ. Σὺ ἄρα βούλοιο ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν;

Σα. Βουλοίμην μὲν ἂν ἔγωγε οὐδέτερα· εἰ δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἐλοίμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν.

60 Πολ. Σὺ ἄρα τυραννεῖν οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο;

Σα. Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ τυραννεῖν γε λέγεις ὅπερ ἐγώ.

Πολ. Ἄλλ' ἔγωγε τοῦτο λέγω ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἐξεῖναι ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ποιεῖν τοῦτο, καὶ ἀποκτείνοντι καὶ ἐκβάλλοντι καὶ πάντα πράττοντι κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ

65 δόξαν.

XXV. Σα. ὦ μακάριε, ἐμοῦ δὴ λέγοντος τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιλαβοῦ. εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ λαβὼν ὑπὸ α

469 52. οὕτως κτέ.: 'Life is not the highest good, but guilt is certainly the greatest evil.' This was one of the life principles of Socrates. Cf. the beautiful exposition in *Apol.* 28 b ff., especially 29 b and 30 d, *Crito* 48 b.

57. βουλοίμην ἂν οὐδέτερα: I would wish neither; because also to suffer wrong is not a good thing. With Polus wish and preference coincide. —This quibble of Socrates is interesting, as showing the difficulties by which early thinkers were beset. For an accurate statement of principles, an accurate use of synonyms was indispensable; and this was not yet possible, even with the cultured.

60. σὺ ἄρα κτέ.: Polus cannot tear himself away from his fast-rooted ideas. Hence all teaching is vain.

XXV. 1. ὦ μακάριε: has somewhat of an ironical coloring. The

nearest English equivalent is the half serious "Oh, you awful fellow!" — ἐμοῦ δὴ λέγοντος: as an offset to Polus' words ἀλλ' ἔγωγε τοῦτο λέγω. "Let us have, then, argument for argument." The gen. may depend on ἐπιλαβοῦ, as in 506 b, but it is more likely gen. abs. See on ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, 506 a, and *Symp.* 214 e ἐάν τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, μεταξὺ ἐπιλαβοῦ, ἂν βούλῃ, καὶ εἰπὲ ὅτι τοῦτο ψεύδομαι. The original meaning is made clear by *Prot.* 329 a τὰ χαλκεῖα πληγέντα μακρὸν ἤχει καὶ ἀποτείνει, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιλάβηται τις (unless one takes hold of it). — τῷ λόγῳ: instrumental dat., "with your argument."

2. ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ: is not temporal, as in *Xen. An.* i. 8. 1 ἥδη δὲ ἦν ἀμφὶ ἀγορὰν πλῆθουσσαν, i.e. towards noon. It simply indicates the presence of a multitude.

μάλης ἐγχειρίδιον λέγοιμι πρὸς σέ ὅτι “ὦ Πῶλε, ἐμοὶ δύνα-
 μίς τις καὶ τυραννὶς θαυμασία ἄρτι προσγέγονεν· ἐὰν
 5 γὰρ ἄρα ἐμοὶ δόξῃ τινὰ τουτωνὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧν σὺ
 ὄρᾳς αὐτίκα μάλα δεῖν τεθνάναι, τεθνήξει οὗτος ὃν ἂν
 δόξῃ· κἂν τινα δόξῃ μοι τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν κατεαγέαι
 δεῖν, κατεαγὼς ἔσται αὐτίκα μάλα, κἂν θοιμάτιον διεσχί-
 σθαι, διεσχισμένον ἔσται· οὕτω μέγα ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἐν
 10 τῇδε τῇ πόλει”· εἰ οὖν ἀπιστοῦντί σοι δείξαιμι τὸ ἐγχει-
 ρίδιον, ἴσως ἂν εἴποις ἰδὼν ὅτι “ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω μὲν
 πάντες ἂν μέγα δύναυτο, ἐπεὶ κἂν ἐμπρησθεῖν οἰκία τούτῳ
 τῷ τρόπῳ ᾗτιν’ ἂν σοι δοκῇ, καὶ τά γε Ἀθηναίων νεώρια
 καὶ τριήρεις καὶ τὰ πλοῖα πάντα καὶ τὰ δημόσια καὶ τὰ
 15 ἴδια”· ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτ’ ἔστιν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι, τὸ
 ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· ἥ δοκεῖ σοι;

Πηλ. Οὐ δῆτα οὕτω γε.

Ση. Ἐχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν δι’ ὅτι μέμφει τὴν τοιαύτην δύ- 470
 ναμιν.

469
 d 3. ἐγχειρίδιον: is not a “dagger,”
 but a short sword for striking and
 thrusting; the former is shown by
 κατεαγέαι τῆς κεφαλῆς. Cf. Xen. Hell.
 ii. 3. 23 παραγγείλαντες νεανίσκοις . . .
 ξιφίδια ἐπὶ μάλης ἔχοντας παραγενέσθαι.

6. τεθνήξει: one of the two Greek
 verbs with fut. perf. active. See H.
 467. The fut. perfect expresses the
 certainty as well as the immediate-
 ness of the result; cf. κατεαγὼς ἔσται
 αὐτίκα μάλα, and see GMT. 79.

7. τῆς κεφαλῆς: is a gen. of the part
 affected. H. 738 b. Cf. Ar. Ach. 1180
 τῆς κεφαλῆς κατέαγε περὶ λίθον πεσών.
 The acc. could have been used; cf.
 515 e τὰ ὦτα. — αὐτῶν: follows τινά,
 — a case of ‘hyperbaton.’

e 14. The art. is omitted before τριή-
 ρεις, although it has a different gender

from that of the preceding substan- 469
 tive. Cf. Phaedo 111 c καὶ τόν γε
 ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα ὁρᾶσθαι
 ἐπ’ αὐτῶν ὅλα τυγχάνει ὄντα. Omission
 of the art. where both substantives
 are of the same gender is not un-
 common. The two kindred ideas are
 thereby brought together into one
 conception. In the present passage,
 by this means we have the objects
 enumerated divided into classes: (1)
 the navy-yard, with the war-vessels
 therein contained; (2) the remain-
 ing vessels, whether they be public
 or private property. Similarly, Dem.
 Ol. ii. 9 τῶ τὰ χωρία καὶ λιμένας καὶ
 τὰ τοιαῦτα προειληφέναι.

17. οὕτω γε: limits the answer, as
 if Polus still wished to save something
 from his earlier statement.

20 ΠΩΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δή; λέγε.

ΠΩΛ. Ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὸν οὕτω πράττοντα ζημιουῖσθαι ἔστω.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ζημιουῖσθαι οὐ κακόν;

25 ΠΩΛ. Πάνν γε.

57 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι πάλιν αὖ σοι φαίνεται, ἐὰν μὲν πράττοντι ἃ δοκεῖ ἔπεται τὸ ὠφελίμως πράττειν, ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔστιν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, κακὸν καὶ σμικρὸν δύνασθαι· σκεψώμεθα δὲ καὶ τόδε· ἄλλο τι ὁμολογοῦμεν ἐνίστε 1
μὲν ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἢ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀποκτείνουσι τε καὶ ἐξελαύνειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι χρήματα, ἐνίστε δὲ οὐ;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνν γε.

35 ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ ὁμολογεῖται.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πότε οὖν σὺ φῆς ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν; εἰπὲ τίνα ὄρον ὀρίζει.

470 26. οὐκοῦν κτέ.: the sentence is
a merely a statement in the form of an interrogation, and assumes an assent by the opponent, provided no express demurrer is raised. Socrates gives opportunity for this after δύνασθαι (29), but as none is made, he proceeds again with σκεψώμεθα κτέ. — πάλιν αὖ: because in this new conception is contained a correction of the former view held by Polus.

27. φαίνεται: has its subject in τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι, and its predicate in ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι. "Does not then this great power of yours (πάλιν αὖ) appear to you (only provided the one

who does what seems good to him 470
proves to be doing what is profitable) to be both a good thing, — and that, as it seems, is the real (τό) great power; otherwise it is an evil thing and small power." The sentence begins with a question which is lost in an affirmation.

29. εἰ δὲ μή: is phraseological, "otherwise." The contrast is with τοῦτο, and through this with ἐὰν μὲν κτέ. The subject of κακόν (ἐστι) καὶ σμικρὸν δύνασθαι is, of course, the phrase τὸ πράττειν ἃ δοκεῖ, to be supplied from the context. H. 904, 906 a, b.

30. ἄλλο τι: see on 467 d.

b

5 40 Πηλ. Σὺ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπόκριναι ταῦτὸ τοῦτο.
 Ση. Ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν φημί, ὦ Πῶλε, εἴ σοι παρ' ἐμοῦ c
 ἡδιόν ἐστω ἀκούειν, ὅταν μὲν δικαίως τις ταῦτα ποιῇ,
 αἰμεινον εἶναι, ὅταν δὲ ἀδίκως, κάκιον.

XXVI. Πηλ. Χαλεπόν γέ σε ἐλέγξει, ὦ Σώκρατες·
 ἀλλ' οὐχὶ κἂν παῖς σε ἐλέγξειεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις;

Ση. Πολλὴν ἄρα ἐγὼ τῷ παιδὶ χάριν ἔξω, ἵσῃν δὲ καὶ
 σοί, εἴαν με ἐλέγξης καὶ ἀπαλλάξης φλυαρίας. ἀλλὰ μὴ
 5 κάμης φίλον ἄνδρα εὐεργετῶν, ἀλλ' ἔλεγχε.

Πηλ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδέν γέ σε δεῖ παλαιοῖς
 πράγμασιν ἐλέγχειν· τὰ γὰρ ἐχθὲς καὶ πρῶν γεγονότα a
 ταῦτα ἱκανά σε ἐξελέγξει ἐστὶν καὶ ἀποδείξει, ὥς πολλοὶ
 ἀδικοῦντες ἄνθρωποι εὐδαίμονες εἰσιν.

10 Ση. Τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα;

Πηλ. Ἀρχέλαον δῆπου τοῦτον τὸν Περδίκκου ὀρᾶς ἄρ-
 χοντα Μακεδονίας;

470 40. σὺ μὲν οὖν κτέ.: Polus evades
 b the answer and forces it upon So-
 crates, partly because he is not able
 to give it, for the distinction de-
 manded lies equally remote from the
 circle of his thoughts and his feel-
 ings; partly because he does not wish
 it, for he has a suspicion that it will
 contradict all the views which he has
 thus far expressed. The less, however,
 he is in position to confute Socrates
 by arguments, the greater is his confi-
 dence in his ability to do so by facts.

c XXVI. 1. χαλεπόν: is ironic; but in
 ἀλλ' οὐχὶ the irony turns to sober earn-
 est. Not so with the irony of Socrates.

5. μὴ κάμης, ἀλλ' ἔλεγχε: note the
 difference between positive and neg.
 imperative. — εὐεργετῶν: is to be ex-
 plained according to 458 a. On the
 supplementary partic., see G. 279, 1;
 H. 983.

7. τὰ γὰρ ἐχθὲς καὶ πρῶν: means 470
 "recent events." Homer also uses d
 the phrase χθιστὰ τε καὶ πρῶιστα, B 303.
 The Greek idiom requires καί where
 the Eng. uses "or."

8 f. πολλοὶ ἀδικοῦντες ἄνθρωποι: in
 most cases when the participle is used
 as an attribute, we can still feel the
 participial plus as compared with the
 adjective. Here, however, that has
 almost completely disappeared, and
 the participle is as much an adj. as
 πρσιήκων, πρέπων, etc.

10. τὰ ποῖα: it is a matter of indi-
 vidual preference whether the art. be
 used or not; cf. 449 e. When used,
 the article limits the attention to what
 has been already alluded to; here, τὰ
 ἐχθὲς . . . ταῦτα. In Eng. one also
 occasionally hears the art. with the
 interrogative.

11. Ἀρχέλαον: Archelaus, an ille-

Σο. Εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ἀκούω γε.

Πηλ. Εὐδαίμων οὖν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ ἄθλιος;

15 Σο. Οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐ γάρ πω συγγέγονα τῷ ἀνδρί.

Πηλ. Τί δέ; συγγενόμενος ἂν γνοίης, ἄλλως δὲ αὐτό-
θεν οὐ γιγνώσκεις ὅτι εὐδαιμονεῖ;

Σο. Μὰ Δί', οὐ δῆτα.

Πηλ. Δῆλον δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν μέγαν βα-
20 σιλέα γιγνώσκεις φήσεις εὐδαίμονα ὄντα.

Σο. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἐρῶ· οὐ γάρ οἶδα παιδείας ὅπως
ἔχει καὶ δικαιοσύνης.

Πηλ. Τί δέ; ἐν τούτῳ ἢ πᾶσα εὐδαιμονία ἐστίν;

Σο. Ὡς γε ἐγὼ λέγω, ὦ Πῶλε· τὸν μὲν γὰρ καλὸν
25 κάγαθον ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα εὐδαίμονα εἶναί φημι, τὸν δὲ
ἄδικον καὶ πονηρὸν ἄθλιον.

⁴⁷⁰
d gitimate son of Perdiccas, seized the throne in B.C. 414, after his father's death, and reigned until 399, when he was murdered by Craterus or Crateuas (name and motive are alike uncertain). The facts brought forward by Polus in their darkest colors are probably correct; but Archelaus laid the foundation for the later importance of Macedonia by introducing Greek culture. He invited famous artists, among others Euripides, to his court. There is also a tradition that he invited Socrates, but that is hardly credible. — ὄρεται: well expresses the lively interest which Polus, as well as many other Greeks, took in that admired ruler, whose apparent success was doubtless envied by many an aspiring and ambitious man. The answer of Socrates sounds somewhat pedantic, but it is probably jesting, and designed to cool the extravagant ardor of Polus, while at the same

time it prepares the way for οὐκ ⁴⁷⁰
d συγγέγονα τῷ ἀνδρί below.

13. ἀλλὰ... γε: nevertheless, at least. H. 1046, 2, a.

15-26. This passage is translated by Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* v. 12.

16. αὐτόθεν: "instinctively," "of e yourself." This is not translated by Cicero, but it forms a good contrast to συγγενόμενος. Polus thinks the very fact of Archelaus being a ruler implies that he is fortunate. That the Persian king was generally esteemed the personification of happiness is shown by *Apol.* 40 e.

21 f. παιδεία and δικαιοσύνη: together denote moral cultivation. — ὅπως ἔχει: construed with the part. gen. See G. 168, n. 3; H. 757 a.

25. ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα: virtue, and hence also the foundation of εὐδαιμονία, is, according to Socrates, one and the same for all, while the pupils of Gorgias recognized different varie-

Παλ. Ἄθλιος ἄρα οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Ἀρχέλαος κατὰ τὸν
 σὸν λόγον;

Σο. Εἴπερ γε, ὦ φίλε, ἄδικος.

- 30 Παλ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος; ᾧ γε προσήκε μὲν
 τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐδὲν ἦν νῦν ἔχει, ὄντι ἐκ γυναικὸς ἢ τῇ δούλῃ
 Ἀλκέτου τοῦ Περδίκκου ἀδελφοῦ, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ δίκαιον
 δούλος ἦν Ἀλκέτου, καὶ εἰ ἐβούλετο τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν,
 ἐδούλευεν ἂν Ἀλκέτῃ καὶ τῇ εὐδαίμων κατὰ τὸν σὸν λό-
 35 γον· νῦν δὲ θαυμασίως ὡς ἄθλιος γέγονεν, ἐπεὶ τὰ μέ-
 γιστα ἡδίκηκεν· ὅς γε πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον αὐτὸν τὸν
 δεσπότην καὶ θεῖον μεταπεμφάμενος ὡς ἀποδώσων τὴν
 ἀρχὴν ἣν Περδίκκας αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο, ξενίσας καὶ κατα-
 μεθύσας αὐτόν τε καὶ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ Ἀλέξανδρον, ἀνεψιὸν
 40 αὐτοῦ, σχεδὸν ἡλικιώτην, ἐμβαλὼν εἰς ἄμαξαν, νύκτωρ
 ἐξαγαγὼν ἀπέσφαξέν τε καὶ ἡφάνισεν ἀμφοτέρους· καὶ
 ταῦτα ἀδικήσας ἔλαθεν ἑαυτὸν ἀθλιώτατος γενόμενος καὶ

470 ties for different classes. Cf. *Meno*

71 ο πρῶτον μὲν εἰ βούλει ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν, εἰ δὲ βούλει γυναικὸς ἀρετὴν κτέ. On the omission of the art. with *γυναικα*, see on 469 e.

471 27. οὗτος . . . ὁ Ἀρχέλαος: the position emphasizes the name; 'this man — Archelaus!'

30. πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος: sc. ἐστίν. This admission, coupled with the opinion that Archelaus is an enviable and happy man, which is very evident from the ironical narrative which follows, shows most plainly the utter opposition between Polus' view and the moral principle which Socrates champions. — ᾧ γε: introduces the authority of indisputable facts. See on 460 e.

32 ff. καί, καί, καί: is in sense almost equiv. to "and therefore." The

construction begun in the clause ᾧ γε . . . ἀδελφοῦ is naturally varied in καὶ

. . . Ἀλκέτου by being made personal.

33. εἰ ἐβούλετο, ἦν εὐδαίμων: is an unreal conditional sentence, with opposition to the present. The close proximity of the two clauses in the apodosis explains the omission of the second εἰ.

37. δεσπότην καὶ θεῖον: denotes two kinds of moral obligation to which Archelaus paid no attention; ξενίσας adds a third, the violation of which was considered among Greeks the worst of crimes, a sin against Zeus ξένιος. Cf. Hom. N 624, Xen. An. iii. 2. 4. The heaping up of the words καταμεθύσας, ἐμβαλὼν (like a thing), ἐξαγαγὼν, ἀπέσφαξεν, ἡφάνισεν makes the impression of the repeated acts of violence very vivid.

οὐ μετεμέλησεν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον ὕστερον τὸν ἀδελφόν,
τὸν γνήσιον τοῦ Περδίκκου υἱόν, παῖδα ὡς ἐπείτῃ, οὗ ἢ c
45 ἀρχὴ ἐγίγνετο κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, οὐκ ἐβουλήθη εὐδαίμων
γενέσθαι δικαίως ἐκθρέψας καὶ ἀποδοὺς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκείνῳ,
ἀλλ' εἰς φρέαρ ἐμβαλὼν καὶ ἀποπνίξας πρὸς τὴν μητέρα
αὐτοῦ Κλεοπάτραν χῆνα ἔφη διώκοντα ἐμπεσεῖν καὶ ἀπο-
θανεῖν. τοιγάρτοι νῦν, αἶτε μέγιστα ἡδικηκῶς τῶν ἐν
50 Μακεδονίᾳ, ἀθλιώτατός ἐστιν πάντων Μακεδόνων, ἀλλ'
οὐκ εὐδαιμονέστατος, καὶ ἴσως ἐστὶν ὅστις Ἀθηναίων
ἀπὸ σοῦ ἀρξάμενος δέξαιτ' ἂν ἄλλος ὅστισιν Μακεδόνων
γενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ Ἀρχέλαος. d

XXVII. Ση. Καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγων, ὦ Πῶλε,
ἔγωγέ σε ἐπῆνεσα ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς εὖ πρὸς τὴν ῥητορικὴν
παιδαγεῖσθαι, τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι ἡμεληκέναι· καὶ νῦν
ἄλλο τι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος, ὃ με καὶ ἂν παῖς ἐξελέγξεις,
5 καὶ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ σοῦ νῦν, ὡς σὺ οἶει, ἐξεληλεγμαι τοῦτ' ἰδὼ
λόγῳ, φάσκων τὸν ἀδικοῦντα οὐκ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι; πόθεν,
ὠγαθέ; καὶ μὴν οὐδέν γέ σοι τούτων ὁμολογῶ ὧν σὺ φῆς.

471 43. τὸν ἀδελφόν: is emphasized by
b its position in advance of its govern-
ing verb (partic.).

c 44. Περδίκκου: Perdikkas II. reigned
from B.C. 454 (?) until 414 or 413,
after having dispossessed his brother
Alcetas. During the Peloponnesian
war he pursued a very prudent but
faithless policy. — The extraordinary
number of participles employed by
Polus has an artistic value in showing
the tumultuousness of his feelings.

45. οὐκ ἐβουλήθη (he did not choose)
εὐδαίμων γενέσθαι: is very sarcastic.
The conclusion introduced by τοιγάρτοι
is equally emphatic. Polus admires in
Archelaus the strength of will which
hesitates at nothing to accomplish its
aim; regret with him is weakness.

51. καὶ ἴσως ἐστὶν ὅστις κτέ.: in 471
these words, in spite of their sarcastic
form, lies the only attempt at proof c
which Polus makes, i.e. an appeal to
the opinion of others; he of course
thinks that no one will own himself
to be such a man.

XXVII. 1. καὶ κατ' ἀρχάς: leads d
us to expect in the following καὶ νῦν
a confirmation and climax of praise,
— which, however, is changed instead
to blame by τοῦ . . . ἡμεληκέναι. Note
the zeugma in combining τοῦ . . . ἡμε-
ληκέναι with ἐπῆνεσα. See on 520 b
ἢ τῷ αὐτῷ. The praise was bestowed
in 448 d.

6. πόθεν: is a question with a
negative force, to which the affirma-
tive καὶ μὴν corresponds.

Πολ. Οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γέ σοι ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω. ^e

Σπ. ὦ μακάριε, ῥητορικῶς γάρ με ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν,
 10 ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἡγούμενοι ἐλέγχειν. καὶ
 γὰρ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἕτεροι τοὺς ἑτέρους δοκοῦσιν ἐλέγχειν, ἐπειδὰν
 τῶν λόγων ὧν ἂν λέγωσι μάρτυρας πολλοὺς παρέχωνται
 καὶ εὐδοκίμους, ὁ δὲ τὰναντία λέγων ἕνα τινὰ παρέχεται
 ἢ μηδένα. οὗτος δὲ ὁ ἑλεγχος οὐδενὸς ἀξίός ἐστιν πρὸς ⁴⁷²
 15 τὴν ἀλήθειαν· ἐνίστε γὰρ ἂν καὶ καταψευδομαρτυρηθεῖη
 τις ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δοκούντων εἶναι τί. καὶ νῦν περὶ ὧν
 σὺ λέγεις ὀλίγου σοι πάντες συμφήσουσιν ταῦτα Ἀθη-
 ναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξένοι, εἰάν βούλη κατ' ἐμοῦ μάρτυρας παρα-
 σχέσθαι, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγω· μαρτυρήσουσί σοι, εἰάν

⁴⁷¹ 8. ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ: in such phrases the
^e ἐπεὶ has the force of "although,"
 "whereas." Cf. Prot. 335 c σοφὸς γὰρ
 εἶ· ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατος
 ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἂν οἷός τ' εἶναι. Apol.
 19 e. The conj. merely indicates a
 relation between the two ideas. If
 these two ideas harmonize, the rela-
 tion becomes causal; if not, it be-
 comes adversative.

9. ὦ μακάριε (cf. 469 c): implies
 the reproof which follows.

10. ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις: the man-
 ner of argument practised there fre-
 quently incurs Plato's disapproval.
 Cf. Apol. 34 b ff. The emphasis is
 laid on ἡγούμενοι and δοκοῦσιν.

13. ἕνα τινά: the indef. pron. em-
 phasizes the number, "a paltry one."

⁴⁷² 15 f. καταψευδομαρτυρηθεῖη τις: the
^a Greek idiom does not require intr.
 verbs to be used impersonally in the
 passive. Cf. Xen. Apol. 24 καταψευ-
 δομαρτυρεῖν ἐμοῦ with Dem. in Meid.
 138 καταψευδομαρτυροῦμαι.

16. δοκούντων εἶναι τί: equal to
 εὐδοκίμων. Cf. the English colloquial-
 ism 'he pretends to be something.'

17. ὀλίγου: almost; the remnant ⁴⁷²
 of the phrase ὀλίγου δεῖν. H. 743 b. ^a

19. μαρτυρήσου σκεῖ: Nicias, the
 celebrated general in the Pelopon-
 nesian war, who met his death in the
 Sicilian expedition (b.c. 413), was
 leader of the moderate wing of the
 aristocratic party. Aristocrates, the
 son of Scellias or Scellius, belonged,
 as we can judge from Ar. Av. 125 and
 Thuc. viii. 89, to the extreme or oli-
 garchical order. He was one of the
 generals condemned to death for neg-
 ligence at the battle of Arginusae.
 Xen. Hell. i. 7. Socrates here speaks
 of both as if they were still living.
 (See Introd. § 18.) Next to them,
 Socrates mentions the house of Peri-
 cles; he could not name the states-
 man himself because he was already
 dead when Gorgias visited Athens for
 the first time; but he, with his house,
 was a champion of the Athenian dem-
 ocracy. So we have here representa-
 tives of the chief political parties as
 witnesses for Polus. They agreed
 with each other in that they esteemed
 power in the state,—even tyranny,

20 μὲν βούλῃ, Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ,
 ὧν οἱ τρίποδες οἱ ἐφεξῆς ἐστῶτές εἰσιν ἐν τῷ Διουνυσίῳ,
 εἰάν δὲ βούλῃ, Ἀριστοκράτης ὁ Σκελλίου, οὗ αὖ ἔστιν ἐν
 | Πυθίου τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν ἀνάθημα, εἰάν δὲ βούλῃ, ἡ Περι- b
 κλέους ὅλη οἰκία, ἥ ἄλλη συγγένεια ἦντινα ἂν βούλῃ τῶν
 25 ἐνθάδε ἐκλέξασθαι. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ σοι εἰς ὧν οὐχ ὁμολογῶ·
 | οὐ γάρ με σὺ ἀναγκάζεις, ἀλλὰ ψευδομάρτυρας πολλοὺς
 κατ' ἐμοῦ παρασχόμενος ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς
 οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν μὴ σέ αὐτὸν ἓνα ὄντα
 μάρτυρα παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὧν λέγω, οὐδὲν
 30 οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγου μοι πεπεράνθαι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἡμῖν ὁ c

472 — though purchased at the price of
 a wrong-doing, to be the highest good.

20 ff. *εἰάν μὲν βούλῃ, εἰάν δὲ βούλῃ*: are not pleonastic after *εἰάν βούλῃ*, but are due partly to courtesy (cf. *Prot.* 353 b *εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλει, εἰ σοι φίλον*), and serve also by specifying to emphasize the possibility of a free choice among all parties.

21. *ὧν οἱ τρίποδες*: in this way these men show that they were *δοκοῦντες εἶναι τί*. They also, by the magnificence of their offerings, proved their piety, and their 'testimony' would be therefore the more weighty. Nicias was, according to all accounts, an honorable man. Thucydides says (vii. 86) of him, in referring to his mournful death: *ἥκιστα δὲ ἄξιος ὧν τῶν γε ἐπ' ἐμοῦ Ἑλλήνων ἐς τοῦτο δυστυχίας ἀφικέσθαι διὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτηδεύειν*. By Dionysius is to be understood not a temple, but a spot sacred to Dionysius, — a sacred precinct. Nicias built there a kind of shrine, which possessed, among other treasures, some very costly tripods which he had dedicated to Dionysus after he had discharged the office of Choregus — a very costly liturgy in

itself. The tripods were arranged 472 apparently *ἐφεξῆς* with a kind of os- a tentation.

22 f. *ἐν Πυθίου*: sc. *ἱερῷ*. The offering of Aristocrates must have been, according to the words of Socrates, also costly and well-known.

26. *ἀναγκάζεις*: sc. to agreement b by convincing reasons; often followed by *ὁμολογεῖν*, but without it in *Theaet.* 196 b *τούτω αὐτῷ ἡναγκάζομεν μὴ εἶναι ψευδῇ δόξαν*.

27 f. *ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς*: this is ambiguous, for *οὐσία* can denote property, material possessions as well as physical existence. Accordingly Polus appears here in the investigation as a tyrant, who drives others from house and home. But it is this same power which the orator wishes to obtain (before a court) by his speech.

28 f. *σέ αὐτόν . . . μάρτυρα*: the dialectical proof is a course of logic, a process of reasoning, which Socrates carries through, with the help of his adversary, by question and answer. Hence by his enforced agreement a man becomes a witness against himself.

λόγος ἦ· οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σοί, ἐὰν μὴ ἐγὼ σοι μαρτυρῶ εἰς
 | ὦν μόνος, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους πάντας τούτους χαίρειν ἑᾶς.
 ἔστιν μὲν οὖν οὗτός τις τρόπος ἐλέγχου, ὡς σύ τε οἶει καὶ
 ἄλλοι πολλοί· ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἄλλος, ὃν ἐγὼ αὖ οἶμαι.
 35 παραβαλόντες οὖν παρ' ἀλλήλους σκεψώμεθα, εἴ τι διοί-
 σουσιν ἀλλήλων. καὶ γὰρ τυγχάνει περὶ ὧν ἀμφισβη-
 τοῦμεν οὐ πάννυ σμικρὰ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ταῦτα, περὶ
 ὧν εἰδέναι τε κάλλιστον μὴ εἰδέναι τε αἰσχιστον· τὸ γὰρ
 κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἔστιν ἡ γιγνώσκειν ἢ ἀγνοεῖν, ὅστις τε
 40 εὐδαίμων ἔστιν καὶ ὅστις μὴ. αὐτίκα πρῶτον, περὶ οὗ d
 νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, σὺ ἡγείσῃς ὅτιον τε εἶναι μακάριον ἄνδρα
 ἀδικοῦντά τε καὶ ἀδικον ὄντα, εἴπερ Ἀρχέλαον ἀδικον μὲν
 ἡγείσῃς εἶναι, εὐδαίμονα δέ· ἄλλο τι ὡς οὕτω σου νομίζοντος
 | διανώμεθα;

45 Πῶς. Πάννυ γε.

XXVIII. Ση. Ἐγὼ δὲ φημι ἀδύνατον. ἐν μὲν τουτὶ
 ἀμφισβητοῦμεν. εἰεν· ἀδικῶν δὲ δὴ εὐδαίμων ἔσται ἄρ'
 ἂν τυγχάνῃ δίκης τε καὶ τιμωρίας;

472 33. ἔστιν κτέ.: Socrates does not
 c hereby recognize this adducing of 'testi-
 mony' to be a correct τρόπος ἐλέγ-
 χου, but rather implies by the words
 ὡς σύ τε οἶει κτέ. (cf. 471 d, 473 b)
 that it is only a pretended one, which
 cannot stand against the true one.

37. σχεδόν τι: does not weaken the
 idea, but merely softens the expres-
 sion. The question under discussion
 is really the cardinal one of life,
 'How can I be happy?'

d 40. αὐτίκα: is one of the ways of
 introducing an example in Greek. Cf.
Prot. 359 e πᾶν τούναντίον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ᾧ
 οἱ τε δειλοὶ ἔρχονται καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι.
 αὐτίκα εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οἱ μὲν ἐθέλουσιν
 ἵνα, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν. The addi-
 tion of πρῶτον shows that there are

still other conflicts between their 472
 views; e.g. in reference to the nature d
 and value of punishment.

41. εἶναι: is thrown forward for
 the sake of emphasis, as ἔστι above.
 After ἡγοῦμαι, νομίζω, and similar
 verbs the pred. is often found without
 a copula. Cf. 473 a.

XXVIII. 1. εἶν: with this are con-
 nected other points of difference.

2. εἰεν: see on 466 c. — ἄρα: the
 position here is still more remarkable
 than in 467 e and 476 a. — The whole
 weight of the question falls on ἂν
 τυγχάνῃ δίκης καὶ τιμωρίας. The for-
 mer, δίκη, usually denotes simply the
 carrying out of the law, the infliction
 of justice; the latter, τιμωρία,
 the fine or penalty which falls to the

Πολ. Ἡκιστά γε, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γ' ἂν ἀθλιώτατος εἴη.

5 Σα. Ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἄρα μὴ τυγχάνῃ δίκης ὁ ἀδικῶν, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εὐδαίμων ἔσται;

Πολ. Φημί.

63 Σα. Κατὰ δέ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἀδικῶν τε καὶ ὁ ἄδικος πάντως μὲν ἄθλιος, ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι, ἐὰν
10 μὴ διδῷ δίκην μηδὲ τυγχάνῃ τιμωρίας ἀδικῶν, ἦττον δὲ ἄθλιος, ἐὰν διδῷ δίκην καὶ τυγχάνῃ δίκης ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων.

Πολ. Ἀτοπά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιχειρεῖς λέγειν. 473

Σα. Πειράσομαι δέ γε καὶ σὲ ποιῆσαι, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ταῦτα
15 ἐμοὶ λέγειν· φίλον γάρ σε ἡγοῦμαι. νῦν μὲν οὖν ἂ διαφερόμεθα ταῦτ' ἐστίν· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ· εἶπον ἐγὼ πον ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι.

472 injured person or the state. These
d are both external demands on the criminal, called forth by his crime, and by which an expiation of it is to be effected. On the other hand, *κόλασις* is the discipline which the guilty party himself undergoes, designed to prevent further transgression; while *ζημία* (470 a) is only the injury or damage which he sustains in expiating his crime. From the outset Socrates shows that, even according to the view of his opponent, wrongdoing does not give happiness under all conditions. This point is not made superfluous by the discussion of 469 c-470 c; for there the question concerns *δύναμις*, not *εὐδαιμονία*.

e 11. καὶ τυγχάνῃ δίκης: seems a strange addition after διδῶ δίκην, with which it appears to be almost synonymous. But the two phrases are probably intended to be but the subjective and objective, the active and passive

expression of the same idea; as the *ὑπό* with the gen. would indicate. e

15. φίλον γάρ σε ἡγοῦμαι: there- 473
fore Socrates does not allow himself to be deterred by the trouble it will involve to bring Polus to the same opinion. ταῦτα λέγειν (καὶ φρονεῖν) is held as a sign of friendship, just as διαφέρεισθαι of enmity. See on 510 c and Sall. *Cat.* 20 nam idem velle atque idem nolle, ea demum firma amicitia est. At the same time the words contain a delicate reply to Polus' discourteous exclamation. Socrates will soon bring him to say what is in his own view ἀτοπον. a

16 f. ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν: cf. 469 b.

17. τὸ ἀδικεῖν . . . εἶναι: is cited as an example of rather uncommon use of the indir. disc. inf. after εἶπον (GMT. 753, 3), but the clause is to be looked at rather as the object of εἶπον in the sense of "declare."

Πολ. Πάνυ γε.

Σο. Σὺ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι.

20 Πολ. Ναί.

Σο. Καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἀθλίους ἔφην εἶναι ἐγώ, καὶ ἐξηλέγχθην ὑπὸ σοῦ.

Πολ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία.

Σο. Ὡς σὺ οἶε, ὦ Πῶλε.

25 Πολ. Ἀληθὴ γε οἰόμενος ἴσως.

Σο. Σὺ δέ γε εὐδαίμονας αὖ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἐὰν μὴ διδῶσι δίκην.

Πολ. Πάνυ μὲν οὔν.

Σο. Ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτοὺς ἀθλιωτάτους φημί, τοὺς δὲ διδόν-
30 τας δίκην ἥττον. βούλει καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγχειν;

Πολ. Ἀλλ' ἐτι τοῦτ' ἐκείνου χαλεπώτερόν ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐξελέγξαι.

Σο. Οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Πῶλε, ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐδέποτε ἐλέγχεται.

35 Πολ. Πῶς λέγεις; ἐὰν ἀδικῶν ἄνθρωπος ληφθῇ τυραν-
νίδι ἐπιβουλεύων, καὶ ληφθεὶς στρεβλῶται καὶ ἐκτέμνηται

473 22. καὶ ἐξηλέγχθην ὑπὸ σοῦ: of
a course the addition of Socrates after
Polus' reply throws a quite different
coloring over this sentence. Polus'
self-assurance is apparent in *ναὶ μὰ*
Δία, his positiveness in *ἀληθὴ γε οἰόμε-*
νος. *ἴσως* shows no uncertainty, but
is only the conscious under-statement
which is common in English. See on
480 a.

b 31. ἄλλ' ἐτι τοῦτο κτ.: * refers to
470 c and is just as ironical. In
sharp contrast with the false assur-
ance which trusts its own cleverness
is Socrates' faith in the immutability
of truth, τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐδέποτε ἐλέγ-
χεται.

35. ληφθῇ: pictures vividly the
actual scene. In compound verbs
c the metaphorical meaning often pre-
dominates, and leaves the actual in
the background (cf. *ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ κα-*
ταλαμβάνεσθαι). In what follows, no-
tice the rhetorical heaping up of the
most frightful punishments; which
reminds us of Aesch. *Eum.* 186 ff. *κα-*
ρανιστῆρες ὀφθαλμωρύχοι | δίκαι σφαγαί
τε σπέρματός τ' ἀποφθοραὶ | παίδων, κα-
κοῦ τε χλοῦνις ἡδ' ἀκρωνία, | λευσμός τε
καὶ μύζουσιν οἰκτισμὸν πολὺν | ὑπὸ βράχιν
παγέντες. Cf. *Rep.* ii. 361 *ο* *μαστι-*
γώσεται, στρεβλώσεται, δεδήσεται, ἐκ-
καυθήσεται τῷ φθαλμῷ, τελευτῶν πάντα
κακὰ παθὼν ἀνασχινδυλευθήσεται.

καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκκᾶπται, καὶ ἄλλας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας καὶ παντοδαπὰς λώβας αὐτὸς τε λαβηθεὶς καὶ τοὺς αὐτοῦ ἐπιδὼν παῖδάς τε καὶ γυναῖκα τὸ ἔσχατον ἀνα-
 40 σταυρωθῇ ἢ καταπιπτωθῇ, οὗτος εὐδαιμονέστερος ἔσται, ἢ ἔὰν διαφυγὼν τύραννος καταστῇ καὶ ἄρχων ἐν τῇ πόλει διαβιῶ ποιῶν ὅτι ἂν βούληται, ζηλωτὸς ὢν καὶ εὐδαιμονιζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων; ταῦτα α λέγεις ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἐξελέγχειν;

XXIX. Σο. Μορμολύττει αὖ, ὦ γενναῖε Πῶλε, καὶ οὐκ ἐλέγχεις· ἄρτι δὲ ἐμαρτύρου. ὅμως δὲ ὑπόμνησόν με σμικρόν· “ἔὰν ἀδίκως ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι,” εἶπες;

5 Πολ. *Εγώ γε.

Σο. Εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν τοῖνυν οὐδέποτε ἔσται οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν, οὔτε ὁ κατειργασμένος τὴν τυραννίδα ἀδίκως οὔτε ὁ διδοὺς δίκην· δυοῖν γὰρ ἀθλίωιν εὐδαιμονέστερος

473 37. καὶ ἄλλας κτέ.: notice the ὁμοι-
 ο τέλευτα.

39. ἐπιδὼν: sc. λαβηθέντας.

40. καταπιπτωθῇ: an especially severe manner of punishment. The criminal was put into a sack smeared with pitch,—the so-called tunica molesta,—which was then set on fire.

41. διαφυγόν: “if he succeed”; opposed to ληφθῇ.

42. ὅτι ἂν βούληται: Polus has again forgotten the explanation of the difference between δοκεῖν and βούλεσθαι.—εὐδαιμονιζόμενος: to be thought εὐδαίμων by the multitude is to be so, in Polus’ estimation.

43. καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων: cf. Hom. B 191 ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς τε κάθησο καὶ ἄλλους ἴδρνε λαούς, 480 d, Phaedo 110 e λίθοις καὶ γῇ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς. The same idiom is found in

Latin, as equites et aliud vul- 473
 gus. See on 447 c.

43 f. ταῦτα λέγεις: Polus is triumphant, as if Socrates’ position (ταῦτα) were now overthrown.

XXIX. 1. μορμολύττει: the expression for terrifying with ghost stories. The ‘mormo’ was the ‘bad man’ with which children were frightened. Cf. Crilo 46 c.—ὦ γενναῖε: is probably designedly used because the means employed are unfair, being only a pretended, not a real proof. Cf. 471 e.

2. ὅμως δέ: although in reality no point has been made, yet Socrates is ready to assume one and proceed upon that.

3. ἐὰν ἀδίκως ἐπιβουλεύων: can be completed from c. The change in the expression is due to the collocation of the two words.

μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι ὁ διαφεύγων καὶ τυ-
10 ραννεύσας. τί τοῦτο, ὦ Πῶλε; γελᾷς; ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο
εἶδος ἐλέγχου ἐστίν, ἐπειδάν τις τι εἴπῃ, καταγελᾶν, ἐλέγ-
χειν δὲ μή;

Ἰ Πῶλ. Οὐκ οἶμι ἐξεληλέγχθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν τοιαῦτα
λέγῃς, ἃ οὐδεὶς ἂν φήσειεν ἀνθρώπων; ἐπεὶ ἐροῦ τινα
15 τουτωνί.

Σο. ὦ Πῶλε, οὐκ εἰμὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, καὶ πέρυσι βου-
λεύειν λαχὼν, ἐπειδὴ ἡ φυλὴ ἐπρυτάνευε καὶ ἔδει με
ἐπιψηφίζειν, γέλωτα παρῆχον καὶ οὐκ ἡπιστάμην ἐπιψη- 474
φίζειν. μὴ οὖν μηδὲ νῦν με κέλευε ἐπιψηφίζειν τοὺς

473 9. ὁ διαφεύγων: "whoever remains
e unpunished."—*τυραννεύσας*: "he who
attains to the tyranny." The more
important idea precedes.

10. τί τοῦτο: *what can this mean?*
The inappropriate laughter of Polus
is probably in accordance with the pre-
cept of Gorgias that in serious things
one must draw the audience to his
own side by laughing. Arist. *Rhet.* iii.
18 (*Rhet. Gr.* ed. Sp. i. 160): δεῖν ἔφη
Γοργίας τὴν μὲν σπουδὴν διαφθεῖρειν τῶν
ἐναντίων γέλωτι, τὸν δὲ γέλωτα σπουδῇ.

11. καταγελᾶν: *to laugh it down*.
Socrates' opinion of the ἄλλο εἶδος
ἐλέγχου is shown by the addition,
ἐλέγχειν δὲ μή.

14 f. ἐροῦ τινα τουτωνί: by again
having recourse unto the opinion of
others, Polus again reverts, though in
a different manner, to his 'witnesses'
(469 e), and shows that the rhetorical
method of proof is alone comprehen-
sible to him. By inviting Socrates
to put the question to those present,
he reminds him of the analogous
practice of ἐπιψηφίζειν (*rogare po-*
pulum), and gives him a chance to
plead his own inaptitude as an excuse

for not employing rhetorical methods. 473
Socrates in his reply also shows that
to accept the opinion of the majority
— the method which the state had
settled upon as the best way of estab-
lishing the truth — was as unsatisfac-
tory, when employed by the individ-
ual, as the rhetorical methods. The
fact to which Socrates alludes is the
well-known trial of the generals who
had won the battle of Arginusae and
afterwards fell victims to political
intrigue. The full proceedings are
detailed by Xen. *Hell.* i. 6. 33 ff. and
7. Socrates was senator this year
(Ol. 93. 3, 406 B.C.), and in the me-
morable assembly ἐπιστάτης τῶν πρυ-
τάνων. As such, he opposed the
unlawful proceeding with an intrepid
courage which he here humorously
calls inaptitude in ἐπιψηφίζειν. So-
crates mentions the circumstance also
in *Apol.* 32 b, but in a different man-
ner. On the chronological difficulty,
see *Introd.* § 18.

17. ἡ φυλή: of course that to which
Socrates belonged, ἡ Ἀντιοχίς.

18. γέλωτα παρῆχον καὶ κτέ.: a 474
'hysteron proteron.' See *Rid.* § 308. a

20 παρόντας, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ἔχεις τούτων βελτίῳ ἔλεγχον, ὅπερ
 νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἐμοὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει παράδος, καὶ πείρα-
 σαι τοῦ ἐλέγχου, οἷον ἐγὼ οἶμαι δεῖν εἶναι. ἐγὼ γὰρ ὦν
 ἂν λέγω ἓνα μὲν παρασχέσθαι μάρτυρα ἐπίσταμαι, αὐτόν,
 πρὸς ὃν ἂν μοι ὁ λόγος ᾗ, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἐὼ χαίρειν, καὶ
 25 ἓνα ἐπιψηφίζειν ἐπίσταμαι, τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγο-
 μαι. ὅρα οὖν, εἰ ἐθελήσεις ἐν τῷ μέρει διδόναι ἔλεγχον ^b
 ἀποκρινόμενος τὰ ἐρωτώμενα. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οἶμαι καὶ ἐμὲ
 καὶ σὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδι-
 κείσθαι κάκιον ἡγείσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ διδόναι δίκην τοῦ
 30 διδόναι.

Πολ. Ἐγὼ δέ γε οὐτ' ἐμὲ οὐτ' ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα.
 ἐπεὶ σὺ δέξαι' ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν.

Σο. Καὶ σύ γ' ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες.

Πολ. Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐτ' ἐγὼ οὔτε σὺ οὐτ' ἄλλος
 35 οὐδεὶς.

Σο. Οὐκοῦν ἀποκρινεῖ;

Πολ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν · καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι ὅτι ποτ'
 ἐρεῖς.

Σο. Λέγε δὴ μοι, ὅν' εἰδῆς, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς σε
 40 ἡρώτων · πότερον δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Πῶλε, κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ
 ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι;

474 20. τούτων: i.e. the various means
^a with which Polus had hitherto at-
 tempted to confute Socrates.—ὅπερ
 νυνδὴ: 472 c.

21. παράδος: viz. τὸν ἔλεγχον. Cf.
 below, διδόναι ἔλεγχον "to give a
 chance for refutation."

25. οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι: because sci-
 entific investigation by means of con-
 versation is naturally confined to
 individuals.

^b 32. ἐπεὶ . . . ἀδικεῖν: this is not
 meant in earnest, but is a reductio

ad absurdum of the preceding ⁴⁷⁴
 words of Socrates, which are so op-
 posed to Polus' view. On ἐπεὶ cf.
 471 e, and see GMT. 718, where this
 clause is cited as interrogative.

37. καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶ: implies a ^c
 doubt whether Socrates can really
 advance anything in support of his
 view. On the following answers of
 Polus, see Introd. § 14.

39. ὥσπερ κτέ.: as an actual fact,
 the discussion has been concerning
 the question whether ἀδικεῖν or ἀδικεῖ-

Πηλ. Τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε.

Ση. Τί δὲ δῆ; αἰσχιον πότερον τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ἀποκρίνου.

45 Πηλ. Τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

XXX. Ση. Οὐκοῦν καὶ κάκιον, εἴπερ αἰσχιον;

Πηλ. Ἦκιστά γε.

Ση. Μανθάνω· οὐ ταῦτόν ἡγεί σύ, ὥς ἔοικας, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν. d

5 Πηλ. Οὐ δῆτα.

Ση. Τί δὲ τόδε; τὰ καλὰ πάντα, οἶον καὶ σώματα καὶ χρώματα καὶ σχήματα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα, εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἐκάστοτε καλὰ; οἶον πρῶτον τὰ σώματα τὰ καλὰ οὐχὶ ἦτοι κατὰ τὴν χρεῖαν λέγεις καλὰ εἶναι, πρὸς δ' ἂν ἕκαστον χρήσιμον ᾗ, πρὸς τοῦτο, ᾗ κατὰ ἡδονὴν τινα, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι χαίρειν ποιῇ τοὺς

⁴⁷⁴ *σθαι* were the greater evil, since the middle of ch. XXIV.

43. τί δὲ δῆ; *how so, then?* — The predicate is thrown forward in the following clause, because the chief weight of the contrast falls upon it.

XXX. 1. οὐκοῦν κτέ.: the *καλόν* is here the species under which the *ἀγαθόν* and the *ἡδύ* are subordinated.

3. ὥς ἔοικας: logically, in such cases as this, an inf. is to be supplied; but it is doubtful if any such ellipses were felt by the Greeks. — *καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν*, — *κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν*: 'chiasmus.'

d 6. τόδε: is probably an acc. with *λέγεις* understood. Cf. *Phaedo* 65 d τί δὲ δῆ τὰ τοιαῦτα and Xen. *Mem.* iii. 1. 10 τί δὲ τοὺς κινδυνεύειν μέλλοντας. On the other hand, *Phil.* 27 e τί δὲ δὸς βίος and Soph. *Aj.* 101 τί γὰρ δὴ παῖς δὲ τοῦ Λαερτίου make for the nom. The context must be the guide.

8. εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων: *with regard unto nothing*, that is, without searching for some characteristic common to all these things, in accordance with which you would be justified in calling them *καλὰ*. The word *ἀποβλέπω* is used also when reference is made to an idea or principle, which conditions a person's action or the manner of appearance of any phenomenon.

9. κατὰ: is used of the scale according to which a thing is to be measured.

10. πρὸς τοῦτο: points emphatically back to *πρὸς δ' κτέ.*, in a way more remarkable here than in 469 c. The relative clause itself is an extension of *κατὰ τὴν χρεῖαν*, laying especial stress on the relativity of the *καλόν*.

11. ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι: notice the use of the passive to denote the point of view from which *σῶμα* is *καλόν*.

θεωροῦντας; ἔχεις τι ἐκτὸς τούτων λέγειν περὶ σώματος ὁ
κάλλους;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔχω.

15 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα οὕτω καὶ σχήματα καὶ
χρώματα ἢ διὰ ἡδονὴν τινα ἢ διὰ ὠφελίαν ἢ δι' ἀμφοτέρα
καλὰ προσαγορεύεις;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐ καὶ τὰς φωνὰς καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν μουσικὴν
20 πάντα ὡσαύτως;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τά γε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύ-
ματα οὐ δήπου ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστίν, τὰ καλὰ, ἢ ὠφέλιμα
εἶναι ἢ ἡδέα ἢ ἀμφοτέρα.

25 ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων κάλλος ὡσαύτως; 475

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε· καὶ καλῶς γε νῦν ὀρίζει, ὦ Σώκρατες,
ἡδονῇ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ ὀριζόμενος τὸ καλόν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ αἰσχυρὸν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, λύπη τε καὶ κακῷ;

474 12. ἐκτὸς τούτων: i.e. the points
of view mentioned in § . . . §.

17. προσαγορεύειν: i.e. to designate
by the addition of a characteristic, as
if one were addressing a person by
name.

22. καὶ μὴν: introduces us to a
new variety of the beautiful, i.e. the
results of mental activity. The νόμοι,
ἐπιτηδεύματα, and μαθήματα are, with
reference to the subject of investiga-
tion, fittingly introduced as represen-
tatives of this class.—τά γε κατὰ
τοὺς νόμους κτέ.: it must be confessed
that we could do very well without
τὰ καλὰ. If kept, it must be consid-
ered as a repetition and restriction of
τά γε κατὰ κτέ., and τούτων must be

explained by ἢ ὠφέλιμα κτέ. in appo- 474
sition. See H. 950. But Rid. § 271 b
seems to have a different view of
the sentence, which he holds to be a
case of inversion of government, and
with this Cope seems to agree in his
translation: "And moreover, in all
that belongs to laws and habits of
life, their beauty, I presume, is to be
found nowhere beyond these limits;
that is to say, either the utility or
the pleasure that is in them, or both."

27. καὶ καλῶς κτέ.: this lively as- 475
sent of Polus shows that he thinks
that Socrates is at last veering round
to his position. The manner in which
he is gradually undeceived is inter-
esting.

30 ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν ἄρα δυοῖν καλοῦν θάτερον κάλλιον ἦ, ἢ τῷ
ἐτέρῳ τούτοις ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ὑπερβάλλον κάλλιον ἔστιν,
ἦτοι ἡδονῇ ἢ ὠφελίᾳ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις.

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

35 ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅταν δὲ δὴ δυοῖν αἰσχροῖν τὸ ἕτερον αἰσχρον
ἦ, ἦτοι λύπῃ ἢ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον αἰσχρον ἔσται· ἢ οὐκ ἔστι
ἀνάγκη;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, πῶς ἐλέγγο νυνδὴ περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ
40 ἀδικεῖσθαι; οὐκ ἔλεγες τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι,
τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν αἰσχρον;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐλεγον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ αἰσχρον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι,
ἦτοι λυπηρότερόν ἐστιν καὶ λύπῃ ὑπερβάλλον αἰσχρον ἂν
45 εἴη ἢ κακῷ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις; οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη;

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

XXXI. ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν δὴ σκεψώμεθα, ἄρα λύπῃ ἢ
ὑπερβάλλει τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀλγοῦσι
μᾶλλον οἱ ἀδικοῦντες ἢ οἱ ἀδικούμενοι;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε.

5 ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα λύπῃ γε ὑπερέχει.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ λύπῃ, ἀμφοτέροις μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι
ὑπερβάλλοι.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

⁴⁷⁵ 36. ἦτοι κτέ.: if the text is sound,
^b Socrates here speaks with less exact-
ness than above, omitting what can
be easily supplied.

39. φέρε δῆ: the result obtained is
applied to the case under discussion.

XXXI. 1. λύπῃ: here denotes, as ⁴⁷⁵
the following ἀλγοῦσι explains, only ^c
physical pain. No reference can be
meant to the gnawings of conscience.

2. ὑπερβάλλει: here construed with
gen. like ὑπερέχει (5). Cf. *Leg.* v. 734a.

10 Σο. Οὐκοῦν τῷ ἐτέρῳ λείπεται;

Πολ. Ναί.

Σο. Τῷ κακῷ;

Πολ. Ἐοικεν.

Σο. Οὐκοῦν κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον τὸ ἀδικοῦν κάκιον ἂν εἴη
15 τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι;

Πολ. Δηλοῖν δὴ ὅτι.

Σο. Ἄλλο τι οὖν ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ
ὑπὸ σοῦ ὁμολογεῖτο ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ αἰσχίον
εἶναι τὸ ἀδικοῦν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι;

20 Πολ. Ναί.

Σο. Νῦν δέ γε κάκιον ἐφάνη.

Πολ. Ἐοικεν.

Σο. Δέξαιτο ἂν οὖν σὺ μᾶλλον τὸ κάκιον καὶ τὸ αἰσχίον
ἀντὶ τοῦ ἦττον; μὴ ὄκνει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐδὲν
25 γὰρ βλαβήσκει· ἀλλὰ γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ ἱατρῷ
παρέχων ἀποκρίνου, καὶ ἡ φάθι ἢ μὴ ἂ ἐρωτῶ.

Πολ. Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σο. Ἄλλος δέ τις ἀνθρώπων;

Πολ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ κατὰ γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.

475 d 17. Ἄλλο τι: see on 467 d. Polus
had several times given as an authority the opinion of the masses, and had even, in 474 b, by the words οὐτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς spoken in their name. He thus appears, like Protagoras in *Prot.* 353 a, as their representative. ὁμολογεῖτο properly applies to ὑπὸ σοῦ, and the present is to be supplied to ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων.

23. Δέξαιτο ἂν: pays back for Polus' question in 474 b. The construction is varied by the substitution of ἀντὶ with gen. instead of ἢ after μᾶλλον.

24. ἀντὶ τοῦ ἦττον: sc. κακοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ. d

25. γενναίως: bravely; scorning the pain. The comparison is the same as in 480 c παρέχειν . . . ὥσπερ τέμνειν καὶ κτείνει ἱατρῷ, and seems to be a Socratic one. Cf. Xen. *Mem.* i. 2. 54. For the construction, see on 456 b.

26. φάθι ἢ μὴ (sc. φάθι): affirm or deny. See on 454 d.

29. κατὰ γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον: a conditional admission, implying that with a different treatment possibly a different result might be obtained.

30 Σο. Ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι οὐτ' ἂν ἐγὼ οὐτ' ἂν σὺ οὐτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων δέξαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι· κάκιον γὰρ τυγχάνει ὄν.

Πηλ. Φαίνεται.

Σο. Ὅρᾳς οὖν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἔλεγχος παρὰ τὸν ἔλεγχον
35 παραβαλλόμενος ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ σοὶ μὲν οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐμοὶ δὲ σὺ ἐξαρκεῖς εἰς ὧν μόνος καὶ ὁμολογῶν καὶ μαρτυρῶν, καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ
μόνον ἐπιψηφίζων τοὺς ἄλλους ἐὼ χαίρειν. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὕτως ἐχέτω· μετὰ τοῦτο δὲ περὶ οὗ τὸ δεύτερον
40 ἡμφεσβητήσαμεν σκεψώμεθα, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην ἄρα μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστίν, ὡς σὺ ᾧον, ἢ μείζον τὸ μὴ διδόναι, ὡς αὖ ἐγὼ ᾧμην. σκοπώμεθα δὲ τῇδε· τὸ διδόναι δίκην καὶ τὸ κολάζεσθαι δικαίως ἀδικοῦντα ἄρα τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖς;

45 Πηλ. Ἐγωγε.

Σο. Ἐχεις οὖν λέγειν, ὡς οὐχὶ τά γε δίκαια πάντα καλὰ ἔστι, καθ' ὅσον δίκαια; καὶ διασκεψάμενος εἰπέ.

Πηλ. Ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

475 30 f. οὐτ' ἂν κτέ.: ἂν draws attention to the emphatic words. On the position and repetition, see H. 862, 864; GMT. 223, 226.

34. ὁρᾳς οὖν, ὁ ἔλεγχος κτέ.: we might also have had ὁρᾳς οὖν τὸν ἔλεγχον ὅτι παρὰ κτέ. But the form chosen by Plato greatly heightens the contrast. Socrates, moreover, is referring to his own words in 472 c παραβαλόντες οὖν παρ' ἀλλήλους σκεψώμεθα, εἴ τι διοίσουσιν ἀλλήλων. Hence also the addition of the expressions μαρτυρῶν and ἐπιψηφίζων to the more general ὁμολογῶν.

476 41. ἄρα μέγιστον: the more usual particle for "whether" is εἰ, but cf.

Phaedo 70 d ἴδωμεν ἄρ' οὕτως ἵγνεται ἅπαντα. H. 1016. In the sentence following, we have ἄρα introducing a direct question previously announced by τῇδε as in 459 d.

43. κολάζεσθαι δικαίως ἀδικοῦντα: the adverb is necessary, because upon it rests the main point in the proof.

43 f. ἄρα τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖς: the position makes the question more pointed.

47. καὶ διασκεψάμενος εἰπέ: the exhortation to Polus to think well before he speaks is at the same time an intimation to the reader that the principle touched on in the question is of the greatest importance, as indicative of a man's moral views, and

XXXII. ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε· ἄρα εἴ τις τι ποιεῖ, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι καὶ πάσχον ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ ποιούντος;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα τοῦτο πάσχον, ὃ τὸ ποιοῦν ποιεῖ, καὶ τοιούτον, οἷον ποιεῖ τὸ ποιοῦν; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· εἴ τις τύπτει, ἀνάγκη τι τύπτεσθαι;

ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ σφόδρα τύπτει ἢ ταχὺ ὁ τύπτων, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον τύπτεσθαι;

10 ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τοιούτον ἄρα πάθος τῷ τυπτομένῳ ἐστίν, οἷον ἂν τὸ τύπτον ποιῇ;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ κάει τις, ἀνάγκη τι κάεσθαι;

15 ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ σφόδρα γε κάει ἢ ἀλγεινῶς, οὕτως κάεσθαι τὸ καόμενον ὥς ἂν τὸ κᾶον κάη;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ τέμνει τις, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος; τέμνεται
20 γάρ τι.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ μέγα γε ἢ βαθὺ τὸ τμήμα ἢ ἀλγεινόν, τοιούτον τμήμα τέμνεται τὸ τεμνόμενον, οἷον τὸ τέμνον α
τέμνει;

25 ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

⁴⁷⁶ hence is not to be accepted without
^b earnest investigation. How neces-
sary this exhortation is, can be per-
ceived from a question of Polus in
477 c.

^c XXXII. 14. *καί*: the examples
are chosen from cauterizing and sur-
gery, because the healing art is in

general for the body what the puni-
tive administration of justice is for
the soul. See on 458 b. The second
example is an advance on the first, in
so far as the result of the treatment
— corresponding to the general idea
πάθος — can be expressed in the sub-
stantival form *τμήμα*.

Σο. Συλλήβδην δὴ ὅρα εἰ ὁμολογεῖς, ὃ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, περὶ πάντων, οἷον ἂν ποιῇ τὸ ποιῶν, τοιοῦτον τὸ πάσχον πάσχειν.

Πολ. Ἄλλ' ὁμολογῶ.

30 Σο. Τούτων δὴ ὁμολογουμένων, τὸ δίκην διδόναι πότε-
ρον πάσχειν τί ἐστὶν ἢ ποιεῖν;

Πολ. Ἀνάγκη, ὃ Σώκρατες, πάσχειν.

Σο. Οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ τινος ποιῶντος;

Πολ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ὑπὸ γε τοῦ κολάζοντος.

35 Σο. Ὅ δὲ ὀρθῶς κολάζων δικαίως κολάζει;

Πολ. Ναί.

Σο. Δίκαια ποιῶν ἢ οὐ;

Πολ. Δίκαια.

Σο. Οὐκοῦν ὁ κολαζόμενος δίκην διδούς δίκαια πά-

40 σχει;

Πολ. Φαίνεται.

Σο. Τὰ δὲ δίκαιά που καλὰ ὁμολόγηται;

Πολ. Πάνν γε.

Σο. Τούτων ἄρα ὁ μὲν ποιεῖ καλά, ὁ δὲ πάσχει, ὁ κολα-

45 ζόμενος.

Πολ. Ναί.

XXXIII. Σο. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλά, ἀγαθά; ἢ γὰρ 477
ἡδέα ἢ ὠφέλιμα.

Πολ. Ἀνάγκη.

Σο. Ἀγαθὰ ἄρα πάσχει ὁ δίκην διδούς;

^d 26. συλλήβδην: turns from the particular to the generic, and extends to all cases the law which has been noticed in special cases. It belongs, of course, to the last clause οἷον κτέ.

30. τὸ δίκην διδόναι: the article determines the subject. GMT. 790.

^e 35. ὀρθῶς: denotes in general the

proper or appropriate exercise of any function, and thus leads up to δικαίως, ^e which is specially ethical.

XXXIII. 1. εἴπερ καλά κτέ.: the ⁴⁷⁷ argument, made according to the ^a modus tollendo ponens with natural abbreviations, rests on the exposition made in 474 d f.

5 ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικεν.

7 2 ΣΩ. Ὀφελεῖται ἄρα;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα ἥνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφελίαν; βελ-
τίων τὴν ψυχὴν γίγνεται, εἴπερ δικαίως κολάζεται;

10 ΠΩΛ. Εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Κακίας ἄρα ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττεται ὁ δίκην διδούς;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα οὖν τοῦ μεγίστου ἀπαλλάττεται κακοῦ; ὧδε
δὲ σκοπεῖ· ἐν χρημάτων κατασκευῇ ἀνθρώπου κακίαν
15 ἄλλην τινα ἐνορᾷς ἢ πενίαν;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ πενίαν.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἐν σώματος κατασκευῇ; κακίαν ἂν φήσῃς
ἀσθένειαν εἶναι καὶ νόσον καὶ αἰσχος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

20 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ πονηρίαν ἡγεί τινα εἶναι;

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Ταύτην οὖν οὐκ ἀδικίαν καλεῖς καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ
δειλίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;

477 8. τὴν ὠφελίαν: cognate accusa-
a tive. After ὑπολαμβάνω we must sup-
ply ὠφελεῖσθαι. The asyndeton which
follows is of the very common ex-
planatory class.

13. ἄρα οὖν: introduces a new sec-
tion of the argument, regarding the
statement advanced by Socrates in
469 b.

b 14. κατασκευῇ: is distinguished
from παρασκευῇ in that it denotes a
preparation designed to endure; παρα-
σκευῇ is for the emergency. Conse-
quently the constitution of the body,
so far as it is the result of physical
culture, is naturally a κατασκευῇ.

20. πονηρίαν: not κακίαν. The lat-

ter word, according to the prevailing 477
usage, denotes, as applied to the soul, b
moral depravity only, as above (a).
The former denotes a bad condition
in general, which may or may not be
due to moral depravity. But as the
bad condition usually involves bad
constitution, πονηρία comes to mean
much the same as κακία. The use of
the words depends upon κατασκευῇ.

23. καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα: shows that the
enumeration is not complete. The
omitted member is given below in d
(ἀκόλαστον) and ε (ἀκολασία), and thereby
the number of πονηρία (i.e. varieties of
πονηρία) is made to correspond with the
number of cardinal virtues (ἀρεταί).

Πολ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

- 25 Σο. Οὐκοῦν χρημάτων καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, τριῶν ὄντων, τριττὰς εἴρηκας ποιηρίας, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀδικίαν; c

Πολ. Ναί.

Σο. Τίς οὖν τούτων τῶν πονηριῶν αἰσχίστη; οὐχ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ συλλήβδην ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία;

- 30 Πολ. Πολύ γε.

Σο. Εἰ δὴ αἰσχίστη, καὶ κακίστη;

Πολ. Πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις;

- Σο. Ὡδί· ἀεὶ τὸ αἰσχιστον ἤτοι λύπην μεγίστην παρέχον ἢ βλάβην ἢ ἀμφοτέρα αἰσχιστόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν ὁμο-
35 λογημένων ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν.

Πολ. Μάλιστα.

Σο. Αἰσχιστον δὲ ἀδικία καὶ σύμπασα ψυχῆς πονηρία νυνδὴ ὁμολόγηται ἡμῖν; d

Πολ. Ὡμολόγηται γάρ.

- 40 Σο. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ἀναιρότατόν ἐστι καὶ ἀνία ὑπερβάλλον αἰσχιστον τούτων ἐστὶν ἢ βλάβη ἢ ἀμφοτέρα;

Πολ. Ἀνάγκη.

Σο. Ἄρ' οὖν ἀλγεωτέρον ἐστιν τοῦ πένεσθαι καὶ κάμν-
νειν τὸ ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ δειλὸν καὶ ἀμαθῆ;

- 45 Πολ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπὸ τούτων γε.

477 32. πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες; Polus shows ^c by the question that he has not yet completely grasped the relationship of the ideas, good and beautiful, bad and ugly (cf. 477 a), although it has been twice expounded by Socrates.

d 40. ἀναιρός and ἀνία: like ἀλγεινός and ἀλγηδών, characterize the λύπη from its physical side, i.e. the pain caused by the punishment. Cf. also Prot. 355 e and Gorg. 499 a, where ἀνιάσθαι is opposed to χαίρειν. With βλάβη sc. ὑπερβάλλον, and also with

ἀμφοτέρα, which is the adverbial acc. 477 like τούναντιον and the like. See G. 160, 2; H. 719 b. The words ἀναιρότατόν ἐστι do not indeed harmonize with the rest of the sentence and may without injury be cut out, but still they are not unnatural in this careless form of conversational speaking and do fit the following question ἀρ' ἀλγεινότερον.

41. τούτων: is of course to be understood in the partitive sense.

45. ἀπὸ τούτων γε: 'ex his quidem quae disputata sunt.' Stallbaum.

Σο. Ὑπερφνεῖ τινι ἄρα ὡς μεγάλη βλάβη καὶ κακῷ θαν-
μασίῳ ὑπερβάλλουσα τᾶλλα ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία αἰσχι-
στόν ἐστι πάντων, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀλγηδόνι γε, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος. e

Πολ. Φαίνεται.

50 Σο. Ἀλλὰ μὴν που τό γε μεγίστη βλάβη ὑπερβάλλον
μέγιστον ἂν κακὸν εἴη τῶν ὄντων.

Πολ. Ναί.

Σο. Ἡ ἀδικία ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ψυχῆς
πονηρία μέγιστον τῶν ὄντων κακόν ἐστιν;

55 Πολ. Φαίνεται.

74 XXXIV. Σο. Τίς οὖν τέχνη πενίας ἀπαλλάττει; οὐ
χρηματιστική;

Πολ. Ναί.

Σο. Τίς δὲ νόσου; οὐκ ἰατρική;

5 Πολ. Ἀνάγκη.

Σο. Τίς δὲ πονηρίας καὶ ἀδικίας; εἰ μὴ οὕτως εὐπο- 478
ρεῖς, ὧδε σκόπει· ποι ἄγομεν καὶ παρὰ τίνας τοὺς κάμ-
νοντας τὰ σώματα;

Πολ. Παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς, ὦ Σώκρατες.

10 Σο. Ποῖ δὲ τοὺς ἀδικούντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολασταίνοντας.

477 Polus has a suspicion of what is coming
d and so expresses himself guard-
edly, as if he wished to leave a door
open behind him. On the contrary,
Socrates speaks with great decision,
and probably has in mind Polus' words
in 471 a *θανμασίως ὡς ἄθλιος γέγονεν*.

46. *ὑπερφνεῖ ὡς μεγάλη βλάβη*: a case
of what was originally attraction, but
which by long usage has become phra-
seological. See H. 1003 b; Rid. § 197.

e XXXIV. 2. *χρηματιστική*: this
and the *ἰατρική* appear already in
462 a ff., where they are associated
478 with *γυμναστική*.

a 6 f. *εὐπορεῖς*: is used in a trans-

ferred sense, as is more frequently 478
the case with *ἀπορεῖν*. "If you are a
not at once (*οὕτως*) prepared with an
answer." We must imagine a short
pause as occurring before *εἰ*. Such
halts and explanations by means of
examples, analogies, suggestive ques-
tions, and the like, are of course in
accordance with the artistic design of
the dialogue, but also serve to keep
the attention of the reader. Note the
interrogative form of one of Polus'
answers. On *οὕτως* see on 503 d.

10. *ἀκολασταίνοντας*: appears again
in *Rep.* 555 d, but otherwise seems
to be restricted to comedy.

Πολ. Παρὰ τοὺς δικαστὰς λέγεις ;

Σο. Οὐκοῦν δίκην δώσοντας ;

Πολ. Φημί.

Σο. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ δικαιοσύνη τινὶ χρώμενοι κολάζουσιν
15 οἱ ὀρθῶς κολάζοντες ;

Πολ. Δηλὸν δῆ.

Σο. Χρηματιστικὴ μὲν ἄρα πενίας ἀπαλλάττει, ἱατρικὴ
δὲ νόσου, δίκη δὲ ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀδικίας. b

Πολ. Φαίνεται.

20 Σο. Τί τούτων κάλλιστόν ἐστιν ;

Πολ. Τίνων λέγεις ;

Σο. Χρηματιστικῆς, ἱατρικῆς, δίκης.

Πολ. Πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ δίκη.

Σο. Οὐκοῦν αὖ ἤτοι ἡδονὴν πλείστην ποιεῖ ἢ ὠφελίαν
25 ἢ ἀμφοτέρα, εἴπερ κάλλιστόν ἐστιν ;

Πολ. Ναί.

30 15 Σο. Ἄρ' οὖν τὸ ἱατρεύεσθαι ἡδύ ἐστιν, καὶ χαίρουσιν
οἱ ἱατρεῦόμενοι ;

Πολ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

30 Σο. Ἄλλ' ὠφέλιμόν γε. ἢ γάρ ;

Πολ. Ναί. c

Σο. Μεγάλου γὰρ κακοῦ ἀπαλλάττεται, ὥστε λυσιτελεῖ
ὑπομεῖναι τὴν ἀλγηδόνα καὶ ὑγιῇ εἶναι.

Πολ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;

35 Σο. Ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως ἂν περὶ σῶμα εὐδαιμονέστατος
ἄνθρωπος εἴη, ἱατρεῦόμενος, ἢ μὴδὲ κάμνων ἀρχήν ;

⁴⁷⁸ 23. πολλὸ διαφέρει: this utterance
^b comes from Polus' heart because he
still continues to regard the practice
of law as the proper field for the
exercise of the art which he teaches.

^c 32. ἀπαλλάττεται: the subj. is to be
supplied from the previous question of

Socrates (ἄρ' οὖν ... ἱατρεῦόμενοι). The ⁴⁷⁸
trans. use of ἱατρεύειν is not common. c

33. ὑγιῇ: on the form, see H. 231 b.

35. ἄρ' οὖν κτέ.: Socrates proceeds
now to fulfil the promise made in
473 a. — οὕτως: is explained by the
partic. which follows.

Πολ. Δῆλον ὅτι μηδὲ κάμνων.

Σο. Οὐ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἦν εὐδαιμονία, ὡς ἔοικε, κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγή, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν μηδὲ κτήσις.

40 Πολ. *Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Σο. Τί δέ; ἀθλιώτερος πότερος δυοῶν ἐχόντων κακὸν αἰετ' ἐν σώματι εἶτ' ἐν ψυχῇ, ὁ ἰατρευόμενος καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενος τοῦ κακοῦ, ἢ ὁ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος, ἔχων δέ;

Πολ. Φαίνεται μοι ὁ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος.

45 Σο. Οὐκοῦν τὸ δίκην διδόναι μεγίστου κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγή ἦν, πονηρίας;

Πολ. *Ἦν γάρ.

Σο. Σωφρονίζει γάρ που καὶ δικαιότερους ποιεῖ καὶ ἱατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἢ δίκη.

50 Πολ. Ναί.

¶ Σο. Εὐδαιμονέστατος μὲν ἄρα ὁ μὴ ἔχων κακίαν ἐν ὁ ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐφάνη.

Πολ. Δῆλον δῆ.

Σο. Δεύτερος δῆπου ὁ ἀπαλλαττόμενος.

55 Πολ. *Ἔοικεν.

Σο. Οὗτος δ' ἦν ὁ νοθετούμενός τε καὶ ἐπιπληττόμενος καὶ δίκην διδούς.

478 38. τοῦτ' ἦν κτέ.: on the gender, see H. 617; G. 138, n. 2 c. The impf. of 'awakening' is often employed with ἄρα or its equivalents (ὡς ἔοικε). See H. 833.

39. τὴν ἀρχὴν μηδὲ κτήσις: is the substantival, hence the general expression for the previous particular partic. clause. τὴν ἀρχὴν is construed with κτήσις, which thus far retains its verbal nature.

d 49. ἱατρικὴ γίγνεται: carries out the analogy already so far developed. σωφρονίζειν in the soul corresponds

to ἱατρεύειν (κάειν καὶ τέμνειν) in the 478 d body.

52. τοῦτο: i.e. τὸ ἔχειν κακίαν ἐν ὁ σώματι, to be supplied from the preceding clause.

54. δεύτερος: cf. the Eng. colloquial 'second best.'

56. ὁ νοθετούμενος: contains an intimation that the improving punishment need not necessarily be the infliction of physical pain, but may be perceptible only by its effect on the soul. Cf. *Apol.* 26 a τῶν ἀκουσίων ἁμαρτημάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἐστίν,

Πολ. Ναί.

Σο. Κάκιστα ἄρα ζῇ ὁ ἔχων ἀδικίαν καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλατ-
60 τόμενος.

Πολ. Φαίνεται.

Σο. Οὐκοῦν οὗτος τυγχάνει ὦν ὃς ἂν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδι-
κῶν καὶ χρώμενος μεγίστη ἀδικία διαπράξῃται ὥστε μήτε
νουθετεῖσθαι μήτε κολάζεσθαι μήτε δίκην δίδοναι, ὥσπερ 479
65 σὺ φῆς Ἀρχέλαον παρεσκευάσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τυράν-
νους καὶ ῥήτορας καὶ δυνάστας ;

Πολ. Ἔοικε.

XXXV. Σο. Σχεδὸν γάρ που οὗτοι, ὧ ἄριστε, τὸ αὐτὸ
διαπεπραγμένοι εἰσίν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τοῖς μεγίστοις
νοσήμασιν συνισχόμενος διαπράξαιτο μὴ δίδοναι δίκην
τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀμαρτημάτων τοῖς ἰατροῖς μηδὲ ἰατρού-
5 εσθαι, φοβούμενος ὥσπερ ἀνὴρ παῖς τὸ κάεσθαι καὶ τὸ
τέμνεσθαι, ὅτι ἀλγυνόν. ἥ οὐ δοκεῖ καὶ σοὶ οὕτω ; b

478 ἀλλ' ἰδίᾳ λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νουθε-
6 τεῖν. The following expressions can be
conceived as denoting progressively
severer modes of punishment without
going into details. — ἐπιπληττόμενος :
the act. usually governs the dative.
See on 472 a.

59. ἀδικίαν: in accordance with
the general purpose of the discussion
this word is used as a general repre-
sentative of the various varieties of
κακία of the soul.

62. οὗτος: is pred. and is explained
by the preceding clause. The subject
is the following rel. clause.

63. διαπράξῃται: cf. 473 c. — The
three expressions for the idea of pun-
ishment correspond to those above
used, since κολάζειν ἐνελθεῖν (*Leg.* viii.
847 a) is but little different from

479 ἐπιπληττεῖν.

a XXXV. 2. ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις: a

case of very natural ellipsis. Cf. the 479
analogous Lat. use of *tanquam si*,
ut si. When used by itself this
expression becomes a relative phrase,
equivalent to the Lat. *tanquam*
sicut. In this sense it is written as
one word. GMT. 227, 868. The com-
parison to a child occurs in Homer,
and is found also elsewhere in Plato,
e.g. *Phaedo* 77 d διδόναι τὸ τῶν παιδῶν
and εἴσω ἐνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς ὅστις
τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται. Cf. above, 470 c.

3. μὴ δίδοναι δίκην: cf. 478 e just
above, where the same verb is used
with ὥστε μή, and below, b, c, where
πάν ποιῶσι is used like διαπράξαιτο in
this passage without ὥστε.

5 f. τὸ κάεσθαι καὶ τὸ τέμνεσθαι: the
repetition of the art. is unusual, and
serves to keep the two ideas separate.

6. ὅτι ἀλγυνόν: on the causal ὅτι
after verbs of fearing, see GMT. 377. b

Πολ. *Εμοιγε.

- 77 Σο. Ἀγνοῶν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἶόν ἐστιν ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ἀρετὴ σώματος. κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ὁμο-
 10 λογημένων τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν καὶ οἱ τὴν δίκην φεύγοντες, ὦ Πῶλε, τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυφλῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἀγνοεῖν, ὅσῳ ἀθλιώτερόν ἐστι μὴ ὑγιоῦς σώματος μὴ ὑγιεῖ ψυχῇ συνοικεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαθρᾷ καὶ ἀδίκῳ καὶ ἀνοσίῳ. ὅθεν καὶ πᾶν ποιοῦσιν ὥστε δίκην μὴ διδό-
 15 ναι μηδ' ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, καὶ χρήματα παρασκευαζόμενοι καὶ φίλους καὶ ὅπως ἂν ὦσιν ὡς πιθανώτατοι λέγειν. εἰ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀληθῆ ὁμολογήκαμεν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἄρ' αἰσθάνει τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τοῦ λόγου; ἡ βούλει συλλογισώμεθα αὐτά;
 20 Πολ. Εἰ μὴ σοί γε ἄλλως δοκεῖ.

479 8. ἀγνοῶν γε: Plato frequently
 b employs participial clauses as a kind of addendum to sentences which are either interrupted by the answer of the respondent or already complete in themselves. — οἶον: *what sort of a thing*.

11 f. καθορᾶν ... ἀγνοεῖν: is epexegetical to τοιοῦτόν τι, and corresponds to συνισχόμενος . . . φοβούμενος and ἀγνοῶν in the comparison above.

12 f. μὴ ὑγιоῦς σώματος: a harsh use of the comparative gen. equiv. to ἡ μὴ ὑγιεῖ σώματι. See Madv. *Syn.* § 90.

13. συνοικεῖν: divorces the human personality from the soul and body, by a union of which it exists. With καθορᾶν κτέ., Plato thinks especially of the νοῦς to which he opposes that part which, in its subserviency to the lusts and appetites, willingly withdraws from the control of reason. — σαθρᾷ: is used of injuries and defects of all kinds, whether of material things, as

jars (493 e), or of the body (Dem. Ol. 479 ii. 21 κἂν βήγμα (*fracture*) κἂν στρέμμα (*dislocation*) κἂν ἄλλο τι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων σαθρόν ᾖ). From this meaning comes its transferred use in application to the soul or the state. Notice that the unhealthy soul is designated as σαθρά from a physical point of view, ἀδικος in its dealings with its neighbors, and ἀνόσιος in its attitude towards the divine.

15 f. καὶ χρήματα παρασκευαζόμενοι: epexegetic partic. to πᾶν ποιοῦσιν.

16. ὅπως ἂν ὦσιν κτέ.: is a circumlocution for a third substantive.

18. τὰ συμβαίνοντα: "the results" obtained.

19. συλλογισασθαι: "to sum up what has been proved." See on 478 a above, in regard to the answers of Polus.

20. εἰ μὴ κτέ.: affirms and admits; but because nothing else can be done.

Σο. Ἄρ' οὖν συμβαίνει μέγιστον κακὸν ἢ ἀδικία καὶ
τὸ ἀδικεῖν;

Πολ. Φαίνεται γε.

Σο. Καὶ μὴν ἀπαλλαγὴ γε ἐφάνη τούτου τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ α
25 δίκην διδόναι;

Πολ. Κινδυνεύει.

Σο. Τὸ δέ γε μὴ διδόναι ἐμμονὴ τοῦ κακοῦ;

Πολ. Ναί.

Σο. Δεύτερον ἄρα ἐστὶν τῶν κακῶν μεγέθει τὸ ἀδικεῖν.
30 τὸ δὲ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην πάντων μέγιστόν τε καὶ
πρώτον κακῶν πέφυκεν.

Πολ. Ἔοικεν.

Σο. Ἄρ' οὖν περὶ τούτου, ὦ φίλε, ἡμφεσβητήσαμεν, σὺ
μὲν τὸν Ἀρχέλαον εὐδαιμονίζων τὸν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδι-
35 κούντα δίκην οὐδεμίαν διδόντα, ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦναντίον οἰόμε-
νος, εἴτ' Ἀρχέλαος εἴτ' ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων ὅστισοῦν μὴ
δίδωσι δίκην ἀδικῶν, τούτῳ προσήκειν ἀθλίῳ εἶναι διαφε-
ρόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αἰετὸν τὸν ἀδικοῦντα τοῦ
ἀδικουμένου ἀθλιώτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὴ διδόντα δίκην
40 τοῦ διδόντος; οὐ ταῦτ' ἦν τὰ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ λεγόμενα;

Πολ. Ναί.

479 21. ἄρ' οὖν: regularly introduces
c a conjecture, which is expected to be
confirmed by the other party; ἄρα
alone is also often so used; ἄρα οὐ
expects distinctly an affirmative an-
swer. Often ἄρ' οὖν approximates to
ἀρ' οὐ. Cf. 450 a. — μέγιστον κακόν:
συμβαίνειν has (in addition to the inf.)
the constr. of τυγχάνω. Hence the
omission of the partic. is allowable.
GMT. 890.

d 24. καὶ μὴν κτέ.: in this and in the
following utterance of Socrates, the
question is denoted merely by the tone.

29. δεύτερον κτέ.: cf. the similar 479
usage above in 478 e. If the reading is
d sound, we must infer from the follow-
ing clause that τὸ ἀδικεῖν has the same
force as τὸ ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην.

34. τὸν Ἀρχέλαον ... τὸν κτέ.: the
main force of the example lies in the
predicate, τὸν ... διδόντα, as the art.
shows. Constr. τὸν with διδόντα, to
which ἀδικοῦντα is subordinate.

37 f. διαφερόντως: is construed like c
the corresponding verb. Cf. Apol. 29 b
ἐγὼ ταύτῃ ἴσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν
ἀνθρώπων.

Σο. Οὐκοῦν ἀποδεδείκται ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἔλέγετο;

Πολ. Φαίνεται.

XXXVI. Σο. Εἶεν· εἰ οὖν δὴ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὦ Πῶλε, 480
τίς ἡ μεγάλη χρεία ἐστὶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς; δεῖ μὲν γὰρ δὴ
ἐκ τῶν νῦν ὁμολογημένων αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα φυλάτ-
τειν ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσῃ, ὡς ικανὸν κακὸν ἔξοντα. οὐ γάρ;

5 Πολ. Πάνυ γε.

Σο. Ἐὰν δέ γε ἀδικήσῃ ἡ αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος τις ὧν ἂν
κῆδεται, αὐτὸν ἐκόντα ἰέναι ἐκείσε, ὅπου ὡς τάχιστα δώ-
σει δίκην, παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν ὥσπερ παρὰ τὸν ἱατρόν,
σπεύδοντα ὅπως μὴ ἐγχερονισθὲν τὸ νόσημα τῆς ἀδικίας b
10 ὑπουλον τὴν ψυχὴν ποιήσῃ καὶ ἀνίατον· ἡ πῶς λέγωμεν,
ὦ Πῶλε, εἴπερ τὰ πρότερον μένει ἡμῖν ὁμολογήματα;
οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταῦτα ἐκείνοις οὕτω μὲν συμφωνεῖν, ἄλλως
δὲ μή;

Πολ. Τί γὰρ δὴ φῶμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

15 Σο. Ἐπὶ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἀπολογεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀδικίας
τῆς αὐτοῦ ἢ γονέων ἢ ἐταίρων ἢ παιδῶν ἢ πατρίδος ἀδι-

480 XXXVI. 2. ἡ μεγάλη κτέ.: the
a use of the adj. is a slightly sarcastic
allusion to Polus' extravagant enco-
miums on rhetoric. The rhetorical
question has the force of a neg.
Hence the following causal clause.

3. αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν κτέ.: the prefixing
of αὐτὸν emphasizes the reflexive. H.
688. The subj. of φυλάττειν is indefi-
nite; cf. 456 d.

4. ικανόν: the use of this word is
an example of *μείωσις*, or understatement,
the peculiar characteristic of
American humor. A similar case is
Ant. *Tetral.* A. β 2 ἐμοὶ δὲ ζῶν τε
ἄνθρωπος ἀνατροπεὺς τοῦ οἴκου ἐγένετο
ἀποθανών τε . . . ικανὰς λύπας . . . προσ-
βέβληκεν.

10. ὑπουλον: is stronger than σα- 480
θρόν. The disease leaves the sur- b
face, and fastens on the innermost
kernel of the soul. We are re-
minded of the Ovidian *Princi-
piis obsta. sero medicina pa-
ratur, | cum mala per longas
convalescere moras (Rem. Am.
91 f.)*.

14. τί γὰρ δὴ κτέ.: the rhetorical
question has the force of an emphatic
affirmation, τί being almost equiv. to
τί ἄλλο.

16 f. πατρίδος ἀδικουσύνης: the
speeches in the assembly are hereby
put in the same category with the
judicial. — ἀδικουσύνης: is a colloquial
repetition of ἀδικίας.

κούσης οὐ χρήσιμος οὐδὲν ἢ ῥητορικὴ ἡμῖν, ὦ Πῶλε, εἰ
 μὴ εἴ τις ὑπολάβοι τούναντίον, κατηγορεῖν δεῖν μάλιστα
 μὲν ἑαυτοῦ, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅς
 20 ἂν αἰ τῶν φίλων τυγχάνῃ ἀδικῶν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύπτεσθαι,
 ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ φανερόν ἄγειν τὸ ἀδίκημα, ἵνα δῶ δίκην καὶ
 ὑγιῆς γένηται, ἀναγκάζειν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
 μὴ ἀποδειλιᾶν, ἀλλὰ παρέχειν μύσαντα καὶ ἀνδρείως
 ὥσπερ τέμνειν καὶ κἀκεῖν ἱατρῷ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν
 25 διώκοντα μὴ ὑπολογιζόμενον τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἐὰν μὲν γε πλη-
 γῶν ἄξια ἡδίκηκώς ᾖ, τύπτειν παρέχοντα, ἐὰν δὲ δεσμοῦ, α
 δεῖν, ἐὰν δὲ ζημίας, ἀποτίνοντα, ἐὰν δὲ φυγῆς, φεύγοντα,
 ἐὰν δὲ θανάτου, ἀποθνήσκοντα, αὐτὸν πρῶτον ὄντα κατή-
 γορον καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρώ-
 30 μενον τῇ ῥητορικῇ, ὅπως ἂν καταδῆλων τῶν ἀδικημάτων
 γιγνομένων ἀπαλλάττωνται τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, ἀδικίας.
 φῶμεν οὕτως ἢ μὴ φῶμεν, ὦ Πῶλε;
 Πηλ. Ἄτοπα μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, τοῖς μέν-
 35 τοι ἔμπροσθεν ἴσως σοι ὁμολογεῖται.

480 17 f. εἰ μὴ εἰ: cf. Lach. 196 a οὔτε
 b γὰρ μάντιν οὔτε ἱατρὸν . . . λέγει τὸν
 ἀνδρείον εἰ μὴ εἰ θεόν τινα λέγει αὐτὸν
 εἶναι. Cf. Lat. nisi si; e.g. Cic. ad
 Fam. xiv. 2. 1 noli putare me ad
 quemquam scribere, nisi si
 quis ad me scripsit.

c 18. εἰ ὑπολάβοι τούναντίον: except
 in case one should assume, on the con-
 trary, that, etc.

19 f. ὅς ἂν κτέ.: follows a pl. on
 account of its generic signification,
 and governs τῶν φίλων as a part. gen.
 Examples in Kr. 58, 4, 5.

23. μύσαντα: to go into danger
 blindly, i.e. with closed eyes,—to be
 blind to the existence of danger, as
 such, was apparently thought to be a

mark of great courage and determi- 480
 nation; hence μύσαντα is paired here c
 with ἀνδρείως. Why one should act
 so, is explained by τὸ . . . διώκοντα.
 One of the functions of the partici-
 ple is to express manner; hence it is
 quite natural to find it side by side
 with an adverb.

29. τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων κτέ.: see on d
 473 c.

30. ὅπως ἂν κτέ.: is correlative
 with ἐπὶ τοῦτο. Notice that here the
 ὅπως is a purely final particle, as it
 was not in a, b above.

34. ἴσως σοι ὁμολογεῖται: the per- e
 sonal dat. σοι seems strange, since it
 can neither be understood as 482 b
 below, οὐ σοι ὁμολογήσει Καλλικλῆς,

35 Σο. Οὐκοῦν ἢ κακέϊνα λυτέον ἢ τάδε ἀνάγκη συμβαίνειν ;

Πολ. Ναί, τοῦτό γε οὕτως ἔχει.

/ Σο. Τοῦναντίον δέ γε αὖ μεταβαλόντα, εἴ ἄρα δεῖ τινα κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἴτ' ἐχθρὸν εἴτε ὄντινουν, ἐὰν μόνον μὴ
40 αὐτὸς ἀδικῆται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εὐλαβητέον· ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλον ἀδικῇ ὁ ἐχθρός, παντὶ τρόπῳ παρασκευαστέον καὶ πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα, ὅπως μὴ δῶ δίκην 481

480 nor as 477 d above, αἰσχιστον ἀδικία
e . . . ὁμολόγηται ἡμῖν, for ὁμολογεῖται (conveniunt, consentanea sunt) has its dat. in τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν. But it is not superfluous; its force seems to be this: "but perhaps you can make it agree with what precedes." Thus the dat., as well as ἵσως, would serve the author's purpose in delineating Polus' character, who by such shallow artifices seeks to weaken his admissions, and, as far as possible, relieve himself from any responsibility in the results,—a design which Socrates balks by his following question. See on 477 d, 478 a, and H. 770, 771.

35. κακέϊνα: καὶ assumes εἰ τάδε ἄτοπα δοκεῖ, thus noticing Polus' observation.—λυτέον: a metaphor drawn from such usage as λύειν γέφυραν. Cf. Prot. 332 e, Xen. An. ii. 4. 10. A different meaning appears in διαλύειν τὸν λόγον, 458 b, after διαλύειν τὴν συνουσίαν in 457 c.

38. τοῦναντίον: the heaping up of such kindred ideas as αὖ, αὐθις, πάλιν is not uncommon (see examples in Kr. 69, 12); τοῦναντίον means "on the contrary"; αὖ, "on the other hand"; μεταβαλόντα (intransitive), "vice versa."—εἰ ἄρα: if, assuming the ordinary view to be the correct one (ἄρα).—τινά: is object, and with it εἴτε . . .

ὄντινουν is in apposition. ἐχθρός is 480
a personal enemy, as distinguished from πολέμιος, a national enemy.

39. ἐὰν μόνον μὴ αὐτὸς κτέ.: because experiencing injury might be held as a kind of substitute for the punishment due for inflicting it.

40. αὐτός: refers to the subject of κακῶς ποιεῖν, which is indefinite.—τοῦτο κτέ.: the insertion of this clause, which is due to the preceding ἐὰν μόνον κτέ., defers the completion of the sentence to παντὶ τρόπῳ κτέ.

42. πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα: the 481
two species of activity do not exclude each other, for the effect of πράττειν may be more thoroughly completed by λέγειν, and vice versa.—The acc. case is in agreement with the unexpressed indefinite agent of παρασκευαστέον. On the case of the agent with verbal adjs., see G. 281, 2; H. 991 a.—ὅπως μὴ δῶ κτέ.: this sentence is remarkable on account of the variety of the constructions found after ὅπως,—three out of the perhaps eight varieties being found, viz. subjv., ἄν with subjv., fut. indic. We should not attempt to make any sharp distinctions here, for Plato is capable of changing the construction for the sake of variety. We may, however, say this much. ὅπως μὴ δῶ is purely final, the conjunction not

μηδὲ ἔλθῃ παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν· εἰ δὲ ἔλθῃ, μηχανητέον,
 ὅπως ἂν διαφύγῃ καὶ μὴ δῶ δίκην ὁ ἐχθρὸς, ἀλλ' εἰάν τε
 45 χρυσίον (ἦ) ἡρπακῶς πολὺ, μὴ ἀποδιδῶ τοῦτο ἀλλ' ἔχων
 ἀναλίσκῃ καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως καὶ
 ἀθέως, εἰάν τε θανάτου ἄξια ἡδίκηκώς ἦ, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθα-
 νεῖται, μάλιστα μὲν μηδέποτε, ἀλλ' ἀθάνατος ἔσται πονη-
 ρὸς ὢν· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅπως ὡς πλείστον χρόνον βιώσεται τοι-
 50 οὔτος ὢν. ἐπὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἡ ῥητο-
 ρικὴ χρήσιμος εἶναι, ἐπεὶ τῷ γε μὴ μέλλοντι ἀδικεῖν οὐ
 μεγάλη τίς μοι δοκεῖ ἡ χρεία αὐτῆς εἶναι, εἰ δὴ καὶ ἔστιν
 τις χρεία, ὡς ἔν γε τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδαμῇ ἐφάνη οὔσα.

XXXVII. ΚΑΛ. Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, σπουδάζει
 ταῦτα Σωκράτης ἢ παίζει;

ΧΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπερφυῶς σπουδά-
 ζειν. “οὐδὲν” μέντοι “οἶον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν.”

481 differing from *ἴνα*. When the delin-
 a quent is brought before the judge,
 there is some doubt as to his escape,
 and *ὅπως ἂν* (equiv. to *εἰάν πως*) gives
 expression to this doubt. In the long
 sentence following the *ἂν* gradually
 fades away, and the most common
 relative construction with the fut.
 indic. closes the series. On *εἰ δὲ μή*
 after *εἰάν*, see on 502 b.

43. *εἰάν δὲ ἔλθῃ*: in thus stating
 the opposite alternative, Socrates
 takes for the moment the standpoint
 of the orators. That it is only for
 the moment is seen from *Crito* 49 c
οὔτε ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν
οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἂν ὀτιοῦν πάσχη
ὑπ' αὐτῶν.

46. *ἀναλίσκῃ*: to make the state-
 ment of the wrong complete, the way
 in which the money is wasted is added.

b XXXVII. 1. On the role assigned
 to Callicles here, see *Introd.* § 15.

After Polus has shown himself in- 481
 capable of maintaining his views of
 rhetoric against the superior dialecti-
 cal skill of Socrates, Callicles enters
 the discussion with a thought quite
 similar to the one with which Polus
 had entered it in 461 b. The view
 of life on which all of Socrates' de-
 ductions rest is so abhorrent to his
 innermost nature and all his hitherto
 cherished ideas that he cannot be
 brought to look upon the principles
 here advocated as the earnest convic-
 tions of a reasonable man. He does
 not, however, rush into the lists so
 roughly as Polus, but, being a more
 polished man of the world, turns first
 to Chaerephon, who is thoroughly
 acquainted with Socrates' views. He,
 however, wittily refers him to the
 master, in the same words with which
 Callicles himself had in 447 c re-
 ferred Socrates to Gorgias.

5 ΚΑΛ. Νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλ' ἐπιθυμῶ. εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρα- c
τες, πότερόν σε φῶμεν νυνὶ σπουδάζοντα ἢ παίζοντα;
εἰ μὲν γὰρ σπουδάζεις τε καὶ τυγχάνει ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ὄντα
ἀ λέγεις, ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἀνατετραμμένος ἂν εἴη
τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πράττομεν, ὡς ἔοικεν,
10 ἢ ἂ δει;

ΣΟ. ὦ Καλλίκευς, εἰ μή τι ἦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάθος,
τοῖς μὲν ἄλλο τι, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλο τι, τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλὰ τις ἡμῶν
ἰδιὸν τι ἔπασχε πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ῥάδιον ἐνδεί- a
ξασθαι τῷ ἐτέρῳ τὸ ἐαυτοῦ πάθημα. λέγω δ' ἐννοήσας,
15 ὅτι ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν τυγχάνομεν ταυτὸν τι πεπονθότες,

481 5. νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλ' ἐπιθυμῶ:
c ἀλλὰ is used after an expression of
asseveration, as in 463 d. The words
of Chaerephon contain the challenge,
"Why don't you rather turn to So-
crates himself?" to which Callicles
replies, "But that is just what I do
desire." In Callicles' manner of ex-
pression we discern his excitable na-
ture as well as his strong faith in his
own views, which he is the more sur-
prised to find opposed, not only by
Socrates, but also by Chaerephon.
Artistically also his words form the
text for the discussion which follows.

6. φῶμεν . . . παίζοντα: this is a
very unusual construction for φημί.
G. 260, 2, n. 1.

8. ἀνατετραμμένος: cf. ἀνατρέπειν
τὰ πράγματα, πόλιν, οἶκον. For if you
has been entirely upside down? — τῶν
ἀνθρώπων: is emphatically added be-
cause Callicles does not intend that
under ἡμῶν only a limited circle shall
be understood. Cf. Ar. Plut. 500 ὡς

μὲν γὰρ νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ βίος τοῖς ἀνθρώποις 481
διέκεται. c

9. πάντα τὰ ἐναντία: like πᾶν τοῦ-
ναντίον, quite the contrary.

11. εἰ μή τι κτέ.: Socrates recog-
nizes indeed the opposition in their
views of life, but refers it to the dif-
ferent exercise of a common feeling,
— love, — which varies according to
the difference in the objects to which
it is directed. The comparison of
love of wisdom with other varieties of
human love is often found in Plato,
e.g. *Phaedo* 68 a. — πάθος: denotes a
state of mind brought about by ex-
ternal influences. According to cause
and circumstances it may be love,
hate, admiration, or scorn. But no
variety is peculiar to any single man;
this is made clear by the explanatory
clause inserted between πάθος and τὸ
αὐτό.

13. ἴδιον: contains in itself an idea d
of comparison, like ἄλλο ἕτερον, and
hence takes ἦ.

15. ταυτόν τι: the πάθος experi-
enced by each one, is first roughly
characterized as "about the same
thing," and later clearly defined by

ἐρῶντε δύο ὄντε δυοῖν ἐκάτερος, ἐγὼ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδου τε τοῦ Κλεινίου καὶ φιλοσοφίας, σὺ δὲ τοῦ τε Ἀθηναίων δήμου καὶ τοῦ Πυριλάμπους. αἰσθάνομαι οὖν σου ἐκάσποτε, καίπερ ὄντος δεινοῦ, ὅτι ἂν φῇ σου τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ 20 ὅπως ἂν φῇ ἔχειν, οὐ δυναμένου ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄνω καὶ ἑκάτω μεταβαλλομένου· ἐν τε τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, εἴαν τι σοῦ λέγοντος ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων μὴ φῇ οὕτως ἔχειν, μεταβαλλόμενος λέγεις ἃ ἐκείνος βούλεται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν Πυριλάμπους νεανίαν τὸν καλὸν τοῦτον τοιαῦτα ἕτερα πέπον- 25 θας· τοῖς γὰρ τῶν παιδικῶν βουλευμασί τε καὶ λόγοις

481 the explanatory ἐρῶντε κτέ. The variation from the pl. to the dual is interesting. The lack of a first person dual compels the first pl., with its accompanying partic. *πεινοῦσθες*, while the following dual emphasizes the exact similarity of the two experiences.

16. Ἀλκιβιάδου: the mental and moral training of the rising youth was largely directed by prominent older men with whom they associated, usually according to individual preference. One of these prominent teachers, and one who made it the business of his life, was Socrates, and among the young men who clustered around him and followed his conversations was Alcibiades, whom Socrates greatly loved for his mental gifts. Owing to his great beauty he was 7 jestingly called Socrates' sweetheart (τὰ παιδικά). Cf. *Prot. init.* Πόθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνει; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι ἀπὸ κυνηγεσίου τοῦ περὶ τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου ὄραν. This is the point of the allusion here.

18. δῆμον: has two allusions. The son of Pyrilampes, a rich Athenian and friend of Pericles, was called Demus. Like his father, he is re-

ported to have been especially beau- 481 tiful, and is also mentioned by Ar. ^d *Vesp.* 97 ff. as a much admired sweetheart. This fact Socrates skillfully uses to characterize Callicles' relation to the Athenian demus. This people needed, like a boy, a leader and guide; but the orators, instead of governing it, regulated their actions according to its whims. — τοῦ Πυριλάμπους: is of course to be understood in the usual way, like τοῦ Κλεινίου. Cf. τὸν Πυριλάμπους below, and 513 b.

18 f. αἰσθάνομαι . . . οὐ δυναμένου: on the gen. partic. construction see GMT. 884-6; H. 742, 982. — δεινοῦ: is often joined with λέγειν, in order to describe a skilful orator, but can also be used without this addition, in the sense of "skilful," "clever."

20 f. ἄνω καὶ ἑκάτω: like Lat. *sum deorsum*, with *μεταστρέφειν*, *στρέφειν* (511 a), *μεταβάλλειν*, *μεταπίπτειν* (493 a) denotes a changeable and uncertain course of action. Variations of the phrase are ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω, and more often ἄνω κάτω.

25. βουλευμασί: i.e. the fanciful plans and designs of boys.

οὐχ οἷός τ' εἶ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ὥστε, εἴ τις σου λέγοντος ἐκά-
 στοτε, ἃ διὰ τούτους λέγεις, θαυμάζοι ὡς ἄτοπά ἐστιν,
 ἴσως εἴποις ἂν αὐτῷ, εἰ βούλοιο τάληθῇ λέγω, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ
 τις παύσει τὰ σὰ παιδικὰ τούτων τῶν λόγων, οὐδὲ σὺ 482
 30 παύσει ποτὲ ταῦτα λέγων. νόμιζε τοίνυν καὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ
 χρῆναι ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀκούειν, καὶ μὴ θαύμαζε ὅτι ἐγὼ
 ταῦτα λέγω, ἀλλὰ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τὰ ἐμὰ παιδικὰ, παύ-
 σον ταῦτα λέγουσαν. λέγει γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἐταῖρε, ἃ νῦν
 ἐμοῦ ἀκούεις, καὶ μοί ἐστιν τῶν ἐτέρων παιδικῶν πολλὴ
 35 ἥττον ἐμπληκτος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κλεινίειος οὗτος ἄλλοτε
 ἄλλων ἐστὶ λόγων, ἡ δὲ φιλοσοφία (αἰεὶ) τῶν αὐτῶν· λέγει
 δὲ ἃ σὺ νῦν θαυμάζεις, παρήσθα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς λεγομένοις. b
 ἡ οὖν ἐκείνην ἐξέλεγξον, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ὡς οὐ τὸ ἀδι-
 κεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀδικοῦντα δίκην μὴ διδόναι ἀπάντων ἔσχα-
 40 τον κακῶν· ἡ εἰ τοῦτο ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, μὰ τὸν κύνα
 τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν, οὗ σοι ὁμολογήσει Καλλικλῆς, ὃ

481 28. εἰ βούλοιο: which probably was
 e hardly to be expected.

482 31. ἕτερα τοιαῦτα: cf. above (24),
 a τοιαῦτα ἕτερα.

34. τῶν ἐτέρων παιδικῶν: in the
 above-cited passage from *Phaedo*
 (68 a) we find the word ἀνθρωπίνων
 in the same connexion.

35. ἐμπληκτος: unstable. Cf. *Soph.*
Ai. 1358 τοιοῦδε μέντοι φῶτες ἐμπλη-
 κτοι βροτῶν.

36. ἄλλων . . . τῶν αὐτῶν: gen.
 of characteristic is not common in
 Greek, and is always predicate. Cf.
Thuc. i. 113 ὅσοι τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης
 ἦσαν. See *H.* 732 d.

b 37. παρήσθα δέ: change from the
 rel. to the independent construction.
 See on 452 d. Here, however, we
 must supply the pronoun (αὐτοῖς) to
 which λεγομένοις is a subordinate tem-

poral partic. equiv. to ὅτε ἐλέγετο. 482
 We might translate δέ "although." b

38. ἐξέλεγξον ὡς κτέ.: see on 467 a.
 Here, to "prove by confuting her."
 — ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον: refers to 480 e
 οὐκοῦν ἢ κακείνα λυτίον ἢ τάδε ἀνάγκη
 συμβαίνειν. The transition from the
 personal to the material object is
 made much easier by the meaning of
 the verb ἐξέλεγξον.

40. μὰ τὸν κύνα: the addition of
 τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν is a humorous al-
 lusion to the animal worship of the
 Egyptians. See *Apol.* 21 e. The
 omission of the art. with Αἰγυπτίων is
 regular.

41. Καλλικλῆς: the use of the
 proper name in contrast with the
 pronoun σοί, and its close connection
 with the address ὦ Καλλίκελεις, is in-
 tended to emphasize as sharply as

Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ διαφωνήσῃ ἐν ᾧ παντὶ τῷ βίῳ. καίτοι ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ὃ βέλτιστε, καὶ τὴν λύραν μοι κρεῖττον εἶναι ἀναρμωστῆν τε καὶ διαφωνεῖν, καὶ χορὸν ᾧ χορηγοίην, 45 καὶ πλείστους ἀνθρώπους μὴ ὁμολογεῖν μοι ἀλλ' ἐναντία ο λέγειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἓνα ὄντα ἐμὲ ἐμαυτῷ ἀσύμφωνον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντία λέγειν.

XXXVIII. ΚΑΛ. ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς νεανιεύεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγόρος ὢν· καὶ νῦν ταῦτα δημηγορεῖς ταῦτ' ὅν παθόντος Πῶλου πάθος, ὅπερ Γοργίου κατηγόρει πρὸς σὲ παθεῖν. ἔφη γάρ που Γοργίαν ἐρωτῶ-

482 possible the inner conflict which
b must continue to rage in Callicles' soul, so long as one opinion has not decisively vanquished the other.

44. ἀναρμωστῆν: applies especially to imperfection in the general harmony, while διαφωνεῖν is used of the discord between single tones. Two different principles exert their effects upon the soul. — χορηγοίην: this liturgy, which has been already mentioned in note on 472 a, was of course not possible for Socrates, and could be only for the rich. But in proportion as a victory in this kind of musical competition was looked upon as a great honor, so a failure was a great humiliation. The opt. is ideal, and to be translated "which I might conduct."

c 46. μᾶλλον: frequently follows a comp. to reiterate the idea with a slight modification (rather than). Cf. below, 487 b, *Phaedo* 79 e, and see for other examples, *Rid.* § 166.

XXXVIII. 1. νεανιεύεσθαι: "to act like a wild young man." Callicles has in mind especially the insolent, bold, and reckless conduct of the rich and proud Athenian youth. This is usually the meaning of the adject-

tive νεανικός (so in our dialogue, 508 d, 482 509 a), which, however, is sometimes used only of the freshness and the vigor of youth, as below, 485 e. The verb applies especially to the training of the youth by the Sophists, which leads them to light and idle speeches and to a defense of the most conflicting principles without having regard unto the higher and earnest problems of life. Cf. *Phaedrus* 235 a καὶ ἐφαίμετο δὴ μοι νεανιεύεσθαι ἐπιδεικνύμενος ὡς οἷός τε ὢν ταῦτ' ἀτέρως τε καὶ ἐτέρωσ λέγων ἀμφοτέρωσ εἰπὲν ἄριστα.

2 f. δημηγόρος, δημηγορεῖν: indicate dissatisfaction, sometimes with the length of the speeches, as opposed to διαλέγεσθαι, e.g. 519 d, e, *Prot.* 329 a, 336 b; sometimes, as here and in 494 d, with the means employed by those who, unconcerned for the truth, seek only the approbation of the multitude. In the mouth of Callicles, who is the real δημηγόρος, this reproach sounds very strange, especially with the addition ὡς ἀληθῶς. It is a kind of unconscious self-criticism.

4. πρὸς σέ: cf. 485 b below, and *Apol.* 21 c πρὸς ὃν ἐγὼ τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον, "at whose hands I had some such experience."

5 μενον ὑπὸ σοῦ, ἐὰν ἀφίκηται παρ' αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπιστάμενος
τὰ δίκαια ὁ τὴν ῥητορικὴν βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, εἰ διδάξοι α
αὐτὸν ὁ Γοργίας, αἰσχυρῆναι αὐτὸν καὶ φάναι διδάξειν
διὰ τὸ ἔλθωσ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι ἀγανακτοῖεν ἂν εἴ τις μὴ
φαίῃ· διὰ δὲ ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν ἀναγκασθῆναι ἑναν-
10 τία αὐτὸν αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν, σὲ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾶν. καὶ σου
κατεγέλα, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖν, ὀρθῶς τότε· νῦν δὲ πάλιν
αὐτὸς ταῦτόν τοῦτο ἔπαθεν, καὶ ἔγωγε κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐκ
ἄγμαι Πῶλον, ὅτι σοι συνεχώρησε τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἰσχίον
εἶναι τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι· ἐκ ταύτης γὰρ αὖ τῆς ὁμολογίας
15 αὐτὸς ὑπὸ σοῦ συμποδισθεὶς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπεστομίσθη,
αἰσχυρθεὶς ἅ ἐνόει εἰπεῖν. σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Σώκρατες,
εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις φορτικά καὶ δημηγορικά, φάσκων τὴν

482 6. διδάξοι: the fut. opt. is only
d found in indir. disc. as a representa-
tive of the fut. indicative. It is post-
Homeric, the first example occurring
in Pindar.

7. αὐτόν: repeats with emphasis
the subject Γοργίαν, which is already
expressed. Cf. Xen. Cyr. i. 3. 15 πει-
ράσσομαι τῷ πάμπω ἀγαθῶν ἱππέων κράτι-
στος ὢν ἱππεὺς συμμαχεῖν αὐτῷ. The
clause with ὅτι is causal, and is ex-
planatory of διὰ τὸ ἔλθωσ τῶν ἀνθρώπων,
which is to be connected with φάναι,
not with διδάξειν.

10. ἀγαπᾶν: cf. 461 c δ δὲ ἀγαπᾶς.

11. ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖν: as it seemed to
me. The phrase is found sometimes
with ὥς as here and Hdt. ii. 124;
sometimes without, as Meno 81 a;
ἐμοίγε δοκεῖν Soph. El. 410.

e 15. συμποδισθεὶς ἐπεστομίσθη: a
combination of two metaphors, both
of which refer to a horse which has
been caught by a noose, and then
guided according to a strange will by
a bridle which has been forced into

its mouth. In the same way Polus, 482
by that unlucky admission, allowed
himself to be noosed, and was thus
compelled to follow the lead of So-
crates, wherever that might take him.

16. τῷ ὄντι: affirms the justice of
the accusation made against Socrates
by Polus.

17. φορτικά: a word not uncom-
mon in Plato, is used in Euthyd. 287 a
of insidious catch-questions. See on
Apol. 32 a, where combined with δυκα-
νικά it is used of the tediousness of
those detailed discussions from which
Socrates, after the manner of an or-
ator before a court, seeks to draw his
proofs. Here Callicles probably wants
to indicate the vulgarity of such il-
lustrations and talks, as being fit
only for the uncultured multitude.
The rel. sentence ἅ φύσει κτέ. is con-
nected exegetically with τοιαῦτα,
and thereby the conclusion from the
special case is made of general appli-
cation. It was indeed from the idea
of the καλόν that Socrates drew the

ἀλήθειαν διώκειν, ἃ φύσει μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν καλὰ, νόμῳ δέ.
 ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐναντί' ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἧ τε φύσις
 20 καὶ ὁ νόμος. ἐὰν οὖν τις αἰσχύνηται καὶ μὴ τολμᾷ λέγειν 483
 ἅπερ νοεῖ, ἀναγκάζεται ἐναντία λέγειν. ὁ δὲ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο
 τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκῶς κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν
 μὲν τις κατὰ νόμον λέγῃ, κατὰ φύσιν ὑπερωτῶν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ
 τῆς φύσεως, τὰ τοῦ νόμου. ὥσπερ αὐτίκα ἐν τούτοις, τῷ
 25 ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι, Πάλου τὸ κατὰ νόμον
 αἰσχίον λέγοντος, σὺ τὸν νόμον ἐδιώκαθες κατὰ φύσιν.
 φύσει μὲν γὰρ πᾶν αἰσχίον ἐστὶν ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον, τὸ

482 whole argument with which he re-
 futed Polus.

18. φύσει μὲν, νόμῳ δέ: the opposi-
 tion of natural right to conventional
 right (law) was first definitely main-
 tained by Hippias of Elis. Cf. *Prot.*
 337 c d, *Xen. Mem.* iv. 4. 14. After
 him this principle was accepted and
 made a commonplace by all the
 Sophists. It is probable that Gorgias
 himself did not defend it, but his
 teaching can be traced back to it.
 This principle Callicles now proceeds
 to unfold. Of kindred import is also
 the discussion between Alcibiades
 and Pericles, related by *Xen. Mem.* i.
 2. 40 ff.

483 21 f. ὁ δὲ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν
 κτέ.: τὸ σοφόν (*artifice, trick*) is used
 somewhat scornfully in the sense in
 which the sophistical Eristics em-
 ployed it, with whom Callicles puts
 Socrates on a level. Hence he also
 employs towards him the word κα-
 κουργεῖν, which was used among the
 Eristics to denote crafty tripping in
 discussion. Cf. *Rep.* i. 341 a οὐτε γὰρ
 ἂν με λάθοις κακουργῶν, by which Thra-
 symachus declares his ability to de-
 fend himself against such unfair treat-

ment; so *ib.* 338 d. The same feel- 483
 ing determines the choice of the com-
 pound ὑπερωτᾶν "to slip artfully into
 the question," "ask silyly". — τοῦτο
 τὸ σοφόν: is exegetical to δ.

23. ἐὰν δὲ κτέ.: supply the same
 verbs as are found in the first mem-
 ber of the sentence.

24. ὥσπερ αὐτίκα: *as, for example.*
 See on 472 d.

26. ἐδιώκαθες κατὰ φύσιν: 'you
 followed up what he meant "conven-
 tionally" by arguing upon it in the
 "natural" sense.' Cope. *I.e.* Socrates
 had treated the concession of Polus,
 and drawn his results from it, as if
 Polus had therein conceded that to
 do wrong was by nature, *i.e.* of itself,
 more ugly than to suffer wrong. "For
 — so runs the argument of Callicles
 — that which is by nature ugly coin-
 cides with what is evil, which latter,
 however, is the suffering of wrong.
 But we must not conclude from this
 that what is by law the more ugly is
 also the greater evil."

27 f. τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι: as the passage
 stands, must be considered as explan-
 atory of the preceding, without close
 construction.

ἀδικεῖσθαι, νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς τοῦτο
 γ' ἐστὶν τὸ πάθημα, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀνδραπόδου τινός,
 οὗ κρείττον' ἐστὶν τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν, ὅστις ἀδικούμενος καὶ
 προπηλακιζόμενος μὴ οἷός τέ ἐστιν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν
 μηδὲ ἄλλῳ οὐ ἂν κήδηται. ἀλλ', οἶμαι, οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς
 νόμους οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ἀνθρωποὶ εἰσιν καὶ οἱ πολλοί. πρὸς
 αὐτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὐτοῖς συμφέρον τούς τε νόμους τίθεν-
 35 ται καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐπαινοῦσιν καὶ τοὺς ψόγους ψέγου-
 σιν. ἐκφοβούμεντες τοὺς ἐρρωμενεστέρους τῶν ἀνθρώπων
 καὶ δυνατοὺς ὄντας πλέον ἔχειν, ἵνα μὴ αὐτῶν πλέον ἔχω-
 σιν, λέγουσιν ὡς αἰσχροὺς καὶ ἄδικον τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν, καὶ
 τοῦτο ἐστὶν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ πλέον τῶν ἄλλων ζητεῖν ἔχειν.

483
 b 28. οὐδὲ γάρ: leads over to a criti-
 cism of Socrates' view per se, the
 question thus far having been his man-
 ner of procedure in the case of Polus.

30. οὗ κρείττον' κτέ.: in the opinion
 of the masses, the same is true of all
 who are without the enjoyments of
 life. Cf. *Phaedo* 85 a. The regular
 relative after an indefinite (τινός) is
 ὅστις, which frequently has a condi-
 tional idea, and then takes the cond.
 neg. μή. H. 699 a.

31 f. αὐτὸς . . . κήδηται: the same
 ideas were presented in 480 a. Here
 every man is expressly thrown upon
 his own resources and the state abol-
 ished.

32. ἀλλ', οἶμαι κτέ.: this exposition
 of the origin of conventional right is
 designed by Callicles to show the su-
 perior authority of the natural right
 which he advocates. — οἱ τιθέμενοι:
 "the law-makers." The active is used
 of the law-giver. On the force of
 the article with the predicate, see H.
 669 a; G. 141, x. 8.

33. καὶ οἱ πολλοί: it is just this
 addition which contains the most im-

portant point, according to Callicles' 483
 real view, though he keeps it in the
 background, because for him the con-
 trast between stronger and weaker is
 of more value for his argument. It
 is this begging of the question to
 which Socrates first turns his atten-
 tion in 488 c ff. — πρὸς αὐτούς: usu-
 ally we find βλέποντες, but the prepo-
 sition itself is sufficient. Kr. 68, 39, 5.

35. ἐπαίνους, ψόγους: the people c
 not only makes laws, — i.e. commands
 and prohibitions, the transgression of
 which is punished by penalties, — but
 also expresses in manifold ways, by
 offices, honors, etc., its judgment on
 the value of men and actions.

36. Another case of explanatory
 asyndeton. — ἐρρωμενεστέρους: how
 completely this word has become an
 adjective is shown by the fact that
 it is the only partic. which admits
 comparison.

38. πλεονεκτεῖν: is an expression
 for every effort of self-aggrandize-
 ment, and was often used as a politi-
 cal watchword in opposition to ἰσονο-
 μία. Cf. τὸ ἴσον, two lines below.

40 ἀγαπῶσι γάρ, οἶμαι, αὐτοὶ ἂν τὸ ἴσον ἔχωσιν φαυλότεροι
ὄντες.

XXXIX. Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ νόμῳ μὲν τοῦτο ἄδικον καὶ
αἰσχροὺν λέγεται, τὸ πλέον ζητεῖν ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ
ἀδικεῖν αὐτὸ καλοῦσιν· ἡ δέ γε, οἶμαι, φύσις αὐτῇ ἀπο- α
φαίνει αὐτό, ὅτι δίκαιόν ἐστιν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος
5 πλέον ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου. δηλοῖ
δὲ ταῦτα πολλαχοῦ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώ-
οις καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γένε-
σιν, ὅτι οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον κέκριται, τὸν κρείττω τοῦ ἥττονος
ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ ποίῳ δικαίῳ χρώμενος

483 40. ἀγαπῶσι: in mockery, because
c satisfaction is a sign of weakness.
Cf. what Adimantus says in *Rep.* ii.
386 c οἶδεν ὅτι πλὴν εἴ τις θεῖα φύσει
δυσχεραίνειν τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἐπιστήμην λα-
βῶν ἀπέχεται αὐτοῦ, τῶν γε ἄλλων
οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν δίκαιος, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἀνανδρίας
ἢ γήρως ἢ τινος ἄλλης ἀσθενείας ψέγει
τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἀδυνατῶν αὐτὸ δρᾶν. — τὸ
ἴσον: Callicles is thinking of the
fundamental principle of democratic
states, the *ισονομία* and *ισότης* of all.

d XXXIX. 4. αὐτό: draws especial
attention to the following clause,
which it introduces. By its proxim-
ity to αὐτή this emphasis is still more
increased. — ἀμείνω: is here probably
used purposely instead of κρείττω,
as Callicles had in mind also the
mental superiority of the rhetorically
educated over the great multitude.
Hence, too, δυνατώτερον.

5. δηλοῖ: can be taken in construc-
tion with φύσις, or, which is better,
as an impersonal verb equiv. to δηλόν
(δηλὰ) ἐστιν. The subj. is the fol-
lowing ὅτι clause, whose own subj.,
ταῦτα, has been attracted to the gov-
ernment of the leading verb.

6. πολλαχοῦ: introduces facts in
support of the general statement. —
καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις: the law of
nature is the principle which is at the
basis of national law. Here is, more-
over, an indication of the moral char-
acter of those who hold this view, in
that they put the *ἄνθρωπος* on the
plane of the ζῷον.

7. ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεσι: in inter-
national relations this natural law
(‘might makes right’) has preserved
its force longer than in the inter-
course of individual men; hence γέ-
νος is equiv. to gens. The clause
following, ὅτι . . . ἔχειν, is explana-
tory of ταῦτα ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει.

8. κέκριται: in 520 e νενόμισται is
the word.

9. ἄρχειν: is the legal, πλέον ἔχειν
the natural expression of the same
idea. — ἐπεὶ ποίῳ δικαίῳ κτέ.: is not
purely neg., but has somewhat the
sense: “What other right had Xerxes
than that of nature?” The choice of
examples shows that with this self-
ish, immoral view of life is connected
also a lack of national feeling. Cal-
licles himself feels the impropriety

- 10 Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευσεν ἢ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ Σκύθας ἢ ἄλλα μυρία ἂν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα λέγειν· ἄλλ', οἶμαι, οὗτοι κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ δικαίου ταῦτα πράττουσιν, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς φύσεως, οὐ μέντοι ἴσως κατὰ τοῦτον, ὃν ἡμεῖς [τιθέμεθα] πλάττοντες τοὺς
 15 βελτίστους καὶ ἔρρωμενεστάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες, ὥσπερ λέοντας κατεπαύοντες τε καὶ γοητεύοντες καταδουλούμεθα λέγοντες, ὡς τὸ ἴσον χρή ἔχειν καὶ 484 τοῦτ' ἔστιν τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἐὰν δέ γε, οἶμαι,

483 of declaring Xerxes to be ἀμείνων and
 d δυνατώτερος τῶν Ἑλλήνων, and therefore hastily seeks another example which will not arouse personal feeling.

e 11. ἄλλα μυρία: is simply rhetorical exaggeration. The concluding summarizing clause deviates from the regular construction of the sentence, as also in a similar passage in *Apol.* 41 c ἐπὶ πόσῳ δ' ἂν τις δέξαιτο ἐξετάσαι ἢ Ὀδυσσεῖα ἢ Σίσυφον, ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἂν τις εἴποι κτέ.

12. οἶμαι: as well as ἴσως, a couple of lines below, merely softens the expression, without diminishing its positiveness. *Cf.* 473 a.—τὴν τοῦ δικαίου: if these words, which we would rather miss, are genuine, we have a case of word-play, which may be justified on the ground of the proposition above, ἢ δέ γε . . . ἀδυνατωτέρου. The same force must be assigned to τοῦ δικαίου φύσει below (484 c), though the form is different.

13. ναὶ μὰ Δία κατὰ κτέ.: a clever play upon the word νόμος. "Nature, too, has its law,—right and custom."

14. ἡμεῖς: contains, by the implied contrast, a rebuke. Notice the heap-
 ing up of the participles, which, though connected with one verb, are subordinated one to another, quite after the Greek habit. See *Kr.* 56,

15, with notes.—πλάττοντες: the 483 side-idea of artificiality and amateurishness easily attaches itself to this verb. *Cf.* *Apol.* 17 c μερικῶς πλάττοντι λόγους. It is applied to laws, as here, also *Leg.* iv. 712 b πειρώμεθα καθάπερ παῖδες πρεσβῦται πλάττειν τῷ λόγῳ τοὺς νόμους.

15 f. ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες: *cf.* *Apol.* 18 b ἐκ παίδων παραλαβόντες. The usual word for 'receiving into school' is the compound. *Cf.* 516 b. The use of the simple verb here implies a forcible compulsory manner of treatment.

16. ὥσπερ λέοντας κατεπαύοντες: the comparison describes with bitterness the suppression of the so-called natural freedom, in that it compares education to the taming of wild beasts (καταδουλούμεθα). κατεπαύειν applies to soothing by certain formulae, or charms; γοητεύειν to the employment of forms of magic and witchcraft. Meno uses the same expression regarding the dialectic proof of Socrates, 80 a καὶ νῦν, ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, γοητεύεις με καὶ φαρμάτεις καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατεπαύεις. In a jesting way, without feeling, ἐπαύειν is used in *Phaedo* 77 e, ἐποφῶν in *Charm.* 155 e.

18 f. ἐὰν . . . γένηται: Callicles 484 does not doubt that this future absolute ruler will come.

φύσιν ικανὴν γένηται ἔχων ἀνὴρ, πάντα ταῦτα ἀποσεισά-
 20 μενος καὶ διαρρήξας καὶ διαφυγὼν, καταπατήσας τὰ ἡμέ-
 τερα γράμματα καὶ μαγγανεύματα καὶ ἐπῳδὰς καὶ νόμους
 τοὺς παρὰ φύσιν ἅπαντας, ἐπαναστὰς ἀνεφάνη δεσπότης
 ἡμέτερος ὁ δοῦλος, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐξέλαμψεν τὸ τῆς φύσεως
 δίκαιον. δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ Πίνδαρος ἄπερ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐνδείκ-
 25 νυσθαι ἐν τῷ ᾄσματι ἐν ᾧ λέγει ὅτι

νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς
 θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων·

484 19. φύσιν ικανήν: "a nature which
 a is equal to all difficulties." There is
 no understatement, as in 480 a. — All
 the following expressions are chosen
 so as to be appropriate to the much-
 loved comparison with wild beasts.
 ἀποσεισθαι can apply both to the
 shaking off of any bond or yoke and
 to the throwing of his rider by a
 horse; διαρρήξας is used more of break-
 ing a hedge or an enclosure than a
 halter, etc. ἀπορρήξας would be more
 natural for the latter; cf. Hom. Z 507
 δεσμὸν ἀπορρήξας, which passage quite
 suits the view of Callicles.

20. διαφυγόν: calls to mind what
 has been previously said by Polus
 (473 c). — καταπατήσας: depicts the
 insolence of the victor to the van-
 quished. In Δ 157 Homer makes
 Agamemnon say of the perjured
 Trojans κατὰ δ' ὄρκια πιστὰ πάτησαν.

21. γράμματα κτέ.: the γράμματα
 denote, in contradistinction to the
 unwritten laws implanted in man by
 nature, the "written laws" which limit
 and regulate the exercise of the will;
 μαγγανεύματα "works of deceit and
 witchcraft," which fetter the reason;
 ἐπῳδαί "incantations" which palsy the
 feelings. These ideas correspond in
 the reverse order to the preceding

participles, κατεπείδοντες, γοητεύοντες, 484
 λέγοντες, and the participles just in
 advance ἀποσεισάμενος . . . διαφυγὼν
 are probably chosen with reference to
 them. All three ideas serve, more-
 over, to show from the various sides
 what objections can be made to the
 laws which are opposed to nature,
 and are hence crowded together for
 greater emphasis.

22. ἐπαναστὰς: is used of one who
 has lain prostrate for a time and now
 unexpectedly shows his strength. —
 ἀνεφάνη: is 'gnomic aorist.' The
 single past example (aor.) serves as
 a norm for the general statement
 (pres.). H. 840; GMT. 155.

23. ὁ δοῦλος: as a result of κατα-
 δουλούμεθα above, 483 e, "the one
 whom we brought up as a slave." —
 ἐξέλαμψε: shone forth in splendor, a
 poetical word also employed in Rep.
 iv. 435 a.

24. δοκεῖ δέ μοι: introduces a new
 element, — the authority of Pindar.
 Knowledge of the poets was a require-
 ment of the culture of the period.
 Cf. Prot. 338 e. The last words of
 the fragment are restored by Bergk
 (Poet. Lyr. Gr. p. 344, ed. 3) from
 the citation of the Scholiast as fol-
 lows:—

οὗτος δὲ δῆ, φησὶν,

30 ἄγει δικαίων τὸ βιαιότατον
ὑπερτάτῃ χειρί· τεκμαίρομαι
ἔργοισιν Ἡρακλέος, ἐπεὶ ἀπριάτας —

λέγει οὕτω πως· τὸ γὰρ ἄσµα οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι· λέγει δ' ὅτι
οὔτε πριάμενος οὔτε δόντος τοῦ Γηρύνου ἡλάσατο τὰς
βοῦς, ὡς τούτου ὄντος τοῦ δικαίου φύσει, καὶ βοῦς καὶ
35 τᾶλλα κτήματα εἶναι πάντα τοῦ βελτιονός τε καὶ κρείτ-
τονος τὰ τῶν χειρόνων τε καὶ ἡττόνων.

XL. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθὲς οὕτως ἔχει, γνώσει δέ, ἂν ἐπὶ
τὰ μείζω ἔλθῃς ἐάσας ἤδη φιλοσοφίαν. φιλοσοφία γάρ

484
b ἔργοισιν Ἡρακλέος ἐπεὶ Γηρύνῃ βόας
Κυκλαπῶν ἐπὶ προθύρων Εὐρύσθεος
ἀναιτήτας τε καὶ ἀπριάτας ἤλασεν.

Since we do not know the context in which these verses stand, Pindar's views cannot be determined from them with certainty; but they were probably based on the principles of religious belief. In this νόμος δ' πάντων βασιλεὺς Pindar may be thinking of the power of that *fate* which is superior even to the gods themselves. — Geryones, son of Chrysaor ("lightning") and the Oceanid Callirhoe ("beautiful stream"), was a giant with three bodies and three heads. He lived with his dog Orthros, or Orthos, on the fertile island Erytheia, and possessed great herds of cattle. These were stolen from him by Hercules in the expedition celebrated in the story. Cf. Preller, *Mythol.*³ ii. 202-216. — ἐνδεικνύειν: is used of all kinds of practical proof; ἀποδεικνύειν, of demonstration.

32. οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι: says Callicles, because the exact words of the poem

are not at his command. The verb 484
b has the same meaning in *Prot.* 339 b, *Phaedo* 61 b. After ἀπριάτας Callicles breaks off, intending to give the sense of what follows, and resumes the idea with οὔτε πριάμενος.

33. ἡλάσατο: the use of the middle instead of the active is normal, but is well suited to Callicles' conception.

34. ὡς τούτου ὄντος: the use of ὡς c ascribes this view to Hercules, as his basis of action. τούτου is explained by the clause καὶ βοῦς κτέ.

36. τὰ τῶν χειρόνων κτέ.: notice the rhetorical position.

XL. 1. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθὲς: introduces a new topic, that of the value of philosophy. Its connexion with the preceding lies in the fact that Callicles looks upon philosophy as the *hindrance* which prevents Socrates from recognizing the truth of what he says. — ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω: is indefinite, and is employed only to depreciate philosophy and relegate it to a lower plane, as is evident from Callicles' further exposition.

St. I. p. 484.

τοί ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, *χαρίεν*, ἂν τις αὐτοῦ μετρίως αἴψη-
 ται ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ· ἐὰν δὲ περαιτέρω τοῦ δέοντος ἐνδια-
 5 τρήσῃ, διαφθορὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἐὰν γὰρ καὶ πάνν
 εὐφυῆς ᾗ καὶ πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας φιλοσοφῇ, ἀνάγκη πάν- a
 των ἀπειρον γεγονέναι ἐστίν, ὧν χρὴ ἔμπειρον εἶναι τὸν
 μέλλοντα καλὸν καγαθὸν καὶ εὐδόκιμον ἔσεσθαι ἄνδρα.
 καὶ γὰρ τῶν νόμων ἀπειροὶ γίνονται τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν,
 10 καὶ τῶν λόγων, οἷς δεῖ χρώμενον ὁμιλεῖν ἐν τοῖς συμβο-
 λαίοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, καὶ τῶν
 ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων, καὶ συλλήβδην
 τῶν ἡθῶν παντάπασιν ἀπειροὶ γίνονται. ἐπειδὴ οὖν
 ἔλθωσιν εἰς τινα ἰδίαν ἢ πολιτικὴν πρᾶξιν, καταγέλαστοι

484 3. *χαρίεν*: with a pleasing conde-
 cension, recognizing its merit, — but
 what a poor merit! Cf. 485 b.

4. ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ: "in the time of life
 suitable for it." What period this
 is can be gathered from the expres-
 sions πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας and περαιτέρω
 τοῦ δέοντος. The words μετρίως and
 αἴψηται are also designedly chosen.

5. διαφθορά: Callicles assumes al-
 most the tone of an oracle.

d 7. ἀπειρον γεγονέναι: "a man can-
 not practise philosophy and at the
 same time fulfil the requirements of
 his civil position."

8. The καλὸς καγαθός, according to
 the idea of Callicles, is shown by the
 addition of εὐδόκιμος, to be the man
 who, through practical activity, ob-
 tains reputation and honor. With
 μέλλω we find the pres. and fut.
 almost equally common, the aor. ex-
 ceptional.

9. τῶν νόμων: that Callicles is
 laying great stress on the knowledge
 of the laws in this passage, seems at
 first sight inconsistent with the view
 which he has already expressed; but

in reality he has shifted his point of
 view but little, since he advocates the
 study of the laws, not for the pur-
 pose of following them, but as being
 necessary for the work of the practi-
 cal statesman, whether he be in the
 senate or assembly, or hold any pub-
 lic position. The force, therefore, of
 νόμοι is much that of our "constitu-
 tion." The λόγοι οἷς δεῖ χρώμενον κτέ.
 belong to the department of jurispru-
 dence in both its divisions, individual
 and national. *ξυμβόλαια* is character-
 ized in *Rep.* i. 333 a, as the variety
 of *κοινωνήματα* (i.e. mutual intercourse,
 trade, and commerce) in which *δικαι-
 οσύνη* is of especial value. It de-
 notes, accordingly, treaties and the
 law-business connected with them.

11 f. τῶν ἡδονῶν κτέ.: the enjoy-
 ment of life consists, according to
 Callicles, in satisfying the appetites.

12. τῶν ἡθῶν: can be considered
 as a general comprehensive term, in
 so far as we understand by it the
 peculiar traits of mind and charac-
 ter which impart individuality to a
 man.

15 γίνονται, ὥσπερ γε, οἶμαι, οἱ πολιτικοί, ἐπειδὴν αὖ εἰς e
τὰς ὑμετέρας διατριβὰς ἔλθωσιν καὶ τοὺς λόγους, κατα-
γέλαστοί εἰσιν. συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου· λαμ-
πρὸς τ' ἐστὶν ἕκαστος ἐν τούτῳ, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτ' ἐπείγεται,

νέμων τὸ πλείστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος,
20 ἢ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ὢν·

ὅπου δ' ἂν φαῦλος ᾖ, ἐντεῦθεν φεύγει καὶ λαιδορεῖ τῷτο, 485
τὸ δ' ἕτερον ἐπαινεῖ, εὐνοία τῇ αὐτοῦ, ἡγούμενος οὕτως
αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ἐπαινεῖν. ἀλλ', οἶμαι, τὸ ὀρθότατόν ἐστιν
ἀμφοτέρων μετασχεῖν· φιλοσοφίας μὲν ὅσον παιδείας
25 χάριν καλὸν μετέχειν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχροὺς μεираκίῳ ὄντι
φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἤδη πρεσβύτερος ὢν ἄνθρωπος
ἔτι φιλοσοφῇ, καταγέλαστον, ὧ Σώκρατες, τὸ χρῆμα

484 15. ὥσπερ γε: makes a concession,
e in order to anticipate the retort which
could easily be made here.

16. διατριβὰς: is used especially of
philosophical discussions. Cf. *Apol.*
37 c οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς
ἡμᾶς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, *Charm.*
153 a ἢ αὖ ἐπὶ τὰς ξυνήθεις διατριβὰς.

17. συμβαίνει: is in point.—τὸ τοῦ
Εὐριπίδου: inasmuch as his works
abounded in gnomes and sententious
sayings, and he himself was not far
removed from the sophistic way of
looking at things, Euripides was fre-
quently quoted by sophists and ora-
tors, and also by Socrates (Plato).
The present passage is from the
lost tragedy *Antiope*. See below,
485 e.

18. ἐν τούτῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κτέ.: the
demonstratives are antecedent to the
adverbial rel. clause with *ἵνα*, "in
which each one is most successful."
The words λαμπρὸς . . . ἐπείγεται, by
omitting what would not be missed,

and reading *καπὶ* for *καὶ ἐπὶ*, form a 484
trimeter. Cf. *Ar. Vesp.* 1431 *ἔρδοι τις* e
ἦν ἕκαστος εἰδεῖν τέχνην.

20. *ἵνα τυγχάνει*: is to be com-
pared with *ὅπου ἂν ᾖ* to show the dif-
ference between definite and indefinite
antecedent.—*αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ βέλτιστος*:
the gen. with sups. may be an exten-
sion of the gen. with comparatives.
See H. 644 a.

24. ἀμφοτέρων: i.e. philosophy and 485
politics.—*ὅσον παιδείας χάριν*: as far
as it serves the purpose of education.
Cf. *Rep.* iii. 403 e *ὅσον τοὺς τύπους*,
Euthyd. 273 a *τὴν φύσιν ὅσον*. See
H. 719 b; G. 160, 1. The opposite is
ἐπὶ τέχνη, or something similar, as
seen from *Prot.* 312 b *τούτων σὺ ἐκά-*
στην οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνην ἔμαθες, ὡς δημιου-
ργὸς ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ, ὡς
τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει.
Culture was the watchword of the
time.

25. καὶ οὐκ αἰσχροὺς: change from
the καλὸν to the καταγέλαστον.

St. I. p. 485.

- γίνεται, καὶ ἔγωγε ὁμοιότατον πάσχω πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσο- b
 φοῦντας ὥσπερ πρὸς τοὺς ψελλιζόμενους καὶ παίζοντας.
 30 ὅταν μὲν γὰρ παιδίον ἴδω, ᾧ ἔτι προσήκει διαλέγεσθαι
 οὕτω, ψελλιζόμενον καὶ παίζον, χαίρω τε καὶ χαρίεν μοι
 φαίνεται καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ πρέπον τῇ τοῦ παιδίου ἡλικίᾳ,
 ὅταν δὲ σαφῶς διαλεγόμενου παιδαρίου ἀκούσω, πικρόν
 τί μοι δοκεῖ χρήμα εἶναι καὶ ἀνῖα μου τὰ ὦτα καὶ μοι
 35 δοκεῖ δουλοπρεπές τι εἶναι· ὅταν δὲ ἀνδρὸς ἀκούσῃ τις
 ψελλιζόμενον ἢ παίζοντα ὀρᾷ, καταγέλαστον φαίνεται καὶ c
 ἄνανδρον καὶ πληγῶν ἄξιον. ταῦτόν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτο
 πάσχω καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας. παρὰ νέῳ μὲν γὰρ
 μεираκίῳ ὀρῶν φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι, καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ,
 40 καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ἐλευθέρον τινα εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον,
 τὸν δὲ μὴ φιλοσοφοῦντα ἀνελεύθερον καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδεὶος
 ἀξιώσοντα ἑαυτὸν οὔτε καλοῦ οὔτε γενναίου πράγματος·
 ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερον ἴδω ἔτι φιλοσοφοῦντα καὶ μὴ d

485 b 28. πάσχω πρὸς: as 482 c. The comparison, however sensible the thought therein expressed may be, still is not in place here. For it describes only the subjective impression which philosophizing at different periods of life makes on Callicles. It is therefore only a rhetorical reaffirmation of the statement that philosophy is not appropriate for a mature man. In his mind, however, Callicles has still a tertium comparationis which he does not express, viz. the objects of philosophical research afford no real interest, hence resemble *παῖδια*. Further, so much trouble about single ideas is like *ψελλίζεσθαι* (stammering). On the contrary, *σαφῶς διαλέγεσθαι* (*λέγειν*) is the business of orators.

32. ἐλευθέριον: Callicles speaks of

stammering thus, as contrasted with 485 b
 the restraint which the child must exercise in order to learn to speak clearly, which latter seems to him to be *δουλοπρεπές*. Note also the contrast in *χαρίεν* and *πικρόν*.

38. παρὰ νέῳ κτέ.: the companion of c
 (*παρὰ*) a youth. The duplication of the idea is also found in *Prot.* 315 d *νέον τι ἔτι μεираκίον*.

40. ἐλευθέρον: is amplified and illustrated by the following clause, *οὐδεὶος ἀξιώσοντα κτέ.* Philosophy gives the youth an opportunity for the practice in mental gymnastics, which is as yet denied him in public life, and thus prepares him for his future career as a speaker in the assembly.

43. δῆ: deictic. This is just the case about which Callicles raises the question.

ἀπαλλαττόμενον, πληγῶν μοι δοκεῖ ἤδη δεῖσθαι, ὦ Σώ-
 45 κρατες, οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ. ὁ γὰρ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ὑπάρχει
 | τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, κὰν πάνυ εὐφυῆς ᾗ, ἀνάνδρῳ γενέσθαι
 φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς ἀγοράς, ἐν αἷς ἔφη
 ὁ ποιητὴς τοὺς ἀνδρας ἀριπρεπεῖς γίνεσθαι, καταδεδυ-
 | κότι δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν βίον βιώναι μετὰ μεираκίων ἐν γωνίᾳ
 50 τριῶν ἢ τεττάρων ψιθυρίζοντα, ἐλεύθερον δὲ καὶ μέγα καὶ
 νεανικὸν μηδέποτε φθέγξασθαι.

XLI. Ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸς σέ ἐπιεικῶς ἔχω φιλι-
 κῶς · κινδυνεύω οὖν πεπονθέναί νῦν ὅπερ ὁ Ζῆθος πρὸς

485 44. δεῖσθαι: is still stronger than
 d ἔξω, and declares that it is to the
 man's own interest to be so dealt
 with.

47. τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως: is empha-
 sized together with the ἀγορά, in op-
 position with the following ἐν γωνίᾳ.
Cf. Cic. *de Or.* i. 13. 57 quibus
 (philosophis) ego ut de his
 rebus in angulis consumendi
 otii causa disserant cum con-
 cessero, illud tamen oratori
 tribuam, etc.

48. ὁ ποιητής: the poet, of course,
 is Homer. He says, i 440, νῆπιον,
 οὐκ εἰδὸς ὁμοίου πτολέμοιο | οὐδ' ἀγο-
 ρέων, ἵνα τ' ἄνδρες ἀριπρεπέες τελέθου-
 σιν. — καταδεδυκότι: "in retirement,"
 as contrasted with the brilliant life
 of the public man. The word is
 used somewhat differently in *Rep.* ix.
 579 b, where it is said of a tyrant
 οὐτ' ἀποδημησάι ἐξεστίν (αὐτῷ) οὐδ' αὖτις
 οὔτε θεωρῆσαι ὅσων δὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι
 ἐλεύθεροι ἐπιθυμηταί εἰσι, καταδεδυκὼς
 δὲ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τὰ πολλὰ ὡς γυνὴ ζῇ.

49. μετὰ μεираκίων: as contrasted
 with association with men and with
 the whole people. It is evident that,
 in spite of Callicles' exaggeration,
 he is striking continually at Socra-

tes' (and Plato's) occupation. Quite 485
 naturally and conversationally ψιθυ-
 ρίζοντα suggests again its opposite,
 which is added in ἐλεύθερον φθέγ-
 ξασθαι.

51. νεανικόν: for the meaning, see e
 on 482 c above. *Cf.* Dem. *Ol.* iii. 32
 ἔστι δ' οὐδέποτε, οἶμαι, μέγα καὶ νεανικὸν
 φρόνημα λαβεῖν μικρὰ καὶ φαῦλα πράτ-
 τοντας.

XLI. 1. After this general pre-
 sentation of his views of philosophy,
 Callicles now proceeds to make a
 special application to Socrates' case,
 with apparent personal good-will, it
 is true, but still with the condescending
 mien of the superior man of the
 world.

2 f. ὅπερ ὁ Ζῆθος πρὸς τὸν Ἀμ-
 φίωνα: the omission of πρὸς σέ is
 hardly felt. Callicles cleverly illus-
 trates his exposition of the opposition
 between the principles of practical
 life and this theoretical philosophiz-
 ing by reference again to the already
 cited *Antiope* of Euripides. Antiope
 had borne to Zeus twin sons, Amphion
 and Zethus, but was afterwards taken
 by her uncle Lycus to Thebes, where
 she suffered for a long time the most
 cruel treatment at the hands of Ly-

τὸν Ἀμφίωνα ὁ Εὐριπίδου, οὐπερ ἐμνήσθη. καὶ γὰρ
 ἐμοὶ τοιαυτ' ἄττα ἐπέρχεται πρὸς σέ λέγειν, οἷάπερ ἐκείνος
 5 πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφόν, ὅτι “ἀμελεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὧν δεῖ σε
 ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ φύσιν ψυχῆς (ἐχων) ὧδε γενναίαν μει-
 ρακιῶδει τινὶ διαπρέπεις μορφώματι, καὶ οὐτ' ἂν δίκης⁴⁸⁵
 βουλαῖσι προσθεῖ' ἂν ὀρθῶς λόγον, οὐτ' εἰκὸς ἂν καὶ
 πιθαγὸν λάκοις οὐθ' ὑπὲρ ἄλλου νεανικὸν βούλευμα βου-
 10 λεύσαιο.” καίτοι, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες—καί μοι μηδὲν ἀχθε-
 σθῆς· εὐνοία γὰρ ἐρῶ τῇ σῇ—οὐκ αἰσχροὺς δοκεῖ σοι

⁴⁸⁵ cus' wife, Dirce. Meanwhile, her sons
^e were being brought up by a herdsman
 in the forest. Amphion devoted him-
 self entirely to music, while the active
 and restless Zethus spent his time in
 hunting and the care of his herds.
 Finally Antiope escapes from her
 prison, and hurries to her sons. Dirce
 pursues, overtakes her, and is just in
 the act of having her bound to a wild
 steer, when the sons, who had been
 informed of their parentage by the
 herdsman, appear on the scene, rescue
 their mother from the hands of Dirce,
 and bind her to the steer instead.
 Dirce was then changed into a foun-
 tain. Amphion and Zethus attain
 the sovereignty in Thebes, and fortify
 it with walls. In this work Zethus
 contributed his great bodily strength,
 while Amphion's lyre drew after him
 the stones. This difference in charac-
 ter as related in the myth (Apollod.
 iii. 5. 5 Ζῆθος μὲν οὖν ἐπεμελεῖτο βου-
 φορβίων, Ἀμφίων δὲ καθαροδῖαν ἥσκει)
 suggested to Euripides a dialogue
 between the brothers, wherein each
 praises his own calling to the dispar-
 agement of the other's. Callicles
 applies Euripides' words to the op-
 position between political and philo-
 sophical activity.

5 f. The words of Euripides are ⁴⁸⁵
 given by Nauck. *Eur. frag.*² 185, as ^e
 follows:—

. . . ἀμελεῖς, ὧν σε φροντίζειν ἐχρῆν·
 ψυχῆς ἐχων γὰρ ὧδε γενναίαν φύσιν
 γυναικομίμῳ διαπρέπεις μορφώματι·
 . . . κοῦτ' ἂν ἀσπίδος κῦτει
 ὀρθῶς ὁμιλήσεις οὐτ' ἄλλον ὕπερ
 νεανικὸν βούλευμα βουλεύσαιο τι.

Yet these lines do not contain all that
 seems poetical in this passage. In
 place of γυναικομίμῳ Callicles natu-
 rally, from his point of view, uses
 μειρακιῶδει, which is quite different
 from νεανικός in its meaning (boyish).

7 f. δίκης βουλαῖσι προσθεῖ' ἂν⁴⁸⁶
 λόγον: would give an opinion in coun-
 sels of justice.

9. ὑπὲρ ἄλλου: is in the mouth
 of Callicles a very natural change of
 the word of the poet. The sing. of
 ἄλλος, ἕτερος, and of τις is easily used
 in a generic sense.

10. καίτοι: would naturally lead us
 to expect some qualification of his se-
 vere criticism; instead of this he glides
 over to the rhetorical question, which,
 while reaffirming his opinion, sum-
 mons Socrates to decide. Cf. b below.

11. σῇ: equiv. to σοῦ. Cf. 485 a
 εὐνοία τῇ αὐτοῦ, *Apol.* 20 e ἐπὶ διαβολῇ

εἶναι οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἐγὼ σέ οἶμαι ἔχειν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
 τοὺς πόρρω ἀεὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας; νῦν γὰρ εἴ τις
 σοῦ λαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων εἰς τὸ δε-
 15 σμωτήριον ἀπάγοι, φάσκων ἀδικεῖν μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντα, οἶσθ'
 ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ὅτι χρήσαιο σαυτῷ, ἀλλ' εἰλιγγιώης ἂν
 καὶ χασμῷ οὐκ ἔχων ὅτι εἴποις, καὶ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον
 ἀναβάς, κατηγοροῦ τυχὼν πάνυ φαύλου καὶ μοχθηροῦ,
 ἀποθάνοις ἂν, εἰ βούλοιτο θανάτου σοι τιμᾶσθαι. καίτοι
 20 πῶς σοφὸν τοῦτο ἐστίν, ὃ Σώκρατες, εἴ τις εὐφυᾶ λαβοῦσα

⁴⁸⁶ τῇ ἐμῇ, Hom. T 321 σὴ ποθῇ, Soph.
^a O. C. 332 σὴ προμηθεῖα. See H. 694;
 G. 147, n. 1.

13. τοὺς πόρρω ἀεὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας: has a poetic coloring, but also occurs in Xen. and in *Crat.* 410 ο πόρρω ἤδη φαίνομαι σοφίας ἐλαύνειν. *Euthyp.* 4 b. The gen. is partitive. See H. 757; G. 168. — ἀεὶ: when used with the art. and partic. has a distributive sense. In the present case its position between πόρρω and φιλοσοφίας is also to be noted.

15. ἀπάγοι: this was the summary process called ἀπαγωγή, in which the guilty person, when caught in the act, was immediately arrested and brought before the Eleven. Cf. *Apol.* 32 b. The expression here is simply a rhetorical hyperbola, but it sounds prophetic in view of Socrates' trial later on, and was probably written designedly by the author. See *Introd.* § 10. — ἀδικεῖν: the pres. is the customary tense in accusations. *Apol.* 19 b, 24 b. — οἶσθ' ὅτι: parenthetical, with no effect on the construction, much in the same way as the English phraseological 'you know.' The Greek expression is, however, not so colorless as the English, but assumes

a recognition of the truth of the ⁴⁸⁶ observation. ^a

16 f. εἰλιγγιώης, χασμῷ: vividly b portray the confusion and terror of the prisoner.

17. ὅτι εἴποις: this opt. and the preceding χρήσαιο both represent deliberative subjvs. GMT. 186.

18. ἀναβάς: the regular expression for appearing before a court. Its origin may have been from the location of the court; cf. Lat. descendere in forum and *Apol.* 17 d, 33 d. — κατηγοροῦ τυχών: "if chance so willed it." The words πάνυ φαύλου καὶ μοχθηροῦ are again designedly given to Callicles by Plato. Socrates' accuser would of necessity be such a man.

19. θανατοῦ τιμᾶσθαι: if the crime had no definite punishment fixed by law (ἀγὼν ἀτιμῆτος), the accuser proposed some special punishment, for which the accused was at liberty to offer a substitute, and the court had to accept one or the other. Cf. *Apol.* 36 b ff. and for the gen. see H. 746 b.

20. According to Nauck, Fr. 186, the following citation from the *Antiope* runs thus: —

πῶς γὰρ σοφὸν τοῦτ' ἐστίν, εἴ τις εὐφυᾶ λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτ' ἔθηκε χείρονα.

τέχνη φῶτα ἔθηκε χείρονα, μήτε αὐτὸν αὐτῷ δυνάμενον
 βοηθεῖν μηδ' ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων μήτε
 ἑαυτὸν μήτε ἄλλον μηδένα, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν περισυλᾶ- c
 σθαι πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀτεχνῶς δὲ ἄτιμον ζῆν ἐν τῇ
 25 πόλει; τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον, εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροικότερον εἰρησθαι,
 ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ κόρρης τύπτοντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην. ἀλλ',
 92 ὠγαθέ, ἐμοὶ πιθοῦ, παῦσαι δ' ἐλέγχων, πραγμάτων δ'
 | εὐμουσίαν ἄσκει, καὶ ἄσκει ὁπόθεν δόξεις φρονεῖν, ἄλλοις
 | τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ' ἀφείς, εἴτε ληρήματα χρή φάναι εἶναι εἴτε

486 23. **περυσυλᾶσθαι**: implies that the
 c one robbed is vanquished or defence-
 less, and contains the side-idea of in-
 sult added. This inf. as well as ζῆν
 is used freely after ἔθηκε to define in
 what respects the man who follows
 philosophy becomes χείρων.

24. **ἄτιμον**: 'atimia' in various de-
 grees of completeness was a punish-
 ment attached to transgressions
 against the state. Complete 'atimia'
 involved deprivation of all civil
 rights. See Busolt, *Gr. Alter.* § 158,
 and cf. *Andoc.* i. 73-76. According to
 Callicles, Socrates will bring himself
 virtually into this condition by his
 continual philosophizing.

25. **εἰ . . . ἀγροικότερον**: see on
 462 e. Cf. *Lys. in Andoc.* 24 *προσε-*
ψηφίσασθε ὑμεῖς αὐτὸν (sc. τὸν ἄτιμον)
εἰργεσθαι τῆς ἀγορᾶς καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν
ᾧστε μὴ ἀδικούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν
δύνασθαι δίκην λαβεῖν.

26. **ἐπὶ κόρρης τύπτοντα**: a blow
 on the head was considered especially
 dishonorable.—*κόρρη* (old Attic *κόρ-*
ρη), *κόρη*, *δέρη*, and *ἀδάρη* are the sole
 exceptions to the rule which requires
 α after ρ in Attic.

27. Callicles closes with a further
 citation from the *Antlope*, which
 Nauck, *Fr.* 188, gives thus:—

ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πιθοῦ 486
 c παῦσαι μελωδῶν, πολέμιων δ' εὐμουσίαν
 ἄσκει· τοιαυτ' αἶδε καὶ δόξεις φρονεῖν,
 σκάπτων, ἄρῶν γῆν, ποιμνίοις ἐπιστατῶν,
 ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ' ἀφείς σοφίσματα,
 ἐξ ὧν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικῆσεις δόμοις.

—**ἐλέγχων**: is probably, like the cor-
 responding word in the quotation,
 to be considered as a verb, since the
 contrast lies not in a single word, but
 in the whole following clause. Simi-
 larly Thrasymachus says, *Rep.* i.
 336 c, *μηδὲ φιλοτιμοῦ ἐλέγχων*. The
 verb, used absolutely, designates the
 kind of philosophical activity which
 Socrates has just practised against
 Polus. Cf. 472 b.

28. **εὐμουσίαν**: was appropriate in
 Zethus' speech, as he wished to show
 his brother wherein the *εὐμουσία*,
 which he sought in *κιθαρῳδία*, was
 really to be found; less so in Callic-
 les', who probably is thinking rather
 of *εὐβουλία*. The contrast to *φρονεῖν*
 would be *ληρεῖν* or *φλυαρεῖν*. Hence
 Callicles substitutes *ληρήματα* and
φλυαρίας (*trifling and prattling*) for
σοφίσματα.

29. **κομψά**: witty, subtle, often used
 with an unfavorable connotation,
 both of persons and things; but it

30 φλυναρίας, ἐξ ὧν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις, ζηλῶν οὐκ ἐλέγχοντας ἀνδρας τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλ' οἷς ἔστιν καὶ α βίος καὶ δόξα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ.

XLII. Σο. Εἰ χρυσὴν ἔχων ἐτύγγχανον τὴν ψυχὴν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἂν οἶμι με ἄσμενον εὐρεῖν τούτων τινὰ τῶν λίθων, ἣ βασανίζουσιν τὸν χρυσόν, τὴν ἀρίστην, πρὸς ἣντινα ἔμελλον προσαγαγὼν αὐτήν, εἴ μοι ὁμολογήσειεν ἡ ἐκείνη καλῶς τεθεραπεῦσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν, εὖ εἴσεσθαι ὅτι ἱκανῶς ἔχω καὶ οὐδέν μοι δεῖ ἄλλης βασάνου;

Καλ. Πρὸς τί δὴ τοῦτ' ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες;

Σο. Ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ · νῦν οἶμαι ἐγὼ σοὶ ἐντετυχηκῶς τοι οὕτῳ ἐρμαιῶ ἐντετυχηκέναι.

10 Καλ. Τί δή;

Σο. Εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, ἂν μοι σὺ ὁμολογήσης περὶ ὧν ἡ ἐμὴ

486 is applied especially to the quibbles
c of the Sophists and Eristics. Cf. κομψεύεσθαι in *Lach.* 197 d.

d 31. τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα: i.e. those subtle distinctions of words and ideas which in Callicles' view yield no advantage; while political activity and its results — these are τὰ μέγιστα (484 c above).

32. βίος: as opposed to κενοῖσι; δόμοις means "means of livelihood," an abundance of the good things of life. — δόξα: contrasted with ἄτιμον (37).

XLII. 1. The delicate irony which characterizes the reply of Socrates is in striking contrast with the rudeness with which Callicles began, in 482 c above, the exposition of his view of life. — χρυσὴν: is pred. of τὴν ψυχὴν. "If the soul which I have were of gold."

2. οὐκ ἂν οἶμι με ἄσμενον: the main idea lies in ἄσμενον.

2 f. τινὰ τῶν λίθων: equiv. to the more common βάσανος alone.

3. ἦ: after λίθων instead of αἰς. Cf. 486 521 d.

4. ἔμελλον κτέ.: 'The relative fut. after an unreal conditional is ἔμελλον with the infinitive.' Gildersleeve. Cf. *Isae.* ii. 25. — ὁμολογήσειεν: the choice of this expression in the comparison is due to the nature of the discussion. The testing which Socrates is undergoing at the hands of Callicles must end in ὁμολογεῖν (cf. e ἂν μοι σὺ ὁμολογήσης).

5. καλῶς τεθεραπεῦσθαι: leads back to the idea of *θεραπεία τῆς ψυχῆς* already discussed in 484 b above, and thus immediately prepares the way for making progress in the investigation. Cf. 487 a. — The subject of *τεθεραπεῦσθαι* must be supplied from μοί.

9. ἐρμαιῶ: all unexpected gains e (κέρδης ἀπροσδόκητον) were supposed to come from Hermes, who had among other surnames that of κερδαῖος.

11. ἂν μοι κτέ.: we miss the less

- ψυχὴν δοξάζει, ταῦτ' ἤδη ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τάληθῃ. ἐννοῶ γάρ, ὅτι τὸν μέλλοντα βασιανῶν ἱκανῶς ψυχῆς περί ὀρθῶς τε 487 ζώσης καὶ μὴ τρία ἄρα δεῖ ἔχειν, ἃ σὺ πάντα ἔχεις, ἐπι-
 15 στήμην τε καὶ εὐνοίαν καὶ παρρησίαν. ἐγὼ γὰρ πολλοῖς ἐντυγχάνω, οἱ ἐμὲ οὐχ οἷοί τέ εἰσιν βασιανίζειν, διὰ τὸ μὴ σοφοὶ εἶναι ὥσπερ σύ· ἕτεροι δὲ σοφοὶ μὲν εἰσιν, οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν δέ μοι λέγειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, διὰ τὸ μὴ κῆδεσθαι μου ὥσπερ σύ· τῷ δὲ ξένῳ τῷδε, Γοργίας τε καὶ Πῶλος,
 20 σοφῶ μὲν καὶ φίλῳ ἐστὸν ἐμῷ, ἐνδεεστερῷ δὲ παρρησίας ^b καὶ αἰσχυνηροτέρῳ μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος· πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ὦ γε εἰς τοσοῦτον αἰσχύνῃς ἐληλύθατον, ὥστε διὰ τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι τολμᾷ ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἐναντία λέγειν ἐναντίον πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν
 25 μεγίστων. σὺ δὲ ταῦτα πάντα ἔχεις, ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι οὐκ ἔχουσιν· πεπαίδευσαι τε γὰρ ἱκανῶς, ὥς πολλοὶ ἀν φήσαιεν

486 an object to *δολογήσης* since the idea ^c is made especially prominent by the following ταῦτα. Cf. 487 *εἰάν τι σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις δολογήσης μοι*.

12. *δοξάζει*: is a *vox media*. The same activity of the soul may, according to circumstances, lead to error or to truth. Cf. also *δόξα ἀληθής* and *ψευδής*. — *ἤδη*: at once (*j a m*), without need of further discussion.

487 14. *τρία ἄρα δεῖ ἔχειν*: *must of* ^a *necessity possess three qualities*. The particle *ἄρα* shows that this lies in the nature of the matter.

15 f. *πολλοῖς ἐντυγχάνω κτ.*: Socrates gives examples in *Apol.* 21 b ff.

19. *τῷ δὲ ξένῳ κτ.*: Socrates says what follows with an irony which applies especially to Polus; but at the same time it is a significant criticism of the *παρρησία* of Callicles.

^b 21. *μᾶλλον*: see on 482 c.

22. *ὦ γε*: the *γέ* emphasizes the

pronoun. The irony from here on is quite distinct, and no longer veiled. ^b — *διὰ τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι τολμᾷ*: an example of 'oxymoron.' Timidity and shame are not usually the basis of boldness. The opposite of *τολμᾷ* is implied. The reference to 483 *a* is unmistakable: *ἐὰν οὖν τις αἰσχύνηται καὶ μὴ τολμᾷ λέγειν ἅπερ νοεῖ, ἀναγκάζεται ἐναντία λέγειν*.

23. *αὐτῶν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ*: the position makes the contradiction beat heavily upon the ear.

24 f. *περὶ τῶν μεγίστων*: in contrast with 486 *d* τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα. Cf. 484 c τὰ μείζω.

26. *πεπαίδευσαι*: see on *παιδείας*, 485 a. The addition of *ὥς πολλοὶ ἀν φήσαιεν Ἀθηναῖον* implies, of course, the usual opposition of the many ignorant to the few capable, and this makes the tone of *ἱκανῶς* almost bitter.

Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἐμοὶ εἴ εὖνους. τῶν τεκμηρίῳ χρῶμαι;
 ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ. οἶδα ὑμᾶς ἐγώ, ὦ Καλλίκληις, τέτταρας ^c
 ὄντας κοινωνοὺς γεγονότας σοφίας, σέ τε καὶ Τείσανδρον
 30 τὸν Ἀφιδναῖον καὶ Ἄνδρωνα τὸν Ἀνδροτίωνος καὶ Ναυσι-
 κύδην τὸν Χολαργέα· καὶ ποτε ὑμῶν ἐγὼ ἐπήκουσα βου-
 λευομένων, μέχρι ὅποι τὴν σοφίαν ἀσκητέον εἴη, καὶ οἶδα
 ὅτι ἐνίκα ἐν ὑμῖν τοιάδε τις δόξα, μὴ προθυμείσθαι εἰς
 τὴν ἀκρίβειαν φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλὰ εὐλαβεῖσθαι παρεκελεύ- ^d
 35 εσθε ἀλλήλους, ὅπως μὴ πέρα τοῦ δέοντος σοφώτεροι γενό-
 μενοι λῆσσετε διαφθαρέντες. ἐπειδὴ οὖν σου ἀκούω ταῦτα
 ἐμοὶ συμβουλευόντος, ἅπερ τοῖς σεαυτοῦ ἐταιροτάτοις,
 ἱκανόν μοι τεκμηρίον ἐστίν, ὅτι ὡς ἀληθῶς μοι εὖνους εἴ.
 καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε οἷος παρρησιάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι,

487 29 f. Of the three companions of
^c Callicles we know but little. Tisan-
 der is mentioned only here. Andron
 appears in *Prot.* 315 c as a defender
 of Hippias. Nausicydes had, accord-
 ing to *Xen. Mem.* ii. 7. 6, acquired
 wealth from his business of ἀλφίτο-
 ποία. The deme Cholargus belonged
 to the tribe Acamantis, Aphidnae to
 Aiantis.

32. μέχρι ὅποι: the only instance
 in Plato of μέχρι with an adverb. Cf.
Xen. Hell. iv. 7. 5 μέχρι ποῖ.

33. ἐνίκα: has a somewhat comic
 effect, inasmuch as it brings before
 the mind the image of an earnest
 and thorough deliberation engaged in
 by some public body (e.g. the senate),
 followed by the putting of the ques-
 tion. These young men, however,
 judge philosophy without understand-
 ing it.—προθυμείσθαι: expegetic inf.
 to τοιάδε τις δόξα.

33 f. εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν: recalls
 the τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα above. This cau-
 tious decision contrasts remarkably

with the ἐλεύθερον and νεανικόν which ⁴⁸⁷
 Callicles defends in 485 c, d.

35 f. ὅπως μὴ . . . διαφθαρέντες: the ^d
 same state of mind is shown in the ac-
 cusation brought later against Socra-
 tes, the second part of which ran thus:
 ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθεῖραν.
 That this was Callicles' judgment is
 shown by his words in 484 c ff. above.

37. ἐταιροτάτοις: is found also in
Phaedo 89 d.

39 f. ὅτι . . . αὐτός τε φῆς κτέ.: this
 must not be considered as a valid ex-
 ample of ὅτι after φημί, which regu-
 larly takes the infinitive. The ὅτι
 clause precedes, and may have escaped
 the speaker's mind when he was about
 to make the collocation of αὐτός and
 λόγος. The occurrence of two forms of
 λέγω in the same clause would likewise
 have been awkward.—ὅλος παρρησιάζ-
 εσθαι: you are disposed to free speech.
 See on 452 e. The omission of the first
 and second persons of the copula is
 rare. When εἰ is omitted, σὺ is gener-
 ally found. On the inf. see on 457 d.

St. I. p. 487.

40 αὐτός τε φῆς καὶ ὁ λόγος ὃν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγες ὁμο-
 λογεῖ σοι. ἔχει δὴ οὕτωςι δῆλον ὅτι τούτων πέρι νυνί·
 εἴαν τι σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὁμολογήσης μοι, βεβασανισμένον
 τοῦτ' ἤδη ἔσται ἱκανῶς ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ, καὶ οὐκέτι
 αὐτὸ δεήσει ἐπ' ἄλλην βάσανον ἀναφέρειν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν
 45 ποτε αὐτὸ συνεχώρησας σὺ οὔτε σοφίας ἐνδεία οὔτ'
 αἰσχύνης παρουσία, οὐδ' αὖ ἀπατῶν ἐμέ συγχωρήσας
 ἂν· φίλος γάρ μοι εἶ, ὥς καὶ αὐτὸς φῆς. τῷ ὄντι οὖν ἡ
 ἐμὴ καὶ ἡ σὴ ὁμολογία τέλος ἤδη ἔξει τῆς ἀληθείας.
 πάντων δὲ καλλίστη ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, περὶ
 50 τούτων ὧν σὺ δή μοι ἐπετίμησας, ποῖόν τινα χρὴ εἶναι τὸν
 ἄνδρα καὶ τί ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ μέχρι τοῦ, καὶ πρεσβύτερον 488
 καὶ νεώτερον ὄντα. ἐγὼ γὰρ εἴ τι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττω κατὰ
 τὸν βίον τὸν ἐμαντοῦ, εὖ ἴσθι τοῦτο ὅτι οὐχ ἐκὼν ἔξαμαρ-
 τάνω ἀλλ' ἀμαθία τῇ ἐμῇ· σὺ οὖν, ὥσπερ ἤρξω νουθετεῖν

487 d 41. ἔχει δὴ κτέ.: with this Socrates
 recurs to what was said in 486 e.

e 44 ff. ἂν συνεχώρησας, συγχωρή-
 σαις ἂν: the time is pushed into the
 fut. pf. by the previous βεβασανισ-
 μένον ἔσται, and standing on this as-
 sumed plane, Socrates uses naturally
 the unreal past. The second clause
 is, as the αὖ shows, a second thought,
 and being of general application, is
 put into the ideal (potential) opta-
 tive. The whole sentence shows the
 narrow line that separates between
 unreality and ideality.

48. τέλος τῆς ἀληθείας ἔξει: the
 gen., as in the Homeric phrases τέλος
 γάμοιο, θανάτοιο. Every effort must
 be directed to a terminus or comple-
 tion. Here the end is perfect truth.

49. καλλίστη: refers to its value.
 It yields a rich return.

488 a 51. τί χρὴ ἐπιτηδεύειν: is the ques-
 tion about which the following dis-

cussion revolves. Cf. 492 d, 500 c, 488
 512 e, 515 a, 521 a, 527 b, e.

52 f. κατὰ τὸν βίον: refers, not to
 the period of life, but to the manner
 of living.

53. τοῦτο: Heindorf, followed by
 Cron, construes this word with the
 following verb. But it is more nat-
 ural to look upon it as antecedent to
 the following sentence, *know well this
 fact*, etc.—οὐχ ἐκὼν: sc. according to
 the Socratic view as to the cause of
 wrong doing.

54. νουθετεῖν: according to the rule,
 when ἀρχεσθαι is used with the inf.
 the inf. is emphasized; when with the
 partic. the 'beginning' is emphasized.
 So *Theaet.* 187 a ἡρχόμεθα διαλεγόμε-
 νοι, "we commenced the discussion on
 which we are still engaged."—Here,
 as in 458 a, Socrates looks upon the
 correction of any erroneous views as
 a favor.

55 με, μὴ ἀποστῆς, ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς μοι ἔνδειξαι, τί ἔστιν τοῦτο
 ὃ ἐπιτηδευτέον μοι, καὶ τίνα τρόπον κτησαίμην ἂν αὐτό,
 καὶ εἰάν με λάβῃς νῦν μὲν σοι ὁμολογήσαντα, ἐν δὲ τῷ
 ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ μὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα ἅπερ ὁμολόγησα,
 πάνυ με ἡγοῦ βλάκα εἶναι καὶ μηκέτι ποτέ με νοουβητήσης b
 60 ὕστερον, ὥς μηδενὸς ἄξιον ὄντα. ἐξ ἀρχῆς δέ μοι ἐπανά-
 λαβε, πῶς φῆς τὸ δίκαιον ἔχειν καὶ σὺ καὶ Πίνδαρος τὸ
 κατὰ φύσιν; ἄγειν βία τὸν κρείττω τὰ τῶν ἡττόνων καὶ
 ἄρχειν τὸν βελτίῳ τῶν χειρόνων καὶ πλεόν ἔχειν τὸν
 ἀμείνω τοῦ φαυλοτέρου; μὴ τι ἄλλο λέγεις τὸ δίκαιον
 65 εἶναι, ἢ ὀρθῶς μέμνημαι;

XLIII. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα [ἔλεγον] καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν
 λέγω.

Σο. Πότερον δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν βελτίῳ καλεῖς σὺ καὶ κρείττω;
 οὐδὲ γάρ τοι τότε οἷός τ' ἢ μαθεῖν σου τί ποτε λέ- c
 5 γεις. πότερον τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους κρείττους καλεῖς καὶ δεῖ
 ἀκροᾶσθαι τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου τοὺς ἀσθενεστέρους, οἷόν μοι
 δοκεῖς καὶ τότε ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὥς αἱ μεγάλαι πόλεις ἐπὶ τὰς
 σμικρὰς κατὰ τὸ φύσει δίκαιον ἔρχονται, ὅτι κρείττους
 εἰσὶν καὶ ἰσχυρότεραι, ὥς τὸ κρείττον καὶ ἰσχυρότερον
 10 καὶ βέλτιον ταὐτὸν ὄν, ἢ ἔστι βελτίῳ μὲν εἶναι, ἡττω δὲ
 καὶ ἀσθενέστερον, καὶ κρείττω μὲν εἶναι, μοχθηρότερον

58 59. βλάκα: 'implies feebleness
 b both of mind and character, a dolt.'
 Thompson.

60 f. ἐπανάλαβε: we find ἀναλα-
 βεῖν in this sense in 506 c and *Apol.*
 19 b.

61. σὺ καὶ Πίνδαρος: see on 484 b.

62. ἄγειν βία: is a freer expression
 of the sense of Pindar's words.

64. μὴ λέγεις: in spite of the ad-
 dition of ἢ ὀρθῶς μέμνημαι, the ten-
 dency of the question is towards a

negative answer, as is also to be 488
 gathered from the ἀλλὰ of Callicles' b
 answer.

XLIII. 4. τότε: refers to what was c
 said in 483 d, e, and ἐνδείκνυσθαι is
 accordingly imperfect infinitive.—ἢ:
 appears to be the old Attic form.

9 f. ὥς ταὐτὸν ὄν: on the assump-
 tion that, etc. See on 491 a.

10. ἢ ἔστι: begins the second
 member of the double question intro-
 duced by πότερον.

δέ· ἢ ὁ αὐτὸς ὅρος ἐστὶν τοῦ βελτίονος καὶ τοῦ κρείτ- α
 τονος; τοῦτό μοι αὐτὸ σαφῶς διόρισον, ταῦτον ἢ ἕτερόν
 ἐστὶν τὸ κρείττον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρότερον;

15 ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ σοι σαφῶς λέγω, ὅτι ταῦτόν ἐστιν.

ΣΟ. Οὐκοῦν οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς κρείττους εἰσὶν κατὰ
 φύσιν; οἱ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νόμους τίθενται ἐπὶ τῷ ἐνί, ὥσπερ
 καὶ σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες.

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

20 ΣΟ. Τὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἄρα νόμιμα τὰ τῶν κρειττόνων ἐστίν.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΟ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ τῶν βελτιόνων; οἱ γὰρ κρείττους βελ- e
 τίους που κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

25 ΣΟ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ τούτων νόμιμα κατὰ φύσιν καλὰ, κρειτ-
 τόνων γε ὄντων;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΟ. Ἄρ' οὖν οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως, ὥς ἄρτι αὖ
 σὺ ἔλεγες, δίκαιον εἶναι τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ αἰσχίον τὸ
 30 ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ἐστὶν ταῦτα ἢ οὐ; καὶ ὅπως 488
 μὴ ἀλώσει ἐνταῦθα σὺ αἰσχυνόμενος· νομίζουσιν, ἢ οὐ,
 οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ πλεόν δίκαιον εἶναι,
 καὶ αἰσχίον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; μὴ φθόνοι μοι

488 d 12. ὁ αὐτὸς ὅρος: cf. 470 b. The question is, whether the range of each idea is the same. A clear distinction (σαφῶς διόρισον) would obviate any false application.

14. τὸ κρείττον κτέ.: the position of the three terms is arbitrary; but Socrates seems to put first the two on which he lays most stress.

17 f. ὥσπερ . . . ἔλεγες: this appeal to the statement of Callicles reveals a contradiction between his statements,

inasmuch as he had said above, 483 b, 488 d that the πολλοί were the ἀσθενεῖς.

28 f. ὥς ἄρτι αὖ σὺ ἔλεγες: the αὖ e draws attention again to the above ὥσπερ καὶ σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες. See 483 a-d.

30 f. ὅπως μὴ ἀλώσει: an ironical 489 allusion to Callicles' reproaches of a

33. μὴ φθόνοι: a formula for entreaty and urging, still more frequent in the form μὴ φθορήσης. Regularly μὴ with pres. inv. prescribes a neg.

ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῦτο, Καλλίκλεις, ἢν', εἴαν μοι ὁμολογή-
 35 σης, βεβαιώσωμαι ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ, ἅτε ἱκανοῦ ἀνδρὸς
 | διαγνῶναι ὁμολογηκός.

ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' οἱ γε πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐ νόμῳ ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν αἰσχίον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ
 ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φύσει ·
 40 ὥστε κινδυνεύεις οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδὲ b
 ὀρθῶς ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν λέγων, ὅτι ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ὁ νόμος
 καὶ ἡ φύσις, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ γνοὺς κακουργῶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις,
 εἴαν μὲν τις κατὰ φύσιν λέγῃ, ἐπὶ τὸν νόμον ἄγων, εἴαν δέ
 τις κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν.

XLIV. ΚΑΛ. Οὐτοσί ἀνὴρ οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν. εἰπέ
 μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχύνει, τηλικούτος ὢν, ὀνόματα
 | θηρεύων, καὶ εἴαν τις ῥήματι ἀμάρτη, ἐρμαῖον τοῦτο ποι- c
 | ούμενος; ἐμέ γὰρ οἷε ἄλλο τι λέγειν τὸ κρείττους εἶναι

489 course of action, with an aor. subjv.

a negatives a course of action. Socrates wishes at the outset to obviate any tendency to a refusal to answer, or hesitancy.

34. Καλλίκλεις: the omission of the δ is unusual.

35. βεβαιούσθαι: to become strengthened in one's opinion. It is used with παρὶ to designate the quarter from which the influence comes; direct agency would require ὑπό. — ἱκανοῦ διαγνῶναι: competent to decide, with reference to 487 e.

b 40 f. λέγειν, κατηγορεῖν: indir. disc. for impf. indicative. The κατηγορία proper begins with & δῆ. The use of δῆ implies a fact beyond controversy.

XLIV. 1. οὐτοσί ἀνὴρ: Callicles with this turns to the surrounding listeners to give vent to his indignation. Cf. 467 b, 505 c. — οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν: Callicles, who looks upon

all philosophical activity as φλυαρία, 489 objects to having dialectical treatment applied to him. — εἰπέ μοι: the asyndeton renders the question especially incisive, and hence is a measure of excitement. The question οὐκ αἰσχύνει is a rhetorical imperative.

2 f. ὀνόματα θηρεύων: the same image is employed in Theaet. 166 c, with the substantive ὀνομάτων θήρευσις to denote logomachy, where the matter at issue has been quite forgotten.

3. ῥήματι: in an expression. See c on 450 e.

4. Callicles takes his stand on the identity, which he had maintained, of βελτίων and κρείττων, but reverses the relation of these words to each other; for while above he considered βελτίων to be synonymous with κρείττων, now he wishes κρείττων to be understood in the sense of βέλτιων.

5 ἢ τὸ βελτίους; οὐ πάλα σοι λέγω, ὅτι ταυτόν φημι εἶναι τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κρεῖττον; ἢ οἶε με λέγειν, ἐὰν συρφε- τὸς συλλεγῇ δούλων καὶ παντοδαπῶν ἀνθρώπων μηδενὸς ἀξίων πλὴν ἴσως τῷ σώματι ἰσχυρίσασθαι, καὶ οὗτοι φῶσω, αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἶναι νόμιμα;

10 Σο. Εἶεν, ὦ σοφώτατε Καλλίκλεις· οὕτω λέγεις;

Καλ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

d

Σο. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ αὐτὸς πάλα τοπάζω τοιοῦτόν τί σε λέγειν τὸ κρεῖττον, καὶ ἀνερωτῶ γλιχόμενος σαφῶς εἰδέναι ὅτι λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε τοὺς δύο 15 βελτίους ἡγεί τοῦ ενός, οὐδὲ τοὺς σοὺς δούλους βελτίους σοῦ, ὅτι ἰσχυρότεροί εἰσιν ἢ σύ. ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰπέ, τί ποτε λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους, ἐπειδὴ οὐ τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους; καὶ ὦ θαυμάσιε πραότερόν με προδίδασκε, ἵνα (μὴ ἀποφοιτήσω παρὰ σοῦ.

489 5. οὐ πάλα σοι λέγω: he adds, in order to cover this change of conception. See on 456 a.

6. ἢ οἶε κτέ.: Callicles allows himself to be clearly recognized as a member of that political party which applied to itself by preference the name οἱ καλοὶ κάγαθοί, and which both during the latter part and after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war obtained for a brief period the ascendancy in Athens.—σύρφετος: from *σῆρω*, sweep. Cf. the English colloquial words 'off-scurings' and 'scum.'

8. ἀξίων πλὴν: without a following gen., instead of which we find τῷ σώματι ἰσχυρίσασθαι by means of their bodily strength. Others construe τῷ with σώματι, making the inf. depend upon some word of ability to be taken from ἀξίων, but this is harsh.

9. αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἶναι νόμιμα: construe with λέγειν as an indignant dis-

claimer in the shape of a question. 489 "Or think you I mean that if a rabble be got together, of slaves and all sorts of wretches, good for nothing unless perhaps for feats of physical strength, and these people say this or that, that these their mere dicta are to have the force of law?" Thompson.

12. αὐτὸς πάλα τοπάζω: why Socrates does not express his conjecture, he has already explained in 453 b, c.

14. σύ γε: you, at least, for your part. Cf. what has just preceded in c.

16. ἀλλὰ πάλιν: in what precedes Callicles has really succeeded merely in eluding the expression of any positive view.

18. προδίδασκε: the πρό in composition indicates the progress or going forward, which ought to attend teaching.

19. ἀποφοιτήσω παρὰ σοῦ: run away from your school. Cf. 456 d.

20 ΚΑΛ. Εἰρωνεύει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σο. Μὰ τὸν Ζῆθον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ᾧ σὺ χρώμενος, πολλὰ νυνδὴ εἰρωνεύου πρὸς με· ἀλλ' ἴθι εἰπέ, τίνας λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους εἶναι;

ΚΑΛ. Τοὺς ἀμείνους ἔγωγε.

25 Σο. Ὅρας ἄρα, ὅτι σὺ αὐτοὺς ὀνόματα λέγεις, δηλοῖς δὲ οὐδέν; οὐκ ἐρεῖς, τοὺς βελτίους καὶ κρείττους πότερον τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλους τινάς;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία τούτους λέγω, καὶ σφόδρα γε.

Σο. Πολλάκις ἄρα εἰς φρονῶν μυρίων μὴ φρονούντων 480 κρείττων ἐστὶν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ τοῦτον ἄρχειν δεῖ, τοὺς δ' ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ πλεόν ἔχειν τὸν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἀρχομένων — τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖς βούλεσθαι λέγω — καὶ οὐ ῥήματα θηρεύω — εἰ ὁ εἰς τῶν μυρίων κρείττων.

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἃ λέγω. τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι ἐγὼ 35 τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι φύσει, τὸ βελτίῳ ὄντα καὶ φρονιμώτερον καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ πλεόν ἔχειν τῶν φαυλοτέρων.

XLV. Σο. Ἐχε δὴ αὐτοῦ. τί ποτε αὖ νῦν λέγεις; ἐὰν ὅτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὤμεν, ὥσπερ νῦν, πολλοὶ ἄθροοι ἄνθρωποι, καὶ ἡμῖν ἢ ἐν κοινῷ πολλὰ σιτία καὶ ποτά, ὤμεν δὲ παντοδαποί, οἱ μὲν ἰσχυροί, οἱ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς, εἰς δὲ ἡμῶν ἢ

480 21. μὰ τὸν Ζῆθον: with μὰ we always infer the negative. The allusion to Zethus, whom Callicles had brought forward as an authority, has a very comic effect.

22. ἀλλ' ἴθι: see on 451 a.

25. ὁρᾷς κτέ.: alludes to 480 c, where βέλτιον and κρείττον were said by Callicles to be identical. Here he characterizes the βελτίους as ἀμείνους, showing, as Socrates declares in δηλοῖς οὐδέν, that at this time there was no distinction of consequence between these two words.

26. οὐκ ἐρεῖς: again asyndetic, as above in b.

27. φρονιμωτέρους: excludes the ambiguity which was still possible with ἰσχυρότερος.

29. μὴ φρονούντων: the neg. is conditional.

33. ῥήματα: a clear reference to 480 b, c. ῥήμα has rather the force of "phrase."

XLV. 1. ἔχε δὴ: see on 460 a.

3. ἐν κοινῷ: i.e. so that, as being public property, it must be distributed.

4. οἱ μὲν ἰσχυροὶ κτέ.: added be-

5 φρονιμώτερος περὶ ταῦτα, ἰατρὸς ὢν, ἥ δέ, οἷον εἰκός, τῶν μὲν ἰσχυρότερος, τῶν δὲ ἀσθενέστερος, ἄλλο τι ἢ οὗτος, φρονιμώτερος ἡμῶν ὢν, βελτίων καὶ κρείττων ἔσται εἰς ταῦτα;

ΚΑΛ. Πάννυ γε.

10 ΣΩ. Ὁ οὖν τούτων τῶν σιτίων πλεόν ἡμῶν ἐκτέον αὐτῷ, οὐ βελτίων ἔστιν, ἢ τῷ μὲν ἄρχειν πάντα ἐκείων δεῖ νέμειν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀναλίσκειν τε αὐτὰ καὶ καταχρῆσθαι εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα οὐ πλεονεκτεῖν, εἰ μὴ μέλλει ζημιοῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν πλεόν, τῶν δ' ἑλάττω ἐκτέον· ἐὰν δὲ τύχη
15 πάντων ἀσθενέστατος ὢν, πάντων ἐλάχιστον τῷ βελτίστῳ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις; οὐχ οὕτως, ὡγαθέ;

ΚΑΛ. Περὶ σιτία λέγεις καὶ ποτὰ καὶ ἰατροὺς καὶ φλυαρίας· ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ ταῦτα λέγω. d

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τὸν φρονιμώτερον βελτίῳ λέγεις; φάθι
20 ἢ μή.

⁴⁹⁰ cause it is just in the distribution of
^b food that one would expect bodily strength to form the standard.

5. περὶ ταῦτα: the acc. implies some mental activity.

^c 10. ἐκτέον: the verbal of *ἐχω*, which is quite rare, shows two forms, this and the more normal one *σχετέος*, also used by Plato.

11. τῷ μὲν ἄρχειν: this comes to him according to 490 a, because he is *φρονιμώτερος*. The dat. is one of cause. *νέμειν* is an action for which are necessary wisdom, justice, and self-control.

12. καταχρῆσθαι: not *misuse*, but *use up*. *κατὰ* frequently has the force of "completely" in composition. Kr. 68, 46, 10.

13. ζημιοῦσθαι: used metaphorically, of the natural result which follows the over-engorgement of the stomach with food.

14. τῶν μὲν . . . τῶν δέ: with reference to b. ⁴⁹⁰
c

15. τῷ βελτίστῳ: used instead of the pron. for the sake of the contrast with *ἐλάχιστον*.

17. περὶ σιτία: this is a very unusual construction. The gen. is the rule with *περὶ* after *λέγω*. Cron thinks it is calculated to define the region in which the speeches of Socrates move. The word *φλυαρίας* serves also to characterize all that precedes. Cf. 519 a *λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τειχῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαρίων*, the companion passage to this one. Cf. also Dem. Ol. iii. 29 *τὰς ὁδοὺς ἅς ἐπισκευάζομεν, καὶ κρήνας, καὶ λήρους*.

19. πότερον: the second member d is to be supplied from the following question.

20. ἢ μή (sc. *φάθι*): to be understood like *οὐ φημι* (neg o).

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν βελτίω πλέον δεῖν ἔχειν;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐ σιτίων γε οὐδὲ ποτῶν.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνω, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἱματίων, καὶ δεῖ τὸν ὑφαντικώ-
25 | τατον μέγιστον ἱμάτιον ἔχειν καὶ πλείστα καὶ κάλλιστα
ἀμπεχόμενον περιμέναι;

ΚΑΛ. Ποίων ἱματίων;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰς ὑποδήματα δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τὸν
φρονιμώτατον εἰς ταῦτα καὶ βέλτιστον. τὸν σκυτοτόμον
30 ἴσως μέγιστα δεῖ ὑποδήματα καὶ πλείστα ὑποδεδεμένον
περιπατεῖν.

ΚΑΛ. Ποῖα ὑποδήματα; φλυαρεῖς ἔχων.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεις, ἴσως τὰ τοιάδε· οἷον
γεωργικὸν ἄνδρα περὶ γῆν φρόνιμόν τε καὶ καλὸν καὶ
35 ἀγαθόν, τοῦτον δὴ ἴσως δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν σπερμάτων
| καὶ ὡς πλείστῳ σπέρματι χρῆσθαι εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ γῆν.

ΚΑΛ. Ὡς αἰεὶ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

| ΣΩ. Οὐ μόνον γε, ὦ Καλλίκελεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν
αὐτῶν.

490
d 24. *μανθάνω*: ironic; as if Socrates could by any means judge what Callicles did mean from a general statement of what he did not mean. — *ὑφαντικώτατον*: a sup. coined for the occasion.

26. *περιμέναι*: sc. in order to show off in them; still stronger is the following (31) *περιπατεῖν* ("strut about").

27. *ποίων ἱματίων*: expresses indignant contempt. Cf. *Charm.* 174 b ἀρὰ γε (οἶδε) τὸ πεττευτικόν; ποῖον πεττευτικόν;

32. *φλυαρεῖς ἔχων*: a manner of speech taken from the common life, and hence especially frequent in the comic poets. Cf. *τί ἔχων ληρεῖς*; (497 a),

τί δῆτα ἔχων στρέφει; (*Phaedr.* 236 e), 490
τί δῆτα διατριβεῖς ἔχων; (*Ar. Eccles.* 1151). *ἔχων* seems to imply a kind of continual persistence. You still persist in talking nonsense.

33. *τοιαῦτα, τοιάδε*: correspond in usage to οἷτος and ὅδε. The article divides the examples into classes.

37. *ὡς αἰεὶ κτέ.*: an exclamation implying a taunt, which was so often directed against Socrates e.g. (according to *Xen. Mem.* iv. 4. 6) by the sophist Hippias, who receives about the same answer that Callicles does here, with the ironical addition: σὺ δ' ἴσως διὰ τὸ πολυμαθὴς εἶναι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ λέγεις. Cf. 482 a.

40 *Καλ.* Νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἀτεχνῶς γε αἰὲ σκυτέας τε καὶ 491
 κναφέας καὶ μαγείρους λέγων καὶ ἰατροὺς οὐδὲν παύει, ὥς
 περὶ τούτων ἡμῖν ὄντα τὸν λόγον.

Σα. Οὐκοῦν σὺ ἐρεῖς περὶ τίνων ὁ κρείττων τε καὶ φρο-
 νιμώτερος πλεόν ἔχων δικαίως πλεονεκτεῖ; ἢ οὔτε ἐμοῦ
 48 ὑποβάλλοντος ἀνέξει οὗτ' αὐτὸς ἐρεῖς;

Καλ. Ἄλλ' ἐγωγε καὶ πάλαι λέγω. πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς
 κρείττους οἱ εἰσιν οὐ σκυτοτόμους λέγω οὐδὲ μαγείρους,
 ἀλλ' οἱ ἂν εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα φρόνιμοι ᾤσιν, b
 ὄντινα ἂν τρόπον εὖ οἰκοῖτο, καὶ μὴ μόνον φρόνιμοι, ἀλλὰ
 50 καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἱκανοὶ ὄντες ἂ ἂν νοήσωσιν ἐπιτελεῖν, καὶ μὴ
 ἀποκάμνωσι διὰ μαλακίαν τῆς ψυχῆς.

XLVI. Σα. Ὁρᾶς, ὦ βέλτιστε Καλλίκλεις, ὥς οὐ ταῦτα
 σύ τ' ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖς καὶ ἐγὼ σοῦ; σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐμέ φῆς
 αἰὲ ταῦτα λέγειν, καὶ μέμφει μοι· ἐγὼ δὲ σοῦ τούναντίον,

491 40. αἰὲ σκυτέας κτέ.: Charicles, one
 a of the thirty, irritated by some keen
 remark of Socrates, expresses himself
 similarly in Xen. Mem. i. 2. 37 οὐκοῦν,
 ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ τῶν ἐπομένων τού-
 τοις τοῦ τε δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ὀσίου καὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη ὁ
 Χαρίκλῆς, καὶ τῶν βουκόλων γε.

41 f. ὥς ὄντα τὸν λόγον: the acc.
 abs. is rare, except with impers. verbs.
 GMT. 853; G. 278, 2; H. 974. The infer-
 ence here is that the assumption intro-
 duced by the ὥς is untenable; in which
 case we more commonly have ὥσπερ.

43. περὶ τίνων: due to assimilation
 after περὶ τούτων, for, acc. to the
 usage, we should expect περὶ τίνα
 after πλεονεκτεῖ. Cf. Lach. 182 e οἷς
 οὐδὲν ἄλλο μέλει ἢ τοῦτο ζητεῖν, ὅτι ἂν
 μαθόντες πλεονεκτοῖεν τῶν ἄλλων περὶ
 τὸν πόλεμον. The ἐρεῖς may also have
 had some effect. See on 449 d. For
 οὐκοῦν ἐρεῖς, see on 489 e.

46. ἀλλ' ἐγωγε καὶ πάλαι λέγω: 491
 see on 456 a and 489 c. Callicles' a
 irritation shows itself again in the
 side-thrust, οὐ σκυτοτόμους κτέ.

46 f. τοὺς κρείττους οἱ εἰσιν: equiv.
 to τούτους οἱ κρείττους εἰσιν. See Kr.
 61, 6, 2; H. 878. Such prolepsis usu-
 ally occurs after verbs which express
 recognition or make declarations.
 Here the relative clause is almost
 pleonastic, but this is the more in
 harmony with the excited feelings of
 Callicles.

48. εἰς . . . πράγματα: denotes the b
 object, as περὶ ταῦτα (above 490 b)
 denotes the field, to which the φρό-
 νησις is directed; and from it we
 must take the subject of οἰκοῖτο.

50. ἱκανοὶ ὄντες κτέ.: is to be con-
 sidered as explanatory of ἀνδρεῖοι and
 φρόνιμοι ᾤσιν.

XLVI. 3. ἐγὼ δὲ σοῦ τούναντίον:
 this use of σοῦ, with which we must

ὅτι οὐδέποτε ταῦτ' ἀλέγεις περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τότε μὲν
 5 τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους ὠρίζον, ε
 αὐθις δὲ τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους, νῦν δ' αὖ ἑτερόν τι ἤκεις
 ἔχων· ἀνδριότεροί τινες ὑπὸ σοῦ λέγονται οἱ κρείττους
 | καὶ οἱ βελτίους. ἀλλ', ὡγαθέ, εἰπὼν ἀπαλλάγηθι, τίνας
 ποτε λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους καὶ εἰς ὅτι.

10 ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' εἰρηκά γε ἔγωγε τοὺς φρονίμους εἰς τὰ τῆς
 πόλεως πράγματα καὶ ἀνδρείους. τούτους γὰρ προσήκει
 τῶν πόλεων ἄρχειν, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστίν, πλεόν ἔχειν α
 τούτους τῶν ἄλλων, τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῶν ἀρχομένων.

7 | ΣΟ. Τί δὲ αὐτῶν, ὦ ἐταῖρε;

15 ΚΑΛ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΟ. Ἐνα ἕκαστον λέγω αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα· ἢ τοῦτο
 | μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ, αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων;

491 supply κατηγορῶ, is somewhat harsh
 b after ἐμέ, with which it contrasts,
 and leads Cron to prefer to consider
 σοῦ as dependent upon τὸναντίον, in
 the sense "the opposite of you,"—i.e.
 of what you say,—and the clause
 with ὅτι as epexegetic to τὸναντίον,
 —a harsh and doubtful construction.

c 5. τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους: the art. is
 employed, because ἰσχυροτέρους is not
 merely a pred. to τοὺς βελτίους κτέ.,
 but both ideas are considered as identical.

6 f. ἤκεις ἔχων: as 518 a. In Eng-
 lish also we often say, 'here you
 are with,' etc.

7. τινές: 'tis may express indefi-
 niteness of nature: "a sort of." H.
 702.

8. εἰπὼν ἀπαλλάγηθι: relieve your
 mind by saying, tell and be done with
 it. Cf. below, e δ ἐγὼ σοι νῦν παρη-
 σιαζόμενος λέγω. The use of the aor-
 ist tense of the partic. may be simply

a case of attraction; it certainly loses 491
 its connotation of past time, being c
 practically identical with the time of
 the leading verb, as in *Phaedo* 60 c
 εἰ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με. See GMT.
 150, 845; H. 856 b.

12. τοῦτ' ἐστίν: does not refer to d
 ἄρχειν, but simply, as often, intro-
 duces the following clause.

14. τί δὲ αὐτῶν: the indefiniteness
 of the question shows that it is only
 designed to draw Callicles' attention
 to the necessity of some rule govern-
 ing the actions of the κρείττους to one
 another. According to the connexion
 we may supply either ἄρχειν or
 πλεόν ἔχειν to govern the gen., or we
 may consider it as a free genitive.
 The idea of a man's governing him-
 self is so entirely new to Callicles
 that he is unable to catch Socrates'
 meaning at first.

16. ἓνα ἕκαστον: the single con-
 crete case to explain the principle.

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα λέγεις ;

Σο. Οὐδὲν πικρίλον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, σῶφρονα
20 ὄντα καὶ ἐγκρατῆ αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν
ἄρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ.

ΚΑΛ. Ὡς ἡδὺς εἶ· τοὺς ἡλιθίους λέγεις, τοὺς σῶφρο-
νας.

Σο. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ; οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐκ ἂν γνοίῃ, ὅτι οὕτω
25 λέγω.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐπεὶ πῶς ἂν
εὐδαίμων γένοιτο ἄνθρωπος δουλεύων ὀψοῦν ; ἀλλὰ τοῦτ'
ἐστὶν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, ὃ ἐγὼ σοι νῦν
παρρησιαζόμενος λέγω, ὅτι δεῖ τὸν ὀρθῶς βιωσόμενον τὰς

491
d 19. οὐδὲν πικρίλον: means that the question is about a simple matter, whereas the person addressed imagines something else behind the words. — ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί: with this, Socrates calls in the authority of common usage to determine the meaning of ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχειν, which he defines by σῶφρων and ἐγκρατὴς ἑαυτοῦ, with τῶν ἡδονῶν κτέ. explanatory.

e 22. ὥς ἡδὺς εἶ: is often used ironically. — ἡδὺς: corresponds best to our *naive*. Callicles means that Socrates still keeps the point of view of a naive — hence interesting (but cf. 485 b, c) — child, inasmuch as he has not yet laid aside his childish prejudice in favor of *σωφροσύνη*. Hence the words τοὺς ἡλιθίους κτέ. are a criticism of Socrates' view: "you mean those simple-minded fellows, — the temperate." This passage shows that Callicles erases *σωφροσύνη*, as he did *δικαιοσύνη*, from the list of the virtues.

24. οὕτω: we should naturally expect *τούτους*. Of course there is a

tinge of irony in the allusion to Callicles' words.

26. πάνυ γε σφόδρα: sc. οὕτω λέγεις. Callicles, of course, means τοὺς ἡλιθίους, and makes an effort in what follows to defend his words. For this purpose he unfolds his view of life more completely, and shows especially wherein he finds happiness. The beginning of his discourse bears a rhetorical stamp.

27. δουλεύων: not to be conceived literally of human servitude, but rather equiv. to *ἀρχόμενος* and that too αὐτὸς ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ, which Callicles considers just as bad as if the slavery were to some one else, *ὀψοῦν*. The lot of thralldom is considered so unhappy that Callicles conceives *δουλεύων*, even in the sense which it has here, as the exact opposite to *εὐδαίμων*. That self-control is not consistent with the generally held idea of freedom is spoken plainly in *Meno* 86 d ἐπειδὴ δὲ σὺ σαυτοῦ μὲν οὐδ' ἐπιχειρεῖς ἄρχειν ἵνα δὴ ἐλεύθερος ᾖς, and is at the present day a principle of the opponents of the temperance movement.

30 μὲν ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἔαν ὡς μεγίστας εἶναι καὶ μὴ
 κολάζειν, ταύταις δὲ ὡς μεγίσταις οὐσαις ἱκανὸν εἶναι 492
 ὑπηρετεῖν δι' ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν, καὶ ἀποπιμπλάναι
 103 ὧν ἂν αἰὲς ἡ ἐπιθυμία γίγνηται. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ', οἶμαι, τοῖς
 πολλοῖς οὐ δυνατόν· ὅθεν ψέγουσιν τοὺς τοιούτους δι'
 35 αἰσχύνην, ἀποκρυπτόμενοι τὴν αὐτῶν ἀδυναμίαν, καὶ
 αἰσχρὸν δὴ φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἀκολασίαν, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρό-
 σθεν ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, δουλούμενοι τοὺς βελτίους τὴν φύσιν
 ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐκπορίζεσθαι ταῖς
 ἡδοναῖς πλήρωσιν ἐπαινοῦσιν τὴν σωφροσύνην καὶ τὴν b
 40 δικαιοσύνην διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀνανδρίαν. ἐπεὶ γε οἷς ἐξ
 ἀρχῆς ὑπῆρξεν ἡ βασιλέων ὑέσιν εἶναι ἡ αὐτοὺς τῇ φύ-
 σει ἱκανοὺς ἐκπορίσασθαι ἀρχὴν τινα ἢ τυραννίδα ἢ
 δυναστείαν, (τί) τῇ ἀληθείᾳ αἰσχιον καὶ κάκιον (ἂν) εἴη
 σωφροσύνης τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· οἷς ἔξδον ἀπολαύειν

492 31. κολάζειν: in the sense of "discipline" is quite in place here. At the same time its use forms a link between this and the earlier discussion between Polus and Socrates. ἀκολασία is the proper opposite to σωφροσύνη, and as such is praised by Callicles.

32. ὑπηρετεῖν: Callicles says this, without noticing that thereby the servitude (δουλεία) in which man stands to his appetites is recognized.

34. τοὺς τοιούτους: viz. τοὺς δυνατοὺς ἀποπιμπλάναι κτέ.

36. αἰσχρὸν δὴ: with ironical reference to αἰσχύνην. — ὅπερ: introduces what follows. The reference is to 483 c ff.

b 41. οἷς ὑπῆρξεν: whose fortune it was. The original meaning of ὑπάρχειν, "to be as a foundation," "to begin with," becomes gradually weaker as time goes on. The dat. in the pred. here passes over into the acc. as subj. of the

inf. (ἱκανοὺς and εἶναι) as is frequently 492 the case, especially in long periods. b
 Kr. 55, 2, 5, 7. The cause here lies in the necessary addition of αὐτοὺς.

42. ἀρχὴν τινα κτέ.: the word ἀρχή can be applied to any position of power, whether in a democracy or not. Thuc. ii. 65. 9 says of Athens ἐγένετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρός (i.e. Pericles) ἀρχή. The idea of τυραννίς is well known; cf. Nepos, *Milt.* 8. 3. δυναστεία combined with τυραννίς is not infrequently (479 a, Thuc. iii. 62. 3) used of oligarchs, but it is also a designation of princes, both smaller and greater (524 e, 525 d).

43. αἰσχιον καὶ κάκιον: declare as strongly as possible the inappropriateness of the practice of virtue for such men; it becomes for them really a shame and an evil.

44. τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις: pur-

St. I. p. 492.

- 45 τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδῶν ὄντος, αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς
 δεσπότην ἐπαγάγουιν τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων νόμον
 τε καὶ λόγον καὶ ψόγον; ἢ πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἄθλιοι γεγονότες
 εἶεν ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τοῦ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς σωφρο-
 σύνης, μηδὲν πλεον νέμοντες τοῖς φίλοις τοῖς αὐτῶν ἢ τοῖς
 50 ἐχθροῖς, καὶ ταῦτα ἄρχοντες ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν πόλει; ἀλλὰ
 τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἣν φῆς σὺ διώκειν, ὧδ' ἔχει·
τροφὴ καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευθερία, ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ,
 τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ τε καὶ εὐδαιμονία, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ταῦτ'
 ἐστὶν τὰ καλλωπίσματα, τὰ παρὰ φύσιν συνθήματα ἀν-
 55 θρώπων, φλυαρία καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια.

XLVII. Σο. Οὐκ ἀγεννῶς γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐπεξέρχει α

492 posely placed at the end of the clause
 b (as above διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀνδρίαν),

and to emphasize the contrast, ἀνθρώ-
 πων, which is usually wanting, is
 added in the next clause after τῶν
 πολλῶν.—οἷς ἐξόν κτέ.: such connex-
 ion of the subordinate to the princi-
 pal clause is idiomatic in Greek and
 Latin. Cf. *Symp.* 174 e οἱ μὲν γὰρ εὐθὺς
 παῖδά τινα τῶν ἔνδον ἀπαντήσαντα ἔγειν
 οὐ κατέκειντο οἱ ἄλλοι. *Nep. Thrasys.*
 4. 1 huic . . . corona a populo
 data est; quam quod . . . non
 vis expresserat nullam ha-
 buit invidiam. Notice the neces-
 sary shift in *ἐξόν* and *μηδενὸς* . . . ὄντος
 due to the change from impersonal
 to personal. The participles are both
 practically concessive, the neg. *μή*
 being due to the conditional coloring.

46. τῶν πολλῶν κτέ.: notice the
 assonance (*παρίσωσις*) in *νόμον*, *λόγον*,
ψόγον.

c 48. τοῦ καλοῦ: is said with bitter
 irony. Callicles shows here, as well
 as in 486 b above, the code of morals
 prevalent at that time and which Xen.
 expresses in the praise awarded to

Cyrus, *Anab.* i. 9. 11 φάνερος ἦν εἰ τις 492
 τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ποιήσειεν αὐτόν, c
 νικᾶν περὶώμενος.

51. ἣν φῆς σὺ διώκειν: as above
 482 e φάσκων τὴν ἀλήθειαν διώκειν.

52. ἐπικουρίαν: capacity to help
 (one's self); i.e. to provide means
 for pleasure and to ward off hind-
 rances. So also ἐπικουρεῖν and ἐπί-
 κούρος. Cf. below, the recapitulation
 of Socrates.

53. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα κτέ.: the subject,
 which at first is only inferred as the
 opposite of the three qualities speci-
 fied, is nearer specified first by the
 characteristic addition τὰ καλλωπίσ-
 ματα (*affectations*) and then by a
 definite expression which at the same
 time shows Callicles' opinion.

53. φλυαρία κτέ.: is predicate.

XLVII. 1. οὐκ ἀγεννῶς: like γεν- d
 ναῖως 475 d, 521 a, transferred from
 its original application to the free
 independent conduct proper for a
 man of noble birth; hence equiv. to
 "spirited," "brave."—ἐπεξέρχει: an
 image from war. Cf. ἐπιχειρώμεν
 495 c.

τῷ λόγῳ παρρησιαζόμενος· σαφῶς γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις,
 ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι διανοοῦνται μὲν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν.
 δέομαι οὖν ἐγὼ σου μηδενὶ τρόπῳ ἀνείναι, ἵνα τῷ ὄντι
 εἰ κατάδηλον γένηται πῶς βιωτέον. καὶ μοι λέγε· τὰς μὲν
 ἐπιθυμίας φῆς οὐ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει τις οἶον δεῖ εἶναι,
 ἐῶντα δὲ αὐτὰς ὡς μεγίστας πλήρωσιν αὐταῖς ἀμόθεν γέ
 ποθεν ἐτοιμάζω, καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν;

ΚΑΛ. Φημὶ ταῦτα ἐγώ.

10 ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς λέγονται οἱ μηδενὸς δεόμενοι
 εὐδαιμόνες εἶναι.

ΚΑΛ. Οἱ λίθοι γὰρ δὴ οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ εὐδαιμονέ-
 στατοὶ εἰσιν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὥς γε σὺ λέγεις δεωδὸς ὁ βίος.

492 2. τῷ λόγῳ: refers to the view
 d just stated, the position defended.
Cf. Prot. 345 d, where Socrates says
 of Simonides δι' ὅλου τοῦ ἔσματος ἐπ-
 εἰρέχεται τῷ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ῥήματι. We
 may, however, consider ἐπεἰρέχει as
 used absolutely and τῷ λόγῳ as dat.
 of accompaniment.

6. εἰ μέλλει τις (sc. τοιοῦτος εἶναι)
 οἶον δεῖ (αὐτὸν sc. τὸν ἄνθρωπον) εἶναι:
 the absence of the inf. after ἐῶντα is
 strange; cf. 491 e above.

7 f. ἀμόθεν γέ ποθεν: Socrates
 wishes to settle beyond all cavil that
 Callicles sanctions the employment
 of all means, without limitation and
 in the broadest sense, to satisfy his
 desires. As ἐτοιμάζειν is in the same
 construction with κολαστέον, we must
 conceive an idea of obligation con-
 nected with it. *Cf. Crito* 51 e ποιη-
 τέον . . . ἢ πείθειν.

e 8. τὴν ἀρετὴν: the sole true vir-
 tue (manliness), which is recognized
 also by Callicles.

10. ἄρα: "it appears," "according

to your view." — οἱ μηδενὸς δεόμενοι 492
 κτέ.: the fundamental principle of the
 Cynic school (of Antisthenes), which
 also derived its origin from Socrates.
Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 6. 10, where to the
 sophist Antiphon, who maintains sim-
 ilar principles to those of Callicles
 here, Socrates says ἔοικας τὴν εὐδαι-
 μονίαν οἰομένῳ τρυφῇ καὶ πολυτέλειαν
 εἶναι· ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς
 δεῖσθαι θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δ' ὡς ἐλάχιστον
 ἐγγυτάτῳ τοῦ θεοῦ.

12. οἱ νεκροὶ κτέ.: Socrates men-
 tions the prevalence of this view in
Phaedo 65 a καὶ δοκεῖ γέ που τοῖς πολ-
 λοῖς ἀνθρώποις . . . ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ
 τεθνάναι ὁ μηδὲν φροντίζων τῶν ἡδονῶν
 αἱ διὰ τοῦ σώματος εἰσιν. Sophocles,
 however, makes the sorely afflicted
 Ajax say (*Ai.* 554 f.) ἐν τῷ φρονεῖν
 γὰρ μηδὲν ἡδιστος βίος, | ἔως τὸ χαίρειν
 καὶ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι μαθῆς.

14. Now that Callicles has stated
 exactly the manner in which he looks
 at life, Socrates proceeds to contrast
 that view with his own, not directly

15 οὐ γάρ τοι θαυμάζοιμ' ἄν, εἰ Εὐριπίδης ἀληθῆ ἐν τοῖσδε λέγει, λέγων

τίς δ' οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἐστὶ κατθανεῖν,
τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν;

καὶ ἡμεῖς τῷ ὄντι ἴσως τέθναμεν· ἤδη τοῦ ἔγωγε καὶ 493
20 ἤκουσα τῶν σοφῶν, ὡς νῦν ἡμεῖς τέθναμεν, καὶ τὸ μὲν
σῶμά ἐστιν ἡμῖν σῆμα, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ ἐπιθυ-
| μίαι εἰσὶ, τυγχάνει δν οἶον ἀναπείθεσθαι καὶ μεταπίπτειν

492 indeed, but by a series of comparisons and similes, which serve the double purpose of calming the feelings of the listeners and readers after the impassioned speech of Callicles and, by presenting these pictures to the fancy, of preparing their minds for the following dialectical argument.

15. Εὐριπίδης: the same poet to whom Callicles has several times appealed. Socrates also can quote for his own purpose. The passage is from the *Polyidus*, and has the second line completed by the words *κάτω νομίζεται*. Quite similar is a passage which has come down to us from another lost tragedy, the *Phrixus*, *τίς οἶδεν εἰ ζῆν τοῦθ' ὃ κέκληται θανεῖν, | τὸ ζῆν δὲ θνήσκειν ἐστί*. See Nauck, *Fr.* 639, 830.

493 19 f. ἔγωγε καὶ ἤκουσά του: the following comparisons are probably taken from the book of Philolaus, a Pythagorean who, after having been driven from Italy, wandered to Thebes, and there engaged in teaching and writing. Socrates was acquainted with the Pythagorean teaching probably only orally, from association with his Theban friends Simmias and Cebes. For this reason Plato implies

by the manner of expression that this 493 knowledge, which Socrates himself in ^a nowise valued, was as general as possible. See Thompson.

20 f. τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι σῆμα: this comparison, though ascribed to the Pythagoreans, is connected also with the Orphic saying that the body is the custodian of the soul. Plato combines both in the same manner in *Crat.* 400 b καὶ γὰρ σῆμά τι ἐς φασιν αὐτὸ (sc. τὸ σῶμα) εἶναι τῇ ψυχῇ. Cf. *Phaedo* 62 b.

21. τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τοῦτο: in order to continue the discussion, a distinction between the separate parts of the soul is necessary. This could not be given here scientifically; but as much as is needful is stated by the comparison. Elsewhere Plato distinguishes three parts of the soul,—τὸ λογιστικόν, τὸ θυμοειδές (θυμός), and τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν. For his present purpose two are sufficient,—the really spiritual, the reason, and that part which clings greedily to the body; for the question to be decided is: Shall life be directed according to the nature of the soul or of the body?

22. μεταπίπτειν: the active is found in 481 d, e. Cf. 517 b μεταβιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας.

ἄνω κάτω. καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα τις μυθολογῶν κομψὸς ἀνὴρ, ἵσως Σικελός τις ἢ Ἰταλικός, παράγων τῷ ὀνόματι διὰ τὸ
 25 πιθανόν τε καὶ πειστικὸν ὠνόμασε πίθον, τοὺς δὲ ἀνοήτους ἀμνήτους· τῶν δ' ἀμνήτων τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐ αἱ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶ, τὸ ἀκόλαστον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ στεγανόν, ὡς τετρη- b

493 23. μυθολογῶν: "speaking in mythical (here allegorical) form," in contradistinction with the dialectical method. Cf. *Phaedo* 61 e διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν.—κομψός: of delicate perceptions. Often with irony, but not here. See on 486 c. Σικελός refers to Empedocles, Ἰταλικός to Philolaus. Neither was able, in the infancy of the science, to clothe his profound thoughts in philosophical form. Cf. Cron-Dyer *Introd. to Apol.* §§ 3 and 8. Σικελός, and not Σικελικός, may be due to the old love song of Timocreon Rhodius, which began: Σικελὸς κομψὸς ἀνὴρ | ποτὶ τὰν μητέρ' ἔφα.

24. παράγων τῷ ὀνόματι: by a slight variation of the word. παράγειν is otherwise used of etymologies which are effected by small variations in the sound.—διὰ τὸ πιθανόν τε καὶ πειστικόν: Philolaus was very fond of such tricks of derivation (cf. Boeckh, *Philolaos*, p. 188). Both words are obviously, as was shown above by ἀναπίθεσθαι and μεταπίπτειν, to be considered as passive, and applying to something that can be easily persuaded. In form πιθανόν approaches closest to πίθον, and hence stands first. It is usually active, yet it occurs also as a passive, e.g. Xen. *Cyr.* ii. 2. 10 πιθανοὶ δ' οὕτως εἰσὶ τινες, ὥστε, πρὶν εἰδέναι τὸ προσταττόμενον, πρότερον πείθονται.—πειστικόν: adapted and inclined to belief, presupposes also some persuasion.

25. ἀνοήτους: is chosen here as the

opposite of σώφρονες, on account of 493 its assonance with ἀμνήτους, and denotes those who are under the control, not of the νοῦς, but of the ἐπιθυμία. ἀμνήτοι, according to the regular usage, denotes those who are not initiated into the mysteries. Hence Plato applies it also, in *Phaedo* 69 c and *Theaet.* 155 e, to those who have not been initiated into wisdom, or Philosophy, which causes—as the mysteries were also designed to do—an actual inner purification of the soul. But here is also probably, at the same time, an allusion to the actual untransferred meaning of μύειν, close,—i.e. the "unconfined." With this agrees the following explanation, οὐ στεγανόν and τετρημένος πίθος. The ἀμνήτοι stand open to all the charms of sense and the outer world.

27. τὸ ἀκόλαστον: an allusion to b the expression of Callicles.—οὐ στεγανόν: which does not cover and preserve its contents, gives cause and introduction for the image of the jar. It is noteworthy that this greedy part of the soul is designated entirely by neg. expressions.

27 f. ὡς τετρημένος εἴη πίθος: depends on an ἔλεγε, which is implied in ὠνόμασε. It is true, however, that after a verb of naming we find occasionally a relative clause, as Soph. *O. R.* 780 καλεῖ (με) πλαστός ὡς εἴην πατρί. The comparison reminds one of the myth of the Danaidae. With the image of the πίθος and κόσκινον Thompson compares Shaks. *Cym.* i. 7

105 / μένος εἷη πίθος, διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν ἀπεικάσας. τούναν-
 30 τιον δὴ οὗτος σοί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνδείκνυται ὡς τῶν ἐν
 οἱ ἀμύητοι, καὶ φοροῦν εἰς τὸν τετρημένον πίθον ὕδωρ
 ἐτέρῳ τοιοῦτῳ τετρημένῳ κοσκίνῳ. τὸ δὲ κόσκινον ἄρα
 λέγει, ὡς ἔφη ὁ πρὸς ἐμὲ λέγων, τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι. τὴν δὲ
 35 ψυχὴν κοσκίνῳ ἀπήκασεν τὴν τῶν ἀνοήτων ὡς τετρημέ-
 νην, αἵτε οὐ δυναμένην στέγειν δι' ἀπιστίαν τε καὶ λήθην.
 ταῦτ' ἐπεικῶς μὲν ἐστὶν ὑπὸ τι ἄτοπα, δηλοῖ μὲν ὁ ἐγὼ
 βούλομαί σοι ἐνδείζαμενος, ἔάν πως οἷός τε ὦ, πείσαι

493
 b 'The cloyed will, That satiate yet
 unsatisfied desire, That tub both filled
 and running,' and *All's Well* i. 3. 193
 'Yet in this captious and untenable
 sieve, I still pour in the waters of my
 love, And lack not to lose still.'

28. ἀπεικάσας: the necessary ob-
 jects in the acc. and dat. are to be
 supplied from the context. — τούναν-
 τιον: construe with σοί.

29 f. ἐν Ἄιδου: the following ety-
 mological explanation is found also
 elsewhere. It draws attention to a
 consideration of the beyond and the
 life after death, which plays an im-
 portant part in the close of the dia-
 logue. Cf. *Phaedo* 80 d, 81 c, d.

30. οὔτοι: points back, but is at
 the same time fixed by the addition
 οἱ ἀμύητοι.

32. ἐτέρῳ τοιοῦτῳ: "likewise." The
 objects are different, but their defects
 are similar.

c 33. ὁ πρὸς ἐμὲ λέγων: Socrates
 again refers to his authority, because
 he is still engaged with the details of
 the simile.

34. τὴν τῶν ἀμύητων: emphati-
 cally added, because what follows ap-
 plies only to οἱ ἀμύητοι. The soul is
 here, as a whole, compared to a per-

forated sieve, whereas, just before, 493
 only a part of it was compared with
 the jar, because thereby was meant
 only the part attached to the body.
 But the other part, the soul proper,
 is brought into service to this bodily
 part, so that it affords material for
 it, and even assumes its nature. Cf.
Phaedo 86 d δουλεύοντες τῇ τοῦ σώμα-
 τος θεραπείᾳ.

35. ἀπιστίαν: no contradiction to
 the above πειστικόν, which was said
 only of the ἐπιθυμητικόν of the soul.
 By yielding to the sensual, the soul
 loses its power of reception and re-
 tention, of belief and knowledge.

36. ἐπεικῶς: reasonably, fairly, and
 then very likely, indeed. — ὑπό τι:
 somewhat, like ὅπως in *ὑπομνηστος Rep.*
 viii. 548 e, belongs to ἄτοπον. Rid.
 § 131 cites *Phaedr.* 242 d ὅπως τι
 ἄσεβῃ (λόγον). Cf. in Lat. subab-
 surdus, subrusticus, etc. — μὲν:
 yet, moreover, like the more usual μέ-
 ντοι.

37. σοί: in Greek, when a pron.
 has been expressed once with one of
 the verbs of a series, it is not neces-
 sary to express it a second time, even
 though the second verb would require
 a different case, as here.

μεταθέσθαι, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπλήστως καὶ ἀκολάστως ἔχοντος
βίου τὸν κοσμίως καὶ τοῖς αἰεὶ παροῦσιν ἱκανῶς καὶ ἔξαρ-
40 κούντως ἔχοντα βίον ἐλέσθαι. ἀλλὰ πότερον πείθω τί σε
καὶ μετατίθεσαι εὐδαιμονεστέρους εἶναι τοὺς κοσμίους α
τῶν ἀκολάστων, ἢ οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα μυθολογῶ,
οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον μεταθήσει;

ΚΑΛ. Τοῦτ' ἀληθέστερον εἶρηκας, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XLVIII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, ἄλλην σοι εἰκόνα λέγω ἐκ τοῦ
αὐτοῦ γυμνασίου τῇ νῦν. σκόπει γὰρ εἰ τοιόνδε λέγεις
περὶ τοῦ βίου ἐκατέρου, τοῦ τε σώφρονος καὶ τοῦ ἀκολά-
στου, οἷον εἰ δυοῖν ἀνδρῶν ἐκατέρῳ πίθοι. πολλοὶ εἶναι, καὶ
5 τῷ μὲν ἐτέρῳ ὑγιεῖς καὶ πλήρεις, ὁ μὲν οἶνου, ὁ δὲ μέλι- ο
τος, ὁ δὲ γάλακτος, καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πολλῶν, νάματα δὲ

493 38. μετατίθεσθαι: denotes the change
c of an opinion or statement. Cf. *Rep.*
i. 334 e ἀλλὰ μεταθώμεθα· κινδυνεύομεν
γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς . . . θέσθαι.

38 f. ἀντὶ . . . ἐλέσθαι: exegetical,
instead of ὥστε ἐλέσθαι.

39. κοσμίως: chastically contrasted
with ἀκολάστως.

40. πότερον πείθω: the question
shows that Socrates himself attaches
no especial cogency to the compari-
son. Cf. below, μυθολογῶ.

d 41. μετατίθεσθαι: here equiv. to με-
ταθέμενος ἡγεῖ. Mutasne ita sen-
tentiam ut statuas feliciores
esse modestos libidinosos.
Heindorf.

44. τοῦτο: refers to the second
part of the double question.

XLVIII. 1. φέρε δὴ: the employ-
ment of another simile after the pre-
ceding one is strange; but possibly
the second contains an advance on
the first, inasmuch as it extends the
consideration from the nature to the
life. It may, however, be only an-

other version of the first one, as the 493
scholiast suggests: ἦν δὲ ἐκείνο μὲν d
τῶν Πυθαγορείων οἰκεῖον, τοῦτο δὲ Σω-
κράτους, ὡς σαφέστερόν τε καὶ πηκτι-
κώτερον.

2. γυμνασίον: it is not necessary to
refer this strictly to the philosophi-
cal school already mentioned. It
rather has the meaning of "place of
general exercise," the domain of im-
agination and fancy from which So-
crates (Plato) draws his new image.
On the 'brachylogy' in τῇ νῦν ("where
we obtained the one just given"), see
Kr. 48, 13, 9.

4. πίθοι πολλοί: by these are to
be understood only the separate de-
sires. Pleasures are the materials
with which the jars are filled.

5. ὑγιεῖς: in the physical sense, e
"undamaged," but with a pre-under-
standing of the moral judgment in
regard to them; hence the contrast
is formed by σαθρά, as in 479 b.

6. πολλῶν: viz. τοιούτων χρημάτων
or ναμάτων. The common manner of

σπάνια καὶ χαλεπὰ ἐκάστου τούτων εἷη καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν
 πόνων καὶ χαλεπῶν ἐκποριζόμενα· ὁ μὲν οὖν ἕτερος πλη-
 ρωσάμενος μήτ' ἐποχετεύοι μήτε τι φροντίζοι, ἀλλ' ἔνεκα
 10 τούτων ἡσυχίαν ἔχοι· τῷ δ' ἑτέρῳ τὰ μὲν νάματα, ὥσπερ
 καὶ ἐκείνῳ, δυνατὰ μὲν πορίζεσθαι, χαλεπὰ δέ, τὰ δ' ἀγ-
 γεῖα τετρημένα καὶ σαθρά, ἀναγκάζοιτο δ' αἰεὶ καὶ νύκτα
 καὶ ἡμέραν πιμπλάναι αὐτά, ἥ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύ- 494
 πας· ἄρα τοιούτου ἐκατέρου ὄντος τοῦ βίου, λέγεις τὸν τοῦ
 15 ἀκολάστου εὐδαιμονέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὸν τοῦ κοσμίου;
 πείθω τί σε ταῦτα λέγων συγχωρῆσαι τὸν κόσμιον βίον
 τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀμείνω εἶναι, ἢ οὐ πείθω;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐ πείθεις, ὦ Σώκρατες· τῷ μὲν γὰρ πληρωσα-
 μένῳ ἐκείνῳ οὐκέτ' ἔστω ἡδονὴ οὐδεμία, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἔστω,
 20 ὃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τὸ ὥσπερ λίθον ζῆν, ἐπειδὰν πλη-
 ρώσῃ, μήτε χαίροντα ἔτι μήτε λυπούμενον. ἀλλ' ἐν τούτῳ ὅ
 ἔστιν τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν, ἐν τῷ ὡς πλείστον ἐπιρρεῖν.

493 expression would be ἄλλοι ἄλλων πολ-
 ὅ λῶν or ἄλλοι ἄλλων πολλοὶ πολλῶν.

7. χαλεπὰ: used absolutely and explained by the addition of καὶ . . . ἐκποριζόμενα. Cf. below (11), where the supplement is self-evident.

8. ὁ μὲν ἕτερος: i.e. ὁ σάφρων.

9 f. ἔνεκα τούτων: "so far as it depends upon the filling of the casks or desires." Cf. Theaet. 148 d προθυμίας μὲν ἔνεκα φανεῖται.

11. πορίζεσθαι: probably middle. Kr. 65, 3, 8; H. 813.

494 13. ἦ: i.e. εἰ δὲ μή (πιμπλαίῃ).

a 14. ἄρα τοιούτου κτέ.: comprehensive resumption of the protasis beginning with εἰ δυοῖν.

16. πείθω τι: the adverbial acc. of the indef. neut. pron. is frequent. See H. 719 b; G. 160, 2. The repetition of πείθω shows that Socrates attaches no value to the comparison as a proof,

for one simile can be offset by another, but it helps to clarify the idea. a

20. τὸ ὥσπερ λίθον ζῆν: exegetical to τοῦτο . . . ὃ κτέ., in order to draw attention again to the earlier remark.—We must supply naturally the same subject to πληρώσῃ as to ζῆν.

22. ἐπιρρεῖν: Callicles takes up b the simile of Socrates; but at the same time, in this treatment of it there may be some traces of the teaching of Gorgias, if, as is supposed, he accepted Empedocles' ideas of flux and reflux in his views of physics. Cf. Meno 76 c βούλει οὖν σοι κατὰ Γοργίαν ἀποκρίνωμαι;—Οὐκοῦν λέγετε ἀπορροὰς τινὰς τῶν ὄντων κατ' Ἐμπεδοκλέα; καὶ πόρους εἰς οὓς καὶ δι' ὧν αἱ ἀπορροαὶ πορεύονται. In this light the word πορίζεσθαι gains especial importance.

| 107 Σο. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη γ', ἂν πολὺ ἐπιρρέῃ, πολὺ καὶ τὸ
ἀπὸν εἶναι, καὶ μεγάλ' ἄττα τὰ τρήματα εἶναι ταῖς
25 ἐκροαῖς;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Σο. Χαραδριῶ τινα αὖ σὺ βίον λέγεις, ἀλλ' οὐ νεκροῦ
οὐδὲ λίθου. καὶ μοι λέγε· τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις οἷον πευνῆν
καὶ πειωῶντα ἐσθίειν;

30 ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε.

Σο. Καὶ διψῆν γε καὶ διψῶντα πίνειν;

ΚΑΛ. Λέγω, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἀπάσας ἔχοντα
καὶ δυνάμενον πληροῦν χαίροντα εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν.

XLIX. Σο. Εὖγε, ὦ βέλτιστε· διατέλει γὰρ ὥσπερ
ῥῆξω, καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἀπαισχυεῖ. δεῖ δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, μὴδ'
ἐμὲ ἀπαισχυθῆναι. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν εἰπέ, εἰ καὶ ψωρῶντα
καὶ κνησιῶντα, ἀφθόνως ἔχοντα τοῦ κνησθαι, κνώμενον
5 διατελοῦντα τὸν βίον εὐδαιμόνως ἔστι ζῆν.

494 25. ἐκροαῖς: this compound with
b ἐκ is very unusual, but also here very
exact.

27. χαραδριῶ: according to Arist. *Anim. Hist.* ix. 11, the χαραδριῶς was a bird of ugly voice and color, which lived in chasms and clefts of the rock, and came forth only at night. Others describe it as a very greedy bird, *ὅς ἅμα τῷ ἐσθίειν ἐκκρίνει*. It is this peculiarity which explains the reference here. The duck has that reputation with us. — ἀλλ' οὐ: we might also have simple οὐ (456 e), or *καὶ οὐ* (Kr. 59, 1, 10).

28. τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις: viz. as the above (ἀλλ' . . . ἐπιρρεῖν) used expressions. The following answer of Callicles, λέγω κτέ., saves Socrates the trouble of enumeration. — τὸ τοιόνδε: see on 490 e.

c XLIX. 1. εὖγε: the verb is reg-

ularly omitted with this exclamation, 494
which is usually ironic. By the words c
τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἀπάσας, Callicles gives Socrates an open field for attack. Hence the ironical praise. Callicles need only continue to make such rash statements to be soon silenced.

2. ὡς ἔοικε: by this expression Socrates reminds Callicles of the principle he had laid down in 482 e (cf. 489 a), in order, by this ironical praise of his determination which shrinks from no consequence, to make acceptable the diversion of the discussion to less pleasant subjects. At the same time, he shows that he feels himself compelled, by the results of Callicles' moral view, to carry the investigation into this field.

4. ἀφθόνως ἔχοντα τοῦ κνησθαι: the gen., on account of the meaning

ΚΑΛ. Ὡς ἄτοπος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημη- α
γός.

ΣΟ. Τοιγάρτοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, Πῶλον μὲν καὶ Γοργίαν
καὶ ἐξέπληξα καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐποίησα, σὺ δὲ οὐ μὴ
10 ἐκπλαγῆς οὐδὲ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆς· ἀνδρείος γὰρ εἶ. ἀλλ'
ἀποκρίνου μόνον.

ΚΑΛ. Φημί τοῦνυν καὶ τὸν κνόμενον ἡδέως ἂν βιώναι.

ΣΟ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἡδέως, καὶ εὐδαιμόνως;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

15 ΣΟ. Πότερον εἰ τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον κνησιώῃ, ἢ ἔτι τί σε
ἐρωτῶ; ὅρα, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τί ἀποκρινεῖ, ἔάν τις σε τὰ
[ἐχόμενα] τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἅπαντα ἐρωτᾷ· καὶ τούτων τοι-
? | οὔτων ὄντων κεφάλαιον, ὁ τῶν κνωαίδων βίος, οὗτος οὐ
δεινὸς καὶ αἰσχυρὸς καὶ ἄθλιος; ἢ τούτους τολμήσεις λέ-
20 γειν εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, ἐὰν ἀφθόνως ἔχωσιν ὧν δέονται;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ αἰσχύνει εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς
λόγους;

ΣΟ. Ἡ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἄγω ἐνταῦθα, ὦ γενναίε, ἢ ἐκείνος, ὃς

⁴⁹⁴ of the adverb (cf. φθονεῖν τινί τινος).

^c — κνησθαι: contracted like ζῆν, ψῆν, etc. Cf. πεινῆν in b above.

d 6. ὡς ἄτοπος εἶ κτέ.: rudeness instead of response. — δημηγός: see on 482 c.

8. τοιγάρτοι: this strong inferential particle (cf. 471 c) serves to compel Callicles, who would gladly have evaded the answer by the general reproach ὡς ἄτοπος εἶ, to a definite answer, by reference to 487 a, b.

10. ἀνδρείος: with an allusion to 491 b. It is contrasted with ἐκπλαγῆναι, because, besides φρόνησις, bravery is the only virtue recognized by Callicles as necessary for a statesman. He must, therefore, display this quality himself.

16 f. τὰ ἐχόμενα: used absolutely ⁴⁹⁴ would not indeed be unexampled (cf. ^e

Isoc. vi. 29 ἐκ τῶν ἐχομένων γνώσεσθε), but in connection with τούτοις ἐφεξῆς is pleonastic. Otherwise Plato's usage is either τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα (Rep. iii. 389 e) or τὰ τούτοις ἐφεξῆς (Tim. 30 c, Phileb. 34 d).

18. κεφάλαιον: without the article is rather uncommon (cf. 453 a, 472 c), but does occasionally occur. Cf. Dem. ii. 31. — οὗτος: points emphatically back to ὁ τῶν κνωαίδων βίος, which has already received especial stress through the preceding word κεφάλαιον.

21. εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγων: is the same reproach which was made above, 482 e.

ἀν φῇ ἀνέδην οὕτω τοὺς χαίροντας, ὅπως ἂν χαίρωσιν,
 25 εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, καὶ μὴ διορίζηται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὅποιαι 495
 ἀγαθαὶ καὶ κακαί; ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν λέγε, πότερον φῆς
 εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἢ εἶναι τι τῶν ἡδέων, ὃ οὐκ
 ἔστιν ἀγαθόν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἵνα δὴ μοι μὴ ἀνομολογούμενος ἦ ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν
 30 ἕτερον φήσω εἶναι, τὸ αὐτὸ φημι εἶναι.

ΣΔ. Διαφθείρεις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τοὺς πρώτους λόγους,
 καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μετ' ἐμοῦ ἱκανῶς τὰ ὄντα ἐξετάζεις, εἴπερ
 παρὰ τὰ δοκούντα σταντῶ ἐρεῖς.

ΚΑΛ. Καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

35 ΣΔ. Οὐ τοῖνυν ὀρθῶς ποιῶ οὐτ' ἐγώ, εἴπερ ποιῶ τοῦτο,
 οὐτε σύ. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, ἄθρει, μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ἦ τὸ ἀγαθόν,
 τὸ πάντως χαίρειν· ταυτά τε γὰρ τὰ νυνδὴ αἰνιχθέντα
 πολλὰ καὶ αἰσχροῖα φαίνεται συμβαίνοντα, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως
 ἔχει, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ.

494 24. ἀνέδην: without limitation, from
 e the same root as ἀνίημι. — οὕτω: see
 on 468 c ἀπλῶς οὕτως.

495 26. ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν: the last at-
 a tempt to come to an understanding.
Cf. Crito 44 b. The answer of Calli-
 cles tends to bring into the foreground
 the question of the identity or oppo-
 sition of the agreeable and the good.

29. ἀνομολογούμενος: is not to be
 connected with ἀνομολογεῖσθαι, "to re-
 peat an admission already made and
 to come to an agreement," but is from
 ὁμολογούμενος in composition with a-
 privative. By this expression Calli-
 cles makes plain the recklessness of
 his thinking and the obstinacy of his
 disposition. The sentence is con-
 densed by the omission of a self-
 evident clause: "in order that I may
 not make my statement inconsistent,
 (which I will do) if I say," etc.

31. διαφθείρεις τοὺς πρώτους λό- 495
 γους: cf. *Prot.* 360 a διαφθερούμεν τὰς a
 ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογίας. Callicles' words
 in 491 e and elsewhere gave reason
 to expect that he would speak his
 sentiments roundly without any hesi-
 tation. *Cf.* 492 d.

32. ἱκανῶς . . . ἐξετάζεις: has refer-
 ence to 487 e ἐάν τι σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις
 ὁμολογήσῃς μοι, βεβασανισμένον τοῦτ'
 ἡδὴ ἔσται ἱκανῶς. — εἴπερ . . . ἐρεῖς:
 "if you will persist in speaking," with
 a decidedly unfavorable color.

33. σταντῶ: rather stronger than σόλ.

34. καὶ γὰρ σύ: complete the sen- b
 tence from what precedes.

36. ἄθρει: like σκοπεῖν and similar
 verbs has the construction of verbs
 of fear.

37. αἰνιχθέντα: denotes the conse-
 quences previously intimated, though
 not definitely stated, by Socrates.

- 40 ΚΑΛ. Ὡς σύ γε οἶει, ὦ Σώκρατες.
 (Σα. Σὺ δὲ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ταῦτα ἰσχυρίζεαι;
 ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε.
 Λ. Σα. Ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἄρα τῷ λόγῳ ὡς σοῦ σπουδά- c
 ζοντος;
 ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα.
 Σα. Ἴθι δὴ μοι, ἐπειδὴ οὕτω δοκεῖ, διελοῦ τάδε· ἐπι-
 5 στήμην που καλεῖς τι;
 ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε.
 Σα. Οὐ καὶ ἀνδρείαν νυνδὴ ἔλεγές τινα εἶναι μετὰ ἐπι-
 στήμης;
 ΚΑΛ. Ἐλεγον γάρ.
 10 Σα. Ἄλλο τι οὖν ὥς ἕτερον τὴν ἀνδρείαν τῆς ἐπιστήμης
 δύο ταῦτα ἔλεγες;
 ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε.
 Σα. Τί δέ; ἡδονὴν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον;
 ΚΑΛ. Ἐτερον δήπου, ὦ σοφώτατε σύ. d
 15 Σα. Ἡ καὶ ἀνδρείαν ἐτέραν ἡδονῆς;
 ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
 Σα. Φέρε δὴ ὅπως μεμνησόμεθα ταῦτα, ὅτι Καλλικλῆς
- 495 40. ὥς σύ γε οἶει: evasive, as 473
 b. The following question inquires
 whether Callicles still holds to his
 previous statement, while accepting
 the consequences of it.
 c. L. 1. ἐπιχειρῶμεν: see on 492 d
 ἐπεξέρχει. Notice the determination
 and assurance of the answers of Cal-
 licles.
 4. διελοῦ: because it is a question
 of distinction between ideas.
 7. νυνδὴ ἔλεγες: inasmuch as Cal-
 licles had in 491 a, b classed together
 ἀνδρεῖοι and φρόνιμοι.
 10. ὥς ἕτερον (sc. δ): the omis-
 sion of the partic. in the acc. abs.
- with an adj. and ὥς is very rare; e.g. 495
 Prot. 323 b ὥς ἀναγκαῖον οὐδένα δυναι' c
 οὐχὶ ἀμωσγέπως μετέχειν αὐτῆς. But
 Heindorf supplies ὅν.
 14. ὦ σοφώτατε σύ: a humorously d
 ironical intimation that Socrates was
 asking something quite self-evident.
 But Callicles should not recognize an
 ἐπιστήμη and an ἀνδρεία, in addition to
 "the good," if this is to find its real-
 ization in ἡδονή. The argument
 which begins 497 d is based upon
 this contradiction.
 17. ὅπως μεμνησόμεθα: this use of
 ὅπως with the fut. is distinctively a
 colloquialism, the majority of exam-

ἔφη Ἀχαρνεὺς ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ταῦτόν εἶναι, ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕτερον.

20 ΚΑΛ. Σωκράτης δέ γε ἡμῖν ὁ Ἀλωπεκῆθεν οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ ταῦτα; ἢ ὁμολογεῖ;

ΣΑ. Οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ· οἶμαι δέ γε οὐδὲ Καλλικλῆς, ὅταν αὐτὸς αὐτὸν θεάσῃται ὀρθῶς. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, τοὺς εὖ πράττοντας τοῖς κακῶς πράττουσιν οὐ τούναντίον ἡγεῖ
25 πάθος πεπονθέναι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΑ. Ἀρ' οὖν, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστὶν ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις, ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν ὥσπερ περὶ ὑγιείας ἔχει καὶ νόσου; οὐ γὰρ ἅμα δῆπου ὑγιαίνει τε καὶ νοσεῖ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ ἅμα ἀπαλλάττεται ὑγιείας τε καὶ νόσου.

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΑ. Οἷον περὶ ὅτου βούλει τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαβὼν σκόπει. νοσεῖ πον ἄνθρωπος ὀφθαλμούς, ᾧ ὄνομα ὀφθαλμία;
496

495 d ples being found in Aristophanes. For statistics, see GMT. 274.

17 f. Καλλικλῆς ἔφη Ἀχαρνεὺς: a humorous imitation of the custom which prevailed in the public assembly, according to which any one who introduced a motion or resolution had to add to his own name the name of the deme to which he belonged; cf. the famous line which used to afford Philip of Macedon so much amusement, Δημοσθένης Δημοσθένους Παιανιεὺς τὰδ' εἶπεν. Callicles falls in with the humor immediately. Ἀχαρνεὶς belonged to the φυλὴ Οἰνιῆς, Ἀλωπεκῆ to the φυλὴ Ἀντιοχίς.

19. τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ: does not properly belong in this summing up (ὅπως μεμνησόμεθα) of the foregoing steps, which define expressly the fact that

ἐπιστήμη and ἀνδρεία on the one hand 496 are quite distinct from ἡδονή (τὸ ἡδύ) on the other. Still, by reason of the identity of ἡδύ and ἀγαθόν maintained by Callicles, the ἀγαθόν would be very easily substituted for the ἡδύ.

23. αὐτὸς αὐτόν: "himself," i.e. his own mind.

27. ἐναντία: i.e. logically contrary and contradictory ideas, between which a mean is not to be thought of.

32. ἀπολαβῶν: used absolutely equiv. to "separately." Cf. Rep. iii. 392 e ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ ἀδύνατοι λέγειν, οὐ κατὰ ὄλον, ἀλλ' ἀπολαβῶν μέρος τι πειράσομαι σοι ἐν τούτῳ δηλῶσαι. The gen. τοῦ σώματος depends on περὶ ὅτου (μέρους) βούλει.

33. ἄνθρωπος: the same as ὁ ἄνθρωπος 496 a
πος above.

35 ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Οὐ δὴπον καὶ ὑγιαίνει γε ἅμα τοὺς αὐτούς;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ὅταν τῆς ὀφθαλμίας ἀπαλλάττηται, ἄρα
τότε καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ἀπαλλάττεται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ
40 τελευτῶν ἅμα ἀμφοτέρων ἀπήλλακται;

ΚΑΛ. Ἥκιστα γε.

ΣΩ. Θαυμάσιον γάρ, οἶμαι, καὶ ἄλλοτε γίγνεται· ἢ
γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε.

45 ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐν μέρει, οἶμαι, ἐκάτερον καὶ λαμβάνει καὶ
ἀπολλύει;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰσχὺν καὶ ἀσθένειαν ὡσαύτως;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

50 ΣΩ. Καὶ τάχος καὶ βραδυτήτα;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ τάγαθὰ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τάναντία
τούτων, κακὰ τε καὶ ἀθλιότητα, ἐν μέρει λαμβάνει καὶ ἐν
μέρει ἀπαλλάττεται ἐκατέρου;

55 ΚΑΛ. Πάντως δῆπον.

ΣΩ. Ἐὰν εὖρωμεν ἄρα ἅττα, ὧν ἅμα τε ἀπαλλάττεται ^c
ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἅμα ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτά γε οὐκ ἂν εἴη τό
τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν. ὁμολογοῦμεν ταῦτα; καὶ εὖ
μᾶλα σκεψάμενος ἀποκρίνου.

496 37. οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν: by the addi-
^a tion of οὐν, the relative seems to ac-
quire the force of an indefinite. See
Kr. 51, 15, 3; H. 285, 1002 a.

42. θαυμάσιον . . . γίγνεται: "the
result (γίγνεται) so stated is unrea-
sonable." Note that the Greek uses
the ind. of the necessary conclusion,

whereas Eng. would prefer the ideal ⁴⁹⁶
'would be.' ^a

58 f. καὶ εὖ μᾶλα κτέ.: with this ^c
formula Socrates warns Callicles of
the importance of being careful in
his response, — a warning which the
latter ignores in the reckless assur-
ance of his answer.

60 ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' ὑπερφυῶς ὡς ὁμολογῶ.

LI. ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἐμπροσθεν ὁμολογημένα. τὸ πεινῆν ἔλεγες πότερον ἡδὺ ἢ ἀνιαρόν ἐῖναι; αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ πεινῆν.

ΚΑΛ. Ἀνιαρόν ἔγωγε· τὸ μέντοι πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ἡδύ.

5 ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐγὼ· μανθάνω· ἀλλ' οὖν τό γε πεινῆν αὐτὸ α ἀνιαρόν. ἢ οὐχί;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ διψῆν;

ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε.

1 | 20 ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ἔτι πλείω ἐρωτῶ, ἢ ὁμολογεῖς ἅπασαν ἔνδειαν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνιαρόν ἐῖναι;

ΚΑΛ. Ὅμολογῶ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν· διψῶντα δὲ δὴ πίνειν ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡδὺ φῆς εἶναι;

15 ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

| ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτου οὐ λέγεις τὸ μὲν διψῶντα λυπούμενον δῆπου ἐστίν;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ πίνειν πλήρωσίς τε τῆς ἐνδείας καὶ ἡδονή;

496 LI. 1 f. τὸ πεινῆν ἔλεγες πότερον:
c the question, by coming late in the sentence, gains in animation. Cf. Rid. §§ 309, 310.

2 f. αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ πεινῆν: added by Socrates that Callicles may not think at the same time of the satisfaction of the hunger. How close that idea lay is shown by Callicles' answer, in which he tries to guard himself by adding this idea.

d 5. καὶ ἐγὼ· μανθάνω: the asyndetic union of two such expressions, one expressing assent, the other comprehension, is quite isolated and contrary

to usage. Cf. 474 c, 490 d. — ἀλλ' 496 οὖν: but in any case, frequently associated with γέ. Cf. 506 b and Apol. 27 c ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, 34 e, Prot. 327 c ἀλλ' οὖν ἀληθεῖς γ' ἂν πάντες ἦσαν ἱκανοί.

9. σφόδρα γε: see on μάλιστα in e below.

12. ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα: further questions are superfluous.

16. τούτου οὐ λέγεις κτέ.: the concrete example διψῶντα πίνειν Socrates uses to distinguish and characterize the two ideas clearly. The generaliz-

20 ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαίρειν λέγεις;

ΚΑΛ. Μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. Διψῶντά γε;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

25 ΣΩ. Λυπούμενον;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Αἰσθάνει οὖν τὸ συμβαῖνον, ὅτι λυπούμενον χαίρειν λέγεις ἅμα, ὅταν διψῶντα πίνειν λέγῃς; ἢ οὐχ ἅμα τοῦτο γίγνεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον καὶ χρόνον εἴτε ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος βούλει; οὐδὲν γάρ, οἶμαι, διαφέρει. ἔστι ταῦτα ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εὖ γε πράττοντα κακῶς πράττειν ἅμα ἀδύνατον φῆς εἶναι.

35 ΚΑΛ. Φημί γάρ.

ΣΩ. Ἀνιῶμενον δέ γε χαίρειν δυνατὸν ὁμολόγηκας. 497

ΚΑΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εὖ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνιάσθαι κακῶς, ὥστε ἕτερον γίγνεται τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

40 ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα σοφίζει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

496 ation that pain and pleasure can both be present in the same act follows later.

22. *μάλιστα*: like *σφόδρα γε* in d above, gives emphatic assent. *μάλιστα* has become the general word for "yes" in modern Greek, almost to the exclusion of *ναί*.

29 f. *εἴτε ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος*: for Socrates' argument it is immaterial whether pleasure and pain are looked upon as something bodily or something psychical; for psychology, not so. But here the question is only

of the nature of the ideas themselves, the peculiarity of their association at the same place and time, which distinguishes them from that other class of mutually exclusive ideas.

34. *φῆς*: with reference to 495 e. The answer of Callicles shows that he still maintains his statement.

40. *οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα σοφίζει*: Callicles avoids admitting his defeat by complaining of Socrates' methods. Cf. 511 a. *σοφίζεσθαι* is much the same as "subtilize," "quibble."

113 Σα. Οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ ἀκκίζει, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· καὶ πρόθι γε
 ἔτι εἰς τὸ ἐμπροσθεν —

ΚΑΛ. Τί ἔχων ληρεῖς;

Σα. Ἵνα εἰδῆς, ὡς σοφὸς ὢν με νουθετεῖς. οὐχ ἅμα
 45 διψῶν τε ἕκαστος ἡμῶν πέπαιται καὶ ἅμα ἡδόμενος διὰ τὸ
 τοῦ πίνειν;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδα ὅτι λέγεις.

ΓΟΡ. Μηδαμῶς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου καὶ ἡμῶν
 ἕνεκα, ἵνα περανθῶσιν οἱ λόγοι.

50 ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' αἰεὶ τοιοῦτός ἐστι Σωκράτης, ὦ Γοργία.
 σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγου ἄξια ἀνερωτᾷ καὶ ἐξελέγχει.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ τί σοὶ διαφέρει; πάντως οὐ σὴ αὕτη ἡ
 1 τιμή, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· ἀλλ' ὑπόσχες Σωκράτει ἐξελέγξαι
 ὅπως ἂν βούληται.

55 ΚΑΛ. Ἐρώτα δὴ σὺ τὰ σμικρὰ τε καὶ στενὰ ταῦτα, ο
 ἐπείπερ Γοργία δοκεῖ οὕτως.

497 41. ἀκκίζεισθαι: 'this word and its
 a derivative ἀκκισμός are used to de-
 note any kind of mock modesty or
 prudery, especially, though not ex-
 clusively, on the part of women.'
 Thompson. To Socrates' words of
 encouragement Callicles angrily re-
 plies, "What nonsense are you still
 talking?" whereby, however, Socra-
 tes is not deterred from continuing
 his talk in the courtly manner which
 is characteristic of him. On the
 phrase ἔχων ληρεῖς see on 490 e.

b 47. οὐκ οἶδα ὅτι λέγεις: Callicles
 sees that from this new turn Socrates
 will draw the same conclusion which
 he has drawn above (ἕτερον γίγνεται
 τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ). Hence he repeat-
 edly refuses to answer, and so shows
 plainly that he wishes to break off
 the conversation. This leads to the
 deprecatory remark of Gorgias.

48. μηδαμῶς: don't! To be com- 497
 pleted by some such general phrase b
 as οὕτω ποιήσης. The omission of the
 verb is common. Cf. Symp. 175 b
 μηδαμῶς, ἀλλ' εἰπτε αὐτόν.— That Gor-
 gias here enters as mediator is quite
 in keeping with the role assigned him
 in this dialogue, in accordance with
 which he is distinguished from his
 companions by his personal dignity.
 See Introd. § 13.

53. τιμή: in a judicial sense, "the
 penalty decreed by the court." Hence
 the words οὐ σὴ κτέ. are equivalent
 to "this is no fault of yours," "the
 blame cannot be laid upon you."—
 ὑπόσχες: equiv. to ὑπ' σεαυτόν. See
 on παρασχεῖν 456 b and 475 d.

55. Callicles allows himself to be c
 persuaded by Gorgias to continue
 the conversation, but not without re-
 peated expression of his disinclina-

LII. Σο. Εὐδαίμων εἰ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὅτι τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι πρὶν τὰ σμικρά· ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ ᾧμην θεμιτὸν εἶναι. ὅθεν οὖν ἀπέλιπες, ἀποκρίνου, εἰ οὐχ ἅμα παύεται διψῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν καὶ ἡδόμενος.

5 ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

Σο. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πεινῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν ἅμα παύεται;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Σο. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν λυπῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἅμα
10 παύεται; d

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

11 Σο. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν οὐχ ἅμα παύεται, ὥς σὺ ὠμολόγεις· νῦν δὲ οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε· τί οὖν δῆ;

15 Σο. Ὅτι οὐ ταῦτ' ἀγίνεται, ὦ φίλε, τὰ γὰρ τοῖς ἡδέσων οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ τοῖς ἀνιαιροῖς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅμα παύεται,

⁴⁹⁷ tion. — στανά: mean, paltry, is in
c keeping with the view expressed by Callicles in 486 d of the relative provinces of philosophy and politics.

LII. 1 f. τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι κτέ.: two kinds of Eleusinian mysteries were distinguished, the greater and the lesser. In the great procession which on the 20th of Boedromion (September) conducted Iacchus to Eleusis, no one could take part who had not received previously at Athens the less and preparatory consecration (μύησις, καθάρσις, προτέλεια) in the month Anthesterion (February). By this he became eligible to initiation into the Greater Mysteries; and after initiation, as an initiated member (μύστης), to the ἐποπτεία or view of the mysterious sacred relics and participation in the holy rites which were

connected with the arrival of the pro-⁴⁹⁷ c
cession at Eleusis and took place in the so-called τελεστήριον.—Socrates meets with most cutting irony the disdainful contempt with which Callicles regards dialectical methods. A different simile for the same matter is found in 514 e.

3. ὅθεν ἀπέλιπες: the interrupted argument is resumed again by Socrates at the point where it had been broken off by Callicles' refusal to answer.

7. ἡδονῶν: corresponding with what precedes we might expect ἡδόμενος. The noun is used owing to ἐπιθυμιῶν, which stands on the same plane as πεινῶν and as a kind of ἐνδεια (496 d) is an ἀνιαιρόν. Hence the employment of λυπῶν below.

14. τί οὖν δῆ: well! what then? d
See on 453 b and 515 e.

τῶν δὲ οὗ, ὡς ἐτέρων ὄντων. πῶς οὖν ταῦτα ἂν εἴη τὰ
 ἡδέα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τὰ ἀνιάρὰ τοῖς κακοῖς; ἐὰν δὲ βούλη,
 καὶ τῇδ' ἐπίσκειναι· οἶμαι γάρ σοι οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ὁμολογεῖ-
 20 σθαι. ἄθρει δέ· τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἀγαθῶν παρουσία
 ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς, ὥσπερ τοὺς καλοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῇ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγῶ γε.

ΣΟ. Τί δέ; ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας καλεῖς ἄφρονας καὶ δει-
 λούς; οὐ γὰρ ἄρτι γε, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους καὶ φρονίμους
 25 ἔλεγες· ἢ οὐ τούτους ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΟ. Τί δέ; παῖδα ἀνόητον χαίροντα ἤδη εἶδες;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγῶ γε.

ΣΟ. Ἄνδρα δὲ οὐπω εἶδες ἀνόητον χαίροντα;

30 ΚΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο;

ΣΟ. Οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου.

ΚΑΛ. Εἶδον.

497 d 17. ὡς ἐτέρων ὄντων: this seems otiose after the preceding sentence. If genuine, it must be considered as mere conversational fullness.

19. τῇδε: refers naturally, according to the regular usage, to the argument begun in τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς κτέ. The introduction of this argument is, however, delayed by the parenthetical clause οἶμαι . . . ἄθρει δέ. In this clause ταύτῃ, though in sense also applicable to the argument which follows, is in form to be connected with τῇδε. The subject of ὁμολογεῖσθαι is general, and can be supplied from the clause πῶς οὖν κτέ.

e 20 f. τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς, τοὺς κακοὺς: the art. as in 490 e collects the individuals into a class or species. ἀγαθῶν is used on account of its nearness to ἀγαθοὺς, otherwise we should expect ἀρετῶν as in 506 d. The way in which

we arrive at these ideas of distinction 497 between species is shown by the same expressions which are employed in other places to explain the relation of the ideas to the things themselves. So besides παρουσία (παρεῖναι) we find κοινωνία and of things also μετέχειν employed.

23 f. ἄφρονας καὶ δειλούς: "un-reasoning and cowardly creatures." The absence of the art. does not cause obscurity, because the connexion shows ἀγαθοὺς to be the predicate. In the words ἀνδρείους κτέ. Socrates is referring to 489 e and 491 b.

30. τί τοῦτο: see on 448 b above.

32. εἶδον: the tense is due to the preceding question. English would require 'I have seen.' This would be permissible also in Greek. The aor. of verbs of perception states the fact; the pf. retains the image. The

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; νοῦν ἔχοντα λυπούμενον καὶ χαίροντα; 498

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

35 ΣΩ. Πότεροι δὲ μᾶλλον χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται, οἱ φρόνιμοι ἢ οἱ ἄφρονες;

ΚΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε οὐ πολὺ τι διαφέρειν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἀρκεῖ καὶ τοῦτο. ἐν πολέμῳ δὲ ἤδη εἶδες ἄνδρα δειλόν;

40 ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἀπιόντων τῶν πολεμίων πότεροί σοι ἐδόκουν μᾶλλον χαίρειν, οἱ δειλοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀμφοτέροι ἐμοιγε μᾶλλον· εἰ δὲ μή, παραπλησίως γε.

45 ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν διαφέρει. χαίρουσιν δ' οὖν καὶ οἱ δειλοί;

ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες, ὥς ἔοικεν.

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Προσιόντων δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ μόνον λυποῦνται ἢ καὶ οἱ 50 ἀνδρεῖοι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀμφοτέροι.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα ὁμοίως;

ΚΑΛ. Μᾶλλον ἴσως οἱ δειλοί.

ΣΩ. Ἀπιόντων δ' οὐ μᾶλλον χαίρουσιν;

⁴⁹⁷ negation of the fact involves the negation of the image; hence the neg. is usually followed by the aorist. The pf. with the neg. is, however, also found; cf. *Prot.* 310 e. But the difference in the force is evident. In 38, below, the tense may be due to the desire for consistency, or to ἤδη.

⁴⁹⁸ 38. ἀρκεῖ καὶ τοῦτο: gives us to understand that Socrates was expecting a more definite answer.

^b 43. ἀμφοτέροι μᾶλλον: Callicles

tries to return such answers as will not afford Socrates any chance for argument. Such action borders on rudeness, and is almost equivalent to a refusal to answer. The addition that he makes, however, gives Socrates a hold. The answers which follow show that Callicles is not stating his real sentiments. The artistic design of the author is therefore now to make his defeat seem all the more decisive.

55 ΚΑΛ. ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λυποῦνται μὲν καὶ χαίρουσιν καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι παραπλησίως, ὡς σὺ φῆς, μᾶλλον δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ τῶν ἀνδρείων;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

60 ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἷ γε φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἀγαθοί, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄφρονες κακοί;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Παραπλησίως ἄρα χαίρουσιν καὶ λυποῦνται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί;

65 ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν παραπλησίως εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τε καὶ οἱ κακοί; ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ [οἱ ἀγαθοὶ] καὶ κακοὶ εἰσιν οἱ κακοί;

LIII. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτι λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀγαθῶν φῆς παρουσίᾳ εἶναι ἀγαθοὺς, κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν; τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τὰς ἡδονάς, κακὰ δὲ τὰς ἀνίας;

498 66. ἀρ' οὖν κτέ.: this conclusion comes from the fact that Socrates, on the basis of the view set forth by Callicles in 491 e ff., uses in the predicate ἀγαθοί in place of χαίρουσι, and κακοί in place of λυποῦνται, whereas these same words in the subject have an entirely different meaning, which is to be seen from the explanation of Callicles in 491 c d. The two predicates are to be conceived as belonging to two different sentences, thus: οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τε καὶ οἱ κακοὶ παραπλησίως εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ and οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τε καὶ οἱ κακοὶ παραπλησίως εἰσὶ κακοί.

d LIII. 1. ἀλλὰ λέγεις: this statement of Callicles may be meant in earnest, inasmuch as the previous words of Socrates are really some-

what confusing, although they are simply a paradoxical conclusion from Callicles' paradoxical propositions. But by confessing his inability to comprehend, Callicles gives Socrates the opportunity of supplying a proof of his previous exposition, and setting forth the principles upon which it rests. The distinction made in 497 e now becomes of value.

3. κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν: both the subj. as well as the subst. on which the gen. depends are to be supplied from the context. Note the chiasmus of the arrangement. — τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ κτέ.: the preds. are τὰς ἡδονάς, τὰς ἀνίας, the art. defining a class. The art. with ἀγαθὰ refers back to ἀγαθῶν. We should also expect one with κακὰ.

5 ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῖς χαίρουσιν πάρεστιν ἀγαθά, αἱ ἡδοναί,
εἴπερ χαίρουσιν;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθῶν παρόντων ἀγαθοὶ εἰσιν οἱ χαίροντες;

10 ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τοῖς ἀνιωμένοις οὐ πάρεστιν τὰ κακά, αἱ
λύπαι;

ΚΑΛ. Πάρεστιν.

ΣΩ. Κακῶν δέ γε παρουσία φῆς σὺ εἶναι κακοὺς τοὺς
15 κακοὺς· ἡ οὐκέτι φῆς;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀγαθοὶ ἄρα οἱ ἂν χαίρωσι, κακοὶ δὲ οἱ ἂν ἀνιών-
ται;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

20 ΣΩ. Οἱ μὲν γε μᾶλλον μᾶλλον, οἱ δ' ἦττον ἦττον, οἱ δὲ
παραπλησίως παραπλησίως;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φῆς παραπλησίως χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι
τοὺς φρονίμους καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας καὶ τοὺς δειλοὺς καὶ
25 τοὺς ἀνδρείους, ἡ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι τοὺς δειλοὺς;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Συλλόγισαι δὴ κοινῇ μετ' ἐμοῦ, τί ἡμῖν συμβαίνει
ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων· καὶ δις γάρ τοι καὶ τρίς φασιν
καλὸν εἶναι τὰ καλὰ λέγειν τε καὶ ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι. ἀγαθὸν
30 μὲν εἶναι τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν φαμεν. ἡ γάρ;

⁴⁹⁸ 20. οἱ μὲν γε μᾶλλον κτέ.: is to be
completed from the context thus:
οἱ μὲν (ἂν) μᾶλλον (χαίρωσι) μᾶλλον
(ἀγαθοὶ) κτέ.

28. δις γὰρ καὶ τρίς: this proverb
is ascribed to Empedocles. Plato
employs it also in *Phil.* 59 e, where we

read: τὸ δις καὶ τρίς τό γε καλῶς ἔχον
ἐπαναπολεῖν τῷ λόγῳ. Cf. *Soph. Phil.*
1238 δις ταῦτ' αὖτ' αὖτ' ἀναπολεῖν
μ' ἔπη. The first καὶ means also, and its
force extends over both members, as
Phaedo 63 e ἐνίοτε ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ δις
καὶ τρίς πίνειν τοὺς τι τοιοῦτον ποιοῦντας.

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἄφρονα καὶ δειλόν;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὸν δὲ αὖ τὸν χαίροντα;

35 ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἀνιώμενον;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ἀνιᾶσθαι δὲ καὶ χαίρειν τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν
ὁμοίως, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον τὸν κακόν;

40 ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁμοίως γίγνεται κακὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τῷ
ἀγαθῷ ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸς ὁ κακός; οὐ ταῦτα συμβαί-
νει καὶ τὰ πρότερα ἐκείνα, ἐάν τις ταῦτα φῇ ἡδέα τε καὶ
ἀγαθὰ εἶναι; οὐ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις;

LIV. ΚΑΛ. Πάλαι τοί σου ἀκροῶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες,
καθομολογῶν, ἐνθυμούμενος ὅτι, κἂν παίζων τίς σοι ἐνδῶ
ὀτιοῦν, τούτου ἄσμενος ἔχει ὥσπερ τὰ μειράκια. ὥς δὴ
σὺ οἶε ἐμὲ ἢ καὶ ἄλλον ὄντινόν ἀνθρώπων οὐχ ἡγείσθαι
5 τὰς μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ χείρους.

⁴⁹⁹ 43. τὰ πρότερα ἐκείνα: refer proba-
^b bly to the discussion of 494 a-495 a, where Socrates had urged Callicles to reflect whether he was determined to abide by his statement that ἡδὴ and ἀγαθόν are the same.

LIV. 1. πάλαι τοι κτέ.: like all who try only to gain their point, not to arrive at the truth, Callicles seeks to evade the now inevitable confession of his error by representing his previous statement as a mere joke. But cf. 495 a-c.

3. τούτου: ἔχουσθαι, to hold fast, takes the gen. See G. 171, 1; H. 738. — ὥσπερ τὰ μειράκια: boys easily receive as genuine what one tries to im-

pose upon them. Farther than this, ⁴⁹⁹ the comparison is not to be pressed. ^b

— ὥς δὴ σὺ οἶα: see on 468 e. Callicles tries to heighten the probability that he was only joking, by himself characterizing his first statement as nonsensical.

5. ἡδονάς: the natural position would be τὰς μὲν ἡδονὰς βελτίους κτέ. The reason for the post-position is that the word is an afterthought of Callicles, added from the sudden consciousness that τὰς μὲν was not sufficiently definite. Just as if you suppose that I, etc., do not believe that some are better, — pleasures, I mean, — others worse.

114 Σο. Ἰοῦ ἰοῦ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς πανούργος εἶ, καὶ μοι ^c
 ὥσπερ παιδί χρῆ, τοτὲ μὲν αὖ φάσκων οὕτως ἔχειν, τοτὲ
 δὲ ἐτέρως, ἐξαπατῶν με. καίτοι οὐκ ᾤμην γε κατ' ἀρχὰς
 ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐκόντος εἶναι ἐξαπατηθήσεσθαι, ὡς ὄντος φίλου.
 10 νῦν δὲ ἐψεύσθην, καὶ ὡς ἔοικεν ἀνάγκη μοι κατὰ τὸν
 παλαιὸν λόγον τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦτο δέχεσθαι τὸ
 διδόμενον παρὰ σοῦ. ἔστιν δὲ δῆ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ νῦν λέγεις,
 ὅτι ἡδοναὶ τινὲς εἰσιν αἱ μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ κακαί· ἥ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

15 Σο. Ἄρ' οὖν ἀγαθαὶ μὲν αἱ ὠφέλιμοι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ ^a
 βλαβεραί;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνν γε.

Σο. Ὡφέλιμοι δέ γε αἱ ἀγαθὸν τι ποιῶσαι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ
 κακόν τι;

499 6. ἰοῦ ἰοῦ: exclamation of sur-
^cprise and wonder, usually with a side-
 idea of ill-treatment (σχετλιαστικὸν
 ἐπίρρημα), as *Ar. Nub.* 1 ἰοῦ ἰοῦ, ὦ
 Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ, τὸ χρῆμα τῶν νυκτῶν ὅσον
 ἀπέραντον, but it also expresses pleas-
 ure, as e.g. *Rep.* iv. 432 d καὶ ἐγὼ κατι-
 δὼν, Ἰοῦ ἰοῦ, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαῦκων· κινδυ-
 νεύομεν τι ἔχειν ἵχνος (trace) καὶ μοι
 δοκεῖ οὐ πᾶν τι ἐκφευγεῖσθαι ἡμᾶς. Εἰ
 ἀγγέλλεις, ἥ δ' ὅς.—πανούργος: some-
 times associated with δεινός, denotes
 a rather excessive adroitness, border-
 ing on rascality, as “artful,” “sly”;
 also “knavish.”

7. ὥσπερ παιδί: by a delicate use
 of his own comparison, Socrates char-
 acterizes Callicles' conduct in acting
 as if he were dealing with boys, not
 men, as improper and unworthy.—
 τότε μὲν αὖ: it must be confessed
 that αὖ in this position gives trouble.
 Cron thinks that it recalls a similar
 allegation in 491 b; but that is rather
 far-fetched.

8. καίτοι κτέ.: in 495 a Socrates' 499
 faith in Callicles' *παρρησία* is shaken; ^c
 in 497 a, that in his *σοφία*, and now,
 that in his *εὐνοία*.

9. ἐκόντος εἶναι: on the use of *εἶναι*
 in phrases, see GMT. 780 and H. 956 a.

10 f. κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον: a
 common way of introducing a prov-
 erb; cf. *Symp.* 195 b.

11. τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν κτέ.: a mix-
 ture of two proverbs. The first one
 means literally, to “treat well what
 is at hand,” i.e. ‘to make the best of
 what one has,’ according to the Eng-
 lish saying. In almost the same
 sense we use the more colloquial
 ‘grin and bear it.’ The second prov-
 erb, δέχεσθαι τὸ διδόμενον, applies
 more exactly to the case in point, the
 διδόμενον being naturally τὸ λεγόμενον.
 An English proverb which has much
 the same force is, ‘do not look a gift-
 horse in the mouth.’ After τοῦτο, τὸ
 διδόμενον serves for a relative clause.

18. κακαί: we should naturally ex- ^d

20 ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν τὰς τοιαύσδε λέγεις, οἷον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἅς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν ἐν τῷ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἡδονάς; ἄρα τούτων αἱ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιοῦσαι ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ ἰσχὺν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ ἀρετὴν τοῦ σώματος, αὗται μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ 25 τάναντία τούτων κακαί;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ λῦπαι ὡσαύτως αἱ μὲν χρησταί εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ πονηραί;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

30 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ αἰρετέον ἐστὶν καὶ πρακτέον;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς οὔ;

ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δῆ.

35 ΣΩ. Ἐνεκα γάρ που τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἅπαντα ἡμῖν ἔδοξεν πρακτέον εἶναι, εἰ μνημονεύεις, ἐμοί τε καὶ Πῶλῳ. ἄρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτω, τέλος εἶναι ἀπασῶν τῶν πράξεων τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκείνου ἔνεκα δεῖν πάντα τᾶλλα πράττεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκῶ τῶν ἄλλων; σύμψηφος ἡμῖν εἴ καὶ 500

40 σὺ ἐκ τρίτων;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄρα ἔνεκα δεῖ καὶ τᾶλλα καὶ τὰ ἡδέα πράττειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων.

⁴⁹⁹ ^d pect βλαβεραί, but κακός is elsewhere also used in this sense.

24. αὗται μὲν: resumes αἱ μὲν . . . τοῦ σώματος.

^e 37 f. τέλος . . . τὸ ἀγαθόν: cf. 468 a ff. The subst. embraces in one idea what has been said, and thus gives it a form of general application.

⁵⁰⁰ ^a 39. σύμψηφος: reminds again of

the formal vote, and hence sounds somewhat solemn. Cf. 501 c and ^a 473 e f.

40. ἐκ τρίτων: "of the third part." Thompson. Cf. *Symp.* 213 b ὑπολύετε, παῖδες, Ἀλκιβιάδην, ἵνα ἐκ τρίτων (i.e. with Agathon and Socrates) κατακίνηται. In *Tim.* 54 a ἐκ τρίτου is used in much the same sense.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

- 45 ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν παντὸς ἀνδρός ἐστὶν ἐκλέξασθαι, ποῖα ἀγαθὰ—τῶν ἡδέων—ἐστὶν καὶ ὅποια κακά, ἢ τεχνικοῦ δεῖ εἰς ἕκαστον.

ΚΑΛ. Τεχνικοῦ.

- LV. ΣΩ. Ἀναμνησθῶμεν δὴ ὧν αὖ ἐγὼ πρὸς Πῶλον καὶ Γοργίαν ἐτύγχανον λέγων. ἔλεγον γάρ, εἰ μνημονεύεις, ὅτι εἶεν παρασκευαὶ αἱ μὲν μέχρι ἡδονῆς, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μόνον παρασκευάζουσai, ἀγνοοῦσαι δὲ τὸ βέλτιον
5 καὶ τὸ χεῖρον, αἱ δὲ γινώσκουσai ὅτι τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅτι κακόν. καὶ ἐτίθην τῶν μὲν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὴν μαγειρικὴν ἐμπειρίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τέχνην, τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἰατρικὴν τέχνην. καὶ πρὸς φιλίου, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, μήτε αὐτὸς οἴου δεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ παίζειν μῆδ' ὅτι ἂν τύχης

500 45. παντὸς ἀνδρός: possessive gen.
a in pred. See H. 732 a, c.

45 f. ποῖα . . . τῶν ἡδέων: the position of the gen. shows that it is an example of ἐπιφορά, based on the conclusion drawn in 499 b. The use of ὅποια after ποῖα may be due to euphonic reasons, or to its distance from the beginning of the question.

46. τεχνικοῦ: i.e. of a man who understands the matter thoroughly, who is a master of his profession (whether art or science). Only this man can decide what is to be done and what not. The same point is made in *Crito* 47 a.

LV. 1. ὧν αὖ: the αὖ belongs to the dem. included in the relative. The arguments which Socrates again calls to mind were set forth in 404 b ff.

b 3. παρασκευαί: contrivances. This word, which is not found in the passage referred to, is used generally instead of ἐπιτηδεύσεις, θεραπεῖαι, as

drawing more attention to the end in view (μέχρι ἡδονῆς). The prep. shows that the contrivances are not claimed to reach ἡδονή, but must be varied and directed until the object is compassed; hence παρασκευάζουσai is conative.—αὐτὸ τοῦτο: i.e. the general idea, ἡδονή.

6 f. τῶν μὲν, τῶν δέ: take up αἱ μὲν, αἱ δέ. On the part. gen. with τιθέ-ναι, see G. 169, 2; H. 732 a.

8. πρὸς φίλον: so 519 e. Cf. *Phaedr.* 234 e εἰπὲ πρὸς Διὸς φίλου. This adjuration is designed to remind Callicles of his ostentatious profession of εὐνοία, which he had so quickly forgotten.

9. μήτε αὐτός: finds its correlative in μῆτ' αὐτὸ τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ, while μῆδὲ serves only to connect the two sections of the first member.—ὅτι ἂν τύχης κτέ.: implies perverseness in addition to chance. Cf. 495 a, b, and 499 c.

- 10 παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀποκρίνου, μήτ' αὖ τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ οὕτως
ἀποδέχου ὡς παίζοντος· ὁρᾷς γάρ, ὅτι περὶ τούτου ἡμῖν ^c
εἰσιν οἱ λόγοι, οὗ τί ἂν μᾶλλον σπουδάσειέ τις καὶ σμι-
κρὸν νοῦν ἔχων ἄνθρωπος, ἢ τοῦτο, ὅντινα χρή τρόπον
ζῆν, πότερον ἐπὶ ὃν σὺ παρακαλεῖς ἐμέ, τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ
15 ταῦτα πράττοντα, λέγοντά τε ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ ῥητορικὴν
ἀσκοῦντα καὶ πολιτευόμενον τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὃν ὑμεῖς
νῦν πολιτεύεσθε, ἢ ἐπὶ τόνδε τὸν βίον τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ,
καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν οὗτος ἐκείνου διαφέρων. ἴσως οὖν βέλ-
τιστόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἐπεχείρησα, διαιρεῖσθαι, διελο- ^d
20 μένους δὲ καὶ ὁμολογήσαντας ἀλλήλοις, εἰ ἔστιν τούτῳ
διττῷ τῷ βίῳ, σκέψασθαι, τί τε διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοις καὶ
ὁπότερον βιωτέον αὐτοῖν. ἴσως οὖν οὕτω οἶσθα τί λέγω.

121 ΚΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

500 12. οὗ: depends upon μᾶλλον and ^c
is explained in ἢ τοῦτο. Cf. *Crito*
44 c τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἴη ταύτης δόξα ἢ
δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιέεισθαι
ἢ φίλους. See *Kr.* 47, 27, 8. — σπου-
δάσει: in reference to an investiga-
tion which one should seriously pro-
secute.

12 f. σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχων: indicates
that the question is important for
every one, not merely for statesmen
and philosophers.

14. τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δῆ: ironically added
as a matter already decided, because
Callicles had so defined the sphere of
the "real man."

17. ἐπὶ τόνδε: anacoluthic, as if
ἐπὶ πότερον χρή βίον παρακαλεῖν had
preceded, whereas with πότερον we
must supply τοῦτον, i.e. τὸν τρόπον ζῆν
χρή.

18. διαφέρων: on the pred. use of
the partic., see GMT. 830.

19. ὡς ἄρτι ἐπεχείρησα: we think
at first of the question raised in 491 d

ff. as to the nature of self-control, 500
which leads naturally to a distinction ^c
between what is good and what is
pleasant, but we are also reminded of
the earlier conversation with Polus
and Gorgias (464 b) in which a dis-
tinction was drawn between true arts
and various tricks of dexterity, which
are designed only to cajole.

20. εἰ ἔστιν κτέ.: to be conceived, ^d
not as an interr. clause depending
upon ὁμολογήσαντας, but as the prota-
sis of a logical conditional sentence,
the apodosis of which is formed by
βέλτιστόν ἐστιν . . . σκέψασθαι. The
further investigation as to τί διαφέ-
ρετον can only take place in case the
existence of these two views of life is
definitely settled. — ὁμολογήσαντας:
as well as διελομένους and διαιρεῖσθαι,
whose meaning is defined by its refer-
ence to 495 c, are used absolutely.

22. ὁπότερον βιωτέον: sc. βίον. Cf.
485 d and *Apol.* 38 a ὁ ἀνεξέταστος
βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ.

Σα. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ σοι σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. ἐπειδὴ ὠμολογή-
 25 καμεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ εἶναι μὲν τι ἀγαθόν, εἶναι δέ τι ἡδύ,
 ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἐκατέρου δὲ αὐτοῖν μελέτην
 τινὰ εἶναι καὶ παρασκευὴν τῆς κτήσεως, τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἡδέος
 θήραν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ — αὐτὸ δέ μοι τοῦτο πρῶτον ἢ
 σύμφαθι ἢ μή· σύμφης;

30 ΚΑΛ. Οὕτως φημί.

LVI. Σα. Ἴθι δὴ, ἂ καὶ πρὸς τοῦσδε ἐγὼ ἔλεγον,
 διομολόγησάι μοι, εἰ ἄρα σοι ἔδοξα τότε ἀληθῆ λέγειν.
 ἔλεγον δέ που, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ὀψοποιικὴ οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη
 εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία, ἡ δ' ἰατρικὴ, λέγων ὅτι ἡ μὲν τούτου 501
 5 οὐ θεραπεύει καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔσκεπται καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ὧν
 πράττει, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τούτων ἐκάστου δοῦναι, ἡ ἰατρικὴ·
 ἡ δ' ἑτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς, πρὸς ἣν ἡ θεραπεία αὐτῇ ἐστὶν

500 27. τὴν μὲν κτέ.: explains ἐκατέρου
 α κτέ. by substituting for the somewhat
 philosophical phrase (μελέτην . . .
 κτήσεως) one less technical (θήραν).
 But before Socrates proceeds further
 he deems it necessary to have these
 assumptions definitely agreed to,
 since, although they are indeed the
 result of the preceding investigations,
 Calicles has not expressly acceded
 to them.

ο LVI. 1. πρὸς τοῦσδε: the dis-
 tinctions between various ideas which
 have been drawn in ch. XVIII.-XX.
 serve for Polus as well as Gorgias,
 inasmuch as the latter entered the
 discussion again in 463 e of his own
 accord.

2. διομολόγησαι: the *διὰ* implies
 'finally,' 'definitely.' We should be
 more apt to use the *καὶ* in the demon-
 strative instead of the relative clause.
 — ἔδοξα: Cron thinks the use of the
 aor. instead of the pres. implies that
 Calicles must have already at the

time come to a decision, though he 500
 had not expressed one. But while
 such was doubtless the case, it is not
 easy to draw such a conclusion from
 the tense, for the Greeks in such an
 expression looked rather to the idea
 of the whole complex.

4. ἡ δ' ἰατρικὴ: the clause is to 501
 be completed from the first member.
 The following ἡ μὲν . . . ἡ δὲ κτέ. are
 arranged chiasmatically.

5. αἰτίαν: cf. 465 a, where the ref-
 erence was especially to the means
 employed (ὧν προσφέρει); here it is
 more general (ὧν πράττει).

6. ἡ δ' ἰατρικὴ: the addition of the
 substantive at the end of the first
 member was not necessary for clear-
 ness, but very conducive to it. Simi-
 larly *Prot.* 351 a.

7. ἡ δ' ἑτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς κτέ.: an-
 other case of anacoluthon. If the
 speaker had followed the line of
 construction begun in the previous
 clause, we should have had some

ἅπαντα, κομιδῇ ἀτέχνως ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἔρχεται, οὔτε τι τὴν φύσιν σκεψαμένη τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔτε τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀλόγως τε
 10 παντάπασιν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν διαριθμησαμένη, τριβῇ καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μνήμην μόνον σφωζομένη τοῦ εἰωθότος γίγνεσθαι, ᾧ δὴ καὶ πορίζεται τὰς ἡδονάς. ταῦτ' οὖν πρῶτον b
 σκόπει εἰ δοκεῖ σοι ἱκανῶς λέγεσθαι, καὶ εἶναί τινες καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν τοιαῦται ἄλλαι πραγματεῖαι, αἱ μὲν τεχνικαί,
 15 προμηθίαν τινὰ ἔχουσαι τοῦ βελτίστου περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, αἱ δὲ τούτου μὲν ὀλιγωροῦσαι, ἐσκεμμέναι δ' αὖ, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, τὴν ἡδονὴν μόνον τῆς ψυχῆς, τίνα ἂν αὐτῇ τρόπον γίγνοιτο, ἥτις δὲ ἡ βελτίων ἢ χειρῶν τῶν ἡδονῶν, οὔτε σκοπούμεναι οὔτε μέλον αὐταῖς ἄλλο ἢ χαρίζεσθαι μόνον,
 20 εἴτε βέλτιον εἴτε χειρόν. ἐμοὶ μὲν γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, c
 δοκοῦσίν τε εἶναι, καὶ ἔγωγέ φημι τὸ τοιοῦτον κολακείαν εἶναι καὶ περὶ σῶμα καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ ἄλλο ὅτου

501 such phrase as οὔτε τὴν φύσιν κτέ., on
 a which τῆς ἡδονῆς would depend, as in the case of τούτου above. In true conversational style, however, he is diverted from his line of thought by the relative clause, and proceeds to a detailed account of the method of the ἐμπειρία which κομιδῇ ἀτέχνως ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἔρχεται. The result is that τῆς ἡδονῆς is left without government, and that too without the speaker or hearers noticing it.

9. ἀλόγως: as 465 a δ ἂν ἢ ἄλογον πᾶγμα, because the distinctive feature of a τέχνη consists in its ability δοῦναι λόγον. This must not be conceived as closely modifying διαριθμησαμένη, but as being a general criticism on οὐδὲν διαριθμησαμένη ("quite foolishly").

10. ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν: probably belongs to the following negation. Cf. *Apol.* 17 a ἀληθές γε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν εἰρηκασιν. See on 450 b.

12. ᾧ δὴ: refers to the whole preceding clause, i.e. equiv. to τῷ σφίζεσθαι μνήμην κτέ. b

14. τοιαῦται ἄλλαι: "according to their nature similar, but different in their application." Supply δοκοῦσιν out of the preceding δοκεῖ.

15. προμηθίαν τοῦ βελτίστου: designed to be in sharp contrast with the μνήμην τοῦ εἰωθότος γίγνεσθαι above.

16 f. ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ: i.e. in the case of the body.

18. ἥτις δὲ ἡ βελτίων κτέ.: is a circumlocutory reference to φύσις, as οὔτε μέλον in the following member is to αἰτία. The abs. partic. μέλον is likewise combined with an appos. partic. in *Phaedr.* 235 a ὡς οὐ πάννυ εὐπορῶν τοῦ πολλὰ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ ἴσως οὐδὲν αὐτῷ μέλον τοῦ τοιούτου.

22. καὶ περὶ ἄλλο: indefinite and c merely preparatory.

ἄν τις τὴν ἡδονὴν θεραπείῃ, ἀσκέπτως ἔχων τοῦ ἀμείνονός
τε καὶ τοῦ χείρονος· σὺ δὲ δὴ πότερον συγκατατίθεσαι
25 ἡμῶν περὶ τούτων τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν ἢ ἀντίφης;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἀλλὰ συγχωρῶ, ἵνα σοι καὶ περανθῇ
ὁ λόγος καὶ Γοργία τῷδε χαρίσωμαι.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ περὶ μὲν μίαν ψυχὴν ἔστιν τοῦτο, περὶ α
δὲ δύο καὶ πολλὰς οὐκ ἔστιν;

30 ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ δύο καὶ περὶ πολλὰς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀθρόαις ἅμα χαρίζεσθαι ἔστι, μηδὲ
σκοπούμενον τὸ βέλτιστον;

123 ΚΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

LVII. ΣΩ. Ἐχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν, αἰτνέες εἰσιν αἱ ἐπιτηδεύ-
σεις αἱ τοῦτο ποιοῦσαι; μᾶλλον δέ, εἰ βούλει, ἐμοῦ ἐρω-
τῶντος, ἢ μὲν ἄν σοι δοκῇ τούτων εἶναι, φάθι, ἢ δ' ἄν μὴ,
μὴ φάθι. πρῶτον δὲ σκεψάμεθα τὴν αὐλητικὴν. οὐ
5 δοκεῖ σοι τοιαύτη τις εἶναι, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, τὴν ἡδονὴν
ἡμῶν μόνον διώκειν, ἄλλο δ' οὐδὲν φροντίζειν;

601 23. ἀσκέπτως ἔχων: like ἀμελῶν
c or ὀλιγωρῶν. Cf. above, b.

24. συγκατατίθεσαι: reminds again
of voting (as above, 500 a σύμψηφος).
It is regularly used without an obj.
Here we must consider δόξαν as tak-
ing the place of the word ψῆφον, to
be construed with this verb after the
analogy of the regular phrase θέσθαι
ψῆφον. See Thompson. συγκατατίθε-
σθαι has also the meaning "lay aside
for future use."

26. οὐκ ἔγωγε κτέ.: an emphatic
assent (see on 453 d). But Callicles
weakens it by the addition of ἵνα . . .
χαρίσωμαι, referring to 497 b, c.

d 28 f. περὶ δὲ δύο κτέ.: this exten-
sion to several souls was necessary in
order that the investigation might be
directed to political activity.

31. μηδέ: "without."

LVII. 4. τὴν αὐλητικὴν: Socrates
so chooses his examples that he passes
from species to species in an ascend-
ing scale, and at the same time grad-
ually approaches nearer to rhetoric.
Playing the flute passed for the low-
est species of music. Cf. the boyish
words of Alcibiades in Plut. Alc. 2
αὐλείτωσαν Θηβαίων παῖδες· οὐ γὰρ
ἴσασι διαλέγεσθαι. In Athens it was
left mostly to such as made a busi-
ness of it. Female flute-players were
accustomed to appear at banquets.
The instrument was probably more
like a clarinet than a flute.

6. διώκειν, φροντίζειν: these infin-
itives, while in sense epexegetic to τοι-
αύτη εἶναι, are syntactically dependent
on δοκεῖ. See on 487 c.

ΚΑΛ. *Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ τοιαῖδε ἅπασαι, οἷον ἡ κιθαριστικὴ ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν;

10 ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἡ τῶν χορῶν διδασκαλία καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων ποιήσεις οὐ τοιαύτη τίς σοι καταφαίνεται; ἡ ἡγεῖ τι φροντίζειν Κωησίαν τὸν Μέλητος, ὅπως ἐρεῖ τι τοιοῦ-

501 9. ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν: Plato considers as a species of flattery only that kind of cithara-playing which was practised in the musical contests at the public festivals. On the other hand, he recognizes a variety of this music which may be helpful to the proper cultivation of the soul of the individual who practises it, and indeed may elevate his moral feeling. This he himself recommends in *Rep.* iii. 399 d f. Cithara-playing was a part of the education of all young Athenians.

11. ἡ τῶν χορῶν διδασκαλία: διδασκαλία denotes the drill of the chorus for orchestral exhibition as well as for singing. It was the business of the poet. Hdt. i. 23 says of Arion ἐόντα κιθαροῦν τῶν τότε ἐόντων οὐδενὸς δεύτερον καὶ διθύραμβον πρῶτον ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν ποιήσαντά τε καὶ ὀνομάσαντα καὶ διδάξαντα ἐν Κορίνθῳ. What is to be understood here by choruses is explained by the addition ἡ διθυράμβων ποιήσεις. It is not all choric lyric which is condemned, but only that part of it which from its connexion with the Dionysus cult had found entrance into Athens and had there been much fostered by the state, which entrusted both native and foreign musicians with the arrangement and production of the dithyramb at the Dionysiac festivals, where con-

tests (ἀγῶνες) took place in it. The founder of dithyrambic melic was the just-named Arion of Methymne (B.C. 600), who resided at the court of Periander of Corinth. He was said to have introduced the *strophic* arrangement, and the so-called *cyclic* chorus (consisting of fifty members), which was thus named because the chorus was arranged in a circle around the altar. The second period of the dithyramb begins with the settling in Athens of Lasus of Hermione, a contemporary of the Pisis-tratidae and a teacher of Pindar. But it soon degenerated in Athens by excessive over-refinement and fantastic cultivation, until it received a new impulse towards the end of the Peloponnesian war by the more artistic cultivation of the dramatic and musical elements by Philoxenus of Cythera.

13. Κωησίας: a very popular dithyrambic poet about the middle of the Peloponnesian war, who deserves a great deal of censure for having helped to debase dithyrambic poetry. He tried to produce a striking effect by fantastic, misty, and often immoral subjects, combined with a pompous diction, excess of imagery, and shallow figures of speech. And he succeeded in a way, for he was ridiculed by the comic

τον, ὅθεν ἂν οἱ ἀκούοντες βελτίους γίγνουντο, ἢ ὅτι μέλλει
 15 χαριεῖσθαι τῷ ὄχλῳ τῶν θεατῶν;

502

ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, Κινησίου γε
 πέρι.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ Μελῆς ἢ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον
 βλέπων ἐδόκει σοι κιθαρωδεῖν; ἢ ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὐδὲ πρὸς
 20 τὸ ἡδιστον· ἡνία γὰρ ἄδων τοὺς θεατάς· ἀλλὰ δὴ σκό-
 πει· οὐχὶ ἢ τε κιθαρωδικὴ δοκεῖ σοι πᾶσα καὶ ἡ τῶν
 διθυράμβων ποίησις ἡδονῆς χάριν ἡρῆσθαι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε.

124 ΣΩ. Τί δέ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ αὕτη καὶ θαυμαστή, ἢ τῆς τρα- b
 25 γωδίας ποίησις ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακεν; πότερόν ἐστιν αὐτῆς

⁵⁰¹ poets Strattis (who composed a comedy upon him), Plato Comicus, and also Aristophanes in the *Clouds* and the *Frogs*, as a sinner against art and taste,—one of those who are called in *Nub.* 333 *κυκλίον χορῶν ψματοκάμπται*. Of his father Meles we know less; he was certainly less important than Cinesias, though he also is ridiculed by the comic poets.

⁵⁰² 15. *τῶν θεατῶν*: just as in English the general designation for the people who fill the theatre is 'audience,' whether the performance be an opera or a drama, so the Greeks used *θεαταί*, "the spectators," as a general designation for the crowds who thronged the Dionysiac theatre, no matter what sort of a performance was given. So, just below (20), we find *ἡνία γὰρ ἄδων τοὺς θεατάς*.

21. *οὐχὶ ἢ τε κιθαρωδική*: this conclusion we must suppose to be permitted because at the moment Callicles can cite no example to the contrary. *κιθαριστική* (above, 501 e) and *κιθαρωδική*, which are properly distinct (cf. *κιθάρισις* and *κιθαρωδία* *Io*

533 b), are here interchanged in accordance with colloquial usage. To fix the meaning of *κιθάρισις*, the adj. *ψαλή* was added. Cf. *Legg.* 669 e.

24. *ἡ σεμνή*: viewed in the light b of the result which Socrates deduces, this word as well as *θαυμαστή* may be considered ironic. But tragedy was regularly designated *σεμνή*, "venerated," as being the most noble presentation of poetry before the public mind, both from its sage maxims and from the moral effect which was ascribed to it. Socrates' actual view of poetry is well stated in *Apol.* 22 b, c *ἐγγων οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφίᾳ ποιοῖεν ἀ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεῖς καὶ οἱ χρησμοδοί*.

25. *ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακε*: the order of the whole sentence is involved; *τί δέ δὴ* (ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο) *ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακεν*. After giving the general question, Socrates follows it by a disjunctive special one. The repetition of the art. *ἡ* is illustrated by Stallbaum from *Symp.* 213 e *τὴν τοῦτον ταυτηνὴν τὴν θαυμαστὴν κεφαλὴν*. It is not common.

τὸ ἐπιχείρημα καὶ ἡ σπουδὴ, ὥς σοι δοκεῖ, χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς μόνον, ἢ καὶ διαμαίχεσθαι, ἐάν τι αὐτοῖς ἡδὺ μὲν ᾗ καὶ κεχαρισμένον, πονηρὸν δέ, ὅπως τοῦτο μὲν μὴ ἐρεῖ, εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ἀηδὲς καὶ ὠφέλιμον, τοῦτο δέ 30 καὶ λέξει καὶ ἄσεται, ἐάν τε χαίρωσιν ἐάν τε μὴ; · ποτέρως σοὶ δοκεῖ παρεσκευάσθαι ἢ τῶν τραγωδιῶν ποίησις;

ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν μᾶλλον ὥρμηται καὶ τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεα- 35 ταῖς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἔφαμεν νυνδὴ κολακείαν εἶναι;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, εἴ τις περιέλοιτο τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τό

502 For the construction ἐπὶ τινι, cf. *Lach.*

^b 183 a ἐκεῖνοι μάλιστα τῶν Ἑλλήνων σπουδάσουσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις, *Xen. Mem.* i. 3. 11 σπουδάξιν . . . ἐφ' οἷς οὐδ' ἂν μαινόμενος σπουδάσειεν. We find περὶ τι in *Phaedo* 64 d φαίνεται σοι φιλοσόφου ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς. For the pf. equiv. to a pres., cf. the passage from *Phaedo* just quoted.

25 f. πότερόν ἐστιν . . . ὥς σοι δοκεῖ: the more usual idiom would require πότερον δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι.

27 ff. ἐάν μὲν, εἰ δέ: this variation in the employment of the cond. particles has come to be a rule; i.e. the negative of an ἐάν μὲν clause is introduced by εἰ δέ. If the condition is particular, we find εἰ with the fut. indic.; if generic, εἰ with the pres. indic., which latter is frequently omitted. In the earlier usage the custom was to give the favorable condition first; hence εἰ δέ μὴ comes to have an unpleasant or unfavorable

connotation, as here. Cf. also 481 b. ⁵⁰² The omission of μὲν after ἐάν is probably due to its employment with ἡδύ. On the repetition of μὲν and δέ with both clauses, see on 512 a.

29. ἀηδὲς καὶ ὠφέλιμον: the connexion of these two words with καὶ seems somewhat strange, when one considers both the relation of the ideas themselves and the fact that they are preceded by ἡδὺ μὲν . . . πονηρὸν δέ. The design is probably to emphasize the co-existence of the two ideas, and not their distinctness. There is no contradiction to ἀηδὲς in the following ἐάν τε χαίρωσιν κτέ.; it refers to the manner in which the spectators will receive his words, concerning which the poet has no reason to trouble himself, provided what he says is correct. — On the omission of ὅν, see GMT. 902; H. 984 a.

30. λέξει καὶ ἄσεται: viz. in the dialogue and choruses.

39. περιέλοιτο: Socrates conceives c

40 τε μέλος καὶ τὸν ῥυθμὸν καὶ τὸ μέτρον, ἄλλο τι ἢ λόγοι
γίνονται τὸ λειπόμενον;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς πολὺν ὄχλον καὶ δῆμον οὗτοι λέγον-
ται οἱ λόγοι;

45 ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Δημηγορία ἄρα τίς ἐστὶν ἡ ποιητική. d

ΚΑΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ῥητορικὴ δημηγορία ἂν εἴη· ἡ οὐ ῥητο-
ρεύειν δοκοῦσί σοι οἱ ποιηταὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις;

50 ΚΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Νῦν ἄρα ἡμεῖς ὑπὴρκαμεν ῥητορικὴν τινα πρὸς
δῆμον τοιοῦτον οἶον παίδων τε ὁμοῦ καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ
ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων, ἣν οὐ πάνν ἀγάμεθα·
κολακικὴν γὰρ αὐτὴν φαμεν εἶναι.

55 ΚΑΛ. Πάνν γε.

LVIII. ΣΩ. Εἶεν· τί δὲ ἡ πρὸς τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον

⁵⁰² the difference between prose and
^c poetry to lie simply in the dress,
which in the case of poetry sur-
rounds the thought as the shell does
the kernel, and is only so far of
value.

40. μέλος: i.e. the musical element,
the melody, which is especially promi-
nent in lyric productions. — ῥυθμόν:
i.e. the regular movement, at the basis
of which lies the μέτρον, syllable and
verse measure.

41. γίνονται: prove to be.

d 46. δημηγορία: here employed with-
out any unpleasant connotation. It
might seem somewhat strange that
Callicles so readily admits that δημη-
γορία is ῥητορικὴ, — an admission on
which the whole deduction rests.
The reason may be that these word-

artists were very prone to extol the
universality of their art, without re-
gard to consequences. See Socrates' ^d
conversation with Gorgias (especially
ch. XI.).

52. οἶον . . . γυναικῶν: one is cer-
tainly justified in assuming according
to this passage that women were ad-
mitted to the tragedies; whether they
also had the right to attend the com-
edies remains doubtful. The admis-
sion of slaves to the theatre was
always restricted.

LVIII. 1. εἶεν: marks the conclu-
sion of one part of the argument, viz.
the premises from which the conclu-
sion is to be drawn. Its employment
here, however, also draws especial
emphasis to the fact that these prem-
ises are definitely settled.

ρήτορικὴ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν δῆμους
 τοὺς τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν, τί ποτε ἡμῖν αὕτη ἐστίν;
 πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσιν πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον αἰεὶ λέγειν οἱ
 5 ῥήτορες, τούτου στοχαζόμενοι, ὅπως οἱ πολῖται ὡς βέλ-
 τιστοι ἔσονται διὰ τοὺς αὐτῶν λόγους, ἢ καὶ οὗτοι πρὸς
 τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις ὠρμημένοι, καὶ ἔνεκα τοῦ
 ἰδίου τοῦ αὐτῶν ὀλιγωροῦντες τοῦ κοινού, ὥσπερ παισὶ
 προσομιλοῦσι τοῖς δῆμοις, χαρίζεσθαι αὐτοῖς πειρώμενοι
 10 μόνον, εἰ δέ γε βελτίους ἔσονται ἢ χείρους διὰ ταῦτα,
 οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν;

503

ΚΑΛ. Οὐχ ἄπλοῦν ἔτι τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς· εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ
 κηδόμενοι τῶν πολιτῶν λέγουσιν ἃ λέγουσιν, εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ
 οἷους σὺ λέγεις.

15 ΣΩ. Ἐξαρκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι διπλοῦν, τὸ μὲν

502 2. ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν: in the politi-
 cal sense of the word. Cf. Soph. Ant.
 737 πόλις γὰρ οὐκ ἔσθ' ἥτις ἀνδρός ἐσθ'
 ἐνός.

3. τοὺς τῶν ἐλευθέρων: is ironic.
 They consider themselves to be free
 men, although they are really, even
 according to the true opinion of Cal-
 licles (cf. 489 c above), slaves. Cf.
 Dem. Ol. iii. 30 τὸ μὲν πρότερον στρα-
 τεύεσθαι τολμῶν αὐτὸς ὁ δῆμος δεσπότης
 τῶν πολιτευομένων ἦν καὶ κύριος αὐτὸς
 ἀπάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν, — νῦν δὲ τοῦναν-
 τὶον κύριοι μὲν οἱ πολιτευόμενοι τῶν ἀγα-
 θῶν καὶ διὰ τούτων ἅπαντα πράττεται,
 ὑμεῖς δ' ὁ δῆμος ἐν ὑπηρέτῳ καὶ προσθή-
 κῃς μέρει γεγέννησθε.

6. ἢ καὶ οὗτοι κτέ.: testimony to
 the correctness of this statement is
 found in the very numerous refer-
 ences and complaints found in the
 orators, notably Demosthenes. Of
 course, Plato meant by τὸ βέλτιστον
 something a little different from the
 orators. Cf. Isoc. de Pace § 5 καὶ

γὰρ τοὶ πεποιήκατε τοὺς ῥήτορας μελε- 502
 τῶν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν οὐ τὰ μέλλοντα τῇ
 πόλει συνοίσειν, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἀρέσκοντας
 ὑμῖν λόγους ἐροῦσιν. The apparent
 pleonasm arising from the recurrence
 of the same idea in but slightly var-
 ied form is artistic in showing that
 this thought lay uppermost in the
 speaker's mind.

8. ὥσπερ παισὶ: reminds of 464 d.

12. οὐκ ἄπλοῦν: the word has its 503
 fundamental meaning. The question
 requires a double answer. Cf. Lach.
 188 c ἄπλοῦν τό γ' ἐμὸν περὶ λόγων
 ἐστίν, εἰ δὲ βούλει, οὐχ ἄπλοῦν, ἀλλὰ
 διπλοῦν. καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξαιμι τῷ φιλό-
 λογος εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸν μισόλογος. Cf. also
 468 c ἄπλως οὕτως.

15. εἰ γὰρ καὶ: καὶ does not belong
 to τοῦτο, but to εἰ. Socrates expresses
 himself as satisfied with the division
 made by Callicles, but recognizes
 even under this condition at least the
 possibility of a good, commendable
 rhetoric.

ἕτερόν που τούτου κολακεία ἂν εἴη καὶ αἰσχροὶ δημηγορία,
τὸ δ' ἕτερον καλόν, τὸ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὡς βέλτισται
ἔσονται τῶν πολιτῶν αἱ ψυχαί, καὶ διαμάχεσθαι λέγοντα
τὰ βέλτιστα, εἴτε ἡδίω εἴτε ἀηδέστερα ἔσται τοῖς ἀκούον-
20 σιν. ἀλλ' οὐ πρόποτε σὺ ταύτην εἶδες τὴν ῥητορικὴν. ἦ β
εἴ τινα ἔχεις τῶν ῥητόρων τοιοῦτον εἰπεῖν, τί οὐχὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ
αὐτὸν ἔφρασας τίς ἐστιν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγέ σοι εἰπεῖν τῶν γε
νῦν ῥητόρων οὐδένα.

25 ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τῶν παλαιῶν ἔχεις τινὰ εἰπεῖν, δι' ὄντινα
αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖ-
νος ἤρξατο δημηγορεῖν, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ χεῖρους
ὄντες; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἶδα τίς ἐστιν οὗτος. c

ΚΑΛ. Τί δέ; Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀκούεις ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν

503 19. εἴτε ἡδίω εἴτε ἀηδέστερα: Demosthenes, who in many speeches combats the πρὸς ἡδονήν and πρὸς χάριν δημηγορεῖν, says in *Ol.* iii. 18, in harmony with Plato's teaching, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὰ βέλτιστα ἀντὶ τῶν ἡδέων, ἂν μὴ συναμφοτέρα ἐξῇ, λαμβάνειν.

b 21. τοιοῦτον εἰπεῖν: speak of as such.

21 f. τί οὐχὶ . . . ἔφρασας: in passionate questions τί οὐ is usually construed with the aorist. The question marks impatience that a thing which is future is not past. The idea is usually modal, "why will you not?" Cf. *Phaedo* 86 d εἴ τις ὑμῶν εὐπορώτερος ἐμοῦ τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο. Difference in 468 c.

26. αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν: a ῥῆμα μέσον (vox media). Originally "to bear the blame," it was gradually worn down until it became merely a circumlocution for λέγεσθαι, as *Theaet.* 169 a ὡν δὴ σὺ περί αἰτίαν ἔχεις διαφέρειν, or *Rep.* iv. 435 ε οἱ δὲ καὶ

ἔχουσι ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν (sc. θυμοειδὲς εἶναι). Usually, however, it retains its bad sense, e.g. *Apol.* 38 c ὄνομα ἔχετε καὶ αἰτίαν — ὡς Σωκράτης ἀπεκτόνατε. b

28. οὐκ οἶδα τίς ἐστιν: when τίς c instead of the more regular ὅστις is used after a neg., it should be conceived rather as a direct question. See on 447 d.

29. Θεμιστοκλέα κτέ.: it is noteworthy that Callicles passes over Aristides, whom Socrates mentions later with respect, and whom also Demosthenes in *Ol.* iii. 21 speaks of among the statesmen who were still honored down to his time. But Callicles was probably hardly able to appreciate the uprightness and unselfishness of Aristides, which was displayed so prominently in the formation of the Delian League. — ἀκούεις: Greek, like the Eng., often uses the pres. of the verbs of perception where the pf. would be more exact. See *GM.T.* 28; *H.* 827.

30 γεγονότα καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ Περικλέα τουτονὶ τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα, οὗ καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας;

Σο. Εἰ ἔστιν γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἣν πρότερον σὺ ἔλεγες ἀρετὴν, ἀληθῆς, τὸ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀπομιμπλάναι καὶ τὰς αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐν τῷ
35 ὑστέρω λόγῳ ἡναγκάσθημεν ἡμεῖς ὁμολογεῖν, ὅτι αἱ μὲν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν πληρούμεναι βελτίῳ ποιοῦσι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, α ταύτας μὲν ἀποτελεῖν, αἱ δὲ χείρω, μὴ· τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις εἶναι· τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα τούτων τινὰ γεγονέναι ἔχεις εἰπεῖν;

Καλ. Οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε πῶς εἶπω.

127 LIX. Σο. Ἄλλ' ἐὰν ζητῆς καλῶς, εὐρήσεις· ἴδωμεν δὴ οὕτως ἀτρέμα σκοπούμενοι, εἴ τις τούτων τοιοῦτος γέγο-

503 30 f. Περικλέα τουτονὶ τὸν νεωστὶ
c τετελευτηκότα: we must guard against drawing the conclusion from this passage that this dialogue was intended to be understood as held soon after Pericles' death. See *Intro.* § 18. For νεωστὶ simply means "lately" as compared with the other statesmen mentioned, and the interval between that and the date of the dialogue may still have been a great one. Cf. *Hdt.* vi. 40. See also on 523 b. The same is true of the Lat. *nuper*, as we see from *Cic. de Nat. Deor.* ii. 50. 126 *Quid ea, quae nuper, id est paucis ante seculis, medicorum ingeniis reperta sunt.*

31. οὗ ἀκήκοας: sc. λέγοντος. A possible reference to 455 e.

32. εἰ ἔστιν γε κτέ.: "yes, if, etc." The answer is so closely connected with the preceding question that there is no need of supplying an apod. In the second member, εἰ δὲ μὴ κτέ., for which we must supply a pred. from the first, instead of the expected criticism of the men mentioned we have

a question based on the principle just 503
c proved.

34. τοῦτο: viz. τὸ . . . ἀπομιμπλάναι. As a pred. supply ἀρετὴ ἀληθῆς ἐστίν. We should expect after ἀλλ' ὅπερ . . . ὁμολογεῖν some expression corresponding to τὸ . . . ἀπομιμπλάναι, instead of which we find ὅτι κτέ., due to ὁμολογεῖν, with which we must again supply ἀρετὴ ἀληθῆς ἐστίν to govern ἀποτελεῖν.

34 f. ἐν τῷ ὑστέρω λόγῳ: refers to 499 e. τοῦτο δέ continues the recapitulation, and refers to 500 a. Instead of τέχνην τινὰ, which we should expect, we find by an anacoluthon the nom. as if ὁμολογήθη preceded. On the neglect of the assimilation in τοῦτο, see *Kr.* 61, 7, 4.

39. οὐκ ἔχω: Callicles does not d understand the standard of judgment, to the exposition of which Socrates now turns.

LIX. 2. οὕτως ἀτρέμα: quietly, just as we are. οὕτως is frequently used by itself to denote "under the conditions or circumstances in which we are at present," and often with

νευ. φέρε γάρ, ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον
λέγων, ἃ ἂν λέγῃ, ἄλλο τι οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐρεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπων
5 πρὸς τι; ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες δημιουργοὶ βλέπον-
τες πρὸς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἕκαστος οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐκλεγόμενος
προσφέρει ἃ προσφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ'
ὅπως ἂν εἰδὸς τι αὐτῷ σχῇ τοῦτο ὃ ἐργάζεται. οἷον εἰ
βούλει ἰδεῖν τοὺς ζωγράφους, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους, τοὺς ναυ-
10 πηγούς, τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας δημιουργούς, ὅτινα βούλει
αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰς τάξιν τινὰ ἕκαστος ἕκαστον τίθησιν ὃ ἂν
τιθῇ, καὶ προσαναγκάζει τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ πρέπον τε
εἶναι καὶ ἀρμόττειν, ἕως ἂν τὸ ἅπαν συστήσῃται τεταγμέ- 504
νόν τε καὶ κεκοσμημένον πρᾶγμα· καὶ οἱ τε δὴ ἄλλοι

⁵⁰³
d an adverb when it is to be translated separately. Sometimes it follows the adverb, and sometimes it has itself an explanatory addition, as *Prot.* 351 c ἀπλῶς οὕτω, ὡς σὺ ἐρωτᾷς. Cf. 460 e, 464 b, 468 c, 478 a, 494 d.

4 f. ἀποβλέπων πρὸς τι: with a view to something, which must, in contrast with εἰκῇ, be a definite object, as is afterwards more clearly shown. See on 474 d.

e 5 ff. οἱ ἄλλοι . . . προσφέρει: a case of part. apposition. See G. 137, n. 2; H. 624 d. Cf. 450 d. The thought with προσφέρει is of the single articles out of which the object is to be made.—δημιουργοί: see on 452 a.

8. ὅπως ἂν . . . σχῇ: a general rel. sentence, giving the opposite to εἰκῇ, "that it may acquire for itself some form." The second aor. of ἔχειν is the only second aor. which seems to have an ingressive force. See Gildersleeve's note to Morris' *Thuc.* i. 12. 3.—εἶδος: i.e. the outward appearance which an object displays, its figure and form, an image of which the artist of course carries in

his mind and gazes upon with the ⁵⁰³ eye of fancy. e

8 f. εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν: with such conversational expressions we should refrain from supplying any definite apod., as doubtless none was felt. The force of this phrase approaches that of a mild inv., σκόπει, after which the objective clause follows naturally with ὡς. The subject ἕκαστος distributes the τοὺς ζωγράφους which has been appropriated as the obj. of ἰδεῖν.

13. συστήσῃται: is applicable to ⁵⁰⁴ the form as a whole, because it is only by the harmony of its several parts (τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἀρμόττειν) that it exists. Cf. *Phaedr.* 269 c τὸ δ' ἕκαστα . . . λέγειν τε καὶ τὸ ὅλον συνίστασθαι.

14. κεκοσμημένον: this word, as well as κόσμος below (19), has, of course, no reference to any external adornment, but only to an endowment with such qualities as are requisite for the ἀρετή of the whole. See on e below.

14 f. οἱ τε δὴ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί: would require properly some such

15 δημιουργοὶ καὶ οὓς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, οἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, παιδοτρίβαι τε καὶ ἰατροί, κοσμοῦσί που τὸ σῶμα καὶ συντάττουσιν. ὁμολογοῦμεν οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχειν ἢ οὐ;

1 2 ΚΑΛ. Ἐστω τοῦτο οὕτω.

ΣΩ. Τάξεως ἄρα καὶ κόσμον τυχοῦσα οἰκία χρηστή ἂν εἴη, ἀταξίας δὲ μοχθηρά;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πλοῖον ὡσαύτως;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ σώματά φαμεν τὰ ἡμέτερα;

25 ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἡ ψυχῇ; ἀταξίας τυχοῦσα ἔσται χρηστή, ἢ τάξεώς τε καὶ τοῦ κόσμου τινός;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν πρόσθε καὶ τοῦτο συνομολογεῖν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώματι τῷ ἐκ τῆς
30 τάξεώς τε καὶ τοῦ κόσμου γιγνομένῳ;

ΚΑΛ. Ὑγίειαν καὶ ἰσχὺν ἴσως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἐγώ γε. τί δὲ αὖ τῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐγγιγνομένῳ ἐκ c

504 pred. as κοσμοῦσιν ἕκαστος τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον. But the general thought is here, as often, to be completed by a kind of zeugma from the special one to which the discussion hurries.

15. οὓς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν: sc. in 500 e, which in turn refers to 464 b ff.—The body serves in general as an analogy for the soul.

18. ἔστω: the inv. indicates only a tentative concession, which Callicles reserves the privilege of recalling if he chooses. The same feeling is felt in ἀνάγκη συνομολογεῖν below.

b 24. καὶ μὴν κτέ.: is to be completed with necessary changes from the preceding question of Socrates (τάξεως ἄρα κτέ.). By καὶ μὴν (and indeed) we pass to the more impor-

tant part of the argument. Here 504 also the general ideas τάξις and κόσμος receive special limitations.

29 f. τῷ γιγνομένῳ: belongs to ὄνομά ἐστιν, while ἐν τῷ σώματι, in looser relation to the whole, denotes the range to which the question extends.

31. ἴσως λέγεις: in the answer of Callicles shows that, while indeed according to his feelings he would regard such a relation as false and impossible, his reason compels him to admit its truth.

32. ἐγγιγνομένῳ: the use of the c compound verb here, in place of the simple one in the other member of the comparison, is probably due to its close connexion with ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ.

τῆς τάξεως καὶ τοῦ κόσμου; πειρῶ εὐρεῖν καὶ εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκείνῳ τὸ ὄνομα.

35 ΚΑΛ. Τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εἴ σοι ἡδιόν ἐστιν, ἐγὼ ἐρῶ· σὺ δέ, ἂν μὲν σοι δοκῶ ἐγὼ καλῶς λέγειν, φάθι· εἰ δὲ μή, ἔλεγχε καὶ μὴ ἐπίτρεπε. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ταῖς μὲν τοῦ σώματος τάξεσιν ὄνομα εἶναι ὑγιεινόν, ἐξ οὗ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ὑγίεια γίγνεται
40 καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ τοῦ σώματος. ἔστιν ταῦτα ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Ταῖς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεσιν καὶ κοσμήσεσιν νόμι- d
μόν τε καὶ νόμος, ὅθεν καὶ νόμιμοι γίνονται καὶ κόσμοι·
ταῦτα δ' ἔστιν δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη. φῆς ἢ οὐ;

45 ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω.

127 LX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς ταῦτα βλέπων ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐκεῖνος,
ὁ τεχνικός τε καὶ ἀγαθός, καὶ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει ταῖς

⁵⁰⁴ 35. τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις: on the meaning of the interr. form, see on 503 b. The question is of the nature of an evasion of the answer, which Callicles pushes upon Socrates to escape responsibility. Cf. 470 b.

37. φάθι: see on 475 e.—εἰ δὲ μή: see on 502 b.—ἔλεγχε: with this and ἐπίτρεπε (yield) the neuter object ("what I say") is understood. In a similar way ἐπιτρέπειν is used absolutely, *Apol.* 35 b and elsewhere.

40. ἀρετή: used at first in the general sense of "proper function or condition," so that it can afterwards appear in its moral force without thereby the standard of judgment being changed.

^d 42 f. νόμιμόν τε καὶ νόμος: sc. ὄνομα εἶναι. Both expressions are found elsewhere associated in order to express the idea as fully and completely as possible, e.g. *Crito* 53 c. Here there is the more reason to add

νόμος because Callicles had previously ⁵⁰⁴ used this word in the passage where ^d he first gave expression to his scorn of right and law (ch. XXXVIII. ff.). The corresponding disposition is also elsewhere called κόσμος. Cf. the passage in *Crito* τὰς τε εὐνομούμενας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιωτάτους. Apropos is *Phaedo* 114 e κοσμήσας τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἀλλὰ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ κόσμῳ σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἐλευθερία καὶ ἀληθεία.

44. ταῦτα: with free reference to what precedes and without assimilation to the predicate, denotes the qualities expressed by νόμιμοι and κόσμοι.

45. ἔστω: see on a above.

LX. 1. πρὸς ταῦτα βλέπων: in the choice of words Socrates goes back to what was said in 503 e.

2. προσοίσει κτέ.: cf. above, 503 e. Although it is by the λόγοι especially that the soul will be shaped, yet

ψυχαῖς, οὓς ἂν λέγῃ, καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἀπάσας, καὶ δῶρον
 ἐάν τι διδῶ, δώσει, καὶ ἐάν τι ἀφαιρῇται, ἀφαιρήσεται,
 5 πρὸς τοῦτο αἰὲν τὸν νοῦν ἔχων, ὅπως ἂν αὐτοῦ τοῖς πολί-
 ταις δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς γίγνηται, ἀδικία δὲ
 ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ σωφροσύνη μὲν ἐγγίγνηται, ἀκολασία
 δὲ ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ ἐγγίγνηται, κακία δὲ
 ἀπίη. συγχωρεῖς ἢ οὐ;

10 ΚΑΛ. Συγχωρῶ.

ΣΩ. Τί γὰρ ὄφελος, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, σώματί γε κάμνουντι
 καὶ μοχθηρῶς διακειμένῳ σιτία πολλὰ διδόναι καὶ τὰ
 ἥδιστα ἢ ποτὰ ἢ ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν, ὃ μὴ ὀνήσει αὐτὸ ἔσθ' ὅτε
 πλέον, ἢ τοῦναντίον κατὰ γε τὸν δίκαιον λόγον καὶ ἔλατ-

15 τον; ἔστι ταῦτα;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω.

505

ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, λυσιτελεῖ μετὰ μοχθηρίας σώματος
 ζῆν ἀνθρώπων. ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ζῆν μοχθηρῶς. ἢ
 οὐχ οὕτως;

20 ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι, οἷον πει-
 νῶντα φαγεῖν ὅσον βούλεται ἢ διψῶντα πιεῖν, ὑγιαίνοντα

⁵⁰⁴ other influences may be brought to
^d bear, just as the orator or statesman
 (a good specimen of such an orator
 was Demosthenes) has power to cause
 gifts to be made to the people—as,
 for example, the θεωρικόν, the δικαστι-
 κόν, the στρατιωτικόν, and the βουλευ-
 τικόν, and the division of booty, pub-
 lic spectacles, etc.—and also to be
 taken away from them, for example,
 by taxes (εἰσφορὰ) or the abolition
 of the gifts mentioned.—The connex-
 ion forbids us to think of any rougher
 kind of deprivation, which seemed to
 Polus (466 c) so enviable a privilege
 of power.

5. αὐτοῦ: poss. gen., to be closely
 connected with τοῖς πολίταις ("his
 fellow-citizens").

13. ὃ μὴ ὀνήσει: the generic idea
 causes the negative μή.

14. τοῦναντίον: is certainly adver-
 bial, and to be attached to ἔλαττον
 (ὀνήσει). The sense of this difficult
 passage seems to be something like
 this: "What advantage is there in giv-
 ing to a sick man anything which can-
 not profit him, more or less"; literally,
 "sometimes more, or on the contrary,
 at least rightly considered, less."

22 f. ὑγιαίνοντα . . . πολλά: is ⁵⁰⁵
 added to make the contrast stronger. ^a

μὲν ἑώσω οἱ ἱατροὶ ὥς τὰ πολλά, κάμνοντα δὲ ὥς ἔπος
εἰπεῖν οὐδέποτε ἑώσω ἐμπίμπλασθαι ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ; συγ-
25 χωρεῖς τοῦτό γε καὶ σύ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

1 3^o ΣΩ. Περὶ δὲ ψυχὴν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος; ἕως
μὲν ἂν πονηρὰ ᾖ, ἀνόητός τε οὖσα καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ
ἀδικος καὶ ἀνόσιος, εἰργεῖν αὐτὴν δεῖ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ
30 μὴ ἐπιτρέπεω ἄλλ' ἅττα ποιεῖν ἢ ἀφ' ὧν βελτίων ἔσται·
φῆς ἡ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Οὕτω γάρ που αὐτῇ ἄμεινον τῇ ψυχῇ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

35 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ εἰργεῖν ἐστὶν ἀφ' ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ κολάζειν;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ κολάζεσθαι ἄρα τῇ ψυχῇ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἢ ἡ
ἀκολασία, ὥσπερ σὺ νυνδὴ φῶν.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἄλλον
40 τινὰ ἐρώτα.

ΣΩ. Οὗτος ἀνὴρ οὐχ ὑπομένει ὠφελούμενος καὶ αὐτὸς
τοῦτο πάσχων περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστί, κολαζόμενος.

505 23 f. ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν: see on 450 b.

a 28. ἀνόητος κτέ.: see in the discus-
b sion with Polus the remark at 477 b,
where the πονηρία of the soul is de-
scribed in the same way.

29. ἀνόσιος: Plato prefers to use
only two endings with this adj., which
usually, especially in later Greek, has
three. The common collocation, as
in the present passage, with several
other adjs. of only two endings, may
perhaps explain his usage.

33. οὕτω . . . ἄμεινον: sc. than if it
were differently dealt with. Cf. 468 b.

38. ὥσπερ σὺ νυνδὴ φῶν: refers
naturally to the second member, for

which a predicate is to be supplied
from the first. Socrates has in mind
491 e ff. The contradiction between
this admission and the statement
made at the first (νυνδὴ), Callicles
seeks, in his accustomed manner, to
evade.

41 f. αὐτὸς τοῦτο πάσχων: Calli-
cles has given in the investigation
also a practical example of that ἀκολα-
σία which he had defended in theory.
For him the investigation is only a
trial of wits. In οὗτος ἀνὴρ κτέ. we
may have a reminiscence of the ex-
pression used by Callicles of Socrates
in 489 b.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐδέ γέ μοι μέλει οὐδὲν ὦν σὺ λέγεις, καὶ ταῦτά σοι Γοργίου χάριν ἀπεκρινάμην.

45 ΣΩ. Εἶεν· τί οὖν δὴ ποιήσομεν; μεταξύ τὸν λόγον καταλύομεν;

ΚΑΛ. Αὐτὸς γνώσει.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς μύθους φασὶ μεταξύ θέμις εἶναι α καταλείπειν, ἀλλ' ἐπιθέντας κεφαλὴν, ἵνα μὴ ἄνευ κεφαλῆς
50 περιίῃ. ἀπόκρῃαι οὖν καὶ τὰ λοιπά, ἵνα ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος κεφαλὴν λάβῃ.

LXI. ΚΑΛ. Ὡς βίαιος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐὰν δὲ ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, ἐάσεις χαίρειν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ἥ καὶ ἄλλῃ τῷ διαλέξει.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ἄλλος ἐθέλει; μὴ γάρ τοι ἀτελῇ γε τὸν
5 λόγον καταλείπωμεν.

ΚΑΛ. Αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἂν δύναιο διελθεῖν τὸν λόγον, ἥ λέγων κατὰ σαυτὸν ἢ ἀποκρινόμενος σαυτῷ;

505 46. καταλύομεν: this idiomatic use of
C the pres. instead of the fut. of a course of action to be immediately taken is also idiomatic in Latin and English. See Kr. 53, 1, 9. In a somewhat similar manner the pres. is used of the immediate consequence by Dem. *de Falsa Leg.* 32 εἰ δὲ φησιν οὗτος, δεῖξάτω καὶ παρασχέσθω, καὶ γὰρ καταβαίνω. Cf. 513 c.

47. αὐτὸς γνώσει: refuses to answer. "You will have to decide that."

d 48. οὐδὲ τοὺς μύθους: to say nothing of a λόγος which is directed to a definite object. The proverb, which Socrates quotes, seems to rest upon a religious feeling, in accordance with which myths had to be completely narrated in order not to draw upon the narrator the anger of the deity. Cf. *Phileb.* 66 d τὸ μετὰ ταῖθ' ἡμῖν οὐδὲν λοιπὸν πλὴν ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς ἐπὶ μέρουσιν, *Euthyd.* 301 e τὸν

κολοφῶνα ἐπιτιθέναι. — θέμις: "right 505
acc. to sacred law." d

50. περιίῃ: the change from the pl. (τοὺς μύθους) to the sing. is explained by the freedom of conversation. Cf. *Prot.* 319 d τούτοις οὐδεὶς τοῦτο ἐπιπλήττει ὥσπερ τοῖς πρότερον, ὅτι οὐδαμῶθεν μαθὼν . . . συμβουλευεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ.

LXI. 1. ὡς βίαιος εἶ: cf. 491 e ὡς ἡδὺς εἶ. — βίαιος: usually in contrast with πείθειν, e.g. *Polit.* 304 d εἴτε διὰ πειθοῦς εἴτε διὰ τινος βίας is applied here by Callicles to Socrates' persistent argument; cf. *Apol.* 35 d εἰ πείθοιμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζοίμην.

4. τίς οὖν κτέ.: since the question assumes the necessity that some one take the role of respondent, a causal clause follows.

4 f. μὴ . . . καταλείπωμεν: for let us no longer leave, etc.

6. αὐτὸς δὲ κτέ.: the question has

Σο. Ἵνα μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου γένηται, ἂ πρὸ τοῦ δύο ^ο
 ἄνδρες ἔλεγον, εἰς ὧν ἱκανὸς γένωμαι; ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει
 10 ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι οὕτως. εἰ μέντοι ποιήσομεν, οἶμαι
 ἔγωγε χρῆναι πάντας ἡμᾶς φιλονίκως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ εἰδέ-
 ναι τὸ ἀληθὲς τί ἐστὶν περὶ ὧν λέγομεν καὶ τί ψεῦδος·
 κοινὸν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἅπασιν φανερόν γενέσθαι αὐτό. δίεμι
 μὲν οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐγὼ ὥς ἂν μοι δοκῇ ἔχειν· ἐὰν δέ τῳ ⁵⁰⁶
 15 ὑμῶν μὴ τὰ ὄντα δοκῶ ὁμολογεῖν ἐμαυτῷ, χρὴ ἀντιλαμ-

⁵⁰⁵ ^d a tone of reproof. αὐτός is opposed to ἄλλῳ διαλεγόμενος. The requirements of the question can be fulfilled in two ways,—either in continuous discourse, as 464 b–466 a, or in the form of a dialogue, which Socrates employs later (ch. LXII.).

^e 8. τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου: Epicharmus was a native of Cos, but early went to Sicily (Megara) and devoted himself there to the study of medicine and philosophy, especially the Pythagorean and Empedoclean. But his claim to fame rests on his comedies. He stands at the head of the Sicilian comic poets, being noted for the ethical nature of his poetry. It was full of sententious sayings, and thereby aroused Plato's interest to the highest degree. He flourished during the Persian war, under the government of Gelo. The verse here cited reads, according to Athenaeus:

τὰ πρὸ τοῦ δὲ ἄνδρες ἔλεγον
 εἰς ἐγὼν ἀποχρέω (i.e. ἀποχράω, I am sufficient).

Socrates means that he is himself assuming a burden which according to the nature of the matter requires two. The answer is in construction connected with the question of Callicles in order to disclose for the others' consideration the doubtful side, as it

were, of such a demand. With this ⁵⁰⁵ the following ἀτὰρ (however) agrees. ^e

11. φιλονίκως ἔχειν: see on 457 d. Socrates wishes to direct ambition only to proper objects.

12. τί ψεῦδος: ψεῦδος is frequently found opposed to ἀληθές. Cf. *Apol.* 34 ^e εἶτε οὖν ἀληθές, εἶτε οὖν ψεῦδος, *Euthyd.* 272 a ἐάν τε ψεῦδος ἐάν τε ἀληθές ᾖ. The article with ἀληθές is due to its position. We should also have in like manner τὸ ψεῦδος, did it precede τί ἐστὶν. Cron thinks it denotes that truth is *single*, while error has many forms.

14 f. ἐὰν . . . δοκῶ, χρὴ κτέ.: is an ⁵⁰⁶ anticipatory cond. sentence, χρὴ with the inf. having the force of an imv. Cf. ἐπιλαμβάνου in b below.

15. ὁμολογεῖν ἐμαυτῷ: Socrates is about to combine the two roles of questioner and respondent, and hence will have to assent to his own statements.

15 f. ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι: with the gen., means to "break in upon a discourse for the purpose of contesting a point," as in *Rep.* i. 336 b καὶ ὁ θρασύμαχος πολλάκις καὶ διαλεγόμενον ἡμῶν μεταξὺ ὄρμα ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου. On the other hand ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, used below in b, means simply "to arrest the discussion." See on 469 c.

βάνεσθαι καὶ ἐλέγχειν. οὐδὲ γάρ τοι ἔγωγε εἰδὼς λέγω
 ἃ λέγω, ἀλλὰ ζητῶ κοινῇ μεθ' ὑμῶν, ὥστε, ἂν τι φαίνεται
 λέγων ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν ἐμοί, ἐγὼ πρῶτος συγχωρήσομαι.
 λέγω μέντοι ταῦτα, εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι διαπερανθῆναι τὸν
 20 λόγον· εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλεσθε, ἐώμεν δὴ χαίρειν καὶ ἀπίωμεν.

ΓΟΡ. Ἄλλ' ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, χρῆναί πω
 ἀπιέναι, ἀλλὰ διεξελθεῖν σε τὸν λόγον· φαίνεται δέ μοι ὅ
 καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκεῖν. βούλομαι γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸς
 ἀκούσαί σου αὐτοῦ διόντος τὰ ἐπίλοιπα.

25 ΣΑ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ αὐτὸς ἡδέως μὲν ἂν
 Καλλικλεί τούτῳ ἔτι διελεγόμην, ἕως αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ Ἀμφί-
 ονος ἀπέδωκα ῥῆσιν ἀντὶ τῆς τοῦ Ζήθου· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σύ, ὦ
 Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλεις συνδιαπερᾶναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' οὖν
 ἐμοῦ γε ἀκούων ἐπιλαμβάνου, ἐάν τί σοι δοκῶ μὴ καλῶς
 30 λέγειν. καί με εἰς ἐξέλεγχης, οὐκ ἀχθεσθήσομαί σοι ὅ

506 17. ἂν τι φαίνεται κτέ.: the emphasis is on the indefinite, as in 472 a.

21. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ κτέ.: on the assumption by Gorgias of the role of mediator, and the justice of his claim to speak in the name of all, see Introd. § 13 *fin.* Cf. 497 b. His request to proceed is a part of the artistic machinery of the dialogue, in that it affords an opportunity for a general summary of what has been already learned in the discussion, which was necessary in order to proceed intelligently. — οὐ . . . πω: a rather unusual 'tmesis,' of which another example is found in *Meno* 72 d οὐ μέντοι ὡς βούλομαι γέ πω κατέχω τὸ ἐρωτώμενον.

b 23. βούλομαι γὰρ κτέ.: with these words Gorgias expresses his approbation of Callicles' opinion that a respondent is not necessary. The chestnuts are good, — but just as good without the intervention of the

cat. Hence γὰρ to give a reason for the continuance of the discussion, καὶ αὐτὸς to show his agreement with Callicles, and αὐτοῦ to exclude the idea of co-operation. The following καὶ αὐτὸς in the answer of Socrates corresponds to the similar expression of Gorgias.

26 f. Ἀμφίονος: Socrates answers with a pleasant allusion to 485 e. He will really assume the character of Amphion, which had been imputed to him, and as Amphion had in the plays of Euripides defended his calling, so will he prove that the claim of philosophy to be followed as a calling in life is a just and weighty one.

27. ἀπέδωκα: the indic. is due to assimilation with the preceding indic. with εἰς of the unfulfilled condition.

28 f. ἀλλ' οὖν . . . ἐπιλαμβάνου: see on 496 d and a above.

ὥσπερ σὺ ἐμοί, ἀλλὰ μέγιστος εὐεργέτης παρ' ἐμοὶ ἀναγεγράφει.

ΚΑΛ. Λέγε, ὦ ἀγαθέ, αὐτὸς καὶ πέραινε.

133 LXII. Σο. Ἄκουε δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐμοῦ ἀναλαβόντος τὸν λόγον. Ἄρα τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστίν; Οὐ ταῦτόν, ὡς ἐγὼ καὶ Καλλικλῆς ὡμολογήσαμεν. Πότερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πρακτέον, ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔνεκα
5 τοῦ ἡδέος; Τὸ ἡδὺ ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Ἡδὺ δέ ἐστιν τοῦτο, οὗ παραγενομένου ἡδόμεθα, ἀγαθὸν δὲ οὗ παρόντος
ἀγαθοί ἐσμεν; Πάνυ γε. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γέ ἐσμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα, ὅσ' ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν, ἀρετῆς τινος παραγενομένης;
10 Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ὦ Καλλί- κλεις. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἡ γε ἀρετὴ ἐκάστου, καὶ σκεύους

506 31 f. εὐεργέτης ἀναγεγράφει: this phrase is found in Hdt. viii. 85, and was doubtless technical, the fut. pf. expressing like the legal pf. the finality and fixity of the action. It was quite common for Greek states to confer the title of εὐεργέτης on citizens or strangers, especially foreign statesmen or princes, for services rendered them. The decree conferring the honor was engraved on stone and preserved. In *Apol.* 36 d Socrates claims the title for himself. The greatest benefit consists, according to 458 a, in freeing a man from error.

33. ὦ ἀγαθέ: a friendly manner of address, which frequently, however, has an ironical coloring, or a tone of condescension, depreciation, or correction. So in Lat., o bone, cf. *Hor. Sat.* ii. 3. 31; or bone vir in comedy.

LXII. 3. ὡς ἐγὼ καὶ Καλλικλῆς ὡμολογήσαμεν: sc. in 495 c ff. Cf. especially 500 d.

8. παραγενομένου, παρόντος: the

words may have been designedly 506 chosen with reference to the nature of the ideas ἡδὺ and ἀγαθόν, the former being only a condition, the latter an actuality.

5. ἡδὺ δέ ἐστιν κτέ.: on the ἡδὺ, cf. what Callicles has himself remarked in 494 a, b, above, and especially *Phileb.* 53 c ἄρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηκόαμεν, ὡς αἰεὶ γένεσις ἐστίν, οὐσία δ' οὐκ ἔστι τὸ παράπαν ἡδονῆς. On the ἀγαθόν, cf. above 468 b ἔνεκ' ἀρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες and *Phileb.* 54 c οὐκοῦν ἡδονὴ γε, εἴπερ γένεσις ἐστίν, ἔνεκά τινος οὐσίας ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεται ἄν—Τό γε μὴν οὐ ἔνεκα τὸ ἔνεκά του γινόμενον αἰεὶ γίγνεται ἄν, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρᾳ ἐκεῖνό ἐστι. This distinction, however, even if intended, is not preserved, as can be seen from the following (8) ἀρετῆς τινος παραγενομένης. See on 497 e.

10. ἀρετῇ: the subst. to denote the d form in which the Good manifests itself in persons and things. According to its real nature the Good re-

καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς αὐ καὶ ζῶον παντός, οὐ τῷ εἰκῇ
 κάλλιστα παραγίνεται, ἀλλὰ τάξει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ
 τέχνῃ, ἣτις ἐκάστῳ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῶν· ἄρα ἔστιν ταῦτα;
 'Εγὼ μὲν γάρ φημι. Τάξει ἄρα τεταγμένον καὶ κεκοσμη-
 15 μένον ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐκάστου; Φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε. Κόσμος
 τις ἄρα ἐγγενόμενος ἐν ἐκάστῳ ὁ ἐκάστου οἰκείος ἀγαθὸν
 παρέχει ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Καὶ ψυχὴ
 ἄρα κόσμον ἔχουσα τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἀμείνων τῆς ἀκοσμήτου;
 'Ανάγκη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἦ γε κόσμον ἔχουσα κοσμία; Πῶς
 20 γὰρ οὐ μέλλει; Ἡ δέ γε κοσμία σώφρων; Πολλή 507
 ἀνάγκη. Ἡ ἄρα σώφρων ψυχὴ ἀγαθή. ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἔχω
 παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλα φάναι, ὦ φίλε Καλλίκλεις· σὺ δ' εἰ
 ἔχεις, δίδασκε.

ΚΑΛ. Λέγ', ὠγαθέ.

25 Σο. Λέγω δὴ ὅτι, εἰ ἡ σώφρων ἀγαθὴ ἔστιν, ἡ τοῦναν-
 τιον τῇ σώφρονι πεπονθυῖα κακὴ ἔστιν· ἣν δὲ αὕτη ἡ

506 d mains one and the same, but its manifestation (the ἀρετή) assumes various names according to circumstances.

11. τῷ εἰκῇ: on the use of the art. with adverbs, see Kr. 50, 5, 10. The dat. is in the same construction as those following.

12 f. τάξει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ τέχνῃ: the two latter words simply complete the first. We might translate them as adjs. The addition of κάλλιστα seems to admit the possibility of a kind of ἀρετή being brought about by other means than τάξει κτέ.

e 16. ὁ ἐκάστου οἰκείος: the nature of each thing conditions the peculiarity of its κόσμος. Hence this may receive different names, according to the conditions.

507 a 22 f. σύ... δίδασκε: Socrates turns now again to Callicles and tries to

draw him into the conversation, be- 507 cause the argument has now been brought just to the point where Callicles broke it off before. a

24. λέγε: go on with your exposition. This answer is a refusal to co-operate and at the same time a neg. answer to εἰ ἔχεις.

25 ff. The idea of σωφροσύνη is defined in the most general way by the expression τὰ προσήκοντα πράττειν. We attain to the idea of righteousness and piety by restricting the προσήκοντα to definite domains, according to the personages (men and gods) towards whom we have duties to perform. We attain to the idea of bravery by distinguishing between especial divisions of the idea πράττειν. Accordingly, we have on the one side διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν, on the other ὑπομένοντα καρτερεῖν.

ἄφρων τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος. Πάνυ γε. Καὶ μὴν ὁ γε σῶ-
φρων τὰ προσήκοντα πράττει ἂν καὶ περὶ θεοὺς καὶ περὶ
ἀνθρώπους· οὐ γὰρ ἂν σωφρονοῖ τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα
30 πράττων. Ἀνάγκη ταῦτ' εἶναι οὕτω. Καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν
ἀνθρώπους τὰ προσήκοντα πράττων δίκαι' ἂν πράττοι, b
περὶ δὲ θεοὺς ὅσια· τὸν δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ὅσια πράττοντα
ἀνάγκη δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον εἶναι. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Καὶ μὲν
δὴ καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν γε ἀνάγκη· οὐ γὰρ δὴ σῶφρονος ἀνδρός
35 ἔστιν οὔτε διώκειν οὔτε φεύγειν ἅ μὴ προσήκει, ἀλλ' ἅ
δεῖ καὶ πράγματα καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας
φεύγειν καὶ διώκειν, καὶ ὑπομένοντα καρτερεῖν ὅπου δεῖ·
ὥστε πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὧ Καλλίκλεις, τὸν σῶφρονα, ὥσπερ c
διήλθομεν, δίκαιον ὄντα καὶ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὅσιον ἀγαθὸν
40 ἄνδρα εἶναι τελῶς, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς πράτ-
τειν ἅ ἂν πράττῃ, τὸν δ' εὖ πράττοντα μακάριόν τε καὶ
εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα

⁵⁰⁷ 36. ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας: added by
b Socrates in his enumeration because
it is just in these spheres that *σωφρο-
σύνη* is usually exercised. The point
at which bravery necessarily coin-
cides with it comes out in this way
most emphatically. The exhibition
of bravery under such conditions is
also discussed in *Lach.* ch. xviii.

c 39 f. ἀγαθὸν . . . τελῶς: 'the per-
fection of goodness.' Cope. All the
virtues *combined make the ἀγαθὸν
ἄνδρα. Wisdom is omitted, probably
because Socrates has in mind only
the earlier discussion, and besides he
is taking for the moment the popular
point of view; hence the collocation
of ὅσιον with δίκαιον, as in *Protagoras*.
Besides, as Socrates' view was that
all evil-acting springs from ignorance,
the fact that a man was δίκαιος, ἀν-

δρεῖος, and ὅσιος would presuppose ⁵⁰⁷
the possession of wisdom. c

41. τὸν δ' εὖ πράττοντα κτέ.: not
in the sense "he who is fortunate,"
so often found, but in the sense of
the clause εὖ καὶ καλῶς πράττειν ἅ ἂν
πράττῃ preceding; otherwise it would
be equivalent to μακάριον καὶ εὐδαί-
μονα, and the syllogism would gain
nothing. Plato therefore conceives
εὖ πράττειν ἅ ἂν πράττῃ the necessary
basis for μακάριον εἶναι, and the latter
as the natural result of the former.
Hence there is no case of a fallacia
secundum dictionem (by
the use of homonyms or ἀμφιβολία),
but the conclusion δ ἀκόλαστος ἄθλιος
is correctly and legitimately obtained
by a combination of the second state-
ment with the first and without any
fallacious or sophistical reasoning.

ἀθλιον· οὗτος δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων τῷ σώφρονι, ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ὃν σὺ ἐπῆνεις.

LXIII. Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὕτω τίθεμαι καὶ φημι ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ, τὸν βουλόμενον, ὡς ἔοικεν, εὐδαίμονα εἶναι σωφροσύνην μὲν διωκτέον καὶ ἀσκητέον, ἀκολασίαν δὲ φευκτέον ὡς ἔχει ποδῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, καὶ παρασκευαστέον μάλιστα μὲν μηδὲν δεῖσθαι τοῦ κολάζεσθαι, ἐὰν δὲ δεηθῇ ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν οἰκείων, ἢ ἰδιώτης ἢ πόλις, ἐπιθετέον δίκην καὶ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει εὐδαίμων εἶναι. οὗτος ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὁ σκοπὸς εἶναι, πρὸς ὃν βλέποντα δεῖ ζῆν, καὶ πάντα εἰς τοῦτο τὰ

507
c LXIII. 1 f. καὶ φημι ταῦτα: the repetition of ταῦτα causes these principles to appear especially weighty.

2 f. τὸν βουλόμενον . . . διωκτέον: the verbal is equivalent here to δεῖ with the inf. The regular case for the agent is the dat.; the acc. is rare. See H. 991 a, and cf. 480 e. The position of ὡς ἔοικεν, which belongs to the whole clause, is noteworthy.

d 4. ὡς ἔχει ποδῶν: i.e. to the full extent of his power, a phrase whose origin can be readily seen. Cf. Hdt. vi. 116 οὗτοι μὲν δὴ περιέπλεον ἄνιμον. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ὡς ποδῶν εἶχον τάχιστα ἐβοήθειον ἐς τὸ ἄστυ καὶ ἐφθῆσαν ἀπικόμενοι πρὶν ἢ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἤκειν, and Thuc. ii. 90. 4 Πελοποννήσιοι . . . ἐπλεον ὡς εἶχε τάχους ἕκαστος ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους. On the use of the gen. with such adverbs as ὡς, ἥριστα, and ἱκανῶς, and ἔχειν, see G. 168, 3; H. 757 a.

5. παρασκευαστέον: in a middle sense, as is frequently the case with verbals, but only when used impersonally.

7. ἢ ἰδιώτης ἢ πόλις: disjunctive apposition to ἄλλος τις τῶν οἰκείων.

Contrasted with πόλις, ἰδιώτης denotes the individual; with ἔρχων, the common man who holds no office; with δημιουργός and similar words, one who is not versed in a certain thing.—ἐπιθετέον δίκην: Socrates deduces from the principles proven exactly the conclusions which, in his argument with Polus, had so offended Callicles. Cf. 480, 481.

9 f. πάντα τὰ αὐτοῦ: "all the powers of the body and soul." Cf. the passage quoted below (10), and *Crito* 46 b τὰ ἐμέ. The construction of καὶ πάντα κτέ. shows another example of the common Greek idiom of following a rel. by a demonstrative. See on 452 d.—εἰς τοῦτο: takes up again οὗτος ὁ σκοπός for the purpose of recapitulating in its correlative clause, ὅπως κτέ., the substance of what has been explained; οὕτω again reiterates in one word the whole previous participial clause, and connects it with πρῶτα, which has the same construction as ζῆν. The positive directions summarized in οὕτω are still further fixed (after Plato's habit) by the following negative direction

- 10 αὐτοῦ συντείνοντα καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως δικαιοσύνη
 παρέσται καὶ σωφροσύνη τῷ μακαρίῳ μέλλοντι ἔσσεσθαι,
 οὕτω πράττειν, οὐκ ἐπιθυμίας ἔδωτα ἀκολάστους εἶναι καὶ
 ταύτας ἐπιχειροῦντα πληροῦν, ἀνήνυτον κακόν, ληστοῦ
 βίον ζῶντα. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ προσφιλὴς ἂν
 15 εἶη ὁ τοιοῦτος οὔτε θεῷ· κοινωνεῖν γὰρ ἀδύνατος· ὅτῳ δὲ
 μὴ ἐνι κοινωνία, φιλία οὐκ ἂν εἶη. φασὶ δ' οἱ σοφοί, ὧ
 Καλλίκλεις, καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους 508
 τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ

506 ^d in the exegetical participial clause
 οὐκ ἐπιθυμίας ἔδωτα . . . πληροῦν. Af-
 ter πληροῦν we find the parenthetical
 criticism ἀνήνυτον κακόν, while the
 life of the man who attempts what is
 deprecated in the participial clause,
 is characterized very emphatically by
 the appositional tag which completes
 this rambling, intensely conversa-
 tional sentence.

10. συντείνοντα: the image is that
 of drawing the bow and aiming, to
 the employment of which, σκόπος has
 led the way. We find in *Rep.* ix.
 591 c the same image in a similar
 connexion, ὃ γε νοῦν ἔχων πάντα τὰ
 αὐτοῦ εἰς τοῦτο ξυντείνας βίωσεται.

13. ἀνήνυτον κακόν: "an evil to
 which there is no end." The striving
 to satisfy the desires is also called an
 ἀνήνυτον ἔργον in *Phaedo* 84 a, and
 compared with the web of Penelope,
 which was begun every day anew.
 On the apposition, see G. 137, 3; H.
 626.

13 f. ληστοῦ βίον ζῶντα: for the
 appositional partic. see Kr. 66, 15, 3.

15. ἀδύνατος: in an active sense.

16. κοινωνία: in passing, Socrates
 shows that the only foundation for
 an all-embracing view of the world
 is found in correct moral principle.

Both in nature and in the universe 507
 the harmony of the parts with each
 other and with the whole is essential
 for existence. The state, and, pro-
 ceeding further, the moral condition
 of the individual soul, should there-
 fore be modelled on the principle of
 general order which pervades the
 world.—οἱ σοφοί: those especially
 meant are the Pythagoreans, to whose
 views Plato had had recourse before.
Cf. 493 a. Pythagoras is said first
 to have applied to the world the
 name κόσμος. He was followed by
 Empedocles with his scientific sys-
 tem, according to which there are
 two principles in the world,—love,
 φιλότης (στοργή, Ἀφροδίτη, ἁρμονία),
 and hate, νεῖκος. The former is the
 cause of association and union, the
 latter of separation and disunion.
Cf. Emped. 94, Karst. "Ἄλλοτε μὲν
 φιλότῃ συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα, |
 "Ἄλλοτε δ' ἀδ' ὅχ' ἕκαστα φορεύμενα
 νεῖκος ἔχθει.

18. συνέχειν: the subj. of the inf. 508
 is τὴν κοινωνίαν, as is shown by the
 art. as well as the connexion. *Cf.*
Soph. 242 e τὸ δὲν . . . ἔχθρα καὶ φιλίᾳ
 συνέχεται. The omission of the art.
 in enumerations is common. See on
 450 d.

σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην, καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα
 20 κόσμον καλοῦσιν, ὃ ἐταῖρε, οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν οὐδὲ ἀκολα-
 σίαν. σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς οὐ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τούτοις,
 καὶ ταῦτα σοφὸς ὢν, ἀλλὰ λέληθέν σε ὅτι ἡ ἰσότης ἡ
 γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύναται.
 25 λείψ. εἶεν. ἡ ἐξελεγκτός δὴ οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἡμῶν ἐστίν,

508 19. **δικαιοσύνη**: an unusual word
^a for justice, formed like *κοσμοσύνη* and
ἰσότης. It was probably chosen here
 on account of the assonance. Simi-
 larly *Prot.* 331 b ταυτὸν ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνης
δσιότητι. Xenophon also uses the
 word.

22. **καὶ ταῦτα**: the regular Greek
 expression for "and that too." See
 H. 612 a.

22 f. ἡ **γεωμετρικὴ**: adds a limita-
 tion to the *ἰσότης*, that absolute
 equality, which is impossible in any
 government. *ἰσότης* alone is purely
 arithmetical equality ($a = b$); *ἰσότης*
γεωμετρικὴ is ratio or proportion
 ($a : b :: c : d$). Plato distinguishes be-
 tween two kinds of *ἰσότης* in *Leg.* vi.
 757 b, the one τὴν μέτρον ἴσην καὶ
 σταθμῷ καὶ ἀριθμῷ, the arithmetical;
 the second, τὴν ἀληθεστάτην καὶ ἀρί-
 στην ἰσότητα, the geometric, which is
 not comprehensible by every man,
 and which is dependent upon the
 judgment and decision of the gods.
 Of this he says (*ib.*): τῷ μὲν μείζονι
 πλείω, τῷ δ' ἐλάττωσι σμικρότερα νέμει,
 μέτρια διδούσα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν
 ἑκατέρω, καὶ δὴ καὶ τιμὰς μείζονι μὲν
 πρὸς ἀρετὴν αἰεὶ μείζους, τοῖς δὲ τούναν-
 τιον ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς τε καὶ παιδείας τὸ
 πρέπον ἑκατέροις ἀπονέμει κατὰ λόγον.
 On this *ἰσότης*, which is here opposed
 to *πλεονεξία*, is founded the adminis-
 tration of justice in the state (*ib.* τὸ

πολιτικὸν τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τὸ δίκαιον). Aris- 508
 totle also (*Nic. Eth.* v. 6, 7, Bekk.)
^a refers τὸ ἐν διανομῇ δίκαιον back to
ἀναλογία, i.e. to *ἰσότης λόγων*, and adds,
 καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀναλογίαν γεω-
 μετρικὴν οἱ μαθηματικοί. Isocrates ex-
 presses himself to the same effect in
Areop. (vii.) 20 ff., where he says of
 Solon and Cleisthenes, μέγιστον αὐτοῖς
 συνεβάλετο πρὸς τὸ καλῶς οἰκεῖν τὴν
 πόλιν, ὅτι δυοῖν ἰσότητιν νομιζόμεναι
 εἶναι, καὶ τῆς μὲν ταυτὸν ἅπασιν ἀπονε-
 μούσης, τῆς δὲ τὸ προσήκον ἑκάστοις,
 οὐκ ἡγνόνουν τὴν χρησιμωτέραν κτέ.
 Thompson also quotes *Plut. Mor.*
 719 b, according to which Lyscurgus
 'expelled from Lacedaemon arith-
 metical equality, holding it to be
 democratic and levelling in princi-
 ple, and introduced the geometric, as
 better suited to a temperate oligarchy
 and monarchy.'

24. **γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμελείς**: Plato
 considered mathematics as a nec-
 essary preliminary to philosophy.
 Hence the well-known *μηδεὶς ἀγεωμέ-
 τρητος εἰσὶτω μου τὴν στέγην* upon his
 house.

25. **εἶεν**: see on 466 c. Cf. 472 d,
 480 a.—**ἡ ἐξελεγκτός δὴ κτέ.**: the al-
 ternative appears as the obvious and
 necessary result of what precedes.
 The meaning and construction are
 similar to 482 b (*ὥς οὐ κτέ.*). See
 on 467 a.

St. I. p. 508.

ὥς οὐ δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης κτήσεται εὐδαίμονες οἱ ἢ
 εὐδαίμονες, κακίας δὲ οἱ ἄθλιοι (ἄθλιοι), ἣ εἰ οὗτος ἀληθής
 ἐστίν, σκεπτέον τί τὰ συμβαίνοντα. τὰ πρόσθεν ἐκέῖνα,
 ὦ Καλλίκλεις, συμβαίνει πάντα, ἐφ' οἷς σύ με ἤρου, εἰ
 30 σπουδάζων λέγοιμι, λέγοντα ὅτι κατηγορητέον εἶη καὶ
 αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑέος καὶ ἐταίρου, ἐάν τι ἀδικῇ, καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ
 ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρηστέον· καὶ ἂ Πῶλον αἰσχύνῃ ᾧ συγχω-
 ρεῖν, ἀληθῇ ἄρα ἦν, τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι,
 ὅσῳ περ αἰσχίον, τοσούτῳ κάκιον· καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὁρ-
 35 θῶς ῥητορικὸν ἔσσεσθαι δίκαιον ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστή-
 μονα τῶν δικαίων, ὃ αὖ Γοργίαν ἔφη Πῶλος δι' αἰσχύνην
 ὁμολογῆσαι.

137 LXIV. Τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων σκεψώμεθα, τί ποτ'
 ἐστὶν ἂ σὺ ἐμοὶ ὀνειδίζεις, ἄρα καλῶς λέγεται ἡ οὐ, ὥς
 ἄρα ἐγὼ οὐχ οἷός τ' εἰμὶ βοηθῆσαι οὔτε ἐμαυτῷ οὔτε τῶν
 φίλων οὐδενὶ οὐδὲ τῶν οἰκείων, οὐδ' ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγί-
 5 στων κινδύνων, εἰμὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄτι-
 μοι [τοῦ ἐθέλοντος], ἃν τε τύπτειν βούληται, τὸ νεανικὸν d

508 27. οἱ ἄθλιοι ἄθλιοι: if the emen-
 b dation is correct, we have an example
 of chiasmus, as in 498 d.

28. τί τὰ συμβαίνοντα: the sing. τί
 inquires for the general result, which
 may include various details. See
 Kr. 61, 8, 2.

32. ἂ Πῶλον αἰσχύνῃ κτέ.: with
 this Socrates avoids the accusation
 that he may have defended those prin-
 ciples only for the sake of confuting
 his adversary. They are seen now to
 be quite necessarily bound together
 with a moral view of life. Note the
 difference in the tenses, συγχωρεῖν
 (equiv. to συνεχώρει) and below (37)
 ὁμολογῆσαι (equiv. to ὡμολόγησε).

c LXIV. 3. ὥς οὐχ οἷός τ' εἰμὶ κτέ.:

this objection Callicles had only 508
 brought forward as a possibility, not
 as an actual fact (486 a, b). Socra-
 c tes treats it as the latter, but even
 thus it does not misrepresent Calli-
 cles' sentiments.

5 f. ὥσπερ οἱ ἄτιμοι: see on 486 c.
 As the reading stands, τοῦ ἐθέλοντος
 must be considered as a variant for
 ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ. In spite of Plato's
 fondness for ποικιλία, it is hardly
 likely that he would use βούλεσθαι
 and θέλειν as identical in meaning.

6 f. τὸ νεανικὸν δὴ τοῦτο: in appo-
 sition to the whole clause, but more
 especially to the words which follow.
 See on 447 a. For the meaning, see
 on 482 c.

δὴ τοῦτο τοῦ σοῦ λόγου, ἐπὶ κόρρης, εἴαν τε χρήματα
 ἀφαιρείσθαι, εἴαν τε ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, εἴαν τε, τὸ
 ἔσχατον, ἀποκτεῖναι· καὶ οὕτω διακείσθαι πάντων δὴ
 10 αἰσχιστόν ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος. ὁ δὲ δὴ ἐμὸς ὅστις, πολ-
 λάκις μὲν ἤδη εἴρηται, οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει καὶ ἔτι λέγεσθαι·
 οὐ φημι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὸ τύπτεσθαι ἐπὶ κόρρης ἀδίκως
 αἰσχιστον εἶναι, οὐδέ γε τὸ τέμνεσθαι οὔτε τὸ σῶμα τὸ
 ἐμὸν οὔτε τὸ βαλλάντιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τύπτειν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ
 15 τὰ ἐμὰ ἀδίκως καὶ τέμνειν καὶ αἰσχιον καὶ κάκιον, καὶ
 κλέπτειν γε ἅμα καὶ ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι καὶ τοιχωρυχεῖν
 καὶ συλλήβδην ὅτιοῦν ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ τῷ
 ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κάκιον καὶ αἰσχιον εἶναι ἢ ἐμοὶ τῷ ἀδικου-
 μένῳ. ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἄνω ἐκεῖ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθε λόγοις οὕτω
 20 φανέντα, ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω, κατέχεται καὶ δέδεται, καὶ εἰ ἄγροι- 509
 κότερόν τι εἰπεῖν ἐστίν, σιδηροῖς καὶ ἀδαμαντίνους λόγοις,

508 10. ὅστις: viz. ἐστίν. The omis-
 sion of the verb in the dependent
 question is very uncommon.

11. ἔτι: almost equivalent to ἔτι
 πλεονάκις.

13. τέμνεσθαι τὸ σῶμα: may be a
 delicate allusion to 473 c (ἐκτέμνηται)
 as τὸ βαλλάντιον and κλέπτειν to 486 c
 (ὅπδ δὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν περισυλασθαι πᾶσαν
 τὴν οὐσίαν), but it is more probable,
 owing to its common association with
 βαλλάντιον, that τέμνεσθαι is used
 generally like the Lat. secari. In
 view of Socrates' poverty, this savors
 of humor.

14. βαλλάντιον: a leathern purse
 for carrying money, which was fas-
 tened to the girdle. The βαλλαντιο-
 τόμοι (cul-purses) were men who made
 a business of slipping off such purses
 in the market-places and the baths,
 and against whom it was difficult to
 protect one's self. This sentence is

also a commentary on the mischiev- 508
 ous results of the principle defended
 by Callicles, which was sure to intro-
 duce the most outrageous kinds of
 ἀδικία. Apropos of this, cf. also the
 view of Thrasymachus in Rep. i. 344,
 especially b καὶ γὰρ ἱερόσυλοι καὶ ἀνδρα-
 ποδισταὶ κτέ., οἱ κατὰ μέρη ἀδικοῦντες
 τῶν τοιούτων κακουργημάτων καλοῦνται·
 ἐπειδὴν δὲ τις πρὸς τοῖς τῶν πολιτῶν
 χρήμασι καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀνδραποδισάμενος
 δουλώσεται, ἀντὶ τούτων τῶν αἰσχρῶν
 ὀνομάτων εὐδαίμονες καὶ μακάριοι κέ-
 κληνται.

20 f. καὶ εἰ ἀγροικότερόν τι εἰπεῖν: 509
 see on 462 e. The καὶ εἰ shows that
 the word used is correct, though
 harsh. See crit. note on 503 a. The
 definite indic. is used in order to ex-
 cuse the unusual comparison of argu-
 ments to iron and steel fetters. The
 simile is well chosen, and is a good
 retort on Callicles, who in 484 a had

ὡς γοῦν ἂν δόξειεν οὕτωςί, οὓς σὺ εἰ μὴ λύσεις ἢ σοῦ τις
 νεανικώτερος, οὐχ οἶόν τε ἄλλως λέγοντα ἢ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν
 λέγω καλῶς λέγειν· ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν αἰεί,
 25 ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως ἔχει, ὅτι μέντοι ὦν ἐγὼ ἐντε-
 τύχηκα, ὥσπερ νῦν, οὐδεὶς οἶός τ' ἐστὶν ἄλλως λέγων μὴ
 οὐ καταγέλαστος εἶναι. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν αὖ τίθημι ταῦτα
 οὕτως ἔχει· εἰ δὲ οὕτως ἔχει καὶ μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ὅ
 ἐστὶν ἡ ἀδικία τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ ἔτι τούτου μείζον μεγί-
 30 στου ὄντος, εἰ οἶόν τε, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην, τίνα
 ἂν βοήθειαν μὴ δυνάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ κατα-
 γέλαστος ἂν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ εἴη; ἄρα οὐ ταύτην, ἥτις ἀπο-
 τρέψει τὴν μεγίστην ἡμῶν βλάβην; ἀλλὰ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη
 ταύτην εἶναι τὴν αἰσχίστην βοήθειαν μὴ δύνασθαι βοη-

509 characterized the laws and moral
 a rules as bonds which the true man
 must break through (*διαρρήξας*).

22. οὕτως: "as matters stand," i.e.
 so far as these principles have been
 tested. They may be attacked with
 new arguments, in which case new
 defences would have to be made. —
 εἰ μὴ λύσεις: the stern minatory con-
 ditional form. See on 502 b.

23. νεανικώτερος: i.e. who is more
 powerful and courageous, just as Cal-
 licles surpassed Polus, and Polus Gor-
 gias. — ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος: cf. 506 a οὐδὲ
 γὰρ ἔγωγε εἰδὼς λέγω ἃ λέγω.

25 f. ὦν . . . ἐντετύχηκα: on this
 unusual kind of attraction, see G.
 153, 2; H. 996 a. We miss a mention
 of the persons with ὥσπερ νῦν.

26 f. μὴ οὐ: after a negatived lead-
 ing verb, the negative of the inf. is
 generally made by μὴ οὐ. See Madv.
Syn. § 211; GMT. 815.

27. αὖ τίθημι: sc. as against the op-
 posing opinions of all others. This
 statement now, taken as a basis (εἰ δὲ

οὕτως ἔχει) leads to a conclusion which 509
 is given in the form of a question. a
 τίθημι is frequently used of the laying
 down of a principle or assumption.
 Cf. *Rep.* ii. 361 b τοιοῦτον θέντες τὸν
 δίκαιον, *Theaet.* 191 c.

29 f. τούτου μείζον μεγίστου ὄντος: b
 notice the comparison of the superla-
 tive.

33. ἀλλά: introduces a more defi-
 nite and detailed statement of a
 thought involved in the previous
 question.

34. ταύτην εἶναι τὴν αἰσχίστην
 κτέ.: a noteworthy instance of the
 employment of a very common con-
 struction, which is as old as Homer
 (*Kr. Di.* 55, 3, 8). Logically we should
 expect ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν μὴ δύνασθαι
 βοηθεῖν αἰσχίστην εἶναι. But βοήθειαν,
 being uppermost in the speaker's
 mind, is made the subject, instead of
 cognate accusative, drawing also the
 predicate after it (see on 449 b, c).
 In this way μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν is
 characterized as a species, and the

35 *θεῖν μήτε αὐτῷ μήτε τοῖς αὐτοῦ φίλοις τε καὶ οἰκείοις,*
δευτέραν δὲ τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου κακοῦ καὶ τρίτην τὴν τοῦ c
τρίτου καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως, ὥς ἐκάστου κακοῦ μέγεθος πέφυ-
κεν, οὕτω καὶ κάλλος τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐφ' ἑκαστα βοη-
θεῖν καὶ αἰσχύνη τοῦ μή. ἄρα ἄλλως ἢ οὕτως ἔχει, ὃ
 40 *Καλλίκλεις;*

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἄλλως.

139 LXV. ΣΩ. Δυοῖν οὖν ὄντοι, τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ ἀδικεῖ-
σθαι, μείζον μὲν φάμεν κακὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ
ἀδικεῖσθαι. τί οὖν ἂν παρασκευασάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοη-
θήσειεν αὐτῷ, ὥστε ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὠφελίας ταύτας ἔχειν,
 5 *τὴν τε ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι; α*
πότερα δύναμιν ἢ βούλησιν; ὧδε δὲ λέγω· πότερον ἐὰν
μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται, ἢ ἐὰν δύναμιν
παρασκευάσῃται τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται;

ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ἐὰν δύναμιν.

10 ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν; πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται

509 most shameful species, of *βοήθεια*,
 b which was pretty exactly Plato's
 opinion of the assistance which the
 orators were in the habit of rendering
 to themselves and their friends before
 a court. This assimilation is extended
 to the following clauses, *δευτέραν* etc.,
 for the sake of consistency.

c 38. *ἐφ' ἑκαστα*: viz. *κακά*, which
 are conceived as the enemy to be
 fought. Instead of *αἰσχύνη* we should
 have expected *αἰσχύνη*.

41. *οὐκ ἄλλως*: it is remarkable
 that after his utterances in 505 d Cal-
 licles allows himself to be again drawn
 into the discussion. 'Ἐκὼν ἀέκοντί γε
θυμῷ; For that the answer slips from
 him unconsciously, instead of being
 a willing admission, seems to follow
 from *ἔστω σοι τοῦτο* (510 a), where

his earlier disposition again becomes 509
 plain. c

LXV. 1. *τοῦ ἀδικεῖν κτέ.*: in appo-
 sition to the *δυοῖν*.

4. *ἀμφοτέρας*: the following inves-
 tigation takes up each of the two
 cases separately.

6. *δύναμιν ἢ βούλησιν*: what has d
 been determined in 466 d regarding
δύνασθαι and *βούλεσθαι* still holds
 good, but is expanded in what follows.

7. *ἀδικήσεται*: the fut. middle as a
 passive occurs more commonly with
 pure verbs. See Kr. 39, 11; H. 496.

9. *δῆλον δὴ κτέ.*: the form of the
 answer shows very willing agreement,
 which applies, however, only to this
 particular point.

10. *τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ κτέ.*: cf. *Phaedo*
 78 d *τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν, οἷον*

St. I. p. 509.

ἀδικεῖν, ἱκανὸν τοῦτ' ἐστίν — οὐ γὰρ ἀδικήσει — ἥ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο δεῖ δυνάμιν τινα καὶ τέχνην παρασκευάσασθαι, ὥς, ἐὰν μὴ μάθῃ αὐτὰ καὶ ἀσκήσῃ, ἀδικήσει; τί οὐκ αὐτό γέ μοι τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, πότερόν σοι
 15 δοκοῦμεν ὀρθῶς ἀναγκασθῆναι ὁμολογεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν λόγοις ἐγώ τε καὶ Πῶλος ἢ οὐ, ἥνίκα ὁμολογήσαμεν μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' ἄκουτας τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πάντας ἀδικεῖν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω σοι τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως, ἵνα διαπε-
 20 ράνῃς τὸν λόγον.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικεν, παρασκευαστέον ἐστὶ δυνάμιν τινα καὶ τέχνην, ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσομεν.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

140 ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ποτ' ἐστὶν τέχνη τῆς παρασκευῆς τοῦ μηδὲν
 25 ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ὥς ὀλίγιστα; σκέψαι εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ ἢ περ ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἦδε· ἡ αὐτὸν ἄρχειν δεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ καὶ τυραννεῖν, ἢ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης πολιτείας ἐταῖρον εἶναι.

509 ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἵππων . . . ; ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτα
 ἔχει κτέ. It is not necessary to supply περί or some other word; when put thus freely at the beginning of the sentence, the genitive is held up to view and the case lost sight of. See Rid. § 27. The acc. also is occasionally thus 'freely' used. Cf. Lyc. 28 καὶ ταῦτα ἐμοῦ θεωρήσατε, ὥς δικαίαν τὴν ἐξέτασιν ποιουμένου περὶ τούτων.

12. δυνάμιν καὶ τέχνην . . . μάθη καὶ ἀσκήσῃ: an example of chiasmus. Knowledge is preserved and strengthened by practice.

13. ὥς . . . ἀδικήσει: the causal use of ὥς is not common. See Kr. 65, 8; H. 925. — αὐτά: for the neut. pl. referring to two preceding fem. sings. see Kr. 58, 3, 5; H. 630, 633.

13 f. τί οὐκ . . . ἀπεκρίνω: see on 509
 503 b.

17. βουλόμενον: for the usual ἐκόντα, in order not to diminish the contrast between δύναμις and βούλησις. Besides, it has just been shown to Polus that he who does wrong does only what seems to him good, not what he wishes, because the wish is always for the good.

22. ἀδικήσομεν: according to (the 510 amended) Dawes' canon ὅπως in object clauses cannot be construed with the first aor. subjv. either act. or middle. See GMT. 363, 364.

28. ἐταῖρον: the common word to express party affiliation (hence also ἐταιρεῖαι, "clubs"), as in *Apol.* 21 a ὧν τῷ πλήθει ἐταῖρος.

ΚΑΛ. Ὅρας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγὼ ἐτοιμός εἰμι ἐπαινεῖν, ^b
 30 ἂν τι καλῶς λέγῃς; τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖς πάνυ καλῶς εἰρη-
 κέναι.

LXVI. ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐάν σοι δοκῶ εὖ λέγειν.
 φίλος μοι δοκεῖ ἕκαστος ἐκάστῳ εἶναι ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα,
 ὃνπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, “ὁ ὁμοῖος τῷ
 ὁμοίῳ.” οὐ καὶ σοί;

5 ΚΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅπου τύραννός ἐστιν ἄρχων ἄγριος καὶ
 ἀπαίδευτος, εἴ τις τούτου ἐν τῇ πόλει πολὺ βελτίων
 εἴη, φοβοῖτο δήπου ἂν αὐτὸν ὁ τύραννος καὶ τούτῳ
 ἐξ ἅπαντος τοῦ νοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποτε δύναιτο φίλος γενέ- ^c
 10 σθαι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

⁵¹⁰ 29. ὁρᾷς κτέ.: expression of joy
^b that Socrates, with whom Callicles
 has had so often to agree unwillingly
 and under protest, now speaks
 quite to his liking. This view is
 the one thought of his life. Cf.
 475 a.

LXVI. 1. σκόπει . . . ἐάν σοι
 δοκῶ κτέ.: for the construction with
 σκόπει see H. 1016 c, and on 452 c.
 Cf. above in a. ‘What is worth no-
 ticing upon this usage is that ἐάν
 gives a different shade of meaning
 from the more usual εἰ. The ques-
 tion submitted is represented by it
 as a perfectly open one; whereas εἰ
 would limit the speaker’s foregone
 conclusion, and give a certain ap-
 pearance of positiveness. ἐάν is
 therefore chosen for the sake of ex-
 pressing more perfect courtesy, in
 contexts such as this, which relate
 to the conduct of a dialogue.’ Rid.
 § 64.

2. ἕκαστος ἐκάστῳ: does not de- ⁵¹⁰
 note an unlimited reciprocity, but ^b
 a restricted one, as is shown by the
 following ὁ ὁμοῖος τῷ ὁμοίῳ.

3. ὃνπερ . . . λέγουσιν: which the
 wise men of old mean when they say
 (λέγουσιν). The following proverb
 occurs very early, e.g. in Homer p 218
 ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν
 ὁμοῖον. Plato often employs it, e.g.
 Prot. 337 d τὸ γὰρ ὁμοῖον τῷ ὁμοίῳ
 φύσει συγγενές ἐστιν, Symp. 195 b
 ὁ γὰρ παλαιὸς λόγος εὖ ἔχει, ὡς ὁμοῖον
 ὁμοίῳ ἀεὶ πελάζει, Lys. 214 b τὸ ὁμοῖον
 τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ φίλον εἶναι. Of
 kindred import is the well-known
 verse ἡλιξ ἡλικά τέρπε, γέρων δέ τε
 τέρπε γέροντα, alluded to in Phaedr.
 240 c.

6. ὅπου τύραννός κτέ.: ‘where a
 savage and illiterate ruler is lord and
 master.’ Cope. In what follows, τού-
 του refers to τύραννος, τούτῳ through
 αὐτόν to the τῆς.

Σο. Οὐδέ γε εἴ τις πολὺ φαυλότερος εἴη, οὐδ' ἂν οὕτως·
καταφρονοὶ γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῦ ὁ τύραννος καὶ οὐκ ἂν ποτε ὡς
πρὸς φίλον σπουδάσειεν.

15 ΚΑΛ. Καὶ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ.

141

Σο. Λέιπεται δὴ ἐκείνος μόνος ἄξιος λόγου φίλος τῷ
τοιούτῳ, ὃς ἂν ὁμοήθης ὦν, ταῦτ' ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἐπαινῶν,
ἐθέλη ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι τῷ ἄρχοντι. οὗτος μέγα
ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει δυνήσεται, τοῦτον οὐδεὶς χαίρων ἀδική-

20 σει. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;

d

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

Σο. Εἰ ἄρα τις ἐννοήσειεν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει τῶν νέων,
τίνα ἂν τρόπον ἐγὼ μέγα δυναίμην καὶ μηδεὶς με ἀδικοίη,
αὕτη, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτῷ ὁδὸς ἐστίν, εὐθύς ἐκ νέου ἐθίζειν

510 12. οὐδ' ἂν οὕτως: is to be com-
c pleted according to the previous
remark of Socrates.

16. ἄξιος λόγου φίλος: pred. after
λείπεται. According to the nature of
the case none other could come under
consideration as lasting friends of the
tyrant, even if they should show
themselves friendly for a time.

17. ταῦτ' ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἐπαινεῖν: like
τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι is the
external sign of a similarity of dispo-
sition and friendliness. See on 473 a.

18. ὑποκεῖσθαι: in the elsewhere
not uncommon meaning, "to be sub-
ject to." Its use here is to emphasize
the degradation in the eyes of a free
man. Cf. also *Crito* 53 e ὑπερχόμενος δὴ
βιάσει πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύων.

d 19. χαίρων ἀδικήσει: the partic.
denotes the result of the verb. "He
will have no reason to rejoice," i.e. he
will not injure him with impunity.
Cf. *Soph. O. R.* 363 ἀλλ' οὐ τι χαίρων
δὶς γε πημονὰς ἔρεϊς.

22. εἰ ἄρα τις: the case which So-

crates here assumes in illustration 510
serves not only to enliven the dis-
d course, but also to show (as opposed
to the objections of ch. XL.) how un-
worthy and debased an object would
have to be set before educators if the
possession of power in the state is to
be the leading aim of mankind.—
Noteworthy is the use of the direct
question after the introductory prota-
sis, and furthermore the omission of
some apodosis corresponding to the
protasis, like γνοίη ἂν ὅτι, in place of
which we find ὡς ἔοικεν. Kr. gives
other similar examples in 65, 6, 14.
Similar cases occur in Latin.—ἐν
ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει: see on 468 e. The
position is noteworthy.

23. μηδεὶς με ἀδικοίη: μή was the
negative of the wish, underlying the
question, and is thus retained. It is
therefore not necessary, with GMT.
292, 2, to suppose an idea of preven-
tion to be involved. *How could I ob-
tain great power and no one do (prevent
any one from doing, GMT.) me wrong?*

25 αὐτὸν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἄχθεσθαι τῷ δεσπότῃ, καὶ
 παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὁμοίους ἔσται ἐκείνῳ.
 οὐχ οὕτως;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτῳ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ μέγα δύ-
 30 νασθαι, ὡς ὁ ὑμέτερος λόγος, ἐν τῇ πόλει διαπεπράζεται.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν; ἢ πολλοῦ δεῖ, εἴπερ
 ὁμοίους ἔσται τῷ ἄρχοντι ὄντι ἀδίκῳ καὶ παρὰ τούτῳ μέγα
 δυνήσεται; ἀλλ' οἶμαι ἔγωγε, πᾶν τούναντίον οὕτως ἢ
 35 παρασκευὴ ἔσται αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τὸ οἶψ τε εἶναι ὡς πλείστα
 ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην· ἢ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μέγιστον αὐτῷ κακὸν ὑπάρξει μοχθηρῷ⁵¹¹
 ὄντι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ λελωβημένῳ διὰ τὴν μίμησιν τοῦ
 40 δεσπότου καὶ δύναμιν.

142 ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπῃ στρέφεις ἐκάστοτε τοὺς λόγους ἄνω
 καὶ κάτω, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι οὗτος ὁ μιμού-
 μενος τὸν μὴ μιμούμενον ἐκείῳ ἀποκτενεῖ, ἐὰν βούληται,
 καὶ ἀφαιρήσεται τὰ ὄντα;

⁵¹⁰ 30. διαπεπράζεται: the fut. pf. is employed to express finality or fixedness. Cope translates, "he will establish for himself a lasting immunity from," etc. See on 469 d.

35. ἐπὶ τὸ οἶψ τε εἶναι: this is considered by Callicles and Polus as an end to be desired.—On the change of case, οἶψ and ἀδικοῦντα, see on 492 b.

⁵¹¹ 40. καὶ δύναμιν: the way to become powerful, says Socrates above, is to imitate the δεσπότης. Hence καὶ δύναμιν is the power (τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι) obtained by this μίμησις (ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὁμοίους ἔσται).

41. ὅπῃ στρέφεις: the last conclusion of Socrates is not agreeable to Callicles, who therefore declares it an arbitrary perversion of the argument. The στρέφειν ἄνω κάτω (see on 481 e), the twisting this way and that of words and ideas so that their sense was reversed, was an important department of Eristic.

43. ἐὰν βούληται: the use of βούλεσθαι again shows that the detailed explanation by Socrates of the difference between βούλεσθαι and δοκεῖν (ch. XXIII. f.) was in vain. Hence Socrates himself ceases to regard it in his answer.

45 Σα. Οἶδα, ὦγαθὲ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μὴ κωφός γ' εἰμί, καὶ ἔ
σου ἀκούων καὶ Πώλου ἄρτι πολλάκις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ὀλίγου πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει· ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐμοῦ ἄκουε,
ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ μέν, ἂν βούληται, ἀλλὰ πονηρὸς ὢν καλὸν
κἀγαθὸν ὄντα.

50 ΚΑΛ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀγανακτητόν;

Σα. Οὐ νούν γε ἔχοντι, ὥς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει. ἡ οἶ
δεῖν τοῦτο παρασκευάζεσθαι ἄνθρωπον, ὥς πλείστον χρό
νον ζῆν, καὶ μελετᾶν τὰς τέχνας ταύτας, αἱ ἡμᾶς αἰεὶ ἐκ
τῶν κινδύνων σφύζουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἦν σὺ κελεύεις ἐμέ
55 μελετᾶν τὴν ῥητορικὴν τὴν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις διασφ
ζουσαν.

ΚΑΛ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία ὀρθῶς γέ σοι συμβουλεύων.

LXVII. Σα. Τί δέ, ὦ βέλτιστε; ἡ καὶ ἡ τοῦ νεῦν ἐπι
στήμη σεμνή τίς σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι;

511 45. εἰ μὴ κωφός γ' εἰμί: "otherwise
b I would have to be deaf." Cf. Prot.

349 ο κἀλλιστον . . . εἰ μὴ μαίνομαι γε.

46. πολλάκις: 486 b, 486 c, et al.

48. ἀποκτενεῖ μέν κτέ.: cf. Plut. Agis
20 ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἄγισ ἐπὶ τὴν στραγγάλην
πορευόμενος, ὡς εἶδε τινα τῶν ὑπηρετῶν
δακρύοντα καὶ περιπαθοῦντα, "παῦσαί
με" εἶπεν, "ὦ ἄνθρωπε, κακίων. καὶ γὰρ
οὕτως παρανόμως καὶ ἀδίκως ἀπολλύμε
νος κρείττων εἰμὶ τῶν ἀναιρούντων."

50. καὶ τὸ ἀγανακτητόν: καὶ is
climactic and the art. emphatic. "So
far from this circumstance mitigating
the outrage, is it not just the revol
ting part of it," i.e. especially revol
ting? Callicles puts himself in the
place of the one who suffers the
wrong, but with a feeling quite the
reverse to that of Agis, quoted in
the preceding note. In a similar
manner Apollodorus says in [Xen.]
Apol. 28 Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρα

τες, χαλεπώτατα φέρω ὅτι ὀρῶ σε ἀδί
κως ἀποθησκόοντα. τὸν δὲ λέγεται κατα
ψήσαντα αὐτοῦ τὴν κεφαλὴν εἰπεῖν, Σὺ
δέ, ὦ φίλτατε Ἀπολλόδωρε, μᾶλλον ἂν
ἐβούλου με δρᾶν δικαίως ἀποθησκόοντα;

51. ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει: assumes
that the statement has already been
proved by the course of the argu
ment. Cf. 527 c.

52 f. δεῖν . . . ζῆν: against such an
over-valuation of life Socrates de
clares himself also in Apol. 28, 29;
Crito 48 b.

55. τὴν ῥητορικὴν: the position is
very emphatic. For examples of the
rel. clause preceding the antecedent,
see Kr. 51, 11.

57. συμβουλεύων: connected in
construction with the last words of
Socrates, as is frequently the case in
answers. Cf. 451 d ὀρθῶς γε λέγων
σύ, 473 b ἀληθῆ γε οἰόμενος ἴσως. See
Kr. 50, 8, 7.

ΚΑΛ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

- ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν σῶζει γε καὶ αὕτη ἐκ θανάτου τοὺς ἀνθρώ-
 5 πους, ὅταν εἰς τοιοῦτον ἐμπέσωσιν, οὐδεὶς ταύτης τῆς ἐπι-
 στημῆς. εἰ δ' αὕτη σοι δοκεῖ σμικρὰ εἶναι, ἐγὼ σοι μεί- α
 ζονα ταύτης ἐρῶ, τὴν κυβερνητικὴν, ἣ οὐ μόνον τὰς ψυχὰς
 σῶζει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα, ἐκ τῶν
 ἐσχάτων κινδύνων, ὥσπερ ἡ ῥητορική· καὶ αὕτη μὲν
 10 προσεσταλμένη ἐστὶν καὶ κοσμία, καὶ οὐ σεμνύνεται
 ἐσχηματισμένη ὡς ὑπερήφανόν τι διαπραττομένη, ἀλλὰ
 ταῦτα διαπραττομένη τῇ δικανικῇ, ἐὰν μὲν ἐξ Αἰγίνης
 δεῦρο σώσῃ, οἶμαι δὴ ὀβολοὺς ἐπράξατο, ἐὰν δὲ ἐξ
 Αἰγύπτου ἢ ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου, ἐὰν πάμπολυ, ταύτης τῆς
 15 μεγάλης εὐεργεσίας, σώσασα ἂν νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, καὶ αὐτὸν e

511 LXVII. 5. τοιοῦτον: has its cor-
 c relative in οὗ, which, like other relative
 adverbs, often stands for a
 prepositional phrase, as here equiv.
 to ἐν φ. Frequently we find τι added
 to τοιοῦτον. The sense of τοιοῦτον is
 made clear by the context.

d 8. τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα:
 probably this phrase was a common
 one, and we must therefore not press
 a contrast between τὰ σώματα and
 τὰς ψυχὰς, which latter refers espe-
 cially to their lives. Thompson sup-
 poses, with some probability, that
 σώματα refers to the other members
 of the passenger's family, who may
 be conceived as belonging to him.
 Perhaps "goods and chattels" may
 be as good a rendering as any.

10. προσεσταλμένη: "retired," i.e.
 unpretending. Still stronger is συνε-
 σταλμένος, as e.g. in Isoc. Panath.
 230 ἀπὲρ φρονιμώτερος γεγενημένος
 καὶ συνεσταλμένην ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν
 ("with a feeling of humility").

11. ἐσχηματισμένη: cf. Soph. 268 a

ὡς ἀγνοεῖ ταῦτα ἂν πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους 511
 ὡς εἰδῶς ἐσχημάτισται ("which he has
 d pretended to know").

12. τῇ δικανικῇ: used by Socrates
 instead of τῇ ῥητορικῇ because this
 species of the art affords the most
 room for comparison.

13. δὴ ὀβολοὺς: i.e. about six cents.
 The price was accordingly very low,
 if, as is shown by what follows, the
 fare from Egypt or Pontus (a dan-
 gerous voyage besides) for a whole
 family, including baggage, was only
 two drachmae, or about thirty-five
 cents. — ἐπράξατο: 'gnomic' or 'em-
 piric' aorist.

15. αὐτόν: the regular designation e
 for the master of the house, who is
 frequently opposed to the rest of the
 family as here. See on 447 c. The
 order of enumeration is noteworthy
 as showing the low estimation in
 which the women were held. The
 pl. may be due to assimilation to
 παῖδας, as we say "wife and child," or
 it may be collective, "women folks."

καὶ παῖδας καὶ χρήματα καὶ γυναῖκας, ἀποβιβάσας⁵¹¹ εἰς
 τὸν λιμένα δύο δραχμὰς ἐπράξατο, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἔχων τὴν
 τέχνην καὶ ταῦτα διαπραξάμενος ἐκβὰς παρὰ τὴν θάλατ-
 | ταν καὶ τὴν ναῦν περιπατεῖ ἐν μετρίῳ σχήματι. λογίζε-
 144 20 σθαι γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐπίσταται, ὅτι ἄδηλόν ἐστιν, οὐστινὰς τε
 ὠφέληκεν τῶν συμπλεόντων οὐκ ἐάσας καταποντωθῆναι
 καὶ οὐστινας ἔβλαπεν, εἰδὼς ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς βελτίους⁵¹²
 ἐξεβίβασεν ἢ οἱ ἐνέβησαν, οὔτε τὰ σώματα οὔτε τὰς
 174 25 ψυχὰς. λογίζεται οὖν, ὅτι οὐκ, εἰ μὲν τις μεγάλους καὶ
 ἀνιάτοις νοσήμασιν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα συνεχόμενος μὴ
 ἀπεπνίγη, οὗτος μὲν ἄθλιός ἐστιν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπέθανεν, καὶ
 οὐδὲν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὠφέληται· εἰ δέ τις ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοῦ σώμα-

⁵¹¹ 18. παρὰ τὴν θάλατταν: also effective in the portrayal of the seaman's unpretending nature.

19. ἐν μετρίῳ σχήματι: with unassuming carriage, has nothing to do with the dress, but merely with the deportment (cf. above, προσεσταλμένη). Perhaps there is a slight hit at Gorgias' pompous manner. See Introd. § 5 fin.

19 f. λογισθῆναι . . . ἐπίσταται: naturally not meant in full earnest, and not without some color of irony. The change of tense in ὠφέληκε and ἔβλαψε is probably due merely to the frequency of the form.

20 f. οὐστινας ὠφέληκε κτέ.: reminds us of Matt. xviii. 6, where of those who offend it is said: συμφέρει αὐτῷ ἵνα . . . καταποντισθῇ ἐν τῷ πελάγει τῆς θαλάσσης.

⁵¹² 23. ἢ οἱ ἐνέβησαν: it is a Greek peculiarity to compare different states by employing the gen. of the reflexive. Here a clause takes its place.

24. λογίζεται ὅτι οὐκ: the force of the neg. extends over the whole

sentence, which is developed antithetically. Since both leading clauses are hypothetical, we have a double employment of μὲν and δέ. The first member of the antithesis is given first only for the sake of the contrast; we should use a subordinate clause in English, and lay the most stress on the second member, and, too, on its conclusion. Cf. *Apol.* 28 e ἐγὼ οὖν δεῖνὰ ἂν εἶην εἰργασμένος, εἰ ὅτε μὲν με οἱ ἔρχοντες ἔταττον, οὐς ὑμεῖς εἰλεσθε ἔρχειν μου, τότε μὲν οὐ ἐκείνοι ἔταττον ἔμενον—τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ φήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφούντὰ με δεῖν ζῆν—ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεῖς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἕλλοι ὀτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τέξιν. See on 502 b and 490 d.

26. ἄθλιος ὅτι οὐκ ἀπέθανεν: some such idea as this frequently occurs in Plato; for example, in the *Republic* and *Laws*. Cf. *Crito* 47 d, e εἰ ἂν διολέσωμεν (sc. τὸ σῶμα) ἄρα βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστί διεφθαρμένον αὐτοῦ; Οὐδαμῶς. Socrates makes there a similar estimate of the relationship of soul to body.

30 τος τιμωτέρῳ, τῇ ψυχῇ, πολλὰ νοσήματα ἔχει καὶ ἀνίατα, τούτῳ δὲ βιωτέον ἐστὶν καὶ τοῦτον ὀνήσει, ἅν τε ἐκ θαλάττης ἅν τε ἐκ δικαστηρίου ἑάν τε ἄλλοθεν ὅποθεν οὖν σώσῃ· ἀλλ' οἶδεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ζῆν τῷ μοχθηρῷ ἢ ἀνθρώπῳ· κακῶς γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν ζῆν.

LXVIII. Διὰ ταῦτα οὐ νόμος ἐστὶ σεμνύνεσθαι τὸν κυβερνήτην, καίπερ σφίζοντα ἡμᾶς· οὐδέ γε, ὦ θαυμάσιε, τὸν μηχανοποιόν, ὃς οὔτε στρατηγοῦ, μὴ ὅτι κυβερνήτου, οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἐλάττω ἐνίστε δύναται σφίζειν· πόλεις γὰρ ἐστὶν ὅτε ὅλας σφίζει. μή σοι δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν δικανικὸν εἶναι; καίτοι εἰ βούλοιο λέγειν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἅπερ ἡμεῖς, σεμνύνων τὸ πρᾶγμα, καταχώσειεν ἅν ὑμᾶς τοῖς λόγοις, λέγων καὶ παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν γίγνεσθαι μηχανοποιούς, ὥς οὐδὲν τᾷλλά ἐστιν· ἱκανὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ

512 LXVIII. 1. νόμος: usage, custom.
b Cf. τὰ νομιζόμενα.

3. μηχανοποιόν: Socrates has in mind the constructors of great machines which were used in the defence of beleaguered cities, and of which the second Punic war offers a celebrated example. The military engineer saves at the same time the lives of many men, — the orator only one life at a time. — μὴ (οὐχ) ὅτι: see on 450 e.

4. ἐλάττω δύναται σφίζειν: this use of the neut. acc. is extended from the cognate. Cf. *Apol.* 30 c ἐμὲ μείζω βλάπτει. On the pl., cf. the adverbial use of the neut. pl. by Thucydides. 'A chance is represented as the sum of so many contingencies; a quantity as the sum of so many smaller units.' *Rid.* § 43.

5. μή σοι δοκεῖ: the answer assumed in the following καίτοι would run as above: μὰ Δι' οὐκ ἔμοιγε. For the interrogative μή, see G. 282, 2. —

κατὰ . . . εἶναι: to be comparable to, i.e. worthy to be put upon the same plane with. Cf. *Apol.* 17 b ὁμολογοῖν ἅν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τοὺτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ.

7. τὸ πρᾶγμα: "his business." — καταχώσειεν: would cover under a mass, c e.g. of arrows, like obruere. Cf. *Hdt.* vii. 225 ἐν τούτῳ σφέας τῷ χώρῳ ἀλεξομένους . . . κατέχουσιν οἱ βάρβαροι βάλλοντες. The use of this word brings up the image of war and the hurling machines of the μηχανοποιοί, whose weapons, however, in this case are to be λόγοι instead of λίθοι.

8. λέγων: the omission of an object clause is accounted for by the addition of παρακαλῶν, which at the same time extends and defines λέγων. The use of δεῖν is rather strange; it would go better with λέγων. Perhaps there is a mixture of two constructions. For the matter, cf. 486 c.

9. ὥς κτέ.: see on 509 e.

9 f. ἱκανὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος: for his case is strong enough.

- 11⁵ 10 λόγος. ἀλλὰ σὺ οὐδὲν ἦττον αὐτοῦ καταφρονεῖς καὶ τῆς τέχνης τῆς ἐκείνου, καὶ ὡς ἐν ὀνειδίει ἀποκαλέσαις ἂν μηχανοποιόν, καὶ τῷ ὑεὶ αὐτοῦ οὐτ' ἂν δοῦναι θυγατέρα ἐθέλοις, οὐτ' ἂν αὐτῷ σαυτοῦ λαβεῖν τὴν ἐκείνου. καίτοι· ἐξ ὧν τὰ σαυτοῦ ἐπαινεῖς, τίνι δικαίῳ λόγῳ τοῦ μηχανο-
 15 ποιῶ καταφρονεῖς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν νυνδὴ ἔλεγες; οἶδ' α ὅτι φαίης ἂν βελτίων εἶναι καὶ ἐκ βελτιόνων. τὸ δὲ βέλ-
 | τιον εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἔστιν ἀρετὴ,
 τὸ σφίζειν αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ὄντα ὁποῖός τις ἔτυχεν, καταγέλαστός σοι ὁ ψόγος γίγνεται καὶ μηχανοποιῶ καὶ
 20 ἱατροῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, ὅσαι τοῦ σφίζειν ἔνεκα πε-
 ποίηνται. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, ὅρα μὴ ἄλλο τι τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἢ τὸ σφίζειν τε καὶ σφίζεσθαι. μὴ γάρ

512 11. ἀποκαλέσαις: call slightlying.
 c Cf. Soph. Ai. 726 τὸν τοῦ μανέντος κάκιβουλευτοῦ στρατοῦ ξύναμον ἀποκα-
 λοῦντες. The displacement of the first οὔτε from its normal position is common enough.

14. ἐξ ὧν: stands either for ἐκ τού-
 των ἐξ ὧν ("for the reasons for which you praise your art") or ἐκ τούτων ἃ ("from that which you say in praise of your art"), more likely the latter. See H. 996 a.

d 16. βελτίων καὶ ἐκ βελτιόνων: such combinations are common. Cf. Phaedr. 246 a θεῶν μὲν οὖν ἵπποι τε καὶ ἡνίοχοι αὐτοὶ τε ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν, Lys. in Agor. 18 δοῦλον καὶ ἐκ δοῦλων ὄντα, Soph. Phil. 384 πρὸς τοῦ κακίστου κακ κακῶν Ὀδυσσεύς, 874 εὐγενὴς γὰρ ἡ φύσις καὶ εὐγενῶν, Paul ad Phil. iii. 5 Ἐβραῖος ἐξ Ἐβραίων.—In this passage, moreover, we see in its worst colors the opposition between the theory championed by Callicles and his actual practices. The former is a kind of sophistical latitudinarianism;

the latter, the narrow-mindedness of 512 d
 Greek tradition.

17. μὴ ἔστιν: the regular accentuation of ἔστι after μὴ and τοῦτο.

18. ὄντα: constr. with the understood subject of σφίζειν.—ὁποῖός τις ἔτυχεν: "without regard to moral qualities."

22 f. μὴ γάρ τοῦτο μὲν, τὸ ζῆν κτέ.: the change from the subjv. to the indic. ἐστὶ may be due to forgetfulness on the part of the speaker, who, after giving the keynote to the sentence with the μὴ γάρ at the beginning, shifts to the independent, straightforward indic. construction. If the ἐστὶ is to be construed rigidly with μὴ, understanding again ὅρα, then we must consider that Socrates rejected the subjv., which may refer either to the present or the future, for the indic., which leaves no ambiguity as to its time sphere. That Socrates is aware of the grammatically uncertain structure of his sentence is shown by the τοῦθ' ὅρα below. But see Goodwin's view, GMT. 269.

τοῦτο μέν, τὸ ζῆν ὅποσονδὴ χρόνον, τόν γε ὡς ἀληθῶς
 ἄνδρα ἐατέον ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ φιλοψυχητέον, ἀλλὰ ἐπιτρέ-
 25 ψαντα περὶ τούτων τῷ θεῷ καὶ πιστεύσαντα ταῖς γυναιξίν,
 ὅτι τὴν εἰμαρμένην οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ἐκφύγοι, τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ
 σκεπτέον, τίν' ἂν τρόπον τοῦτον ὃν μέλλοι χρόνον βιώναι
 ὡς ἄριστα βιοίῃ, ἄρα ἐξομοίων αὐτὸν τῇ πολιτεία ταύτῃ
 ἐν ᾗ ἂν οἰκῇ, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἄρα δεῖ σε ὁμοιότατον γίγνεσθαι
 30 τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων, εἰ μέλλεις τούτῳ προσφιλῆς εἶναι
 καὶ μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει· τοῦθ' ὅρα εἰ σοὶ λυσίτε-

512 23 f. τόν γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα: has
 reference to the lengthy exposition of
 Callicles in ch. XXXVIII. ff., espe-
 cially 485 c, d, where the activity of
 Socrates is characterized as unmanly.
 Wherein true manliness consists, So-
 crates shows in his defence, *Apol.* ch.
 XVI. f. and XXIX.—ἐατέον: cf. 484 c
 ἐέσας φιλοσοφίαν. For the construc-
 tion, see on 507 c.

24 f. ἐπιτρέψαντα . . . τῷ θεῷ: this
 feeling of submission to God's decrees
 Socrates preserved even to his death.
Cf. Apol. 41 d οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ
 κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτή-
 σαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ἐπὶ θεῶν τὰ τού-
 του πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ
 τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ μοι δηλόν
 ἐστὶ τοῦτο ὅτι ἦδη θεοὶ ἀνάαι καὶ ἀπηλλά-
 χθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἢ μοι.

25. περὶ τούτων: for emphasis, in-
 stead of the simple acc. ταῦτα. But
 see *Rid.* § 106.—ταῖς γυναιξίν: be-
 cause these hold more firmly to what
 is old and time-honored, both in dialect
 (*cf. Crat.* 418 c αἱ γυναῖκες μάλιστα τὴν
 ἀρχαίαν φωνὴν σφύουσι, *Cic. de Or.* iii.
 12. 45) and in belief. This same old
 belief is expressed by Hector Z 488,
 μοῖραν (i.e. τὴν εἰμαρμένην) δ' οὐ τινὰ
 φημι πεφυγμένον ἔμμεναι ἀνδρῶν. It is
 ridiculed as an old wives' tale by the

Epicurean Velleius in *Cic. de Nat.* 512
Deor. i. 20. 55 as follows: Hinc
 vobis exstitit primum illa
fatalis necessitas quam εἰμαρ-
μένην dicitis, ut, quidquid ac-
 cidat, id ex aeterna veritate
 causarumque continuatione
 fluxisse dicatis. Quanti au-
 tem haec philosophia aesti-
 manda est cui tamquam ani-
 culis et iis quidem indoctis,
fato fieri videantur omnia?
 By the words ἐπιτρέψαντα κτέ., Socra-
 tes declares in a delicate way that
 this belief of the women harmonizes
 with the principles of true manliness
 better than the view of the highly
 cultured Callicles.

26. οὐδ' ἂν εἰς: οὐδεὶς is separated
 for the sake of emphasis. See G. 77,
 1, 2; H. 290 a.—τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ: see
 on 452 c. ἐπί denotes the immediate
 succession.

27. μέλλοι: is optative by assimila-
 tion to the potential ἂν βιοίῃ.

29. καὶ νῦν δὲ ἄρα: introduces the
 application to Callicles and his rela-
 tion to the Athenian state. In sense
 the clause depends on σκεπτέον above,
 but loosely.

31. τοῦθ' ὅρα: returns to the be-
 ginning, since the sense has become

λεῖ καὶ ἐμοί, ὅπως μὴ, ὦ δαιμόνιε, πεισόμεθα ὅπερ φασὶ
 | τὰς τὴν σελήνην καθαιρούσας, τὰς Θετταλίδας· σὺν τοῖς
 | φιλάτοις ἢ αἵρεσις ἡμῶν ἔσται ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς
 35 ἐν τῇ πόλει. εἰ δέ σοι οἶε ὄντινούν ἀνθρώπων παραδώ-
 σειν τέχνην τινὰ τοιαύτην, ἣτις σε ποιήσει μέγα δύνα-
 σθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇδε ἀνόμοιον ὄντα τῇ πολιτείᾳ εἴτ'
 ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ
 ὀρθῶς βουλεύει, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· οὐ γὰρ μιμητὴν δεῖ
 40 εἶναι ἀλλ' αὐτοφυῶς ὁμοῖον τούτοις, εἰ μέλλεις τι γνή-
 σιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι εἰς φιλίαν τῷ Ἀθηναίων δήμῳ καὶ
 ναὶ μὰ Δία τῷ Πυριλάμπους γε πρός. ὅστις οὖν σε
 τούτοις ὁμοιοτάτον ἀπεργάσεται, οὗτός σε ποιήσει,

513 somewhat obscured by the interven-
 a ing additions. The use of σοὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ
 resumes the previous unemphatic σέ,
 inasmuch as each one wishes to ob-
 tain the others' acceptance of his own
 view of life.

33. τὰς Θετταλίδας: the Thessalian women were very skilful in sorcery and poisoning. They stood in close relation to the night-goddess Hecate; hence people ascribed to them the power to draw the moon from the heavens. Strepsiades says in Ar. Nub. 749 γυναικα φαρμακίδ' εἰ πριάμενος Θετταλὴν | κατέλοιμι νύκτωρ τὴν σελήνην κτέ. Cf. Hor. Epod. 5. 45 quae sidera excantata voce Thessala | lunamque caelo deripit. For this, however, the goddess exacted punishment, for Suidas says αἱ τὴν σελήνην καθαιροῦσαι Θετταλίδες λέγονται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ τῶν παίδων (v. l. ποδῶν) στερίσκεσθαι. εἴρηται ἐπὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῖς τὰ κακὰ ἐπισπωμένων ἢ παροιμία. Cf. also Plin. N. H. xxx. 1. 2 (6). Aristophanes' designation of them under the name φαρμακίς, while it implies that their art consisted in

the manipulation of drugs, does not
 limit us to that view, because Herod-
 otus, vii. 114, uses the verb φαρμακεῖν
 in speaking of the sacrifice of white
 horses by the Magi to the river Stry-
 mon.

33 f. σὺν τοῖς φιλάτοις: at the risk
 of our dearest interests. For the asyn-
 deton, see on 450 b. — τὰ φάτατα:
 denotes the soul and its ἀρετή, as in
 Prot. 314 a ὅρα, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ περὶ τοῖς
 φιλάτοις κυβέης καὶ κινδυνεύης. In
 αἵρεσις lies a play on καθαιρεῖν.

35. ὄντινούν ἀνθρώπων: recalls the
 promises made for rhetoric by Gorgias.

39. μιμητὴν: imitation is not to be b
 thought of, for immoral action with
 a correct moral feeling is impossible.
 Hence the similarity must be original
 (αὐτοφυῶς).

41. φίλιαν τῷ δήμῳ: substantives
 involving action, either physical or
 mental, sometimes take the construc-
 tion of their corresponding adjs. or
 verbs. Cf. 522 d βοήθεια ἑαυτοῦ, Apol.
 30 a τὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. H. 765 a.

42. καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία τῷ Πυριλάμπους:
 see on 481 d.

ὡς ἐπιθυμεῖς πολιτικὸς εἶναι, πολιτικὸν καὶ ῥητορικόν· c
 45 τῷ αὐτῶν γὰρ ἤθει λεγομένων τῶν λόγων ἕκαστοι
 χαίρουσι, τῷ δὲ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἄχθονται· εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἄλλο
 147) λέγεις, ὦ φίλη κεφαλὴ. λεγόμεν τι πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Καλ-
 λίκλεις;

LXIX. ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὄντινά μοι τρόπον δοκεῖς εὖ
 λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες· πέπονθα δὲ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος·
 οὐ πᾶν σοι πείθομαι.

Σα. Ὁ δῆμου γὰρ ἔρως, ὦ Καλλίκελις, ἐνὼν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ
 15 τῇ σῇ ἀντιστατεῖ μοι· ἀλλ' ἐὰν πολλάκις ἴσως καὶ βέλ-
 τιον ταῦτα ταῦτα διασκοπώμεθα, πεισθήσει. ἀναμνή- a
 σθητι δ' οὖν, ὅτι δύο ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὰς παρασκευὰς ἐπὶ τὸ
 ἕκαστον θεραπεύειν καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν, μίαν μὲν πρὸς

513 44. πολιτικὸς εἶναι: since these
 b words would be understood if not
 present, the special insertion of them
 can only serve to emphasize the
 identity of wish and result.

c 45. τῷ αὐτῶν γὰρ ἤθει λεγομένων:
 as an illustration of the sentiment,
cf. Dem. *Ol.* iii. 19 ἀλλ' οἶμαι μέγα τοῖς
 τοιούτοις ὑπάρχει ("comes to the aid
 of") λόγοις ἢ παρ' ἑκάστου βούλησις.

47. ὦ φίλη κεφαλὴ: a humorously
 pathetic mode of address, borrowed
 from the Homeric usage (*Θ* 281 *et*
al.). *Cf.* also Soph. *O. R.* 950 ὦ
 φίλτατον γυναικὸς Ἰοκάστης κάρη etc.
 Our use of the word 'heart' in ten-
 der address is analogous. *Cf.* Shaks.
Love's Labor Lost, v. 3: 'Good heart,
 what grace hast thou thus to re-
 prove?' etc.

LXIX. 2. τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος:
 namely that they listen gladly only
 to that which harmonizes with their
 opinions, and are very loath to offer
 on the altar of more perfect knowl-
 edge the views they have come to

cherish; hence they remain unde- 513
 cided, as Meno says, *Meno* 95 c *ὅπερ οἱ*
πολλοὶ πέπονθα· τοτὲ μὲν μοι δοκοῦσι,
τοτὲ δὲ οὐ. The candor of Callicles
 here as compared with his earlier
 obstinacy is quite remarkable. For
 the asyndeton, see on 450 b.

5. ἴσως: this addition shows that
 the fulfilment of the condition is still
 very doubtful. *Cf.* Socrates' remarks
 on the necessity of time to convince,
 in *Apol.* 19 a, 37 a, b, quoted on 455 a.

7. δ' οὖν: but then, emphasizes, in d
 contrast to the uncertain hope just
 expressed, what must happen in any
 case. *Cf.* *Apol.* 17 a. The Latin
 equivalent is certe. Socrates has
 in mind at the moment ch. LV. f.,
 where, however, reference was made
 to the conversation with Gorgias and
 Polus in ch. XIX. f.

8. ἕκαστον: subject to θεραπεύειν.

8 f. πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν: expe-
 getic to μίαν (*sc.* παρασκευήν). μὴ
 καταχαριζόμενον limits ὁμιλεῖν which
 belongs also to πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, and

ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν, τὴν ἐτέραν δὲ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, μὴ
 10 καταχαριζόμενον ἀλλὰ διαμαχόμενον. οὐ ταῦτα ἦν ἂ
 τότε ὠριζόμεθα;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ μὲν ἐτέρα, ἡ πρὸς ἡδονήν, ἀγεννὴς καὶ
 οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ κολακεία τυγχάνει οὔσα· ἡ γάρ;

15 ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω εἰ βούλει σοι οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δέ γε ἐτέρα ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστον ἔσται τοῦτο, εἴτε
 σῶμα τυγχάνει ὃν εἴτε ψυχὴ, ὃ θεραπεύομεν;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως ἐπιχειρητέον ἡμῶν ἐστὶν τῇ πόλει
 20 καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θεραπεύειν, ὡς βελτίστους αὐτοὺς τοὺς
 πολίτας ποιῶντας; ἄνευ γὰρ δὴ τούτου, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἔμπρο-
 σθεν ἡύρισκομεν, οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἄλλην εὐεργεσίαν οὐδε-
 μίαν προσφέρειν, ἐὰν μὴ καλὴ ἀγαθὴ ἡ διάνοια ἢ τῶν 514

513 requires the supplying of an indefinite
 d subject. See on 512 d ὄντα.

10. καταχαριζόμενον: used in *Apol.*
 35 c with the acc. (τὰ δίκαια). δια-
 μάχεσθαι frequently takes περί τινος.
 See also on 502 b, 503 a.

e 15. εἰ βούλει: added by Callicles
 here, as εἰ σοι ἡδίων in 514 a, ἵνα σοι
 χαρίσωμαι 516 b, to avoid responsi-
 bility. It is almost parenthetical.

16. ἡ . . . ἐτέρα: there is no need
 of an explanatory appositional clause
 corresponding to ἡ πρὸς ἡδονήν, since
 the inference from d is sufficient.
 The lacking verb (τυγχάνει οὔσα) on
 account of the parallelism must be
 taken from the preceding words of
 Socrates. ὅπως . . . τοῦτο is added
 to correspond to ἀγεννὴς . . . κολα-
 κεία, thus, "is directed to that end,
 viz." etc. The connexion is a loose
 one.

20. θεραπεύειν: the addition of the

inf. here is an afterthought, after the 513
 object which in sense belongs to it e
 has been already proleptically con-
 nected with the preceding verb. Cf.
Crito 52 c ἐπιθυμία σε . . . ἄλλων νόμων
 ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι. See *Kr.* 61, 6, 8; *Rid.*
 § 180.

20 f. ὡς . . . ποιῶντας: connected
 (as a correlative) epexegetically with
 οὕτως. Cf. *Phaedo* 59 a σχεδόν τι
 οὕτω διεκέμεθα, ὅτε μὲν γελῶντες,
 ἐνίοτε δὲ δακρύοντες. The position of
 the οὕτως, which in sense is to be
 construed with θεραπεύειν, is due to
 the form of the sentence. The par-
 tics. agree in case with the unex-
 pressed subj. of θεραπεύειν, viz. ἡμᾶς.

23. ἐὰν μὴ κτέ.: explains ἄνευ δὴ 514
 τούτου.—διάνοια: i.e. the inner activ- a
 ity of the soul itself, its reasoning,
 thinking; hence it is often used for
 the mode of thought, the disposition,
 and even for the soul itself.

μελλόντων ἢ χρήματα πολλὰ λαμβάνειν ἢ ἀρχὴν τινων ἢ
25 ἄλλην δύναμιν ἡντινοῦν. θῶμεν οὕτως ἔχειν;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε, εἴ σοι ἦδιον.

14 ΣΔ. Εἰ οὖν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους, ὦ Καλλίκλεις,
δημοσίᾳ πράζοντες τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ
οἰκοδομικά, ἢ τειχῶν ἢ νεωρίων ἢ ἱερῶν ἐπὶ τὰ μέγιστα
30 οἰκοδομήματα, πότερον ἔδει ἂν ἡμᾶς σκέψασθαι ἡμᾶς
αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐξετάσαι, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἐπιστάμεθα τὴν τέχ-
νῃ ἢ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, τὴν οἰκοδομικὴν, καὶ παρὰ τοῦ
ἐμάθομεν; ἔδει ἂν ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

35 ΣΔ. Οὐκοῦν δεύτερον αὖ τόδε, εἴ τι πώποτε οἰκοδόμημα
ᾧκοδομήκαμεν ἰδίᾳ ἢ τῶν φίλων τινὶ ἢ ἡμέτερον αὐτῶν,
καὶ τοῦτο τὸ οἰκοδόμημα καλὸν ἢ αἰσχροὺν ἔστιν· καὶ εἰ
μὲν ἡνρίσκομεν σκοπούμενοι διδασκάλους τε ἡμῶν ἀγα-
θοὺς καὶ ἐλλογίμους γεγονότας καὶ οἰκοδομήματα πολλὰ
40 μὲν καὶ καλὰ μετὰ τῶν διδασκάλων ᾧκοδομημένα ἡμῖν,

514 27. εἰ οὖν παρεκαλοῦμεν κτέ.: by a
a series of analogies Socrates tries to
show that the profession of statecraft
implies various preliminary qualifica-
tions, and that the incipient states-
man ought to be subjected to an
examination as to his education and
previous habits, instead of following
the Athenian practice. Cf. *Prot.* 319d
ἐπειδὴν δέ τι περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως διοι-
κήσεως δὲρ βουλευσασθαι, συμβουλευεῖ
αὐτοῖς ἀνιστάμενος περὶ τούτων ὁμοίως
μὲν τέκτων, ὁμοίως δὲ χαλκεὺς σκυτοτό-
μος, ἔμπορος ναύκληρος, πλούσιος πένης,
γενναῖος ἀγεννής, καὶ τοῦτοις οὐδὲς ἐπι-
πλήττει ὅτι οὐδαμῶθεν μαθὼν οὐδὲ ὄντος
διδασκάλου οὐδενὸς αὐτῷ, ἔπειτα συμβου-
λεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ, *Xen. Mem.* iv. 2. 1-7.
28. δημοσίᾳ πράζοντες: almost
equivalent to δημοσιεύοντες. — τῶν

πραγμάτων: must be considered as 514
part. gen. after δημοσίᾳ πράζοντες, and
is not to be construed with the fol-
lowing clause, with Cron.

29. ἢ τειχῶν ἢ νεωρίων ἢ ἱερῶν:
these are themselves the greatest
public works, but the addition of
μέγιστα serves to emphasize the im-
portance of the matter and the re-
sponsibility of the person.

30. πότερον: the second member
of the double question is found in
the ἢ οὐ which follows the repeated
ἔδει ἂν below. — ἔδει ἂν: instead of
ἔδει, shows that the whole condition
is purely fictitious and unreal. The
simple ἔδει would have drawn atten-
tion only to the inf. GMT. 423.

35. δεύτερον αὖ τόδε: to be com- b
pleted from the preceding πότερον κτέ.

πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἰδίᾳ διὰ ἡμῶν ἐπειδὴ τῶν διδασκάλων ἀπη-
 λάγημεν, οὕτω μὲν διακειμένων νοῦν ἐχόντων ἦν ἂν ἰέναι
 ἐπὶ τὰ δημόσια ἔργα· εἰ δὲ μήτε διδάσκαλον εἶχομεν
 ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιδείξαι οἰκοδομήματά τε ἢ μηδὲν ἢ πολλὰ
 45 καὶ μηδενὸς ἄξια, οὕτω δὲ ἀνόητον ἦν ἂν που ἐπιχειρεῖν
 τοῖς δημοσίοις ἔργοις καὶ παρακαλεῖν ἀλλήλους ἐπ' αὐτά.
 φῶμεν ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

LXX. Σα. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πάντα, τά τε ἄλλα κἂν εἰ
 ἐπιχειρήσαντες δημοσιεύειν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους ὥς
 ἱκανοὶ ἰατροὶ ὄντες, ἐπεσκευάμεθα δῆπου ἂν ἐγὼ τε σέ
 καὶ σὺ ἐμέ, “φέρε πρὸς θεῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης πῶς

⁵¹⁴
 c 41. ἰδίᾳ διὰ ἡμῶν: would lead us
 to expect as a contrast κοινῇ μετὰ τῶν
 διδασκάλων. But κοινῇ is omitted as
 self-evident, while ἰδίᾳ gives a certain
 definiteness to διὰ ἡμῶν.

42. διακειμένων (viz. ἡμῶν): is used
 absolutely; νοῦν ἐχόντων is to be con-
 nected with ἦν as above, 500 a παντὸς
 ἀνδρός.

45. οὕτω δέ: correlative with οὕτω
 μέν. See on 512 a. — ἀνόητον ἦν ἂν:
 cf. below, e καταγέλαστον ἂν ἦν and
 ἀνόητον ἂν εἶναι.

d LXX. 1. οὐκοῦν οὕτω πάντα:
 these words would seem to indicate
 the conclusion of the induction and
 the transition to its application to
 the question under discussion. Mean-
 while, however, Socrates cites another
 example which is still closer to his
 idea. Hence τά τε ἄλλα καί, which
 at the same time sums up and em-
 phasizes. — κἂν: is to be resolved
 into καὶ ἔν, the καὶ being correlative
 with τέ, and not going with εἰ in the
 sense “even.” For the repetition of
 the ἔν, two lines below, see 465 c, d,
 and on 475 e.

2. δημοσιεύειν: the general word ⁵¹⁴
 to denote the public practice of any
 profession or business which is for
 the benefit of the community. See
 on 452 a δημιουργός. In the case of
 physicians, are included not merely
 those who are in the service of the
 government, but also private practi-
 tioners. See on 455 b.

3. ὥς . . . ὄντες: expresses in a
 different form what is found above,
 a, in the phrase ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκοδομικά, viz.
 the department of activity to which
 attention is drawn.

4. φέρε κτέ.: change to direct quo-
 tation occurs frequently as here, with-
 out the employment of a definite verb
 of saying. — δέ: often employed in
 lively questions which are closely con-
 nected with the words of another. So
 here. Socrates offers himself to the
 state as a physician, but in what state
 of health is his own body? Cf.
 Xen. Mem. ii. 1. 26 (in the myth of
 Prodicus, after Κακία had praised
 her gifts) καὶ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἀκούσας
 ταῦτα, ὦ γύναι, ἔφη, ὄνομα δέ σοι τί
 ἐστι;

- 5 ἔχει τὸ σῶμα πρὸς ὑγίειαν; ἢ ἤδη τις ἄλλος διὰ Σωκράτην ἀπηλλάγη νόσου, ἢ δούλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος;” κἀν ἐγώ, οἶμαι, περὶ σοῦ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἐσκόπουν· καὶ εἰ μὴ ἡύρισκομεν δι’ ἡμᾶς μηδένα βελτίω γεγονότα τὸ σῶμα, μήτε τῶν ξένων μήτε τῶν ἀστών, μήτε ἄνδρα μήτε γυναῖκα, 10 πρὸς Διός, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, οὐ καταγέλαστον ἂν ᾦν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀνοίας ἐλθεῖν ἀνθρώπους, ὥστε πρὶν ἰδιωτεύοντας πολλὰ μὲν ὅπως ἐτύχομεν ποιῆσαι, πολλὰ δὲ κατορθῶσαι καὶ γυμνάσασθαι ἱκανῶς τὴν τέχνην, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ πίθῳ τὴν κεραμεῖαν ἐπιχειρεῖν 15 μανθάνειν, καὶ αὐτοὺς τε δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν καὶ ἄλλους τοιοῦτους παρακαλεῖν; οὐκ ἀνόητόν σοι δοκεῖ ἂν εἶναι οὕτω πράττειν;

ΚΑΛ. *Εμοιγε.

514 6. ἢ δούλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος: cf. 502 d and 515 a. The distinction between slaves and freemen, which was always present to the mind of a Greek, is emphasized here because it was common for slaves to be treated by less skilled physicians, who might themselves be slaves, as we learn from *Legg.* iv. 720 c ἀρ’ οὖν καὶ ξυμνοεῖς ἐστὶ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων ὄντων τῶν καμνόντων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τοὺς μὲν δούλους σχεδόν τι οἱ δούλοι τὰ πολλὰ ἰατρεύουσι. Cf. *Herm. Gr. Alt.* iv.³ § 38.

e 11. ἀνθρώπους: from the particular to the general, which also includes the particular. We should say “people” in the same way. It is remarkable, however, how quickly Socrates returns to the first person in the next clause. One must have in mind an individual before he can give particulars.

12. ὅπως ἐτύχομεν ποιῆσαι: is the contrast to κατορθῶσαι. When one is beginning in a profession much is necessarily, from inexperience, done

at a risk, and may or may not succeed. For the phrase ὅπως ἐτύχομεν, cf. 521 c, *Crito* 45 d τὸ σὸν μέρος, ὅτι ἂν τύχῃσι, τοῦτο πράξουσιν, “the success of your sons is left as far as you are concerned to the caprice of chance.” *Prot.* 353 b ὅτι ἂν τύχῃσι, τοῦτο λέγουσι, qui quidquid in buccam venit dicunt. The usual inference is unfavorable. The partic. is to be supplied from the following verb.

14. ἐν τῷ πίθῳ τὴν κεραμεῖαν: the proverb denotes, “to begin with the large instead of with the small.” Cf. *Lach.* 187 a εἰ γὰρ νῦν, πρῶτον ἔρξασθε παιδεύειν, σκοπεῖν χρὴ μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ Καρὶ ὑμῖν ὁ κίνδυνος κινδυνεύεται, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς ὑέσι τε καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῶν φίλων παισὶ, καὶ ἀπεχρῶς τὸ λεγόμενον κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ὑμῖν συμβαίνει ἐν πίθῳ ἢ κεραμεῖα γιγνομένη. A proverb from the potter’s art was natural among the Athenians, where the art flourished (*Κεραμευκός*).

150

- Σο. Νῦν δέ, ὦ βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν, ἐπειδὴ σὺ μὲν αὐτὸς 515
 20 ἄρτι ἄρχει πράττειν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα, ἐμὲ δὲ
 παρακαλεῖς καὶ ὀνειδίζεις ὅτι οὐ πράττω, οὐκ ἐπισκεψό-
 μεθα ἀλλήλους, “φέρε, Καλλικλῆς ἤδη τῷ ἀβελτίῳ πεποίηκε
 τῶν πολιτῶν; ἔστιν ὅστις πρότερον πονηρὸς ὢν, ἀδικός
 τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄφρων, διὰ Καλλικλέα καλὸς τε
 25 καὶ ἀγαθὸς γέγονεν, ἢ ξένος ἢ ἀστός, ἢ δούλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος;”
 λέγε μοι, εἰάν τις σε ταῦτα ἐξετάζη, ὦ Καλλίκευς, τί β
 ἐρεῖς; τίνα φήσεις βελτίῳ πεποιηκέναι ἄνθρωπον τῇ
 συνουσίᾳ τῇ σῇ; ὁκνεῖς ἀποκρίνασθαι, εἴπερ ἔστιν τι
 ἔργον σὸν ἔτι ἰδιωτεύοντος, πρὶν δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν;
 30 Καλ. Φιλόνομος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

LXXI. Σο. Ἄλλ’ οὐ φιλονικία γε ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ’ ὡς
 ἀληθῶς βουλόμενος εἰδέναι, ὅντινά ποτε τρόπον οἶε δεῖν
 πολιτεύεσθαι ἐν ἡμῖν. ἢ ἄλλου τοῦ ἄρα ἐπιμελήσει ἡμῶν
 ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα, ἢ ὅπως ὅτι βέλτιστοι c
 5 πολῖται ὦμεν; ἢ οὐ πολλάκις ἤδη ὠμολογήκαμεν τοῦτο
 δεῖν πράττειν τὸν πολιτικὸν ἄνδρα; ὠμολογήκαμεν ἢ οὐ;

515 19. ὦ βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν: a pathetic
 a address. See on 513 c.

20. ἄρτι ἄρχει: on the age of Cal-
 licles at the time of this dialogue, see
 Introd. § 15.—On the matter, cf. *Apol.*
 36 c ἐπιχειρῶν ἕκαστον ἡμῶν πείθειν μὴ
 πρότερον μῆτε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπι-
 μελεῖσθαι, πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως
 ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος ἔσοιτο,
 μῆτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς
 πόλεως.

22. φέρε κτέ.: see on 514 d.

23 f. ἀδικός τε κτέ.: various kinds
 of πονηρία, as contrasted with the
 corresponding virtues. Cf. 491 e ff.

b 28. εἴπερ κτέ.: Socrates’ opinion
 can be readily perceived. Between
 these repeated questions we must
 assume short pauses. On the pos-

sessive pronoun followed by the gen., 515
 see H. 691; G. 137, n. 1.

30. φιλόνομος εἶ: the accusation
 is a confession of weakness, having
 much the same force as Crito’s an-
 swer (*Crito* 54 d) ἀλλ’, ὦ Σώκρατες,
 οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. See on 457 d.

LXXI. 3. ἐν ἡμῖν: cf. ἐν τοῖς πολί-
 ταις, ἐν τῷ δήμῳ. In spite of the ad-
 dition of δεῖν, no subject for πολιτεύ-
 εσθαι is expressed. But we should
 not feel the ellipsis in English, and
 often make such without noticing
 it.—ἡμῖν: seems to be a kind of
 ethical dat. See G. 184, 3, n. 6;
 H. 770. Cope translates the clause,
 ‘whether we shall find you concern-
 ing yourself about anything else,’
 etc.

151 ἀποκρίνου. ὡμολογήκαμεν· ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ σοῦ ἀποκρινοῦμαι.
εἰ τοίνυν τοῦτο δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα παρασκευάζειν τῇ
ἑαυτοῦ πόλει, νῦν μοι ἀναμνησθεῖς εἰπὲ περὶ ἐκείνων τῶν
10 ἀνδρῶν ὧν ὀλίγῳ πρότερον ἔλεγες, εἰ ἔτι σοι δοκοῦσιν
ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται γεγονέναι, Περικλῆς καὶ Κίμων καὶ Μι- α
τιάδης καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς.

ΚΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, εἴπερ ἀγαθοί, δῆλον ὅτι ἕκαστος αὐτῶν
15 βελτίους ἐποίει τοὺς πολίτας ἀντὶ χειρόνων; ἐποίει ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὅτε Περικλῆς ἤρχετο λέγειν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ,
χείρους ἦσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἢ ὅτε τὰ τελευταῖα ἔλεγεν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἴσως.

515 7. ὑπὲρ σοῦ: cf. *Apol.* 22 e ὥστε
c με ἑμαυτὸν ἀνερῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ,
so that I asked myself in the name of
the oracle.

11. πολῖται: the idea of this word
(as also of πολιτεύεσθαι) approaches
so near that of "statesmen" that it
is frequently used in that sense; e.g.
in the speech of Diodotus against
Cleon (*Thuc.* iii. 42. 5) *χρὴ τὸν ἀγαθὸν*
πολίτην μὴ ἐκφοβοῦντα τοὺς ἀντεροῦν-
τας ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου φαίνεσθαι ἕμεινον
λέγοντα. Cf. below, e. Above we
find *πολιτικὸς ἀνὴρ* and also *ἀνὴρ* simply,
used in the same sense; cf.
517 a.

d 15. ἐποίει: sc. in the course of his
activity as a statesman. — ἀντὶ χειρό-
νων: the brachylogy is here harder
than in the case where the relation is
reversed; e.g. *Polit.* 308 a ἀντ' ἐλευθέ-
ρων γενόμενοι δούλοι. We might have
expected ἐκτ.

17. ἤρχετο λέγειν: here denotes
not so much Pericles' first appear-
ance before the people as the first
period of his political life. This

began even before the death of Ephialtes, who, owing to the machina-
tions of his enemies, was murdered
shortly after the banishment of Cimon
(460 B.C.). The height of Pericles'
power was reached after the death
of Cimon and the banishment of Thu-
cydides, son of Melesias (443 B.C.). —
On the construction of *ἔρχεσθαι*, see
on 488 a.

18. τὰ τελευταῖα ἔλεγεν: Socrates
is referring again, not so much to
Pericles' last oratorical efforts, but to
the last period of his political activ-
ity, which fell within the first years
of the Peloponnesian war. On the
result of his last speech (430 B.C.)
Thucydides (ii. 65) remarks: *Τοιαῦτα*
ὁ Περικλῆς λέγων ἐπειρᾶτο τοὺς Ἀθη-
ναίους τῆς τε ἐπ' αὐτὸν ὀργῆς παραλύειν
καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν παρόντων δεινῶν ἀπάγειν
τὴν γνώμην. οἱ δὲ δημοσίᾳ μὲν τοῖς
λόγοις ἀνεκείθοντο . . . οὐ μέντοι πρότε-
ρόν γε οἱ ξύμπαντες ἐπαύσαντο ἐν ὀργῇ
ἔχοντες αὐτὸν πρὶν ἐξημίωσαν χρήμασιν.
— On the neut. pl., see on 512 b and
Kr. 46, 3, 2.

20 Σο. Οὐκ ἴσως δὴ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων, εἶπερ ἀγαθός γ' ἦν ἐκείνος πολίτης. e

ΚΑΛ. Τί οὖν δὴ;

Σο. Οὐδέν· ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι εἶπὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, εἰ λέγονται Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ Περικλέα βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἢ πᾶν τοῦναντίον διαφθαρῆναι ὑπ' ἐκείνου. ταυτὶ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἀκούω, Περικλέα πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίους ἀργούς καὶ δειλοὺς καὶ λάλους καὶ φιλαργύρους, εἰς μισθοφορίαν πρῶτον κατήσαντα.

ΚΑΛ. Τῶν τὰ ὦτα κατεαγόντων ἀκούεις ταῦτα, ὦ Σώ-
30 κρατες.

⁵¹⁵
^d 20. ἀνάγκη: is adverbial dat. corresponding to the adverb ἴσως.

e 22. τί οὖν δὴ: see on 453 b and 497 d. The reply of Socrates shows that he intends Callicles himself to draw the necessary inference from what he proceeds to bring forward.

26. ἀργούς κτλ.: this accusation is based upon a suspicion that Pericles, in order to bring about certain desirable measures in the government, employed bribery disguised under the names of *μισθὸς στρατιωτικός*, *δικαστικός*, *ἐκκλησιαστικός*, and *θεωρικός*, of which, however, only the first two can be ascribed to Pericles. On this dole the Athenian citizens could live in a poor way at the expense of the state, and they lost perhaps some of that energy which was characteristic of them in earlier times.—*δειλούς*: the Athenians became timid, as a natural consequence of their inactivity, in that they (much later however) withdrew from personal war service, and depended on mercenaries exclusively.

27. *λάλους*: to activity in the real service of the state, principally of course in the assembly, was soon

joined a desire to seek entertainment ⁵¹⁵ in public. For here their curiosity, a natural failing, was nourished by continual gossip and talk. This was the case in the time of Demosthenes (*Phil.* i. 10), of Paul (*Acts* xvii. 18), and is the case at the present day. See on 461 e.—*φιλαργύρους*: the desire to obtain money from the public treasury became continually stronger and more universal, and wrought great damage to the government. At the time of Demosthenes the continuance of the *θεωρικόν* was especially injurious, because the means for military purposes were thereby greatly curtailed. Plato's criticism of Pericles was always unfavorable, which, however, is not to be wondered at, since his youth fell during the years of Athenian depression, which the oligarchy ascribed to the mistakes of the great democratical leader.—*μισθοφορίαν*: on the growth and effects of this policy at Athens and elsewhere, see Grote, *Hist.* xi. 281 (c. lxxxvii.).

29. τῶν τὰ ὦτα κατεαγόντων: the Laconian imitators (*λακωνίζοντες*, *λακωνομανοῦντες*) in Athens were thus

Σα. Ἀλλὰ τάδε οὐκέτι ἀκούω, ἀλλ' οἶδα σαφῶς καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σύ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἡὐδοκίμει Περικλῆς καὶ οὐδεμίαν αἰσχροὺς δίκην κατεψηφίσαντο αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἥνικα χείρους ἦσαν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ καλοὶ κάγαθοὶ ἐγεγόνεσαν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τοῦ βίου τοῦ Περικλέους, κλοπὴν αὐτοῦ κατεψηφίσαντο, ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ θανάτου ἐτίμησαν, δῆλον ὅτι ὡς πονηροῦ ὄντος.

LXXII. ΚΑΛ. Τί οὖν; τούτου ἔνεκα κακὸς ἦν Περικλῆς;

Σα. Ὅνων γοῦν ἂν ἐπιμελητὴς καὶ ἵππων καὶ βοῶν τοιοῦτος ὢν κακὸς ἂν ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰ παραλαβὼν μὴ

⁵¹⁵ named from having their ears often
^e broken in the *πυγμή* by the straps with which the hands were covered (see *Herm. Gr. Alter.* iv.³ § 37, p. 347). They formed a party, hostile to the democracy, which saw in Lacedaemon the model of a noble state, and looked to her for help. They practised Lacedaemonian severity in all external matters; hence they wore mustaches, short mantles, etc., and practised gymnastics very diligently. To harden the body, they even engaged in boxing, which was forbidden in Sparta. They became naturally, therefore, butts for ridicule. *Cf. Prot.* 342 b. — By this remark Callicles here accuses Socrates of partisanship.

⁵¹⁶ 34. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καλοὶ κάγαθοί: with bitter irony. If they were really good, the righteousness of the judgment of Pericles would have been recognized; but if this judgment was unrighteous, then Pericles did not make them good. — ὑπ' αὐτοῦ: γίγνομαι, as passive of ποῖω, requires ὑπό for the agent.

35 f. κλοπὴν αὐτοῦ κτέ.: in the

second year of the Peloponnesian war, when Pericles returned from an expedition against the Spartan coast, the slumbering discontent of the people, caused by the devastation of Attica by the Spartans and the ravages of the plague in Athens, broke out against him in the form of an accusation as a result of which he was fined a sum of money, the amount of which (15, 50, 80 talents) is not certain. *Thuc.* ii. 59; 65. See on 515 d. That the ostensible charge was embezzlement of the public funds is supported by this passage alone, but that various rumors were current of his dishonesty can be gathered from the story of Alcibiades' advice to him in *Plut. Alcib.* vii. Περικλεῖ δὲ βουλόμενος ἐντυχεῖν ἐπὶ θύρας ἦλθεν αὐτοῦ. πυθόμενος δὲ μὴ σχολάζειν, ἀλλὰ σκοπεῖν καθ' ἑαυτόν, ὅπως ἀποδώσει λόγον Ἀθηναίοις, ἀπὼν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης. "εἶτα" ἔφη "βέλτιον οὐκ ἦν σκοπεῖν αὐτόν, ὅπως οὐκ ἀποδώσει λόγον Ἀθηναίοις;"

LXXII. 4. εἰ παραλαβὼν: not designed as an epexegetis to τοιοῦτος ὢν, which merely gives the general

5 λακτίζοντας [ἐαυτὸν] μηδὲ κυρίττοντας μηδὲ δάκνοντας ἀπέδειξε ταῦτα ἅπαντα ποιούντας δι' ἀγριότητα. ἡ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι κακὸς εἶναι ἐπιμελητῆς ὅστισιν ὅτουσιν ζῶν, ὃς ἂν παραλαβὼν ἡμερώτερα ἀποδείξῃ ἀγριώτερα ἢ παρέ-
λαβε; δοκεῖ ἡ οὐ;

10 ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε, ἵνα σοι χαρίσωμαι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τότε τοίνυν μοι χάρισαι ἀποκρινάμενος · πότε-
ρον καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν τῶν ζώων ἐστὶν ἡ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνθρώπων Περικλῆς ἐπεμέλετο;

15 ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔδει αὐτούς, ὥς ἄρτι ὠμολογοῦμεν, δικαιοτέρους γεγονέναι ἀντὶ ἀδικωτέρων ὑπ' ἐκείνου, εἴπερ ἐκείνος ἐπεμελεῖτο αὐτῶν ἀγαθὸς ὢν τὰ πολιτικά;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

20 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἱ γε δίκαιοι ἡμεροί, ὥς ἔφη Ὅμηρος. σὺ δὲ τί φῆς; οὐχ οὕτως;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγριωτέρους γε αὐτοὺς ἀπέφηνεν ἡ οἶος
/παρέλαβε, καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς αὐτόν, ὃν ἡκιστ' ἂν ἐβούλετο.

⁵¹⁶ idea which runs through all the preceding thought, but added to give those details to the simile which seem to be requisite. — παραλαβών: receiving for training. See on 483 e. — The position of the words λακτίζοντας, κυρίττοντας, and δάκνοντας is probably merely a chance one.

6. ἀπέδειξε: the word means "to show or prove as the result of a process," often in mathematical reasoning; here as the result of training. Cf. below c ἀπέφηνεν. Hence also the expression ἀποδεικνύναι τινὰ στρατηγόν. See on 484 b.

b 10. ἵνα σοι χαρίσωμαι: see on

513 e. The reply of Socrates is full of irony. ⁵¹⁶ b

11. ἀποκρινάμενος: for the tense, see on 491 c.

16. ἔδει: without ἂν. See on 514 a.

17. ἀντὶ ἀδικωτέρων: see on 515 d.

20. οἱ γε δίκαιοι ἡμεροί ὥς ἔφη Ὅμηρος: there is no such direct assertion in any passage of Homer, but the same sense is seen in ζ 120, ι 175 ἢ ῥ' οἱ γ' ὕβρισταί τε καὶ ἄγριοι οὐδὲ δίκαιοι. Here, moreover, the leading thought is the utter exclusion of any idea of δικαιοσύνη from the ἄγριοι.

24. ὃν ἡκιστ' ἂν ἐβούλετο: cf. Apol. 25 d ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται

- 25 ΚΑΛ. Βούλει σοι ὁμολογήσω;
 ΣΩ. Εἰ δοκῶ γέ σοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν.
 ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω δὴ ταῦτα.
 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγριωτέρους, ἀδικωτέρους τε καὶ
 χείρους;
 30 ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω. d
 ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρ' ἀγαθὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ Περικλῆς ἦν ἐκ τούτου
 τοῦ λόγου.
 ΚΑΛ. Οὐ σύ γε φῆς.
 ΣΩ. Μὰ Δι' οὐδέ γε σὺ ἐξ ὧν ὁμολόγεις. πάλιν δὲ
 35 λέγε μοι περὶ Κίμωνος· οὐκ ἐξωστράκισαν αὐτὸν οὐτοί
 οὓς ἐθεράπευεν, ἵνα αὐτοῦ δέκα ἐτῶν μὴ ἀκούσειαν τῆς
 φωνῆς; καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα ταῦτα ταῦτα ἐποίησαν καὶ φυγῇ
 προσεξημίωσαν; Μιλτιάδην δὲ τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι εἰς τὸ •

516 ὅπρὸ τῶν ξυνόντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον
 c ἢ ὠφελεῖσθαι. For δν, see on 453 e.
 The ellipsis is to be supplied from
 what precedes.

d 33. οὐ . . . φῆς: see on 450 d.

35. ἐξωστράκισαν αὐτόν: Cimon was a supporter of the Lacedaemonian league, and also caused the Athenians to send aid to the Spartans in the third Messenian war. But when the Athenians were dismissed in so humiliating a manner at Ithome, his opponent, Pericles, turning to account the indignation of the people, succeeded in effecting his banishment in B.C. 461. The term of banishment by ostracism was limited by law to ten years. But Cimon was recalled about B.C. 457, also at the instance of Pericles. Since ostracism (Herm. Gr. Alter. i. § 130) was properly not a punishment, Socrates, in the words ἵνα αὐτοῦ δέκα ἔτη μὴ ἀκούσειαν, is merely making a point against the influence of Cimon in the state.

37. Themistocles was banished in 516 B.C. 471, and went to Argos. Here he was accused by the Spartans of participation in the treason of Pausanias, or μηδισμός, and to escape investigations fled to the Persian king, a step which was followed by the confiscation of his magnificent property at Athens.

38. προσεξημίωσαν: and in addition they punished, etc. Cf. Apol. 20 a σφίσι ξυνεῖναι χρήματα δίδοντας καὶ χάριν προσεῖδέναι. — τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι: this short adverbial expression seems to have been used simply as a distinguishing epithet, and it is not likely that the Greeks supplied or felt any ellipsis such as is suggested by Cron, viz. τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι (Μαραθῶνι alone) παραταξάμενον (μαχεσάμενον) or νικήσαντα. The epithet is the more emphatic as the victors at Marathon (Μαραθωνομάχαι Ar. Nub. 986) were unusually revered by posterity. In consequence of the unfortunate expe-

βάραθρον ἐμβαλεῖν ἐψηφίσαντο, καὶ εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸν πρύ-
 40 τανιν, ἐνέπυσεν αὖν; καίτοι οὗτοι, εἰ ἦσαν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί,
 ὥς σὺ φῆς, οὐκ αὖ ποτε ταῦτα ἔπασχον. οὐκ οὖν οἱ γε
 ἀγαθοὶ ἡνίοχοι κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὐκ ἐκπίπτουσιν ἐκ τῶν
 ζευγῶν, ἐπειδὰν δὲ θεραπεύσωσιν τοὺς ἵππους καὶ αὐτοὶ
 ἀμείνους γένωνται ἡνίοχοι, τότε ἐκπίπτουσιν· οὐκ ἔστι
 45 ταῦτ' οὐτ' ἐν ἡνιοχίᾳ οὐτ' ἐν ἄλλῳ ἔργῳ οὐδενί· ἡ δοκεῖ
 σοι;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθεῖς ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικεν, οἱ ἐμπροσθεν λόγοι ἦσαν,
 ὅτι οὐδένα ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγενοτά τὰ πολι- 517
 50 τικὰ ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει. σὺ δὲ ὠμολόγεις τῶν γε νῦν
 οὐδένα, τῶν μέντοι ἐμπροσθεν, καὶ προείλου τούτους τοὺς
 ἄνδρας· οὗτοι δὲ ἀνεφάνησαν ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς νῦν ὄντες,
 ὥστε, εἰ οὗτοι ῥήτορες ἦσαν, οὔτε τῇ ἀληθινῇ ῥητορικῇ
 ἐχρῶντο — οὐ γὰρ αὖ ἐξέπεσον — οὔτε τῇ κολακικῇ.

516 dition against Paros, Miltiades was,
 6 on the prosecution of Xanthippus, declared guilty of ἀπάτησις τοῦ δήμου, and fined fifty talents. According to Hdt. vi. 136, his adversary demanded the penalty of death, which was averted by the intercession of friends.

39. εἰ μὴ διὰ: "if it had not been for." The prytanis probably exerted his influence before the division, though this whole story seems to be much overdrawn.

40 f. εἰ ἦσαν . . . ἔπασχον: opposition to generic present. Cf. 471 a. Goodwin (GMT. 410) considers this as a case of real opposition to the past.

41. οὐκ οὖν κτέ.: the neg. contained in οὐκ οὖν (Kr. 69, 51, 2) applies not to the second member alone, but to the two members together; the co-

existence of the two clauses is denied. 518
 This form sharply emphasizes the self-contradiction which is fundamental in Callicles' view. — The results of the whole argument are now summed up as briefly as possible.

50. σὺ δὲ κτέ.: with ὠμολόγεις 517
 must be supplied the participial clause of the preceding sentence. From this also we must take a verb of saying to govern a τινὰς also to be supplied from οὐδένα of the clause τῶν . . . ἐμπροσθεν. 2

52. ἐξ ἴσου: has almost the force of an adj. See Kr. 43, 4, 5; H. 798 f.

54. οὐ γὰρ ἐξέπεσον: we find additions, such as ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος, ἀρχῆς, τυραννίδος, and the like; also δόξης, οὐσίας (ἐκ τῶν ἐόντων, Hdt. iii. 14). The verb ἐκπίπτειν serves thus as a passive to ἐκβάλλειν, though the image is that of a chariot driver who is

LXXIII. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μή ποτέ τις τῶν νῦν ἔργα τοιαῦτα ἐργάσῃται, οἷα ὅς τούτων ὃς βούλει εἰργασται.

ΣΑ. Ὡς δαιμόνιε, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ψέγω τούτους ὥς γε διακόνους εἶναι πόλεως, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν γε νῦν διακονικώτεροι γεγονέναι καὶ μᾶλλον οἷοί τε ἐκπορίζειν τῇ πόλει ὧν ἐπεθύμει· ἀλλὰ γὰρ μεταβιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, πείθοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ τοῦτο, ὅθεν ἔμελλον ἀμείνους ἔσεσθαι οἱ πολῖται, ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν 10 τούτων διέφερον ἐκείνοι· ὅπερ μόνον ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀγαθοῦ ο πολίτου. ναὺς δὲ καὶ τείχη καὶ νεώρια καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐγὼ σοι ὁμολογῶ δεινότερους εἶναι ἐκείνους 5 τούτων ἐκπορίζειν. πρᾶγμα οὖν γελοῖον ποιούμεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· ἐν παντὶ γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ, ὃν διαλεγόμεθα, οὐδὲν πανόμεθα εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ αἰεὶ περιφερόμενοι καὶ 15

517 thrown out. Cf. the English phrase
a 'fall through,' as applied to a design or project. — οὕτε τῇ κολακικῇ: sc. with which they might have saved themselves, according to Callicles' view (511 c, 486 b), but which Pericles despised.

LXXIII. 1. ἀλλὰ μέντοι . . . μή ποτε: "But yet, the men of the present day are at least far from being able to," etc.

b 3. ὃς (δοῖς) βούλει: used like the Lat. *quivis*, by a looseness of construction. Cf. *Phileb.* 43 d τριῶν οὖν ὄντων ἡμῖν ὄντων βούλει, *Crat.* 432 a ὅστις βούλει ἄλλος ἀρθμός. *Rid.* § 189.

4 f. ὥς γε διακόνους εἶναι: as far, that is, as their being servants of the city is concerned. See *Madv. Syn.* § 151, GMT. 781, for examples. The distinction here drawn rests also, as is quickly shown, on what has been

demonstrated in ch. XIX. ff. But it 517
is more extensive. b

7. μεταβιβάζειν: "to give another direction to." See on 493 a. This verb and ἐπιτρέπειν are resumed by οὐδὲν τούτων, and depend on διέφερον. A similar passage (without the intervening acc.) is *Prot.* 328 a ἀλλὰ κἀν εἰ ὀλίγον ἐστί τις ὅστις διαφέρει ἡμῶν προβιβάζει εἰς ἀρετὴν, ἀγαπητόν.

8. ἐπιτρέπειν: we must supply a dat. from the preceding acc. See on 460 d. The verb has a slightly different sense in 504 c.

10. τούτων: note the variety in the use of the pronouns; τούτων is the same as τῶν νῦν above, and hence ἐκείνοι is required to take the place of τούτους above.

11. ναὺς κτέ.: cf. 455 d. c

12. εἶναι: equiv. to ὅτι ἦσαν.

15. εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ περιφερόμενοι: similar in form, but not in meaning, to

ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλήλων ὅτι λέγομεν. ἐγὼ οὖν σε πολλάκις οἶμαι ὡμολογηκέναι καὶ ἐγνωκέναι, ὥς ἄρα διττὴ αὕτη τις ἢ πραγματεία ἐστὶν καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, α καὶ ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα διακονικὴ ἐστίν, ἥ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐκπορί- 20 ζειν, εἰ μὲν πεινῇ τὰ σώματα ἡμῶν, σιτία, εἰ μὲν δὲ διψῇ, ποτά, εἰ μὲν δὲ ῥιγῶ, ἱμάτια, στρώματα, ὑποδήματα, ἀλλ' ὧν ἔρχεται σώματα εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν· καὶ ἐξέπιτῆδές σοι διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰκόνων λέγω, ἵνα ῥᾶον καταμάθῃς. τούτων γὰρ ποριστικὸν εἶναι ἡ κάπηλον ὄντα ἡ ἔμπορον ἡ δημι- 25 ουργόν του αὐτῶν τούτων, σιτοποιὸν ἡ ὀψοποιὸν ἡ ὑφάν- ο την ἡ σκυτοτόμον ἡ σκυτοδεψόν, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν ἐστίν ὄντα τοιοῦτον δόξαι καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεραπευτῇν

517 the English phrase "argument in a circle," i.e. a coming back again to the point of departure. Cf. *Rep.* v. 456 b ἤκομεν εἰς τὰ πρότερα περιφερόμενοι.

16. ἀλλήλων: is to be connected, as a kind of subjective or possessive gen., with the following indirect question. See H. 733; Kr. 47, 10, 8. "Each other's language."

17. διττὴ κτέ.: notice the position of the τις, which belongs to διττή, "a kind of doubled." See on 491 c.

d 19. ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα: the second member of the correlation is divided into two parts of which the first is indicated by ὅτι ἔστιν τις κτέ. (below, e), and the other by τὴν δὲ . . . δεσποίναν εἶναι τούτων (518 a).—ἡ . . . εἶναι: the shift from the regular indir. disc. indic. to an inf. is not uncommon. Cf. *Rep.* x. 616 b ἐφ' ἡ ἀφικνεῖσθαι τεταρταίους ὅθεν καθορᾶν ἄνωθεν κτέ. *Rid.* § 281; GMT. 755.

21 f. ἀλλ' ὧν ἔρχεται κτέ.: anything else, that the body comes to want.

24. ποριστικὸν εἶναι κτέ.: in what

follows, three varieties are distinguished. The κάπηλος is the small dealer, hawker or shopkeeper, who deals properly with products of the land (among which are included wines in 518 b); the ἔμπορος is the regular merchant and wholesale dealer. Cf. *Prot.* 313 c. The δημιουργός is the one who prepares from the raw material the various articles demanded by the needs of the body.

26. σκυτοδεψόν: is unusual for θυροδεψής (*tanner*).

27. ὄντα τοιοῦτον: includes under one expression all the divisions and subdivisions of the ποριστικὸν εἶναι, but owing to the introduction of θαυμαστόν ἐστίν the construction is changed and the partic. takes the place of the inf. What Socrates wishes to explain is that one who attends to the needs of the body, even though he may understand nothing of either gymnastics or medicine, may very easily himself become possessed of the idea that he is the genuine conservator of the body, as well as inspire the same belief in others.

εἶναι σώματος, παντὶ τῷ μὴ εἰδότει, ὅτι ἔστιν τις παρὰ
 ταύτας ἀπάσας τέχνη γυμναστική τε καὶ ἰατρική, ἣ δὴ τῷ
 30 ὄντι ἐστὶν σώματος θεραπεία, ἥπερ καὶ προσήκει τούτων
 ἄρχειν πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ χρῆσθαι τοῖς τούτων ἔργοις
 διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι, ὅτι τὸ χρηστὸν καὶ ποιητὸν τῶν σιτίων ἢ
 ποτῶν ἐστὶν εἰς ἀρετὴν σώματος, τὰς δ' ἄλλας πάσας
 ταύτας ἀγνοεῖν· διὸ δὴ καὶ ταύτας μὲν δουλοπρεπεῖς τε ⁵¹⁸
 35 καὶ διακονικὰς καὶ ἀνελευθέρους εἶναι περὶ σῶμα πραγ-
 ματείας, τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, τὴν δὲ γυμναστικὴν καὶ ἰατρι-
 κὴν κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον δεσποίνας εἶναι τούτων. ταῦτα οὖν
 ταῦτα ὅτι ἔστιν καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν, τότε μὲν μοι δοκεῖς μαν-
 θάνειν ὅτε λέγω, καὶ ὁμολογεῖς ὡς εἰδὼς ὅτι ἐγὼ λέγω·
 40 ἤκεις δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον λέγων, ὅτι ἄνθρωποι καλοὶ κάγα-
 θοὶ γεγόνασιν πολῖται ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἐγὼ ἐρωτῶ ^b
 οἷτινες, δοκεῖς μοι ὁμοιοτάτους προτείνεσθαι ἀνθρώπους
 περὶ τὰ πολιτικά, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ περὶ τὰ γυμναστικά ἐμοῦ
 ἐρωτῶντος, οἷτως ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν ἢ εἰσὶν σωματίων
 45 θεραπευταί, ἑλεγές μοι πάνυ σπουδάζων, Θεαρίων ὁ ἀρτο-
 κόπος καὶ Μίθαικος ὁ τὴν ὀψοποιίαν συγγεγραφὼς τὴν

⁵¹⁷ 28. παντὶ τῷ μὴ εἰδότει: added as
^a a restrictive explanation to the pre-
 ceding τοῖς ἄλλοις, which is far too
 general a statement for Socrates.

28 f. παρὰ ταύτας ἀπάσας: see on
 τὰς ἄλλας κτέ. below, 518 a.

⁵¹⁸ 34. δουλοπρεπεῖς: plays on 485 b
^a and similar expressions in the earlier
 conversation with Callicles, e.g. 485 d.
 The attributes of rhetoric and phil-
 osophy are just reversed.

36. τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας: "arts ordi-
 narily designated as such."

^b 45. Θεαρίων: and the following-
 named persons are sometimes men-
 tioned by later authors, Μίθαικος for
 example, among those whom Athe-

naeus xii. 12 cites as authors of works ⁵¹⁸
 on cookery (τὰ ὀψαρτυκτά). The ^b
 title of his work can be surmised
 from this passage. That the art of
 cookery, especially in rich and proud
 Syracuse, was early developed, Plato
 testifies in *Rep.* iii. 404 d Συρακοσίαν
 τράπεζαν καὶ Σικελικὴν ποικιλίαν ἔψου.
Cf. *Hor. Od.* iii. 1. 18 Siculae da-
 pes. The ἀρτοκόπος is at the same
 time a cake-baker. The ἄρτος made
 from wheat meal was a festival
 dainty, as is to be judged from Athe-
 naeus iv. 14 Σόλων δὲ τοῖς ἐν πρυτα-
 νεῖφ σιτουμένοις μᾶζαν παρέχειν κελεύει,
 ἄρτον δὲ ταῖς ἑορταῖς προσπαρτιθέναι.
 Sarambus probably had a wine-shop.

Σικελικὴν καὶ Σάραμβος ὁ κάπηλος, ὅτι οὗτοι θαυμάσιοι γεγόνασιν σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ὁ μὲν ἄρτους θαυμαστοὺς ε παρασκευάζων, ὁ δὲ ὄψον, ὁ δὲ οἶνον.

LXXIV. Ἴσως ἂν οὖν ἡγανάκτεας, εἴ σοι ἔλεγον ἐγὼ ὅτι “ἄνθρωπε, ἐπατεῖς οὐδὲν περὶ γυμναστικῆς· διακόνους μοι λέγεις καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν παρασκευαστὰς ἀνθρώπους, οὐκ ἐπαίοντας καλὸν κάγαθόν οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτῶν, οἷ, ἂν οὕτω
5 τύχωσιν, ἐμπλήσαντες καὶ παχύναντες τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπαινούμενοι ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, προσαπολοῦσιν αὐτῶν α καὶ τὰς ἀρχαίας σάρκας· οἱ δ’ αὖ δι’ ἀπειρίαν οὐ τοὺς ἐστιῶντας αἰτιάσονται τῶν νόσων αἰτίους εἶναι καὶ τῆς ἀποβολῆς τῶν ἀρχαίων σαρκῶν, ἀλλ’ οἱ ἂν αὐτοῖς τύχωσι
10 τότε παρόντες καὶ συμβουλευόντες τι, ὅταν δὴ αὐτοῖς ἦκη ἢ τότε πλησμονὴ νόσον φέρουσα συχνῶ ὕστερον χρόνῳ, ἅτε ἄνευ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ γεγονυῖα, τούτους αἰτιάσονται καὶ

518 LXXIV. 1. Ἴσως ἂν οὖν ἡγανάκτεας: as Callicles really did when
c Socrates proved to him that he understood nothing at all of statecraft.

2. ὅτι: see on 521 b.

3. παρασκευαστὰς ἀνθρώπους: the addition of ἀνθρώπους (“fellows”) is contemptuous.

4. καλὸν κάγαθόν: is used by Plato regularly of persons. Schanz, ii. 2 *poll.* 1, has collected only sixteen cases where it is not so used. Three such examples are found in the *Gorgias*, viz. 514 a, 526 a, in addition to the present passage. — περὶ αὐτῶν: refers according to sense to γυμναστικῆς, but is made general in view of b above.

4 f. ἂν οὕτω τύχωσιν: see on 514 e. Here, “if they so chance,” i.e. perhaps.

d 6 f. προσαπολοῦσιν . . . σάρκας: Demosthenes expresses the same idea

by a somewhat different simile in 518
d *Ol.* i. 15 ὥσπερ οἱ δανειζόμενοι βιβλίας ἐπὶ τοῖς μεγάλοις τόκοις μικρὸν εὐπορήσαντες χρόνον ὕστερον καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀπέστησαν. Also with the following ἀλλ’ οἱ ἂν αὐτοῖς τύχωσιν παρόντες cf. *Dem. Ol.* i. 16 ἐγὼ δὲ οὐκ ἄγνοῶ μὲν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦθ’ ὅτι πολλὰς ὁμεις οὐ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ὑστάτους περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων εἰπόντας ἐν ὀργῇ ποιείσθε ἂν τι μὴ κατὰ γνώμην ἐκβῇ, *Phil.* ii. 34 ὁρῶ γὰρ ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἐρίους οὐκ εἰς τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλ’ εἰς τοὺς ὑπὸ χεῖρα μάλιστα τὴν ὀργὴν ἀφιέντας.

7. οἱ δ’ αὖ: the construction is loose, but the context prevents ambiguity.

10 f. ἦκη φέρουσα: gives a picture, — “it is actually at hand, bringing disease with it,” — for the more prosaic “has brought about disease.” See on 491 c.

ψέξουσιν καὶ κακὸν τι ποιήσουσιν, ἂν οἰοί τ' ὦσι, τοὺς δὲ
προτέρους ἐκείνους καὶ αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν ἐγκωμιάσουσιν."

157 15 καὶ σὺ νῦν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὁμοιότατον τούτῳ ἐργάζει· ο
ἐγκωμιάζεις ἀνθρώπους, οἱ τούτους εἰστιάκασιν εὐχοῦν-
τες ὧν ἐπεθύμουν, καὶ φασὶ μεγάλην τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκέ-
ναι αὐτούς· ὅτι δὲ οἶδεῖ καὶ ὕπουλός ἐστιν δι' ἐκείνους
τοὺς παλαιούς, οὐκ αἰσθάνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ σωφροσύνης 519
20 καὶ δικαιοσύνης λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τειχῶν καὶ φό-
ρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν ἐμπεπλήκασιν τὴν πόλιν· ὅταν
οὖν ἔλθῃ ἡ καταβολὴ αὕτη τῆς ἀσθενείας, τοὺς τότε
παρόντας αἰτιάσονται συμβούλους, Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ καὶ
Κίμωνα καὶ Περικλέα ἐγκωμιάσουσιν, τοὺς αἰτίους τῶν
25 κακῶν· σοῦ δὲ ἴσως ἐπιλήψονται, ἐὰν μὴ εὐλαβῇ, καὶ τοῦ
ἐμοῦ ἐταίρου Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὅταν καὶ τὰ ἀρχαῖα προσαπολ-
λύσῃ πρὸς οἷς ἐκτῆσαντο, οὐκ αἰτίων ὄντων τῶν κακῶν b
ἀλλ' ἴσως συναιτίων. καίτοι ἐγωγε ἀνόητον πρᾶγμα καὶ
νῦν ὁρῶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀκούω τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν πέρι.
30 αἰσθάνομαι γάρ, ὅταν ἡ πόλις τινὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν

518 16. **τούτους**: is defined by the fol-
e lowing τὴν πόλιν. With καὶ φασὶ
the subject changes, so that αὐτούς
refers to the same as οἱ, while τού-
τους furnishes the subject for καὶ
φασὶ.

18. οἶδεῖ καὶ ὕπουλός ἐστι: the
first term denotes an external swell-
ing or bloated condition, which may,
however, for the time have all the
appearance of health; the latter, the
internal and hence invisible seat of
disease.

519 20. **φόρων**: duties and imposts
a which the Athenians imposed upon
other states, but expended only for
their own interests.

21. καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν: with a
side hit at 490 c and a more definite

reference to 455 e. Cf. Dem. Ol. iii. 519
29, quoted on 490 c. a

22 f. **τοὺς τότε παρόντας κτέ.**: again
the same thought as in d above.

25. **σοῦ . . . ἐπιλήψονται**: contains
an allusion to 486 a. For the parti-
tive gen., see H. 738 a, and on 469 c.
— καὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἐταίρου Ἀλκιβιά-
δου: on the value of this prophecy
of Socrates for determining the date
of this discussion, see Introd. § 19.
For the reader, the life of Alcibiades
will serve as a most convincing proof
of the soundness of Socrates' state-
ments.

29. **ὁρῶ, ἀκούω**: Socrates desires b
to emphasize that in the past as well
as the present the same thing has
been repeating itself.

μεταχειρίζεται ὡς ἀδικοῦντα, ἀγανακτούντων καὶ σχετλια-
ζόντων ὡς δεινὰ πάσχουσι· πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὴν πόλιν
πεποιηκότες ἄρα ἀδίκως ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἀπόλλυνται, ὡς ὁ τούτων
λόγος· τὸ δὲ ὄλον ψεῦδός ἐστιν. προστάτης γὰρ πόλεως
35 οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ποτε ἀδίκως ἀπόλοιτο ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως ἥς ο
προστατεῖ· κωδυνεύει γὰρ ταῦτόν εἶναι, ὅσοι τε πολιτικοὶ
προσποιοῦνται εἶναι καὶ ὅσοι σοφισταί. καὶ γὰρ οἱ σοφι-
σταί, τᾶλλα σοφοὶ ὄντες, τοῦτο ἄτοπον ἐργάζονται πρᾶγμα·
φάσκοντες γὰρ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι εἶναι πολλάκις κατ-
40 ηγοροῦσιν τῶν μαθητῶν, ὡς ἀδικοῦσι σφᾶς αὐτούς, τοὺς τε
μισθοὺς ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ ἄλλην χάριν οὐκ ἀποδιδόντες.
εἰ παθόντες ὑπ' αὐτῶν· καὶ τούτου τοῦ λόγου τί ἂν ἀλογώ- d
τερον εἴη πρᾶγμα, ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους γενομέ-
νους, ἐξαιρεθέντας μὲν ἀδικίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ διδασκάλου, σχόν-
45 τας δὲ δικαιοσύνην, ἀδικεῖν τούτῳ ὃ οὐκ ἔχουσιν; οὐ δοκεῖ

519 31. ἀγανακτούντων: depends upon
b αἰσθάνομαι with the omission of αὐτῶν.
The pl. is due to the plural idea, and
to the ἀνδρῶν. The statement holds
good for *all*, though the action affects
the individual only.

33. ἄρα: postpositive, as in *Prot.*
355 b ὡς δὲ ταῦτα γελοῖά ἐστι κατὰ
δηλον ἔσται ἐὰν μὴ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι
χρώμεθα ἄρα. Here it serves to char-
acterize the assumption as a result
that follows of itself.

c 35. οὐδ' ἂν εἰς: see on 512 e.

36. ὅσοι κτέ.: loose connexion.
The same case, "as well in regard to
those who, etc. . . . as, etc."

37. προσποιοῦνται: Socrates is
thinking of the task which each
class assumes, viz. to make the sub-
ject of their treatment better, to
endow him with virtue. The pre-
tended statesman promises this re-
sult to the whole body of citizens;

the sophist, to the individual. Cf. 519
Isocr. xiii. 5 f.

40. σφᾶς αὐτούς: themselves indeed,
with more emphasis than the simple
σφᾶς, which is more usual as the in-
dir. reflexive. Cf. 520 b.

42. καί: but little different from d
καί τοι (and yet) in rejoinders, espe-
cially to statements made by the
speaker. Cf. *Apol.* 29 b καὶ τοῦτο πῶς
οὐκ ἄμαθλα ἐστίν; Dem. vi. 16 καὶ τίς
ἂν ταῦτα πιστεύσειεν;

43. ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοὺς κτέ.: sc. as one
must assume, according to the state-
ment of the sophists. The addition of
ἐξαιρεθέντας ἀδικίαν . . . ἀδικεῖν τούτῳ
(just here lies the ἀδικία) δ οὐκ ἔχου-
σιν serves to bring out very strongly
the want of consistency in the theory.

44. σχόντας: after they had gotten.
See on 503 e. Cf. *Apol.* 19 a, *Soph. E.*
1256 μόλις γὰρ ἔσχον νῦν ἐλευθερον
στόμα.

σοι τοῦτο ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὃ ἐταῖρε; ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγορεῖν
 με ἡνάγκασας, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

LXXV. ΚΑΛ. Σὺ δ' οὐκ ἂν οἴός τ' εἶης λέγειν, εἰ μὴ
 τίς σοι ἀποκρίνοιτο;

ΣΑ. Ἐοικά γε· νῦν γοῦν συχνοὺς τεῶω τῶν λόγων, ὅ
 ἐπειδὴ μοι οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἀλλ' ὠγαθέ, εἰπέ
 5 πρὸς φίλιον, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἄλογον εἶναι ἀγαθὸν φάσκοντα
 πεποιηκέναι τινὰ μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ, ὅτι ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἀγαθὸς
 γεγυνώς τε καὶ ὧν ἔπειτα πονηρὸς ἔστω;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΑ. Οὐκοῦν ἀκούεις τοιαῦτα λεγόντων τῶν φασκόντων
 10 παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἀρετήν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε· ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις ἀνθρώπων πέρι οὐδ- 520
 ἐνὸς ἀξίων;

ΣΑ. Τί δ' ἂν περὶ ἐκείνων λέγοις, οἳ φάσκοντες προ-
 εστάναι τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη
 15 ἔσται, πάλιν αὐτῆς κατηγοροῦσιν, ὅταν τύχωσιν, ὡς πονη-
 ροτάτης; οἷε τι διαφέρειν τούτους ἐκείνων; ταῦτόν, ὃ

519 46. ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγορεῖν: here de-
 d notes the delivery of a long, connected
 discourse as opposed to dialectic in-
 vestigation. It is also a reply to Cal-
 licles' accusation in 482 c ὡς ἀληθῶς
 δημηγόρεις ὦν.

o LXXV. 3. εἰοικά γε (sc. οἴός τ' εἶναι κτέ.): is a partial assent to the
 assertion implied in Callicles' ques-
 tion, "You would doubtless be quite
 capable," etc. — The following clause
 with γοῦν seems to be urged in proof,
 but it is really more of a complaint.
 — συχνοὺς . . . τῶν λόγων: cf. 465 e
 συχρὸν λόγον ἀποτέτακα. The part.
 gen. emphasizes the distinctness of
 the arguments. — For the agreement
 of the adjective in gender and num-
 ber with the subst., cf. Xen. Cyr. iii.

2. 2 πολλὴν τῆς χώρας, iv. 5. 4 τῶν
 ἔργων τοὺς ἡμίσεις. 519 e

5. πρὸς φίλιον: see on 500 b.

10. παιδεύειν . . . εἰς ἀρετήν: cf.
 Xen. Cyr. 1.3. 3 ἐπ' ἀρετὴν.

11. ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις: what would 520
 one have to say? "One need not waste
 words over such people." Callicles, al-
 though at bottom himself a sophist, af-
 fects to despise the class in accordance
 with Gorgias' view concerning them.
 See Introd. § 8, especially note 22.

15. ὅταν τύχωσιν: has here much
 the force of "occasionally." See on
 518 c.

16. ταῦτόν: emphatic asyndeton,
 which as an answer to the question
 immediately preceding has the effect
 of a negation.

μακάρι', ἐστὶν σοφιστῆς καὶ ῥήτωρ, ἣ ἐγγύς τι καὶ παρα-
πλήσιον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πρὸς Πῶλον· σὺ δὲ δι' **b**
ἄγνοίαν τὸ μὲν πάγκαλόν τι οἶε εἶναι, τὴν ῥητορικὴν, τοῦ
20 δὲ καταφρονεῖς. τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ κάλλιον ἐστὶν σοφιστικὴ
ῥητορικῆς ὅσῳ περ νομοθετικὴ δικαστικῆς καὶ γυμναστικὴ
ιατρικῆς. μόνοις δ' ἔγωγε καὶ ἄμην τοῖς δημηγόροις τε
καὶ σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ πράγ-
ματι, ὃ αὐτοὶ παιδεύουσιν, ὡς πονηρόν ἐστιν εἰς σφᾶς,
25 ἣ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ ἅμα καὶ ἑαυτῶν κατηγορεῖν,
ὅτι οὐδὲν ὠφελήκασιν οὓς φασιν ὠφελεῖν. οὐχ οὕτως **c**
ἔχει;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΟ. Καὶ προέσθαι γε δήπου τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἄνευ μι-
30 σθοῦ, ὡς τὸ εἰκόσ, μόνοις τούτοις ἐνεχώρει, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ
ἔλεγον. ἄλλην μὲν γὰρ εὐεργεσίαν τις εὐεργετηθεῖς,
οἷον ταχὺς γενόμενος διὰ παιδοτρίβην, ἴσως ἂν ἀπο-

520 17. ἣ ἐγγύς κτέ.: on the use of
a the adverb, see Kr. 62, 2, 4. τι goes
with it as τίς with the adj., "pretty
nearly." See on 491 c.

b 20. τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ κτέ.: cf. 464 b ff.
22. καὶ ἄμην: the position of καὶ
here, which would properly be con-
nected with μόνοις, is due to the de-
sire to emphasize this latter word by
putting it at the head of the sen-
tence.

23. τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι: that which
receives their training, whether it be
a whole commonwealth or an indi-
vidual. The abstract neut. general-
izes, as in Prot. 312 c, where of the
sophists themselves it is said: καίτοι
εἰ τοῦτ' (i.e. what a sophist is) ἀγνοεῖς
οὐδὲ ὅτ' παραδίδως τὴν ψυχὴν οἶσθα,
οὐτ' εἰ ἀγαθὸν οὐτ' εἰ κακὸν πράγματι.

25. ἣ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ κτέ.: without,
at the same time. Cf. Phaedr. 245 d

τοῦτο δὲ οὐτ' ἀπόλλυσθαι οὔτε γίγνεσθαι **b**
δυνατόν, ἣ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν τε
γένεσιν συμπεσοῦσαν στήναι. Cron sup-
plies from οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν the words
ἀνάγκην εἶναι, but it is very doubtful
whether the Greeks felt the ellipsis.
Cf. 471 d.

29. προέσθαι τὴν εὐεργεσίαν: every **c**
piece of instruction given the scholar
by the teacher is looked upon as a
benefit, and the pay is simply a com-
pensation for benefit received. To
προέσθαι, which of itself denotes a
freewill gift, is added ἄνευ μισθοῦ in
order to make more plain the con-
trast with the practice of the soph-
ists, which ran so counter to the
customary ideas of the Greeks (cf.
Apol. 19 e f., 31 b, 33 a). The prac-
tice of Protagoras, as it is told us in
Prot. 328 b, c, is noteworthy in this
connexion.

στερήσειε τὴν χάριν, εἰ πρόοιτο αὐτῷ ὁ παιδοτρίβης
καὶ μὴ συνθέμενος αὐτῷ μισθὸν ὅτι μάλιστα ἅμα
35 μεταδιδούς τοῦ τάχους λαμβάνοι τὸ ἀργύριον· οὐ γὰρ α
βραδυνῇτι, οἶμαι, ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλ' ἀδικία·
ἦ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΑ. Οὐκοῦν εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀφαιρεῖ, τὴν ἀδικίαν, οὐδὲν
40 δεῶν αὐτῷ μήποτε ἀδικηθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἀσφαλὲς ταύτην
τὴν εὐεργεσίαν προέσθαι, εἴπερ τῷ ὄντι δύναιτό τις ἀγα-
θοὺς ποιεῖν. οὐχ οὕτω;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

LXXVI. ΣΑ. Διὰ ταῦτ' ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικε, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας
συμβουλάς συμβουλεύειν λαμβάνοντα ἀργύριον, οἷον
οἰκοδομίας περὶ ἣ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν.

ΚΑΛ. Ἐοικέ γε.

5 ΣΑ. Περὶ δέ γε ταύτης τῆς πράξεως, ὄντιν' ἂν τις τρό-
πον ὥς βέλτιστος εἴη καὶ ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ
ἢ πόλιν, αἰσχρόν νενόμισται μὴ φάναι συμβουλεύειν, ἐὰν
μή τις αὐτῷ ἀργύριον διδῷ. ἦ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

10 ΣΑ. Δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο αἰτιόν ἐστιν, ὅτι μόνῃ αὕτῃ

520 34. ὅτι μάλιστα: to be connected
C with the partic. clause ἅμα μεταδιδούς,
simul atque tradit. — ἅμα: on
the adv. with the partic., see H. 976;
GMT. 858.

d 39 f. οὐδὲν δεινόν κτέ.: see on 517 a,
and cf. *Apol.* 28 b οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ ἐν
ἐμοὶ στή. It has much the force of
the English, 'there is no danger that,'
etc. See Gildersleeve, *Am. Jour. Phil.*
iii. 204.

LXXVI. 1 f. τὰς μὲν ἄλλας συμ-
βουλάς: almost equiv. to τὰς περὶ
ἄλλων συμβουλάς.

5 f. ὄντιν' ἂν τις τρόπον κτέ.: epex- 520
egetic to ταύτης τῆς πράξεως, "this
matter." The ἀρετὴ πολιτικὴ which the
sophists professed to teach included
both sides, — management of one's
own household and of the state. Cf.
Prot. 318 e τὸ δὲ μάθημά ἐστιν εὐβου-
λία περὶ τε τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα
τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν
τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνα-
τάτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν.

7. μὴ φάναι . . . ἐάν μὴ: generic
conditional of the present. The first
μὴ is due to the infinitive.

τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν τὸν εὖ παθόντα ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ ἀντ' εὖ ποιεῖν· ὥστε καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι, εἰ εὖ ποιήσας ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἀντ' εὖ πείσεται· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ. ἔστι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντα;

15 ΚΑΛ. Ἔστιν.

521

ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ ποτέραν οὖν με παρακαλεῖς τὴν θεραπείαν τῆς πόλεως, διόρισόν μοι, τὴν τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι Ἀθηναίους, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται, ὡς ἱατρον, ἢ ὡς διακονήσονται καὶ πρὸς χάριω ὁμιλήσονται; τάληθῇ μοι εἰπέ, Καλλί-
20 κλεις· δίκαιος γὰρ εἰ, ὥσπερ ἤρξω παρρησιάζεσθαι πρὸς ἐμέ, διατελεῖν ἃ νοεῖς λέγων· καὶ νῦν εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἰπέ.

520 11 f. ὡτ' εὖ ποιεῖν: the old way of writing was ἀντεποιεῖν; but a verb can retain its original form only when compounded with a preposition. See H. 581. Gratitude is only a kind of justice.

12. ὥστε καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι: sc. as testimony to the fact that the teacher has really made him better. The common form of the conditional, where the second member is the converse of the first, is ἐὰν μὲν . . . εἰ δὲ μή. See on 502 b. The use of εἰ with fut. indic. also in the first member emphasizes the rarity of the case. The subject of εὖ ποιήσας is indefinite, 'any one,' as of μὴ φάναι above.

521 16 f. τὴν θεραπείαν τῆς πόλεως: denotes political activity in the sense shown in ch. LVI. above, and in accordance with the principles deduced in ch. XIX. ff. The correct answer to the question propounded would be: "As matters are, I invite you to neither mode; for the one is immoral, the other (as Socrates also makes plain in *Apol.* 31 d f.), for the present impossible." Hence, also, Socrates

intimates that the only way of engaging in true politics is at present limited in Athens to the improvement of individuals in private intercourse. The use of the article with *θεραπείαν* implies that both kinds have been previously mentioned,—as is more definitely stated in the following explanation. Cf. *Crat.* 439 a εἰ οὖν ἔστιν μὲν ὅτι μάλιστα δι' ὀνομάτων τὰ πράγματα μανθάνειν, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτῶν, ποτέρα ἂν εἴη καλλίων ἢ μάθησις.

17. τὴν τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι: cf. *Apol.* 29 b αὕτη ἡ ἐπονέδιστος (ἀμαθία) ἡ τοῦ οἰεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν. According to *Madv. Syn.* 49 a, the exegetical gen. is usually found only with the inf.

18. ὡς ἱατρον: see on 514 d.—ἢ ὡς διακονήσονται: the two words ὡς ἱατρον have caused a shift in the construction where we should have expected (cf. 513 d) something like ἢ τὴν τοῦ καταχαρίζεσθαι κτέ. In the answer of Callicles we have a simple verbal quotation of Socrates' words, without the speaker's troubling himself to observe any fixed construction. One might supply παρακαλῶ σε,

ΚΑΛ. Λέγω τοίνυν ὅτι ὡς διακονήσονται.

ΣΩ. Κολακεύονται ἄρα με, ὦ γενναϊότατε, παρακαλεῖς.

25 ΚΑΛ. Εἰ σοι Μυσόν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὡς εἰ μὴ ταῦτά γε ποιήσεις —

ΣΩ. Μὴ εἴπῃς ὁ πολλάκις εἶρηκας, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ με ὁ βουλόμενος, ἵνα μὴ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπω, ὅτι πονηρός γε ὢν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα· μηδ' ὅτι ἀφαιρήσεται ἐάν τι ἔχω, ἵνα μὴ
30 αὐτὸ ἐγὼ εἴπω ὅτι “ἀλλ' ἀφελόμενος οὐχ ἔξει ὅτι χρήσεται αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ με ἀδίκως ἀφείλετο, οὕτως καὶ λαβὼν
ἀδίκως χρήσεται, εἰ δὲ ἀδίκως, αἰσχροῦς, εἰ δὲ αἰσχροῦς, κακῶς.”

LXXVII. ΚΑΛ. Ὡς μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, πιστεύειν μηδ' ἂν ἐν τούτων παθεῖν, ὡς οἰκῶν ἐκποδῶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν

521 24. *κολακεύονται*: pronounces such
b a judgment upon *διακονήσονται* that its opposition to the idea *γενναῖος* (*γενναϊότατε*, *γενναῖως εἰπέ*) is strongly emphasized.

25. *εἰ σοι Μυσόν γε κτέ.*: when two conditional clauses are contrasted by *εἰ μὲν . . . εἰ δὲ μή*, we not infrequently find the conclusion of the first condition omitted. GMT. 482; H. 904 a. The sense of this passage seems to be: “Yes! if you prefer to use the vilest name for it.” The Mysians were so despised that even slaves brought from Mysia were as little thought of as the Sardinians at Rome. Hence *Μυσῶν ἔσχατος* was a proverb (*Theaet.* 209 b τὸ λεγόμενον Μυσῶν τὸν ἔσχατον), meaning “the vilest of the vile.” Cic. *pro Flacc.* 27 Quid porro in Graeco sermone tam tritum atque celebratum est, quam si quis despiciatui ducitur, ut Mysorum ultimus esse dicatur? *κολακεῖν* was an unpleas-

ant word to the Greek ear, and 521 doubtless offended the euphemistic taste of Callicles. Cf. the English proverb, ‘to call a spade a spade.’ — *ὡς*: see on 509 e. — This passage has troubled the editors.

27. *ὁ πολλάκις εἶρηκας*: 486 a, b, 511 b. Polus, however, had already said the same.

29. *ἐάν τι ἔχω*: to be compared with *χρήσεται αὐτοῖς* in the line below.

30. *ὅτι ἀλλ' ἀφελόμενος*: *ὅτι* is often used to introduce a direct quotation. For examples, see Spieker, *Am. Jour. Phil.* v. 220.

LXXVII. 1. *ὡς μοι δοκεῖς*: to be c understood as a sportive exclamation. Cf. 490 e.

2. *μηδ' ἂν ἐν*: see on 512 e. — *ὡς οἰκῶν ἐκποδῶν*: “as if you dwelt outside the world,” where no one could reach you.

2 f. *ἂν εἰσαχθεῖς*: see on 458 a, and cf. Xen. *An.* i. 1. 10 αἰτέις εἰς διαχιλίους ξένους καὶ τριῶν μηνῶν μισθόν, ὡς οὕτως περιγενόμενος ἂν τῶν ἀντιστασιωτῶν.

εἰσαχθεῖς εἰς δικαστήριον ὑπὸ πάνυ ἴσως μοχθηροῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ φαύλου.

- 5 Σο. Ἀνόητος ἄρα εἰμί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἰ μὴ οἶμαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει ὄντινούν ἄν, ὅτι τύχοι, τοῦτο παθεῖν. τόδε μέντοι εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, εἴανπερ εἰσῶ εἰς δικαστήριον περὶ τούτων τινὸς κινδυνεύων ὃ σὺ λέγεις, πονηρός τίς μ' ἔσται ὁ εἰσάγων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν χρηστός μὴ
10 ἀδικοῦντ' ἄνθρωπον εἰσαγάγοι· καὶ οὐδέν γε ἄτοπον εἰ ἀποθάνοιμι. βούλει σοι εἶπω δι' ὅτι ταῦτα προσδοκῶ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

- Σο. Οἶμαι μετ' ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἶπω μόνος, ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ
15 πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν· ἅτε οὖν οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων τοὺς λόγους οὗς λέγω ἐκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων ποιεῖν ἅ σὺ παραινεῖς,

521 The difference in the participles is the same as it would be in direct discourse: οἰκῶ ἐκποδὼν καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἰσαχθείην. Cf. 486 b.

5. ἀνόητος ἄρα εἰμί: the particle ἄρα has the force, "as it seems," as frequently. Socrates is not to be understood as saying that he is ἀνόητος, but only that according to Callicles' view he would be.

6. ὄντινούν ἄν, ὅτι τύχοι: "any one may experience anything." The more usual mood would be subjv. ὅτι ἂν τύχη, instead of optative. But the opt. is not uncommonly found by attraction in relative sentences which are dependent on clauses with ἄν (either opt. or indic.). GMT. 558. On the subject-matter, cf. *Meno* 94 e ἐγὼ (Anytus is introduced as speaking) μὲν οὖν ἂν σοι συμβουλευσάμην, εἰ ἐθέλεις ἐμοὶ πεῖθεσθαι, εὐλαβεῖσθαι. ὡς ἴσως μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει βῆδιδόν

(βῆδόν) ἔστιν κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους· ἢ 521 εὖ· ἐν τῇδε δὲ καὶ πάνυ. *Apol.* 31 d, e, and *Dem. Ol.* iii. 11 ff. also agree with this.

7 ff. τόδε . . . προσδοκῶ: these d words sound like a prophecy in the mouth of Socrates, but were probably intended by Plato as a severe criticism on his accusers.

8. περὶ τούτων τινὸς κινδυνεύων: referring to the nature of the punishment to be undergone. Cf. above, b. —δ': where we should more naturally have ὧν, but see on 486 d.

13. ἵνα μὴ εἶπω μόνος: this limitation is intended to be exact, as the repetition of μόνος shows. On the matter, see *Apol.* 30 d ff.

16. οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον: the repetition in a changed form of the idea already expressed serves to heighten the contrast. See on οὗτος 452 e.

τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα, οὐχ ἔξω ὅτι λέγω ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ. ὁ αὐτὸς δέ μοι ἦκει λόγος, ὃν περ πρὸς Πῶλον ἔλεγον· κρινούμαι γὰρ ὡς ἐν παιδίοις ἱατρὸς ἂν κρίνοιτο κατηγοροῦντος ὀφιοποιοῦ. σκόπει γάρ, τί ἂν ἀπολογοῖτο ὁ τοιοῦτος ἄνθρωπος ἐν τούτοις ληφθείς, εἰ αὐτοῦ κατηγοροῖ τις λέγων ὅτι “ὦ παῖδες, πολλὰ ὑμᾶς καὶ κακὰ ὁδε εἵργασται ἀνὴρ καὶ αὐτούς, καὶ τοὺς νεωτάτους ὑμῶν διαφθείρει τέμνων τε καὶ κάων, καὶ ἰσχυαίνων καὶ πνίγων ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ, πικρότατα πώματα διδούς καὶ πεινῇν καὶ διψῇν ἀναγκάζων, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ πολλὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ἡνώ-

521 18. τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα: this employment of Callicles' epithet (cf. 486 c) is probably not without design on Socrates' part, according to whose view it applies better to rhetoric than to philosophy.

19. ὁ αὐτὸς . . . λόγος: in the passage referred to (464 d) Socrates is actually speaking to Gorgias, who has taken Polus' place for the time, but what he says applies just as well to Polus, as is seen by reference to 463 e and 465 a.

19 f. κρινούμαι: probably passive; but if so, it is the only example in Attic prose (see Kr. 39, 11, A). On the other hand, the fut. middle of ἀδικέω is regularly used for fut. passive. Cf. 509 d, and see H. 496 a.

22. ἐν τούτοις ληφθείς: cf. 486 a εἰ τις σοῦ λαβόμενος. How ἐν τούτοις is to be understood, is shown by τοὺς τοιοῦτους δικαστὰς below.

23. ὦ παῖδες: what follows as far as εὐάχουν ὑμᾶς is a parody on the accusation made against Socrates, especially in so far as he was declared to be a corrupter of the young.

24. ἀνὴρ: without the art. because it is disparaging. But see H. 674. — τοὺς νεωτάτους: instead of τοὺς νέους,

because the supposed judge himself is a child.

24 f. διαφθείρει καὶ ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ: are loosely connected with κακὰ εἵργασται as denoting two species of the evils complained of, — διαφθείρει the more severe treatment by τέμνων τε καὶ κάων, — ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ, the less severe by ἰσχυαίνων καὶ πνίγων. The latter is explained by πικρότατα κτέ. and πεινῇν . . . ἀναγκάζων in chiasmic position. It denotes, therefore, the condition of wretchedness and discomfort brought about by fasting and nauseating medicines. While διαφθείρει reminds one of the accusation before the court, ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ applies especially to the customary criticisms which were made against Socrates. See on 522 b below.

27. οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγώ: a compressed expression, in which οὐ, though really without a verb, is connected with the following clause as equiv. to οὐκ εὐάχων, ὥσπερ κτέ. Cf. Symp. 179 d, e (θεοί) ἐποίησαν τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ (Ὀρφέως) ὑπὸ γυναικῶν γενέσθαι οὐχ ὥσπερ Ἀχιλλεῖα . . . ἐτίμησαν καὶ εἰς μακρῶν νήσους ἀπέπεμψαν. Cf. Dem. Phil. i. 34. Translate οὐχ ὥσπερ by “whereas.”

χουν ὑμᾶς·” τί ἂν οἶε ἐν τούτῳ τῷ κακῷ ἀποληφθέντα
 ἱατρὸν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν; ἢ εἰ εἴποι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὅτι “ταῦτα
 30 πάντα ἐγὼ ἐποίουν, ὦ παῖδες, ὑγιεινῶς,” πόσον οἶε ἂν
 ἀναβοῆσαι τοὺς τοιούτους δικαστάς; οὐ μέγα;

ΚΑΛ. Ἰσως· οἰσθαί γε χρή.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἶε ἐν πάσῃ ἀπορίᾳ ἂν αὐτὸν ἔχесθαι, ὅτι
 χρή εἰπεῖν;

35 ΚΑΛ. Πάνν γε.

LXXVIII. ΣΩ. Τοιούτον μέντοι καὶ ἐγὼ οἶδ' ὅτι πάθος
 πάθοιμι ἂν εἰσελθὼν εἰς δικαστήριον. οὔτε γὰρ ἡδονὰς
 ἅς ἐκπεπόρικα ἔξω αὐτοῖς λέγειν, ἅς οὗτοι εὐεργεσίας καὶ
 ὠφελίας νομίζουσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὔτε τοὺς πορίζοντας ζηλῶ
 5 οὔτε οἷς πορίζεται· ἐάν τέ τίς με ἢ νεωτέρους φῇ διαφθεί-
 ρειν ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα, ἢ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους κακηγορεῖν

522 30. πόσον: not τί, because the up-
 roar would be characterized by vol-
 ume rather than by distinctness.

31. ἀναβοῆσαι: sc. as the judges of
 Socrates really did. Hence the re-
 peated entreaty of Socrates, μὴ θορυ-
 βεῖτε. Cf. *Apol.* 30 c ἐφ' οἷς ἴσως
 βοήσασθε.

32. ἴσως κτέ.: is, according to the
 sense, a decisive affirmation, though
 it is given unwillingly and grudgingly.
 —οἰσθαί γε χρή: is not very appro-
 priate here; it is frequently em-
 ployed where the speaker answers
 himself, e.g. *Crito* 53 c καὶ οὐκ οἶε
 ὁσχημὸν ἂν φαίνεσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους
 πρᾶγμα; οἰσθαί γε χρή, *Prot.* 325 c.

33. ἐν πάσῃ ἀπορίᾳ κτέ.: cf. *Hdt.*
ix. 98 ἐν ἀπορίῃ εἶχοντο ὅτι ποιέωσι.

LXXVIII. 2. οὔτε γάρ: the cor-
 responding member to this is ἐάν τέ
 τίς με κτέ.

b 4 f. ἐγὼ δὲ (while I) . . . πορίζεται:
 is outside of the regular construc-
 tion.

5. ἢ νεωτέρους: in view of τοὺς
 πρεσβυτέρους we might expect τοὺς
 νεωτέρους. If the reading is sound,
 we must look upon νεωτέρους as en-
 tirely indefinite in the sense of
 “young people,” and τοὺς πρεσβυ-
 τέρους as “the older” as compared
 with them, e.g. their fathers, etc.

6. ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα: this accusa-
 tion was actually made against Socra-
 tes, as we see from *Meno* 79 e, where
 Meno says, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡκουον μὲν
 ἔγωγε πρὶν καὶ συγγενέσθαι σοι, ὅτι σὺ
 οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὸς ἀπορεῖς καὶ τοὺς
 ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν, and Socrates
 himself says in *Theaet.* 149 a λέγουσι
 περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅτι ἀσπώτατός εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ
 τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν. —τοὺς πρεσ-
 βυτέρους κτέ.: an example is afforded
 by *Apol.* 29 d ff., where Socrates rep-
 represents himself as saying to any one
 he meets, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν κτέ., χρη-
 μάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελούμενος
 ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλείστα, φρονήσεως
 δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς

λέγοντα πικροὺς λόγους ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ, οὔτε τὸ ἀληθὲς
 ἕξω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι “δικαίως πάντα ταῦτα ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ πράττω
 τὸ ὑμέτερον δὴ τοῦτο, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί,” οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν·
 10 ὥστε ἴσως, ὅτι ἂν τύχω, τοῦτο πείσομαι.

ΚΑΛ. Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ὧ Σώκρατες, καλῶς ἔχειν ἄνθρω-
 πος ἐν πόλει οὕτως διακεείμενος καὶ ἀδύνατος ὢν ἑαυτῷ
 βοηθεῖν;

ΣΑ. Εἰ ἐκεῖνό γε ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχον, ὧ Καλλίκλεις, ὁ σὺ
 15 πολλάκις ὡμολόγησας· εἰ βεβωθηκῶς εἴη αὐτῷ, μήτε
 περὶ ἀνθρώπους μήτε περὶ θεοὺς ἄδικον μηδὲν μήτε εἰρη- α
 κῶς μήτε εἰργασμένους. αὕτη γάρ τις βοήθεια ἑαυτῷ
 πολλάκις ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται κρατίστη εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν
 ἐμέ τις ἐξελέγχοι ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν ἀδύνατον ὄντα
 20 ἑμαυτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ βοηθεῖν, αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς
 καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις ἐξελεγχόμενος καὶ μόνος ὑπὸ μόνου, καὶ εἰ

522 βελτίστη ἔσται οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ φρον-
 ὀ τῆς; Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 2. 49 ff.

7. λέγοντα πικροὺς λόγους: corre-
 sponds to πικρότατα πώματα διδούς in
 the comparison.

8. ὅτι δικαίως κτέ.: Socrates really
 speaks in this vein in *Apol.* 30 e ff.

c 10. ὅτι ἂν τύχω: see on 521 c.

12. καὶ ἀδύνατος ὢν: in form co-
 ordinate with, but in sense explana-
 tory of, οὕτως διακεείμενος, which refers
 to what precedes.

14. εἰ ἐκεῖνό γε κτέ.: the apod. is
 to be sought in the implied affirma-
 tion to the question δοκεῖ σοι καλῶς
 ἔχειν. Cf. 503 c. The addition of
 ἔν to the pron. makes it very em-
 phatic, as in *Rep.* vii. 537 b (though
 here the order is different) μία καὶ
 αὕτη τῶν βασάνων οὐκ ἐλαχίστη.

15. βεβωθηκῶς εἴη: not to be con-
 sidered as a circumlocutory perfect;
 but the partic. denotes a condition

brought about by a course of action 522
 (εἰρηκῶς μήτε εἰργασμένους) which, be-
 gun in the past, still continues.

17. αὕτη γάρ τις βοήθεια: the use
 of τις instead of the art. shows that d
 Socrates feels he is stretching lan-
 guage a little. The dat. is after the
 analogy of the preceding dat. with
 the partic.; but see on 513 b.

19. ἐξελέγχοι: should confute me by
 showing. Hence the partic. follows
 the analogy of verbs of showing.

20 f. καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις:
 “whether . . . or.”

21. μόνος ὑπὸ μόνου: the disgrace,
 to the mind of Socrates, consists, not
 in the fact that one suffers a defeat
 at the hands of his adversary ἐναντίον
 πολλῶν, but in the unsuspected weak-
 ness which is thus laid bare. Hence,
 so far as the purpose in hand is con-
 cerned, ταύτην τὴν ἀδυναμίαν would be
 equivalent to ἀδικίαν.

διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀδυναμίαν ἀποθνήσκοιμι, ἀγανακτοῖν ἂν·
 εἰ δὲ κολακικῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐνδεία τελευτήν ἔγωγε, εὖ ο
 οἶδα ὅτι ῥαδίως ἰδοὺς ἂν με φέροντα τὸν θάνατον. αὐτὸ
 25 μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται, ὅστις μὴ παντά-
 πασιν ἀλόγιστός τε καὶ ἀνανδρός ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν
 φοβεῖται· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀδικημάτων γέμοντα τὴν ψυχὴν
 εἰς Ἄιδου ἀφικέσθαι πάντων ἔσχατον κακῶν ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ
 βούλει, σοὶ ἐγώ, ὥς τοῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, ἐθέλω λόγον λέξαι.
 30 ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' ἐπέειπερ γε καὶ τᾶλλα ἐπέρανας, καὶ τοῦτο
 πέρανον.

LXXIX. Ση. “Ἄκουε δὴ,” φασί, “μάλα καλοῦ λόγου,” 523
 ὃν σὺ μὲν ἡγήσει μῦθον, ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον· ὥς

522 23. εἰ δὲ κολακικῆς κτέ.: so Socrates
 a declares also after his sentence,
Apol. 38 d ἀπορία μὲν ἔαλωκα, οὐ μέντοι
 λόγον, ἀλλὰ τὸ λῆμψ καὶ ἀναισχυντίας
 καὶ τοῦ ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς
 τοιαῦτα, οἳ ἂν ὑμῖν ἤσκητ' ἢ ἀκούειν,
 and in 38 e, after he has given a
 characterization of that rhetoric to
 the use of which he would not lower
 himself, οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὕτως
 ἀπολογησαμένῳ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον
 αἰρούμαι ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι
 ἢ ἐκείνως ζῆν.

24 f. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ κτέ.: the fear of
 death Socrates declares also in the
Apology to be due to the worst kind
 of ignorance,—that which thinks
 it knows what it does not know.
 “Death is commonly considered an
 evil, although no one knows but that
 it is the greatest good (*Apol.* 29 a,
 37 b). On the other hand, evil is
 to be greatly feared for its conse-
 quences, both here and hereafter.”
 τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν is the “act of dying,”
 τὸ τεθνάναι, the resulting condition,
 death, which latter Socrates discusses
 in *Apol.* 40 c.

26. ἀλόγιστος: cf. *Apol.* 37 c οὕτως 522
 ἀλόγιστος . . . ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογί-
 ζεσθαι. e

29. λόγον: denotes here, not a
 dialectical proof, but a “story,” a
 “tale.” Cf. *λογογράφος*. κατὰ τὰ λε-
 γόμενα is used in the same way in
Apol. 40 c.

LXXIX. 1. ἄκουε δὴ: a solemn be- 523
 a ginning, in order to stimulate inter-
 est. Similarly *Tim.* 20 d ἄκουε δὴ, ὦ
 Σώκρατες, λόγου μάλα μὲν ἀτόπου, παν-
 τάσσι γε μὴν ἀληθοῦς, *Theaet.* 201 d
 ἄκουε δὴ ὑμᾶς ἀντὶ δυνάμεως. The gen.
 with ἀκούω gives the λόγος almost the
 authority of a person. See G. 171, 2,
 n. 1; H. 742 c.

2. The distinction between λόγος
 and μῦθος, which are often contrasted,
 is that λόγος is said of the true and
 the actual; μῦθος, of the fictitious.
 By this distinction Socrates wishes to
 call attention to the fact that a truth
 lies at the basis of the following
 myth, while the dress of it is a mat-
 ter of indifference,—not that he ac-
 tually believes the story as it stands.
 In this light we must also consider

ἀληθῇ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ Ὅμηρος λέγει, διενείμαντο τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ ὁ Ποσειδῶν καὶ ὁ Πλούτων, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλαβον. ἦν οὖν νόμος ὁδε περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ Κρόνου, καὶ αἰεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἔστιν ἐν θεοῖς, τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν μὲν δικαίως τὸν βίον διελθόντα καὶ ὁσίως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς μακάρων

⁵²³ his statement *ὡς ἀληθῇ κτέ.*, looking
^a to his explanation in *Phaedo* 114 d
 τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα δισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως
 ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν
 ἔχοντι ἀνδρὶ, ὅτι μέντοι ἡ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ
 τοιαυτ' ἔττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ
 τὰς οἰκήσεις, ἐπεὶ περ ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ
 ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὕσα, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπει
 μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεῦσαι οἰομένῳ
 οὕτως ἔχειν. See Thompson's note.

3 f. ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος λέγει: Socrates refers to O 187 ff., where Poseidon says:—

τρεῖς γάρ τ' ἐκ Κρόνου εἰμὲν ἀδελφοὶ
 οὗς τέκετο Ῥέα,

Ζεὺς καὶ ἐγὼ, τρίτατος δ' Ἀΐδης ἐνέροι-
 σιν ἀνδράσων.

τριχθὰ δὲ πάντα δέδασται, ἕκαστος δ'
 ἔμμορε τιμῆς.

ἡ τοι ἐγὼν ἔλαχον πολλὴν ἄλα ναιέμεν
 αἰεὶ

παλλομένων, Ἀΐδης δ' ἔλαχε ζῶφον
 ἡρόεντα,

Ζεὺς δ' ἔλαχ' οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἐν αἰθέρι καὶ
 νεφέλησιν

γαῖα δ' ἔτι ξυνὴ πάντων καὶ μακρὸς
 Ὀλύμπος.

Socrates commences with this passage so as to be able to assume therefrom an empire of the dead, or the existence of the soul after death, as an admitted fact which requires no proof.

5. παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλαβον: by making thus the sway over the world a matter of inheritance simply,

Socrates avoids the common story of hostile relations between Cronus and his sons. ^a

6 f. ἦν οὖν νόμος ἐπὶ Κρόνου . . . ἔστιν ἐν θεοῖς: that is, the fundamental distinction between good and evil is also an eternal one. The addition of ἐν θεοῖς is appropriate, inasmuch as the law which was in force during the reign of Cronus is made perpetual by being adopted by his successors, the gods.—καὶ αἰεὶ καὶ νῦν: from that time to the present.

8 f. εἰς μακάρων νήσους: according ^b to Homer, δ 564, Zeus transferred his favorites (Rhadamanthys and Menelaus, the latter a son-in-law of Zeus, are especially mentioned) *alive* to the Ἠλύσιον πεδῖον, where they pass a blissful existence. The first mention of the *Islands of the Blessed* is found in Hesiod (ἔργα κ. ἡ. 170), who makes them the place to which the men of the fourth race, the heroes and chieftains of the Trojan war are sent *after death* as their reward. The *punishment*, on the other hand, of the men of the second and third races is that after death they must wander in Hades (*ib.* 152 *ἐς εὐρώεντα δόμον κρυεροῦ Ἀΐδαο*). The myth is then further developed, and the Isles of the Blessed become gradually in the common belief, largely through Pindar's influence, the abode of all the righteous after death. Cf. Pind. *Ol.* ii. 75 ff. (Gildersleeve).

- νήσους ἀπιόντα οἰκεῖν ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἐκτὸς κακῶν,
 10 τὸν δὲ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως εἰς τὸ τῆς τίσεώς τε καὶ δίκης.
 δεσμωτήριον, ὃ δὴ Τάρταρον καλοῦσιν, ἰέναι. τούτων δὲ
 δικασταὶ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ ἔτι νεωστὶ τοῦ Διὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν
 ἔχοντος ζῶντες ἦσαν ζώντων, ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ δικάζοντες
 ἣ μέλλοιεν τελευτᾶν. κακῶς οὖν αἱ δίκαι ἐκρίνοντο · ὃ τε
 15 οὖν Πλούτων καὶ οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ οἱ ἐκ μακάρων νήσων ἰόν-
 τες ἔλεγον πρὸς τὸν Δία, ὅτι φοιτῶεν σφίσιν ἄνθρωποι
 ἐκατέρωσε ἀνάξιοι. εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ζεὺς· “ἀλλ’ ἐγώ,” ἔφη, ο
 “παύσω τοῦτο γιγνόμενον. νῦν μὲν γὰρ κακῶς αἱ δίκαι

523
 b ὅσοι δ’ ἐτόλμασαν ἐστρῖς
 ἐκατέρωθε μείναντες ἀπὸ πάμπαν
 ἀδίκων ἔχειν
 ψυχάν, ἔτειλαν Διὸς ὁδὸν παρὰ Κρόνου
 τύρσιν· ἐνθα μακάρων
 νᾶσος ὠκεανίδος
 ἀδραι περιπνέουσιν, κτέ.

Tartarus was originally, according to Homer, the prison of the Titans; cf. *Θ* 13, 478. Plato alone makes it the prison of *all* wrong-doers. The term *μακάρων νήσους* became stereotyped very early; hence we never find the prose word *μακαρίων* used in it.

9. ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ: on the omission of the art., see *G.* 142, 4, n. 5; *H.* 672 b.

11 f. τούτων δὲ δικασταί: the representation of a court of the dead, with other judges besides Pluto himself, and *before* the souls enter Hades, is first found in the Platonic version of the myth.

12. ἔτι νεωστί: (*still more recently, when, etc.*) is contrasted with ἐπὶ Κρόνου, so that τοῦ Διὸς . . . ἔχοντος forms the explanation of it. Heindorf connects ἔτι νεωστί with ἔχοντος, and translates: *recente adhuc Iovis imperio*. See on 503 c.

13. ζῶντες ἦσαν ζώντων: this pres-
 entation is quite in harmony with the mythical form which Socrates adopts. The object is to show the contrast between a judgment which is human, uncertain, and based on external appearances, and the true one, which is based on accurate inspection of the unveiled truth. For this purpose the human tribunal is supposed in the myth to have existed first; the second tribunal is then made by Plato to arise as a substitute for the first, although naturally it must be conceived as existent ever since the creation of man. The first tribunal admits of the same criticism as the one in use among men deserves.

15. οἱ ἐπιμεληταί: who these are remains uncertain. The addition οἱ ἐκ μακάρων νήσων shows that they abode there, though their functions probably extended also to Tartarus. On the attraction of the preposition, see *G.* 191, n. 6; *H.* 788 a.

17. ἐκατέρωσε: i.e. as well to Tartarus as to the Isles of the Blessed; hence ἀνάξιοι refers both to reward and punishment.

18. νῦν μὲν γὰρ κτέ.: note the repeated employment of γὰρ, which cor-

δικάζονται. ἀμπεχόμενοι γάρ," ἔφη, "οἱ κρινόμενοι κρίνον-
 20 ται· ζῶντες γὰρ κρίνονται. πολλοὶ οὖν," ἡ δ' οὖς, "ψυχὰς
 ποιηρὰς ἔχοντες ἡμφιεσμένοι εἰσὶ σώματά τε καλὰ καὶ
 γένη καὶ πλούτους, καί, ἐπειδὴν ἡ κρίσις ἦ, ἔρχονται
 αὐτοῖς πολλοὶ μάρτυρες, μαρτυρήσοντες ὡς δικαίως βεβίω-
 25 κασιν· οἱ οὖν δικαστὰὶ ὑπὸ τε τούτων ἐκπλήττονται, καὶ α
 αἷμα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμπεχόμενοι δικάζουσι, πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς
 αὐτῶν ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ ὦτα καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα προκεκα-
 λυμμένοι. ταῦτα δὲ αὐτοῖς πάντα ἐπίπροσθεν γίγνεται,
 καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἀμφιέσματα καὶ τὰ τῶν κρινομένων. πρῶ-
 30 τον μὲν οὖν," ἔφη, "παυστέον ἐστὶν προειδότας αὐτοὺς τὸν
 θάνατον. νῦν γὰρ προΐσασι. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ δὴ
 εἴρηται τῷ Προμηθεὶ ὅπως ἂν παύσῃ αὐτῶν. ἔπειτα γυμ-

523 responds well to the strongly marked
 c (repeated ἔφη) direct speech.

21. ἡμφιεσμένοι: the 'clothing' is to be understood in the wider sense, as everything external which would affect the estimation of a man, — e.g. beauty of person, noble origin, wealth, etc. Cf. 451 e, and *Prot.* 319 c κὰν πάννυ καλὸς ἦ καὶ πλούσιος καὶ τῶν γενναίων.

22 f. ἔρχονται κτέ.: here the Attic court is visible behind the myth.

d 25. πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς: sense-perception is, according to Plato, always untrustworthy, and hence the knowledge gained through it is always uncertain, often untrue. With that, Socrates contrasts the knowledge which is gained by the immediate and thoughtful action of the soul itself, which he represents here as soul-perception.

27. ἐπίπροσθεν γίγνεται: "comes before them," "puts itself in their way." Their wrappings become a hindrance to perception of the truth.

28 f. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν: introduces

the preliminaries which must first be 523
 d settled.

30. τοῦτο: is the condition of προειδῆσι mentioned in the previous clause. Closely connected with it is αὐτῶν as a gen. of possession, such as we see occurring with θαυμάζειν, e.g. *Phaedo* 89 a ἔγωγε μάλιστα θαύμασα αὐτοῦ (in him) πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο κτέ., *Apol.* 17 a μάλιστα αὐτῶν ἐν θαύμασα. The regular const. with both verbs is an acc. of the person with a gen. of the thing.

31. τῷ Προμηθεὶ: in the Attic cult, Prometheus was honored next to Hephaestus and Athena as a benefactor of mankind. As such he bore the surname πυρφόρος, under which name Sophocles celebrates him in *Oedipus Coloneus*, where he says of the neighborhood which Oedipus enters (*O. C.* 54 ff.): χῶρος μὲν ἱερὸς πᾶς δδ' ἐστ', ἔχει δὲ νιν | σεμνὸς Ποσειδῶν ἡδ' ὁ πυρφόρος θεὸς | Τίτᾶν Προμηθεύς. Of his enmity with Zeus, which Aeschylus, following Hesiod, made the

νοὺς κριτέον ἀπάντων τούτων· τεθνεώτας γὰρ δεῖ κρίνε-
σθαι. καὶ τὸν κριτὴν δεῖ γυμνὸν εἶναι, τεθνεῶτα, αὐτῇ τῇ
ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος
35 ἐκάστου, ἐρῆμον πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ καταλιπόντα
ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς πάντα ἐκείνον τὸν κόσμον, ἵνα δικαία ἡ κρί-
σις ᾗ. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ἐγνωκὼς πρότερος ἢ ὑμεῖς
ἐποησάμην δικαστὰς ὑεῖς ἑμαντοῦ, δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας,
Μίνω τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυν, ἓνα δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης, Αἰακόν·

523 central point of his magnificent poem,
d there is no mention either in Sopho-
cles or in Plato, who also, in the *Prot.*
320 d, in the myth of the Gods re-
lated by the sophist, says: προσέταξαν
Προμηθεὶ καὶ Ἐπιμηθεὶ κοσμήσθαι τε καὶ
νεῖμαι δυνάμεις ἐκάστοις ὡς πρέπει. As
a Titan he is called the son of Iapetus.
—Not to be mistaken is the allusion
to Aeschylus *P. V.* 248–251, though
with a modification of the tone:
ΠΡ. Θνητοὺς ἔπαυσα μὴ προδέρκεσθαι
μύρον.

ΧΟΡ. Τὸ ποῖον εὐρὼν τῆσδε φάρμακον
νόσον;

ΠΡ. Τυφλὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐλπίδας κατὰ-
κισα.

ΧΟΡ. Μέγ' ὠφέλημα τοῦτ' ἔδωρῃσιν βρο-
τοῖς.

—ὅπως ἂν παύσῃ: see on 481 a and
480 d. Whether the manner of bring-
ing about this desired object was also
prescribed to Prometheus, or left
to his own ingenuity, is not said. —
αὐτῶν: must be taken as the gen. of
the person, with τοῦτο as object of
παύσῃ. As a rule we have the reverse.

32. ἀπάντων τούτων: i.e. clothes,
etc., mentioned above. — τεθνεώτας γάρ
κτέ.: does not give the reason, but
simply the explanation of the preced-
ing expression; for τεθνεώτας κτέ. is
no basis for γυμνοὺς κτέ., but rather
the reverse.

33 f. αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυ- 523
χὴν: emphasizes the immediateness
of the scrutiny on the side both of
object and subject.

34. ἐξαίφνης: combined, just like
ἔμα, with the partic., which it either
precedes or follows. See on 520 c.

37. πρότερος ἢ ὑμεῖς: on account
of his position as king of the gods,
for πάντα ἰδὼν Διὸς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ πάντα
νοήσας. Hes. *ἔργα κ.* ἡ. 267.

38 f. ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας . . . Εὐρώπης:
the prep. ἐκ can be used of parentage
or of place of origin; here the latter.
According to Hom. *Ξ* 321 f. Minos
and Rhadamanthys were sons of Eu-
ropa, and born in Crete, of which
Minos was afterwards king, while
Aeacus was called the son of Aegina.
Minos was famed as a wise law-giver,
Rhadamanthys and Aeacus for their
wisdom, justice, and piety. — The
Greeks of Plato's time divided the
earth into two parts. Cf. Isoc. *Paneg.*
179 τῆς γῆς ἀπόσης τῆς ὑπὸ τῷ κόσμῳ
κειμένης, δίχα τετμημένης καὶ τῆς μὲν
Ἀσίας, τῆς δ' Εὐρώπης καλουμένης.
Plato must accordingly reckon Crete
as belonging to Asia, unless we are to
conceive that he had in mind the fact
that Phoenix or Agenor, father of
Phoenix and Cadmus and grand-
father of Europa, was king of Phoe-
nicia. To these three, which are also

40 οὗτοι οὖν ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωσι, δικάσουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, 524
ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ, ἐξ ἧς φέρετον τὼ ὁδῷ, ἡ μὲν εἰς μακάρων
νῆσους, ἡ δ' εἰς Τάρταρον. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας
Ῥαδάμανθους κρινεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης Αἰακός·
Μίνω δὲ πρεσβεῖα δώσω ἐπιδιακρίνειν, ἐὰν ἀπορήτόν τι
45 τὼ ἐτέρω, ἵνα ὡς δικαιοσύνη ἡ κρίσις ἢ περὶ τῆς πορείας
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις."

LXXX. Ταῦτ' ἔστιν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἃ ἐγὼ ἀκηκοὺς
πιστεύω ἀληθῆ εἶναι· καὶ ἐκ τούτων τῶν λόγων τοιόνδε τι **b**
λογίζομαι συμβαίνειν. ὁ θάνατος τυγχάνει ὧν, ὡς ἐμοὶ
δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ δυοῖν πραγμάτων διάλυσιν, τῆς ψυχῆς
5 καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀπ' ἀλλήλων.· ἐπειδὰν δὲ διαλυθῇτον
ἄρα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, οὐ πολὺ ἦττον ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν ἔχει τὴν

523 mentioned by Dem. *de Cor.* (xviii.)
127, the Attic hero Triptolemus is added in *Apol.* 41 a.

524 40. ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι: Socrates is thinking of the 'asphodel meadow' of Hom. *λ* 539, 573. According to Homer, it seems to have stretched through the whole of Hades, and to have been the abiding place of the shades. Cf. *ω* 13 αἶψα δ' ἴκοντο κατ' ἀσφοδελὸν λειμῶνα | ἔνθα τε ναίουσι ψυχαί, εἰδῶλα καμόντων. Plato places it at the entrance of Hades.

41. ἐν τῷ τριόδῳ: expegetical ap-
position according to the σχῆμα καθ'
ὅλον καὶ μέρος. For the matter, cf.
Verg. *Aen.* vi. 540 hic locus est,
partis ubi se via findit in
ambas: | dextera quae Ditis
magni sub moenia tendit, |
hac iter Elysium nobis; ac
laeva malorum | exercet poe-
nas et ad impia Tartara mit-
tit.—τῷ ὁδῷ: the fem. dual of the
art. does not occur in Attic. See H.
272 a, Meisterhans,² 46, 17 e.

44. ἐπιδιακρίνειν: "to give the final
verdict." The office here assigned to
Minos is not the same which Homer
(*λ* 568) makes him fill. Cf. 526 d.

45. περὶ τῆς πορείας: not concern-
ing their course on earth, but as
to whether they shall take the road
to Tartarus or that to the Isles of the
Blessed. Cf. *Phaedo* 107 d ἐν ἀρχῇ
τῆς ἐκείσε πορείας.

LXXX. 2 ff. The conclusions which **b**
are drawn from the story here nar-
rated do not begin until d below,
ἐπειδὰν οὖν. The intervening state-
ments contain supplementary matter,
which is drawn by very easy deduc-
tions, partly from philosophy, partly
from experience.

3. ὁ θάνατος κτέ.: cf. *Phaedo* 64 c
εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ
τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὴν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τὸ
σῶμα γεγενέσθαι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ
τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγείσθαι αὐτὴν καθ'
αὐτὴν εἶναι.

6. οὐ πολὺ ἦττον: would lead us
to expect something like ἢ ὅτε ἐξῆ.

St. I. p. 524.

- ἔξιν τὴν αὐτοῦ, ἥνπερ καὶ ὅτε ἔξῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τό τε σῶμα
τὴν φύσιν τὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ θεραπεύματα καὶ τὰ παθή-
ματα ἔνδηλα πάντα. οἷον εἴ τινος μέγα ἦν τὸ σῶμα c
10 φύσει ἢ τροφῇ ἢ ἀμφοτέρα ζώντος, τούτου καὶ ἐπειδὰν
ἀποθάνῃ ὁ νεκρὸς μέγας, καὶ εἰ παχύ, παχὺς καὶ ἀπο-
θανόντος, καὶ ἄλλα οὕτως· καὶ εἰ αὖ ἐπετήδευε κομᾶν,
κομήτης τούτου καὶ ὁ νεκρός. μαστιγίας αὖ εἴ τις ἦν καὶ
ἵχνη εἶχε τῶν πληγῶν οὐλὰς ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ ὑπὸ μαστί-
15 γων ἢ ἄλλων τραυμάτων ζῶν, καὶ τεθνεώτος τὸ σῶμα
ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ταῦτα ἔχον· (καὶ) κατεαγότα εἴ του ἦν μέλη ἢ
διεστραμμένα ζώντος, καὶ τεθνεώτος ταῦτα ἔνδηλα. ἐνὶ d
δὲ λόγῳ, οἷος εἶναι παρεσκεύαστο τὸ σῶμα ζῶν, ἔνδηλα
ταῦτα καὶ τελευτήσαντος ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ πολλὰ ἐπὶ τῶ

524 The transition to the rel. clause is caused by the expression *ἔχει τὴν ἔξιν*.

7. *ἔξιν*: by *ἔξιν* is to be understood the general appearance and condition which a body assumes in virtue of its inner nature, not that nature itself, and not a condition due solely to external agencies. Cf. *Theaet.* 153 b. — *ἥνπερ* κτέ.: on the omission of the verb, see Kr. 62, 4, 1; H. 613. — *τό τε σῶμα* κτέ.: the correlative member follows in a different form in d *ταῦτον δὲ μοι* κτέ. The reason for the change lies in the long-drawn-out *οἷον* clause, through which the speaker loses the construction.

8. *θεραπεύματα, παθήματα*: the marks borne by the body are divided into two classes from the point of view of subject and object. See on *παθήματα* in d below. On the -*μα* termination, see G. 129, 4; H. 553, 1.

c 10. *ἀμφοτέρα*: see on 477 d.

12. *κομᾶν*: to wear the hair long, somewhat after the fashion of the Spartans, was customary at Athens

only up to the age of the Ephebus, 524 with the exception of such men as from their rank (*ἱππεῖς*), or love of display, chose thus to adorn themselves. Hair cut quite short, however, was considered *ἀνδραποδῶδης* *θρίξ*. See *Herm. Gr. Alter.* iv. § 23.

14. *οὐλὰς*: as the explanation *ἵχνη* . . . *πληγῶν* shows, this word denotes not the fresh wounds (*ῥαίματα*), but the scars which remained after they had healed.

17 f. *ἐνὶ δὲ λόγῳ*: sc. *εἰπεῖν*, like *ὡς d* *συνελόντι* *εἰπεῖν*. See on 462 b.

18. *τὸ σῶμα*: in regard to body. Constr. with *οἷος εἶναι*, which depends upon *παρεσκεύαστο* (*he had formed himself*). So also the middle with the inf. in 507 d, 511 b.

19. *ταῦτα*: though referring generally to the preceding clause, is used according to the constructio ad sensum, inasmuch as the traces are meant; so that ἢ πάντα κτέ. very readily follows it.

19 f. *ἐπὶ τινι χρόνῳ*: more indefi-

- 20 χρόνον. ταῦτόν δὴ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτ' ἄρα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὧ Καλλίκλεις· ἔνδηλα πάντα ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὰν γυμνωθῇ τοῦ σώματος, τά τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὰ παθήματα, ἃ διὰ τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν ἐκάστου πράγματος ἔσχεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἀφί-
 25 κωνται παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας παρὰ τὸν Ῥαδάμανθον, ὁ Ῥαδάμανθους ἐκείνους ἐπιστήσας θεᾶται ὁ ἐκάστου τὴν ψυχὴν, οὐκ εἰδὼς ὅτου ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ἐπιλαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὁποιοῦν βασιλέως ἢ δυνάστου κατεῖδεν οὐδὲν ὑγιές ὃν τῆς ψυχῆς,

524 ^d nite than *Phaedo* 80 c, where Socrates says of the same thing ἐπεικῶς συχρὸν ἐπιμένει χρόνον.

20. ταῦτόν δὴ κτέ.: the analogy of the soul with the body is discussed first in a general way, and then as far as possible worked out in details.

22. τὰ τῆς φύσεως: see on 450 c, 453 e.

23. τὰ παθήματα: in stating (above, b) the condition of the body, when separated from the soul, Socrates (Plato) uses the expression *θεραπεύματα καὶ παθήματα*. Here, referring to the soul, he uses *παθήματα* alone. At the basis of this variation seems to lie some such theory as the following: The human body is susceptible of improvement, by care and training; this care must be exerted by the man himself; hence *θεραπεύματα* are the results of this care. On the other hand, a lack of care will subject the body to the evil effect of outside evil influences, and thereby to deterioration; *παθήματα* are the results of this outside influence. The soul is not susceptible of improvement, being perfect at the outset; but lack of care will, just as in the case of the body, subject the

soul to the influence of outside forces. 524 ^d There is therefore no place for *θεραπεύματα* when speaking of the soul.

24. ἔσχεν: see on 503 e, 519 d.—*ἐπειδὰν οὖν*: Socrates resumes his story where he had broken off at the conclusion of ch. LXXIX.

25. οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας: an example of distributive apposition. See on 450 c, 503 d. The correlative second member is simply indicated in 526 c by the words *ταῦτὰ δὲ ταῦτα κτέ.*

26. ἐπιστήσας: "he halts them." ^e They would probably otherwise go their own way.

27. ὅτου ἐστίν: see on 447 d.

28. τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως: why just this example is chosen, is seen from what is said in 470 e.—*ἐπιλαβόμενος*: see on 519 a.

29. κατεῖδεν: another case of 'gnomic aorist,' which gives a certain degree of liveliness to the recital. So *εἶδεν, ἀπέπεμψεν*. See on 484 a.—*οὐδὲν ὑγιές ὃν κτέ.*: the following passage can be traced in Tac. *Ann.* vi. 6 neque frustra prae-stantissimus sapientiae firmare solitus est, si recludantur tyrannorum mentes, posse aspici laniatus et ictus, quando

30 ἀλλὰ διαμεμαστιγωμένην καὶ οὐλῶν μεστὴν ὑπὸ ἐπιορκίων
καὶ ἀδικίας, ἃ ἐκάστη ἢ πράξις αὐτοῦ ἐξωμόρξατο εἰς τὴν 525
ψυχὴν, καὶ πάντα σκολιὰ ὑπὸ ψεύδους καὶ ἀλαζονείας καὶ
οὐδὲν εὐθὺ διὰ τὸ ἄνευ ἀληθείας τεθράφθαι· καὶ ὑπὸ
ἐξουσίας καὶ τρυφῆς καὶ ὕβρεως καὶ ἀκρατίας τῶν πρά-
35 ξεων ἀσυμμετρίας τε καὶ αἰσχροτήτος γέμουσαν τὴν ψυ-
χὴν εἶδεν· ἰδὼν δὲ ἀτίμως ταύτην ἀπέπεμψεν εὐθὺ τῆς
φρουρᾶς, οἳ μέλλει ἐλθοῦσα ἀνατλήναι τὰ προσήκοντα
πάθῃ.

LXXXI. Προσέκει δὲ παντὶ τῷ ἐν τιμωρίᾳ ὄντι, ὑπ' ὃ
ἄλλου ὀρθῶς τιμωρουμένῳ, ἢ βελτίονι γίνεσθαι καὶ ὀνί-
νασθαι ἢ παραδείγματι τοῖς ἄλλοις γίνεσθαι, ἵνα ἄλλοι

524 ut corpora verberibus, ita
^a saevitia, libidina, malis con-
sultis animus dilaceretur.

30. διαμεμαστιγωμένην: after the analogy of the body, which belongs to a *μαστιγίας* (cf. above in c). Likewise *σκολιὰ* καὶ οὐδὲν εὐθὺ corresponds to *διστραμμένα*, and καὶ . . . εἶδεν may also have some connexion with *παχὺς* above c.

525 31. α: refers to both the previously
^a named conditions; see on ταῦτα above, d. Socrates shows us the immoral condition of the soul under three aspects: 1. The vital principle of morality is *δικαιοσύνη*, hence *ἀδικία* is placed first. Beside this, as its worst form, stands perjury, the punishment of which after death was assumed even in the Homeric age; cf. Γ 278, Τ 259 Ἐρινύες, αἳ θ' ὑπὸ γαίαν | ἀνθρώπους τίνυνται ὃ τις κ' ἐπιόρκον ὁμόσση. *ἀδικία* accordingly corrupts the very nature itself of the soul. 2. The natural development of the soul depends upon its knowledge of the truth. Lies restrict that development, and hence warp and twist the soul. This image

at the same time corresponds to the 525
familiar view of the nature of truth. ^a

3. Since the activity of the soul is from within outwards, there is need of fixed, definite limits. If this quality — *σωφροσύνη* — is lacking, or rather if it lapses into *ἀκολασία*, which according to its surrounding conditions appears as *ἐξουσία*, *τρυφή*, and *ὑbris* (*ἀκρατία* is a general term, applicable to all forms), then the proper relation between the separate parts of the soul is destroyed, and its form as a whole becomes unsymmetrical and ugly. One naturally thinks of the extension which the *ἐπιθυμίαι* strive for.

36. ἀτίμως: corresponds to the *ἀτιμία* imposed by earthly judges. — εὐθὺ τῆς φρουρᾶς: for the gen., see G. 182, 2, and on 486 a.

LXXXI. 1. προσέκει κτέ.: the ^b purpose of the punishment determines also its measure. To the consideration of this point, Socrates now turns.

2. τιμωρουμένῳ: the passive of the middle. See H. 499 a; Kr. 52, 10, 11.

3. ἢ παραδείγματι κτέ.: in this

ὁρῶντες πάσχοντα ἂν ἂν πάσχη φοβούμενοι βελτίους
 5 γίνωνται. εἰσὶν δὲ οἱ μὲν ὠφελούμενοί τε καὶ δίκην
 διδόντες ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων οὔτοι, οἱ ἂν ἰάσιμα
 ἁμαρτήματα ἁμάρτωσιν· ὅμως δὲ δι' ἀλγηδόνων καὶ ὀδυ-
 νῶν γίγνεται αὐτοῖς ἡ ὠφελία καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Ἄιδου :
 οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄλλως ἀδικίας ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. οἱ δ' ἂν c
 10 τὰ ἔσχατα ἀδικήσωσι καὶ διὰ τοιαῦτα ἀδικήματα ἀνίατοι
 γένωνται, ἐκ τούτων τὰ παραδείγματα γίγνεται, καὶ οὔτοι
 αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι ὀνίανται οὐδέν, ἅτε ἀνίατοι ὄντες, ἄλλοι
 δὲ ὀνίανται οἱ τούτους ὁρῶντες διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰ μέ-
 γιστα καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ φοβερώτατα πάθη πάσχοντας
 15 τὸν αἰὲ χρόνον, ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνηρημένους ἐκεῖ

525 also, as is shown by what follows, the
 b object is improvement, but of others
 rather than the one punished. The
 terror-theory is put in the mouth of
 the Sophist in the *Protagoras*, who
 says *Prot.* 324 b ὁ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιχειρῶν
 κολάζειν οὐ τοῦ παρελθυῦτος ἕνεκα
 ἀδικήματος τιμωρεῖται, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μέλλον-
 τος χάριν, ἵνα μὴ αὐθις ἀδικήσῃ μήτε
 αὐτὸς οὗτος μήτε ἄλλος ὁ τοῦτον ἰδὼν
 κολασθέντα. Plato's theory concern-
 ing the punishments of the lower
 world implies, though it does not
 expressly mention, the doctrine of
 the wandering habits of souls which
 he expounds in other treatises. For
 the dat., cf. 479 e, and see *G.* 136,
 n. 3; *H.* 941.

4. φοβούμενοι: because fear leads
 to reflection, reflection to more cor-
 rect views, which result in avoid-
 ance of evil and corrupt moral hab-
 its.

5. ὠφελούμενοί τε καὶ δίκην διδόν-
 tes: the second partic. is logically
 subordinate to the first ("by under-
 going"), though formally co-ordi-
 nate. See on 460 d. The correla-

tive to οἱ μὲν κτέ. is οἱ δ' ἂν κτέ., in
 c, which assumes that form on ac-
 count of his proximity to οἱ ἂν ἰάσιμα
 κτέ.

10. ἀνίατοι: since wrong-doing c
 strikes at the very nature of the soul,
 the soul becomes more or less injured
 with every new evil deed. And in-
 deed it may go so far in the path of
 wickedness as to be at last incapable
 of turning back; that is, it may be-
 come incurable. Cf. *Phaedo* 113 e οἱ
 δ' ἂν δόξωσιν ἀνιάτως ἔχειν διὰ τὰ με-
 γέθη τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων κτέ. We must
 note, however, that the punishment
 is not determined according to the
 evil acts as such,—these the judge
 may not even know,—but by the
 condition of the soul as brought
 about by them.

11. τὰ παραδείγματα: the art. is
 employed on account of the previous
 mention of this in b, as a result to be
 gained.

15. παραδείγματα ἀνηρημένους: as
 we are accustomed to hang up warn-
 ings that the passer-by may think
 over them carefully.

ἐν ᾧ Αἰδου ἐν τῷ δεσμοτηρίῳ, τοῖς αἰ τοῦ ἀδίκου ἀφικνου-
 μένοις θεάματα καὶ νουθητήματα. ὦν ἐγὼ φημι ἓνα καὶ α
 Ἀρχέλαον ἔσεσθαι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγει Πῶλος, καὶ ἄλλον
 ὅστις ἂν τοιοῦτος τύραννος ᾗ· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς
 20 εἶναι τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων ἐκ τυράννων καὶ βασι-
 λέων καὶ δυναστῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πραξάντων γεγυνο-
 τας· οὗτοι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν μέγιστα καὶ ἀνοσιώ-
 τατα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμαρτάνουσι. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τούτοις καὶ
 Ὅμηρος· βασιλέας γὰρ καὶ δυνάστας ἐκείνος πεποίηκεν
 25 τοὺς ἐν ᾧ Αἰδου τὸν αἰ χρόνον τιμωρουμένους, Τάνταλον·
 καὶ Σίσυφον καὶ Τιτυόν· Θερσίτην δέ, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος
 πονηρὸς ἦν ἰδιώτης, οὐδεὶς πεποίηκεν μεγάλας τιμωρίας
 συνεχόμενον ὡς ἀνίατον· οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐξῆν αὐτῷ· διὸ
 καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερος ἦν ἢ οἷς ἐξῆν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Καλλι-

525 16. ἐν ᾧ Αἰδου ἐν τῷ δεσμοτηρίῳ:
 c both expressions are placed side by
 side by the σχῆμα καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος.

17. θεάματα καὶ νουθητήματα: the
 second substantive gives the design
 of the first.

d 18. Ἀρχέλαον: cf. 470 d-471 d.

20 f. εἶναι . . . γεγυνοτάς: parti-
 cipial periphrasis. See Kr. 56, 3, 3,
 and crit. note on 510 b.

21. δυναστῶν: men possessed of
 power, not merely in monarchical
 and oligarchical, but also in demo-
 cratical states; hence the addition of
 the explanation with καί. Cf. 479 a,
 524 e, 526 b and see on 492 b. Be-
 low (30) in the same sense we find
 ἐκ τῶν δυναμένων.

22. διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν: cf. above, 525 a.
 The expression very forcibly reminds
 us of the representations of Polus and
 Callicles, when praising what they con-
 ceived to be the highest happiness.

23. τούτοις: "to these statements,"
 "to this view of the matter."

25 f. Τάνταλον, Σίσυφον, Τιτυόν: 525
 cf. Hom. λ 576-800. All three were
 rulers: Tantalus, the founder of the
 house of the Pelopidae, was king in
 Sipylus; Sisyphus, in Corinth; Ti-
 tyus, in Euboea. Thersites was a bad
 and despicable man, but his sphere
 of action was limited and he experi-
 enced rough treatment even during
 his lifetime; B 211-277.

28. ἐξῆν: sc. τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ἀνοσιώ-
 τατα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμαρτάνειν. This was
 the reason why Thersites was not
 held to be ἀνίατος.

29. εὐδαιμονέστερος: Socrates here
 expresses himself with less exact-
 ness than in 473 c.—ἀλλὰ γάρ: *for*,
you see. The clause thus introduced
 serves a two-fold purpose. It ex-
 presses more plainly and definitely
 what had already been implied above,
 and it paves the way, by the words
 καὶ οἱ σφόδρα πονηροί, for the new
 thought which begins with οὐδὲ
 μὴν.

30 κλεις, ἐκ τῶν δυναμένων εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ σφόδρα πονηροὶ
 γιγνόμενοι ἄνθρωποι· οὐδὲν μὴν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τούτοις 528
 ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἐγγίγνεσθαι, καὶ σφόδρα γε ἄξιον ἀγα-
 σθαι τῶν γιγνομένων· χαλεπὸν γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ
 πολλοῦ ἐπαίνου ἄξιον ἐν μεγάλῃ ἐξουσίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν γενό-
 35 μενον δικαίως διαβιῶναι. ὀλίγοι δὲ γίνονται οἱ τοιοῦτοι·
 ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἄλλοι γεγόνασιν, οἷμαι δὲ καὶ ἔσον-
 ται καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν τοῦ δικαίως b
 διαχειρίζειν ἃ ἂν τις ἐπιτρέπη· εἰς δὲ καὶ πάννυ ἐλλόγιμος
 γέγονε καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλληνας, Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσι-
 40 μάχου· οἱ δὲ πολλοί, ὦ ἄριστε, κακοὶ γίνονται τῶν δυνα-
 στῶν.

LXXXII. Ὅπερ οὖν ἔλεγον, ἐπειδὴν ὁ Ῥαδάμανθους
 ἐκείνος τοιοῦτόν τινα λάβη, ἄλλο μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐκ οἶδεν
 οὐδέν, οὐθ' ὅστις οὐθ' ὦντινων, ὅτι δὲ πονηρός τις· καὶ

525 30. καί: "also." Is closely con-
 nected with τῶν δυναμένων.

526 32 f. ἀγασθαι τῶν γιγνομένων: cf.

a 482 d οὐκ ἀγαμαι Πῶλον. The acc. is rare and states simply the obj.; the gen. gives the cause, and may be a person or a thing. With the person is generally found either a participial or an adverbial clause. See H. 784.

33. γιγνομένων: after ἐγγίγνεσθαι, as *Crito* 44 d ἐργάζεσθαι after ἐξεργάζεσθαι, is quite in accordance with the customary usage. — χαλεπὸν γάρ: in our admiration for the 'self-made' man we forget that he has had every incentive to rise, while we withhold our sympathy from fallen greatness, which has had every temptation to fall.

35. ὀλίγοι: as also οἱ σφόδρα πονηροί. The most stand in the mean, according to *Phaedo* 90 a, b οἷε τι σπανιώτερον εἶναι ἢ σφόδρα μέγαν ἢ

σφόδρα σμικρὸν ἐξερεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἢ 528
 κύνα ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιον; ἢ αὖ αἰσχροὺς ἢ a
 καλὸν κτέ.;

37 f. τὴν τοῦ διαχειρίζειν: notice b
 the expegetic gen. See on 521 a.

38. δ . . . ἐπιτρέπη: sc. power or property, or whatever it be. Plato is probably thinking of Aristides' position as general of the confederate army during the war against the Persians and as one of the founders of the Delian league, by which especially he gained his reputation for probity. Cf. *Plut. Arist.* especially ch. XXIII.-XXV. The καί before εἰς has almost the force of "and that, too."

LXXXII. 1. ὅπερ οὖν ἔλεγον: goes back to 524 e.

3. οὐθ' ὅστις κτέ.: sc. as was the case in life, when the name of the man was followed by the name of his father to indicate his family.

τοῦτο κατιδὼν ἀπέπεμψεν εἰς Τάρταρον, ἐπισημηνάμενος,
 5 εἴαν τε ἰάσιμος εἴαν τε ἀνίατος δοκῇ εἶναι· ὁ δὲ ἐκέισε
 ἀφικόμενος τὰ προσήκοντα πάσχει. ἐνίστε δ' ἄλλην εἰσ-
 ιδὼν ὁσίως βεβιωκυῖαν καὶ μετ' ἀληθείας, ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου,
 ἣ ἄλλου τινός, μάλιστα μὲν, ἔγωγέ φημι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις,
 φιλοσόφου τὰ αὐτοῦ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονή-
 10 σαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἡγάσθη τε καὶ ἐς μακάρων νήσους
 ἀπέπεμψε. ταῦτα δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ὁ Αἰακός· ἐκάτερος δὲ
 τούτων ῥάβδον ἔχων δικάζει· ὁ δὲ Μίνως ἐπισκοπῶν
 κάθηται, μόνος ἔχων χρυσοῦν σκῆπτρον, ὥς φησιν Ὀδυσ-
 σεὺς ὁ Ὀμήρου ἰδεῖν αὐτὸν

d

15 χρύσειον σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα, θεμιστεύοντα νέκυσσιν.

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν λόγων
 πέπεισμαι, καὶ σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀποφανοῦμαι τῷ κριτῇ ὥς

526 4. ἐπισημηνάμενος: in accordance
 b with the results of his scrutiny, the
 judge puts upon him a mark and thus
 decides his fate. Cf. *Rep.* x. 614 c
 σημεία περιέψαντας τῶν δεδικασμένων,
 — also of the judges of the dead.

c 6 f. ἄλλην κτέ.: the omission of
 ψυχὴν is so harsh that Heindorf in-
 serts it — but unnecessarily — after ἣ
 ἄλλον τινός. These latter words form
 with what follows (μάλιστα μὲν instead
 of ἣ, “whether philosopher or not,
 but especially,” etc.) an explanatory
 apposition to the general idea, ἰδιώτου.

7. μετ' ἀληθείας: cf. the opposite
 description in 525 a above.

9. τὰ αὐτοῦ πράξαντος: ‘to attend
 to one's own business,’ was for a Greek
 to be both σώφρων and δίκαιος. That
 this did not, however, exclude him
 from taking interest in other people's
 lives is shown by Socrates' words in
Apol. 33 a τὰ ἐμαντοῦ πράττοντος. The

contrary of this phrase is πολυπρα- 526
 γμονεῖν, “to meddle officiously with,
 and to attack unreasonably the rights
 of others.” Cf. *Apol.* 31 c.

12. ῥάβδον ἔχων: the staff was the
 badge of public authority, and was
 borne by heralds, seers, priests, gen-
 erals, and others, but especially by
 judges. Cf. *Dem. de Cor.* (xviii.) 210
 καὶ παραλαμβάνειν γε ἅμα τῇ βακτηρίᾳ
 καὶ τῷ συμβόλῳ τὸ φρόνημα τὸ τῆς πό-
 λεως νομίζειν ἕκαστον ὑμῶν δεῖ. Also
 σκῆπτρον (from σκῆπτεσθαι, to lean on,
 ρ 199) had originally this value; e.g.
 A 234 ff., B 37, but became later the
 name for the badge of a ruler alone.

15. The quotation is from Hom. d
 λ 569.

17. ἀποφανοῦμαι: the simple φα-
 νοῦμαι is always middle, in the sense
 “appear”; the compound ἀπο- is
 almost always transitive or active in
 sense, “present,” “show.”

ὑγιειστάτην τὴν ψυχὴν · χαίρειν οὖν ἑάσας τὰς τιμὰς τὰς
 τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὴν ἀλήθειαν σκοπῶν πειράσομαι
 20 τῷ ὄντι ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι βέλτιστος ὦν καὶ ζῆν καὶ ἐπειδὰν
 ἀποθνήσκω ἀποθνήσκειν. παρακαλῶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
 πάντας ἀνθρώπους, καθ' ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ σὲ
 ἀντιπαρακαλῶ ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν βίον καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τοῦτον,
 ὃν ἐγὼ φημι ἀντὶ πάντων τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀγώνων εἶναι, καὶ
 25 ὀνειδίζω σοι, ὅτι οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσει σαυτῷ βοηθῆσαι, ὅταν
 ἡ δίκη σοι ᾗ καὶ ἡ κρίσις ἦν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἀλλὰ
 ἐλθὼν παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν τὸν τῆς Αἰγίνης ὑόν, ἐπειδάν
 527 σου ἐπιλαβόμενος ἄγῃ, χασμήσει καὶ εἰλιγγιάσεις οὐδὲν
 ἦττον ἢ ἐγὼ ἐνθάδε σὺ ἐκεῖ, καὶ σε ἴσως τυπτήσῃ τις καὶ
 30 ἐπὶ κόρρης ἀτίμως καὶ πάντως προπηλακίει.

LXXXIII. Τάχα δ' οὖν ταῦτα μῦθός σοι δοκεῖ λέγε-
 σθαι ὥσπερ γραὸς καὶ καταφρονεῖς αὐτῶν, καὶ οὐδέν γ'
 ἂν ᾦν θαυμαστὸν καταφρονεῖν τούτων, εἴ πῃ ζητοῦντες
 εἴχομεν αὐτῶν βελτίω καὶ ἀληθέστερα εὔρεω· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς,
 5 ὅτι τρεῖς ὄντες ὑμεῖς, οἵπερ σοφώτατοί ἐστε τῶν νῦν Ἑλλή-

526 23. ἀντιπαρακαλῶ: with reference
 e to 521 a and 485 e ff. — τὸν ἀγῶνα:
 brings up before us at once the public
 games, at which a prize was awarded.
 The name is quite applicable to the
 progress of human life, which is really
 a contest between different systems as
 practised by different men. Cf. the
 passage from *Phaedo* quoted on 527 e.
 But a judicial trial was also called
 ἀγών, and such a one awaits every
 man at the last judgment. Cf. *Apol.*
 34 c εἰ δὲ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τουτοῦ τοῦ
 ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδεήθη.

25. ὅτι οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσει κτέ.: cor-
 responds closely to the objections
 urged by Callicles in 486 a, b, νῦν γὰρ
 εἴ τις σοῦ λαβόμενος κτέ. In what fol-
 lows, the words καὶ ἐπὶ κόρρης ex-

press even an augmentation of the 526
 insult. e

LXXXIII. 2. ὥσπερ γραός: cf. 527
 the proverb ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν ὅθλος
Theaet. 176 b. So also in Latin, Ger-
 man, and English. Cf. *Hor. Sat.* ii. 6.
 77 Cervius haec inter vicinus
 garrit anilis | ex re fabellas. a

4. ἀληθέστερα: of course in com-
 parison with other views which can
 show less claim to truth. Cf. 493 d.
 Grades of truth are conceivable as
 steps in that approximation to the
 perfect truth which abides with God.
 This approximation is nothing more or
 less than knowledge, which has the
 stronger claim to be considered truth
 the better foundation it has.

5. σοφώτατοί ἐστε: such (ironi-

νων, σύ τε καὶ Πῶλος καὶ Γοργίας, οὐκ ἔχετε ἀποδείξαι, ^b
 ὡς δεῖ ἄλλον τινὰ βίον ζῆν ἢ τοῦτον, ὅσπερ καὶ ἐκείσε
 φαίνεται συμφέρων. ἀλλ' ἐν τοσούτοις λόγοις τῶν ἄλλων
 ἐλεγχομένων μόνος οὗτος ἡρεμεί ὁ λόγος, ὡς εὐλαβητέον
 10 ἐστὶν τὸ ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ παντὸς μάλ-
 λον ἀνδρὶ μελετητέον οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ
 εἶναι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ· ἐὰν δέ τις κατὰ τι κακὸς
 γίγνηται, κολαστέος ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο δεύτερον ἀγαθὸν μετὰ
 τὸ εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ γίγνεσθαι καὶ κολαζόμενον διδόναι ^c
 15 δίκην· καὶ πᾶσαν κολακείαν καὶ τὴν περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν
 περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ περὶ ὀλίγους καὶ περὶ πολλούς,
 φευκτέον· καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὕτω χρηστέον ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον
 αἰεὶ, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ πράξει.

Ἐμοὶ οὖν πειθόμενος ἀκολούθησον ἐνταῦθα, οἳ ἀφικό-
 20 μενος εἰδαιμονήσεις καὶ ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας, ὡς ὁ λόγος
 σημαίνει. καὶ ἑασόν τινὰ σου καταφρονῆσαι ὡς ἀνοήτου
 καὶ προπηλακίσαι, ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία σύ γε ^a

527 cal) flattery was submitted to by the
^a Sophists the more easily since mod-
 esty did not prevent them from ap-
 plying this epithet to themselves.
Cf. Prot. 337 d, where Hippias says
 ἡμᾶς οὖν αἰσχρὸν τὴν μὲν φύσιν τῶν
 πραγμάτων εἰδέναι, σοφωτάτους δὲ ὄντας
 τῶν Ἑλλήνων κτέ.

^b 7. ἐκείσε: like ἐκεῖ, of life beyond
 the grave; opposed to ἐνθάδε 525 b.
 The terminus in quem is used,
 inasmuch as the effect is meant, which
 reaches even to the beyond.

9. ἡρεμεί: "stands fast and im-
 movable against all attacks."

11. οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν κτέ.: as Aeschylus
 makes the messenger of Amphiarau-
 say in *Sept. c. Theb.* 592 οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν
 ἄριστος ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει. These words,
 as is well known, were applied by

the Athenians to Aristides. *Plut.* 527
Arist. iii. fin. The two modes of life
 discussed admit of distinction accord-
 ing to appearance and reality.

14. τὸ γίγνεσθαι: sc. δίκαιον.

17. ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον: expegetic to
 οὕτω.

19. ἐμοὶ οὖν πειθόμενος: begins the
 conclusion, which is peculiarly pa-
 thetic.—ἐνταῦθα: "in the direction
 of the attainment of our own perfec-
 tion." See on ἐκείσε above in b.
Cf. Apol. 36 c ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἴα, οἳ
 ἐλθὼν μήτε ὑμῖν μήτε ἑμαυτῷ ἐμελλον
 μηδὲν ὕφελος εἶναι. For the adverb of
 'place where' with a verb of motion,
 see on 456 b.

20 f. ὡς . . . σημαίνει: cf. 511 b.

22 f. σύ γε θαρρῶν: thrown in with d
 emphasis, because what follows in-

θαρρῶν πατάξαι τὴν ἄτιμον ταύτην πληγὴν· οὐδὲν γὰρ
 δεινὸν πείσει, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι ᾗς καλὸς ἀγαθός, ἀσκῶν ἀρε-
 25 τήν. κάπειτα οὕτω κοινῇ ἀσκήσαντες, τότε ἤδη, ἐὰν δοκῇ
 χρῆναι, ἐπιθησόμεθα τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, ἣ ὅποιον ἂν τι ἡμῖν
 δοκῇ, τότε βουλευσόμεθα, βελτίους ὄντες βουλευέσθαι ἢ
 νῦν. αἰσχροὺς γὰρ ἔχοντάς γε ὡς νῦν φαινόμεθα ἔχειν,
 ἔπειτα νεανιεύεσθαι ὥς τι ὄντας, οἷς οὐδέποτε ταῦτα δοκεῖ
 30 περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων· εἰς τοσοῦ-
 τον ἦκομεν ἀπαιδευσίας· ὥσπερ οὖν ἡγεμόνι τῷ λόγῳ
 χρῆσόμεθα τῷ νῦν παραφανέντι, ὃς ἡμῖν σημαίνει, ὅτι
 οὗτος ὁ τρόπος ἀριστος τοῦ βίου, τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ
 τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἀσκούοντας καὶ ζῆν καὶ τεθνάναι. τούτῳ
 35 οὖν ἐπώμεθα, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους παρακαλῶμεν, μὴ ἐκέῳω
 ᾧ σὺ πιστεύων ἐμὲ παρακαλεῖς· ἔστι γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἄξιος,
 ᾧ Καλλίκλεις.

527 flirts the deepest disgrace, πατάξαι.

d With πατάξαι the repetition in thought of *ἔασόν τινα* is the easiest construction. On the common object of the three infs., see on 493 c *soi*.

23. τὴν ἄτιμον ταύτην κτέ.: says Socrates, with reference to 527 a and 486 c.

23 f. οὐδὲν γὰρ δεινὸν πείσει: external rough treatment will not affect the real man.

25. κάπειτα: refers to ἀσκῶν, but it is more exactly defined by οὕτω . . . ἀσκήσαντες. — τότε ἤδη: emphatic position. The addition ἐὰν δοκῇ χρῆναι indicates that they may then find something more important to do.

26. ἐπιθησόμεθα κτέ.: cf. 521 d. This is the answer to Callicles' advice in 484 c ff. On the other hand,

ὅποιον ἂν τι ὑμῖν δοκῇ can serve for 527 d Polus. Cf. 466 c ff.

27. τότε: explained by βελτίους κτέ.

28. ὡς . . . ἔχειν: a polite expression which can hardly be misunderstood by those present.

31. ἀπαιδευσίας: in contrast to the παιδεία on which Callicles and Polus prided themselves. See on 461 b, c. — ὥσπερ οὖν ἡγεμόνι: the λόγος is treated as a living being, to whose guidance one can trust himself. It is the principle from which all other moral regulations proceed.

33. οὗτος: finds its explanation in καὶ . . . τεθνάναι.

34 f. For the conclusion, cf. *Phaedo* 114 c ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα χρὴ ὦν διεληλύθαμεν πᾶν ποιεῖν, ὥστε ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν· καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἄλλον καὶ ἢ ἐλπίς μεγάλη.

CRITICAL APPENDIX.

EDITIONS.

a. COMPLETE EDITIONS OF PLATO.

The following are the most important:—

Platonis Opera quae extant omnia ex nova Ioannis Serrani interpretatione.

Henrici Stephani de quorundam locorum interpretatione iudicium, et multorum contextus Graeci emendatio. 3 voll. Folio. Paris, 1578. (The pages of this edition, divided into paragraphs (a, b, c, d, e), have been adopted as a standard of reference in later editions.)

Platonis Dialogi (Gr. et Lat.) ex recensione Imm. Bekker. 8 voll. Bero-
lini, 1816–1823. (This edition contains the first systematic collation
of Mss.)

*Platonis Opera Omnia rec., prolegg. et comm. illustr. Godofredus Stall-
baum.* 10 voll. Lipsiae, 1827–1877.

*Platonis Dialogi secundum Thrasylli tetralogias dispositi. Ex rec. C. F.
Hermann.* 6 voll. Lipsiae, 1851–53.

*Platonis Opera quae feruntur omnia ad codices denuo collatos ed. Marti-
nus Schanz.* Lipsiae, 1875–.

b. SEPARATE EDITIONS OF THE GORGIAS.

The following are the principal more recent editions of the *Gorgias*
alone:—

Platons Gorgias. Erklärt von Heinrich Kratz. Stuttgart, 1864.

The Gorgias of Plato, with notes by Theodore D. Woolsey. Revised edi-
tion. Hartford, 1869 (reprint of the ed. of 1848).

The Gorgias of Plato, with English Notes, Introduction, and Appendix.
By W. H. Thompson. London, 1871.

*Platonis Gorgias, emendatus atque illustratus nec non prolegomenis et in-
dice instructus. Edidit R. B. Hirschig.* Traiecti ad Rhenum, 1873.

*Platos Ausgewählte Dialoge. Erklärt von C. Schmelzer. Zweiter
Band, Gorgias.* Berlin, 1883.

*Platons Gorgias. Erklärt von Julius Deuschle. Vierte Auflage, bearbeitet
von C. W. J. Cron.* Leipzig, 1886. (This edition is the basis of
the present work.)

In addition to the complete translation by Jowett may be mentioned the scholarly work —

Plato's Gorgias, literally translated. By E. M. Cope. London, 1883.

CRITICAL NOTES.

In the notes which follow, the first reading is that of the present edition; the second, the variant, — usually the reading of Schanz in his edition of 1881 (*Platonis Opera*, vol. viii., Lipsiae), or of the Mss. which his investigations have shown to have the most weight, viz. the Bodleianus or Clarkianus B ('second hand,' b), or the Venetian T ('second hand,' t). Other manuscripts sometimes cited are classed generally as cod. or codd., including those designated by Schanz as 'apographa.'

TITLE. In the Mss. we find the following addition: ἡ περὶ ῥητορικῆς ἀνατρεπτικός. Schanz brackets the last word.

447 a. καὶ ὥστεροῦμεν: is bracketed by S, following Cobet. Hirschig also *ad loc.* gives weighty reasons for the omission of the words. They may readily have crept in from a marginal gloss on κατόπιν . . . ἤκομεν, but a little fullness at the opening of the dialogue is not out of place.

447 b. καὶ: before ἐπιδείξεται is bracketed by S, to make the connexion close with δταν βούλησθε, — a case of unnecessary accuracy.

447 d. ἀποκρίνεσθαι: B T. ἀποκρινείσθαι S after cod. and Coräes. But the customary tense in advertisements is the present.

448 b. τί δέ τοῦτο: Cron, Kr. (62, 3, 11), and others supply ἐστίν instead of διαφέρει.

448 b. τίνα: B T. τί Cron following S, Buttmann, and Olympiodorus. It is true that the shift from τίνα to ὅπερ is harsh; but in view of the employment of τίνα with ἐκαλοῦμεν and καλοῖμεν it is better to retain the masculine. A more obvious emendation would be ὅνπερ for ὅπερ.

448 c. ἡρῆμένοι: S. εὐρημένοι B T. But in 514 d, B shows ἡρόσκομεν. See on ἡρῆκεναι 459 c below. — On the Gorgianic peculiarities of this passage, cf. Volkmann, *Rhetorik der Griechen u. Römer*, c. 38; Blass, *Att. Bered.* 2 i. 68 ff.; *Rhet. Graeci* ed. Spengel, especially vol. iii. In later times it became common to ascribe all kinds of rhetorical figures to the invention of Gorgias. Cf. Suid. *Γοργίας*. οὗτος πρῶτος τῷ ῥητορικῷ εἶδει τῆς παιδείας δύναμιν τε φραστικὴν καὶ τέχνην ἔδωκε, τροπαῖς τε καὶ μεταφοραῖς καὶ ἀλληγοραῖς καὶ ὑπαλλαγαῖς καὶ καταχρήσεσι καὶ ἀναδιπλώσεσι καὶ ἐπαναλήψεσι καὶ ἀποστροφαῖς καὶ παρίσσεσιν ἐχρήσατο.

448 e. μάλα γε: the eds. μάλα S (B T ?).

448 e. ἡρώτα: S following Bekker. ἐρωτᾷ B T.

449 b. ἄλλ' ὅπερ ὑπισχνεῖ (ὑπισχνεῖ b): S. ὅπερ ὑπισχνῇ B T. If there is no gap after ἀποθέσθαι, we should naturally expect ὅπερ ὡς ὑπισχνῇ — a reading which is advocated by Morstadt. In any case, however, such an admonition to Gorgias, before he has had time to answer the question ἀρ' οὖν ἐβελήσας ἂν κτέ., is extremely harsh, and renders it probable that a reply of Gorgias has fallen out. For this reason, S supposes a gap before ὅπερ, and adopts the reading of b as given in the text. Cron reads ὑπισχνεῖ without the gap.

449 c. ὦν φημι: Cron, Hirschig, etc. ὦν φημί S, Thompson, etc.

449 c. μηδένα ὦν . . . εἰπεῖν: the use of μή with the inf. even after verbs of saying was probably original, but the οὐ drove μή almost completely out. Examples are given in GMT. 685 *fin.*, and the whole subject is discussed by Gildersleeve, *Am. Jour. Phil.* i. 48 ff. In addition to this passage, cited on p. 49, n. 3, Professor Gildersleeve would now add *Rep.* vi. 497 b.

449 d. οὕτως: T S. οὕτω B Cron.

450 a. ἐλέγομεν: cod. Heindorf, S. λέγομεν B T.

450 d. πεττευτική: B T. παιδευτική (or πιστευτική) Richter. — Olympiodorus explains the equality of ἔργον and λόγον in the πεττεία as follows: ἀμα γὰρ τῷ βλέπειν τὰς ψήφους (prob. equiv. to κύβος or πεττός) καὶ ἐπιλέγουσί τινα οἶον σ' ε' δ' ἢ τριέκτα ἢ τι τοιοῦτον. This would seem to indicate a game similar to our 'backgammon.' But that the λόγος element goes beyond this is seen from *Rep.* ii. 374 c πεττευτικός ἢ κυβευτικός ἰκανῶς οὐδ' ἂν εἰς γένοιτο μὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐκ παιδὸς ἐπιτηδεύων ἀλλὰ παρέργῳ χρώμενος, *Polit.* 292 e ἴσμεν γὰρ ὅτι χιλίων ἀνδρῶν ἄκροι πεττευταὶ τοσοῦτοι (50) πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν οὐκ ἂν γένοιτό ποτε. In view of this and other considerations, Kleist, *JJ.* cxxxix. 477 (1889), thinks the reference here is to a definite theory of the πεττεία. See also Cron, *Beitr.* 83 ff., and for a discussion of the details of the game, *Herm. Gr. Alter.*³ iv. § 55.

450 e. οὐχ ὅτι: The examples cited for this rare and exclusively Platonic construction are, besides this, *Prot.* 336 d Σωκράτη ἐγγυῶμαι μὴ ἐπιλήσασθαι, οὐχ ὅτι παῖζει καὶ φησιν ἐπιλήσμων εἶναι, *Lys.* 220 a οὐχ ὅτι πολλάκις λέγομεν, ὡς περὶ πολλοῦ ποιούμεθα χρυσίον καὶ ἀργύριον· ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον οὕτω τό γε ἀληθὲς ἔχρη, *Theaet.* 157 b τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς πολλὰ καὶ ἄρτι ἠναγκάσαμεθα χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ. It is to be noticed that in *Lys.* 220 a alone the οὐχ ὅτι clause precedes. The sense, and also the feeling, is very closely given by the English, "not but that"; the other rendering, "although," fails to give the color. The common explanation is to supply some verb of saying, but that will not account for the second negative required. The question has been touched upon by Kratz in the appendix to his edition, by Münscher (*JJ.*, 1870), to whom Cron replies in *Beiträge*, 198 ff., and by Kühner, ii. 525, 4 b, who also recognizes the difficulty. Other scholars are inclined to look for the solution in the use of οὐ as a 'free negative.' The speaker anticipates the question, "Do you judge so, from the statements the party in question has made?" "No! because he actually said the contrary, in so many words."

450 e. ἐν τοῖς λόγοις: cod. Heindorf, S. τοῖς λόγοις B T.

451 b. περιττόν: the word γῶσις, which follows in the Mss., is bracketed by S after Bekker.

451 b. ὅσα ἂν . . . τυγχάνη: B T. ὅσα . . . τυγχάνει S after Ast. But no specific combination of odd and even is thought of, but merely their general relations up to any magnitude. But see Kleist, *JJ.* cxxxix. 479, and critical note to 453 e.

451 d. τις: codd. S. τινῶν B T.

451 d. τί ἐστι: S after Heindorf. ἐστι B T: a case of 'haplography.'

451 d. οὐ: B T. † S after Hirschig.

451 e. τὸ σκολιόν: the name was derived from σκολιός, *crooked, bent*, but variously explained. Some refer it to the order of succession of the singers, who alternated either around the table or in a zigzag across it; others, either to the air as compared with the solemn νόμος ὕμνος, or to the verse-measure of the song, which, as the oldest kind of the especially logaoedic μέλος, was thus named to distinguish it from the hexameter. Cf. Engelbrecht, *De Scoliorum Poesi*, and Gildersleeve, *Pindar*, I. E. xvi.

452 a. παιδοτρίβης: for the manner in which the distinction between παιδοτρίβης and γυμναστής gradually faded out, as well as the particulars of training of Greek youth, see Herm. *Gr. Alter.* iv. § 36, p. 335 ff.; Grasberger, *Erziehung und Unterricht im klass. Alterthum*, i. p. 265 ff.

452 a. καὶ εἶποι: B T S. καὶ εἶποι ἂν Hirschig. But see note.

452 a. ὕληια: is omitted by S following Hirschig. As the text stands, it is impossible to construe ὕληια. But even with it omitted we are troubled by the following δέ, for which we should expect γάρ. Perhaps the true solution has not been reached. It might be possible to read δὲ Σόκρατες; ὕληια;

452 b. θαυμάζοιμι τῶν: B T S. θαυμάζοιμι τῶν Cron.

452 c. αὐτῷ: B. αὐτῷ T S.

452 e. For Anaximenes' views of oratory, cf. his *Ars Rhetorica*, ed. Spengel, c. 1.

453 a. πειθοῦς δημιουργός: the originator of this definition cannot be definitely fixed. Thompson quotes *Prolegomena ad Hermogenem*, where it is ascribed to Corax and Tisias, and Quint. ii. 15. 4, where Isocrates is credited with it.

453 b. ἐστίν (πειθό): S. ἐστίν T. ἐστὶ B, Cron.

453 c. καὶ ποῦ: B T. ἢ οὐ S after Deuschle. (Woolsey had previously made the same emendation in his edition of 1842.) These two words have given endless trouble to the editors, and occasioned numerous emendations, for which see Schanz's note. They seem genuine. In the first place, it is hard to explain how they got in, if they are not genuine. Then, they are read by one of the scholiasts, who makes an attempt to explain them with the words ἐν τῇ κοικίλῃ στοᾶ. With the Greeks especially, everything with name had to have local habitation. The way of fixing an individual was to

give his own name, his father's, and the place of abode. Socrates is here simply (unconsciously, it may be) following out this Greek habit. The $\tau\alpha$ $\pi\omicron\iota\alpha$ corresponds to the genitive, and $\pi\omicron\upsilon$ marks the scene of his labors. That Socrates does not follow up his comparison in the following question is not remarkable, nor is it necessary that he should follow it up, as Thompson thinks; and the omission of the words by Olympiodorus cannot be placed against the concurrent testimony of B and T. Apply the method to Simonides (Semonides) of Amorgus and Simonides of Ceus. Packard, *Transactions Am. Phil. Assoc.* 1877, p. 11, defends the conjecture η $\omicron\delta$.

453 e. $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega\mu\epsilon\nu$: T S. $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu$ B.

453 e. $\delta\sigma\omicron\nu$ $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\nu$: B T S. Rejected by Kratz. Kleist, *JJ.* cxxxix. 479, wishes to translate $\delta\sigma\alpha$ in $\delta\sigma\alpha$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ $\tau\upsilon\gamma\chi\acute{\alpha}\nu\eta$, in 451 b above, by *quot cum que*, and not *quant cum que*, 'wie viele arten es auf beiden seiten geben mag.' For the sake of consistency, he would also substitute $\delta\sigma\alpha$ for $\delta\sigma\omicron\nu$ in this passage. See Cron, *Beiträge*, p. 91 ff. But see note.

454 a. $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\nu$: B. $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota$ T. $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\nu$ S.

454 a. $\rho\eta\tau\omicron\rho\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$ $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\nu$: B. $\rho\eta\tau\omicron\rho\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$ $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\nu$ S.

454 c. $\delta\pi\epsilon\rho$ $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega$: on the use of $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ to resume an interrupted thought, see Shilleto's crit. note to Dem. *de Falsa Leg.* 107 (96), quoted by Thompson.

454 d. δ' : S (B T?). $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ eds.

454 d. $\alpha\upsilon$: B T. $\delta\eta$ S.

455 a. $\pi\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$: t S. $\pi\iota\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ B T Cron.

455 b. $\iota\alpha\tau\rho\acute{\omega}\nu$ $\alpha\lambda\phi\acute{\iota}\sigma\epsilon\upsilon\varsigma$: cf. also *Gorg.* 514 d, and for details of treatment, etc., see Herm. *Gr. Alter.* iv.³ § 38.

455 d. $\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\nu\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\alpha$ $\kappa\tau\acute{\epsilon}$.: to Themistocles was due the fortification of Athens itself (Thuc. i. 90-93), as well as the erection and fortification of the Piraeus, with its commercial-harbor, $\acute{\epsilon}\mu\pi\acute{o}\rho\iota\omicron\nu$, and its war-harbor, $\kappa\alpha\nu\theta\acute{\alpha}\rho\omicron\nu$ or $\kappa\alpha\nu\theta\acute{\alpha}\rho\omicron\nu$ $\lambda\iota\mu\acute{\eta}\nu$, for both of which the Athenians formerly used the open bay of Phalerum. The dockyards were built to hold four hundred ships. The so-called Long Walls, whose erection had probably been suggested by Themistocles, connected with the city the whole coast, from the southeastern end of the bay of Phalerum to the northwestern end of the peninsula of Piraeus, together with its three harbors (in addition to the chief harbor just mentioned, also $\text{Z\acute{e}\alpha}$ and $\text{Mou\nu\nu\chi\acute{\iota}\alpha}$ on the southeastern side). They consisted of the shorter Phalerian wall of thirty-five stades, and the longer Piraeen (Thuc. i. 107) wall of forty stades. To the latter was afterwards added about the time of the $\tau\rho\iota\alpha\kappa\omicron\nu\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ $\sigma\pi\omicron\nu\delta\alpha\iota$, for greater security, a second wall, parallel and six hundred feet distant. These two are often distinguished as $\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\beta\acute{o}\rho\epsilon\iota\omicron\nu$ and $\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\nu\acute{o}\tau\iota\omicron\nu$ $\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}\chi\omicron\varsigma$, and are called by late authors $\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\mu\alpha\kappa\rho\acute{\alpha}$ $\sigma\acute{\kappa}\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\eta$. For details of location, see Bursian, *Geographie von Griechenland*, i. p. 265 ff., and Lolling's *Hellenische Landeskunde* (Müller's *Handb. der Klass. Altertumsw.* iii.) pp. 118, 299 ff.

455 e. $\tau\acute{\omega}\nu$: B T. $\tau\acute{\eta}\varsigma$ S after Buttmann. $\tau\acute{\eta}\varsigma$ $\tau\acute{\omega}\nu$ Schaefer, Hirschig.

456 a. εἰ: B T. τί, εἰ S after Madvig.

456 b. δπη: B T. δποι S after codd. and Heindorf.

456 d. ἀγωνίᾳ οὐ τούτου ἔνεκα: the last two words are bracketed by S after Findeisen, who puts a colon before δτι and a comma after ἐχθρῶν. With either reading an easy asyndeton is involved; and while τούτου ἔνεκα is rather redundant, it conflicts neither with sense nor construction. — On the ὁπλομαχία cf. Lach. init. τεθέασθε μὲν τὸν ἄνδρα μαχόμενον ἐν δπλοῖς κτέ., *Euthyd.* 273 c. For the development of this practice, see Herm. *Gr. Alter.* iv.³ § 35.

456 d. ἀποκτείνουσι: B S. ἀποκτινύναι T. Schanz, vol. viii. *proll.* p. vi f. shows from the Mss. that the form ἀποκτείνουσι is better attested for the *Gorgias*, though in other dialogues the weight of evidence seems to be in favor of the second form.

456 e. μὴ ὑπάρχοντας: for the different varieties of asyndeton and their effect on the style, see Rehdantz, *Dem. Phil. Reden* Index, under the word 'asyndeton,' and Volkmann, *Rhetorik d. Gr. u. Röm.* § 48.

457 c. λόγων: B T. φιλολόγων S. λογίων Madvig. ἀνθρώπων Cobet. Any of these emendations would make the text more exact, it is true, but would not give any other advantage than that of formal exactness, there being no ambiguity of meaning as the passage stands.

457 d. φιλονικούντας: S (vol. vii. *prolegg.*). φιλονεικούντας B T.

457 d. λοιδορηθέντες τε καὶ: is bracketed by S after Hirschig.

457 e. οὐ πάντῃ ἀκόλουθα: Cobet maintains that οὐ πάντῃ is an unqualified negation in classic Greek, although the sense "not entirely" is common in later authors. Cope and Riddell demand the weaker force here; and this corresponds much better with Socrates's whole bearing. See the discussion in App. to Cope's translation.

458 b. χρῆν: B T. χρή S with codd. See the note. The context, as well as εἶδει in the margin, b t, makes for the impf.

458 b. παρούσιν: T S. παρούσι B.

458 c. μή τις: Madv. *Syn.* § 124, 1, and Kr. 54, 8, 12, consider the μή in this case to have an interrogative force, "whether." It is better to look at the indic. as an attempt to avoid any ambiguity, since the subjv. may have two sides, the indic. but one. See GMT. 369, 1.

458 c. κατέχωμεν: B t S. κατέχωμεν T.

458 d. ὥστε χαριεσθε: on ὥστε with the inf. to express tendency, 'so as to,' without specifying as to the reality of the occurrence, and with the indic. to express actual result, see Gildersleeve, *Am. Jour. Phil.* vii. 161 ff.

458 d. ἐρωτᾶν . . . βούλεται: is bracketed by S after Badham, perhaps rightly.

459 c. ἡγήκηναι: S. εἰρηκέναι B T. Cf. 448 c. The evidence of inscriptions shows that after the middle of the fourth century, verbs in εὐ- were not augmented; the latest inscription containing ἡϋ- dates from 321 B.C. See Reinach, *Traité d'Épigraphie Grecque*, 285, Meisterhans, *Grammatik der Attischen Inschriften*,² § 64, 14.

459 c. λόγον: B T. λόγον S after Hermann. See Thompson's note.

460 c. The reading here adopted is that of Thompson, which differs from Hirschig's only in the position of αἰ. Schanz, followed by Cron, brackets οὐκοῦν . . . φαίνεται γε; but, as Thompson points out, the words οὐδέποτε ἔρα βουλήσεται ὃ γε δίκαιος ἀδικεῖν seem to require an intermediate step in the argument, while to retain the words τὸν ῥητορικὸν . . . τὸν δὲ in their present position is to disturb badly the otherwise plain course of reasoning. See the notes of Thompson and Hirschig *ad loc.*

461 b. ἡ οἶσι: S with the eds. ἡ B T Cron. Packard, *Transactions Am. Phil. Assoc.* 1877, p. 12, defends the explanation given in the note, which is now generally accepted.

461 c. ἐταίρους καὶ υἱεῖς (υἱεῖς): t and eds. ἐταίρους υἱεῖς B T. ἐταίρους S. I have adopted the first reading with a slight change in the spelling ('υἱός est un forme ionienne et vulgaire,' Reinach, *Epig.* p. 270; cf. Meisterhans, § 17, 4), though it must be confessed that υἱεῖς is decidedly suspicious.

462 d. οὐδεμία κτέ.: S, following Hirschig, divides the words as follows: ΣΩ. Οὐδεμία — φαθί. ΠΩ. Φημί δὴ. ΣΩ. Ἐμπερία τις. τίνος φαθί. ΠΩ. Φημί δὴ. ΣΩ. Χάριτος . . . Πῶλε. But one can hardly conceive how Polus could have failed to catch the spirit of the play, after Socrates had shown the way.

463 e. ἡ ῥητορικῇ: T Aristides S. ῥητορικῇ B Cron. In 461 a, 464 a, the article is omitted in both Mss., though it might stand as well there as here.

464 b. ἀντίστροφον μὲν τῇ γυμναστικῇ: Aristides, S after Heindorf. ἀντὶ μὲν τῆς γυμναστικῆς B T.

464 d. ὅπερ: b Aristides. ὅπου B T. ὅπῃ δ S.

465 b. οὔσα καὶ: codd. καὶ B T S.

465 b. ἐσθήσει: S after Coraes. αἰσθήσει B T. ἐσθῆτι Aristides, — which would correspond better to usage than ἐσθήσει. See Schanz's note for the many emendations.

465 c. διέστηκεν: B T S. διέστηκε μὲν cod., the editions.

465 c. χρήσονται: T S after Bekker. χρήσονται B Cron. Cf. 465 e.

466 a. ἄρ': S. ἔρ' B. ἄρ' T Cron.

466 b. δοκοῦσιν: T S. δοκοῦσι B Cron.

466 d. ὅτι: cod. S eds. εἰ ὅτι B T. εἰ οὐχὶ cod., Hermann, Cron.

466 d. ἐρωτήματα: codd. S. τὰ ἐρωτήματα B T.

466 e. οὐκοῦν: οὐκ οὖν S after Hermann, who defends this reading in the words: 'negativa responsio disiungi particulas postulat.' But, as Cron justly observes, Polus anticipated no such negative reply, but rather the contrary. He fails to see any difference in the two expressions used by Socrates; which makes the case for οὐκοῦν overwhelming.

466 e. φῆς: S after Baiter. ξφης B T, Cron, eds. The passages in which this anomalous form occurs are as follows: Xen. *Cyr.* iv. 1, 23; Pl. *Gorg.* 466, 496 (φῆς Baiter, S), *Euthyd.* 293 (-ησθα Baiter); Aeschines, ii. 86 (-ησθα Franke, Weidner); Aeschyl. *Ag.* 1613 (φῆς Dindorf, Hermann) and five pas-

sages from Lucian. The only passage remaining unchanged apparently is Xen. *Cyr.* iv. i. 23, where it is true, as Cron says, that *φῆς* cannot be read; but a change to *ἐφησθα* is not difficult, and then, as the word is put into the mouth of a foreigner, Cyrus, it might have been designed. Phrynichus (ed. Rutherford, p. 225) says *ἐφης*: *ἔστι μὲν παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον· τὸ δὲ πλείστον ἐφησθα*. Lobeck questions the truth of this statement, and Rutherford denies flatly that *ἐφης* is Attic. Almost all modern editors agree with Rutherford.

466 e. ἀποδείξεις . . . ἐξελέγξας: B T. ἀποδείξας ἐξελέγξεις S after Hirschig. It is true that Hirschig's reading makes the thought a little more exact, for strictly speaking the refutation consists in the proof. But, at the same time, the best proof of Polus's position would be the refutation of Socrates; so that in either case the general result is much the same.

467 a. κεκτήσονται. ἦ: κεκτήσονται, ἡ S.

467 b. τούτου πρόσθεν: is bracketed by S after Schleiermacher. Its genuineness had been already questioned by Heindorf.

467 b. ὑπερφῶ: S. ὑπερφῶη B T Cron. Meisterhans, § 58, 11, says: 'In the acc. sing. the ending *ᾱ* instead of *ῆ* is found when a vowel precedes. In the case of *ὕγιᾱ*, we find a variation in the use of *ᾱ* and *ῆ* after 360 B.C.' The same seems to hold true for the neut. pl. Cf. 486 b.

467 d. πλούτου γὰρ ἔνεκα πλείουσιν: is bracketed by S after Cobet.

468 a. ἔνεκα: S. ἔνεκεν B T Cron and eds. Meisterhans, § 83, 26: 'The forms in -εν (*ἔνεκεν*, *εἵνεκεν*, *οὐνεκεν*) are entirely foreign to Attic.' The earliest example of *ἔνεκεν* is after 350 B.C.

468 e. ὡς δὲ σὺ κτέ.: Cron considers the construction here to be causal at bottom. Others regard it as exclamatory.

469 a. ζηλωτόν: B T. ζηλωτός cod. S after Ast, who remarks (*Tom.* xi. p. 169 f.): 'Quod coniecera (Praef. p. vi. T. 1) *ζηλωτός* id confirmatum nunc video a Flor. d., idque tam praegressa quam sequentia videntur flagitare.' But the reading of the codex itself rests probably upon an emendation, and the neuter is merely a case of colloquial inexactness. Cf. a similar case in *Legg.* v. 730 c, where it is said that 'who would be happy, must be truthful,' *πιστὸς γὰρ, ὁ δὲ ἄπιστος, φ φίλον ψεύδους ἐκούσιον· ὅτι φ δὲ ἀκούσιον, ἄνους. ὦν οὐδέτερον ζηλωτόν*. Here probably no one will employ an emendation, although the author continues: *ἄφιλος γὰρ δὴ πᾶς ὁ τε ἄπιστος καὶ ἀμαθής*.

469 b. ἐλεινόν γε: S after Stobaeus. ἐλεινὸν δὲ B T.

469 e. ἦντιν' ἂν σοι δοκῇ: codd. S. δόκοι B T.

470 a. πράττειν, ἀγαθόν τε: S. πράττειν ἀγαθόν τε Cron. ἀγαθόν τι Heindorf. Although the idea is plain enough, the arrangement of the words has caused great difficulty. Schleiermacher, followed by Cron, construes *ἀγαθόν* *τε εἶναι* closely with *ὠφελίμως πράττειν*, under the article, thus making *τέ* a 'postscript' *τέ*. To do this, he has to take *φαίνεται* as a complete predicate, in

the sense, "seem good or correct." Ast wrenches the construction so as to supply a predicate, μέγα δύνασθαι, to φαίνεται, and follows it by ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι, making the contrast κακόν (sc. εἶναι) καὶ σμικρόν δύνασθαι in chiasmic position. But as Cron observes, it is quite out of the question to connect a τέ clause with a supplied predicate. Thompson uses the heroic treatment of bracketing the first τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι and the last δύνασθαι after σμικρόν. Most of the eds.—and this is best—put a comma after πρόττειν, and construe ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι and καὶ τοῦτο κτέ. together. This is not without difficulties, as Cron shows. The second clause deviates from the construction, but of this Plato shows several examples in this same dialogue. Socrates changes his expression to bring out with greater emphasis the ἐὰν μὲν clause: "and that (καὶ τοῦτο), it seems, is the real μέγα δύνασθαι." This translation obviates the objection to τοῦτο. Cron does not like the τὸ with the second μέγα δύνασθαι, but the τὸ seems to have much the force of the English emphatic *the*, and that force can be brought out by adding the word 'real.' By thus making τοῦτο a reiteration of ἐὰν μὲν κτέ., we have the contrast εἰ δὲ μή coming regularly with ἔστιν to be supplied after κακόν.

470 a. δύνασθαι· σκεψόμεθα: S. δύνασθαι, σκεψόμεθα Cron after Hermann.

470 b. ταῦτο: is bracketed as a dittograph by S, who refers to a similar case in *Theaet.* 186 d. This is not unlikely; but at the same time we can explain the word as it stands as showing a trace of sophistical quibbling.

470 d. ἐχθές: on the form, Rutherford, *New Phrynichus*, § 295, says: 'ἐχθές was the regular Attic form, the old Ionic χθές being naturally retained in phrases like χθές τε καὶ πρόην and occasionally, as in *Ar. Nub.* 353, *Vesp.* 242, to help the metre. After a word ending in a vowel, ἐχθές yielded to its older rival even in prose.'

470 d. οὐκ οἶσα — ἄδικος (471 a): is translated by Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* v. 12 as follows: Haud scio, nunquam enim cum eo collocatus sum.—Ain' tu? an aliter id scire non potes?—Nullo modo—Tu igitur ne de Persarum quidem rege magno potes dicere, beatusne sit?—An ego possim, quum ignorem quam sit doctus, quam vir bonus?—Quid? tu in eo sitam vitam beatam putas?—Ita prorsus existimo: bonos beatos, improbos miseros—Miser ergo Archelaus?—Certe, si iniustus.

470 e. καγαθόν: S. καὶ ἀγαθόν B T. Schanz, vol. ii. 2, *Prolegg.* § 1, shows that we find regularly καλὸς καγαθός, more rarely, καλός τε καγαθός, but not καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός, or καλός τε καὶ ἀγαθός.

471 b. ὕδν: S. υἱὸν B T Cron. See critical note on 461 c.

471 b. On the general stylistic effect of the partic. see Gildersleeve, *Am. Jour. Phil.* ix. 136 ff., who discusses this passage, showing that we should naturally expect such an outburst from Polus, 'Πῶλος by name and πῶλος by nature.'

471 c. τοῦ Περδίκκου: cod. S. τὸν Περδίκκου B T. Cron, *Beiträge*, p. 118, thinks that perhaps it would be better to join τὸν γνήσιον with τὸν ἀδελφόν, in which case τὸν Περδίκκου ὄν would be a gloss by a later hand.

471 c. ἐπείτῃ: S after Ast. ἐπταετῇ B T. But Heindorf had already observed, before Ast, with the approval of Lobeck, *Phryg.* 407, 'Atticum magis esse ex grammaticorum praeceptis ἐπείτῃ.'

471 d. ἐπήνεσα: B T. ἐπήνεσα† S after Cobet.

471 d. τοῦ δέ . . . ἡμεληκέναι: Thompson construes this clause under ἐπήνεσα in its full sense, considering that Socrates ironically calls his remark in 448 d (δῆλος γάρ μοι Πῶλος . . . ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ρητορικὴν μᾶλλον μεμελέτηκεν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι) a compliment. This view has found a supporter in Packard, *Transactions Am. Phil. Assoc.* 1877, 14. But the passage seems to be rather playful than ironic; and it is not uncommon in Greek to supply a colorless verb of saying from a preceding verb which involves it.

471 d. ἀγαθὲ: ἀγαθὲ B T. ᾧ'γαθὲ S.

472 a. εἶναι τί: S. εἶναι τι B T Cron. S is right in thinking the greater emphasis to be upon τί. This understatement implies much more importance, actual or pretended, in the persons mentioned than would be felt if εἶναι had the emphasis.

472 d. ἔστιν: S after Hermann. ἔστιν B T.

472 d. ἐν Πυθίῳ: cod. S. ἐν Πυθοῖ B T. Heindorf recommends ἐν Πυθίῳ, referring to the note of Suidas: Πύθιον ἱερὸν Ἀπόλλωνος Ἀθήνησιν ὑπὸ Πεισιστράτου γεγονός, εἰς δὲ τοὺς τρίποδας ἐτίθεσαν οἱ τῷ κυκλίῳ χορῷ νυκτίζοντες τὰ θαργήλια. But we find also in Thuc. vi. 54. 7 ἐν Πυθίῳ. In C. I. A. i. 422, we have a dedication by Aristocrates, son of Scellius, which may have belonged to this offering. See Roberts, *Introduction to Greek Epigraphy*, i. p. 97.

472 e. πάντως . . . μέντοι: S after Stobaeus. ἀπάντων . . . μὲν τοίνυν B T.

473 b. ὥς: is bracketed by S, following a suspicion of Heindorf, who, however, afterwards recalled his suspicion by referring to *Phaedrus* 233 e.

473 b. ἀδικῶν: is bracketed by S after Dobree. But Socrates' words in d, ἐὰν ἀδικῶς ἐπιβουλεύω, seem to favor the retention of ἀδικῶν here.

473 c. καταπίπτωθι: such punishments were but rarely inflicted in the Hellenic states, and were never sanctioned by law. When inflicted, they were dictated only by the fury of the moment, as we learn from Ath. xii. 26, p. 524 πρῶτον μὲν κρατήσας ὁ δῆμος καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους ἐκβαλὼν καὶ συναγαγὼν τὰ τέκνα τῶν φυγόντων εἰς ἁλώνιας, βούς συναγαγόντες συνηλοῖσαν καὶ παρανομώτατ' θανάτῳ διεφθεῖραν· τοιγάρτοι πάλιν οἱ πλούσιοι κρατήσαντες ἅπαντας, ὧν κύριοι κατέστησαν, μετὰ τῶν τέκνων κατεπίττωσαν. Routh identified the punishment here mentioned with the Latin *tunica molesta*, alluded to by Juv. viii. 235, on which Mayor gives references; among others Plut. *de ser. num. vind.* 9 'some men are just like children, who often when they behold malefactors in the theatres in tunics of gold and purple shawls, crowned and dancing the pyrrich, admire and envy them as happy; until they are seen goaded and

scourged and discharging fire from that flowered and costly attire' (*πῦρ ἀνιέντες ἐκ τῆς ἀνθιῆς ἐκέλης καὶ πολυτελοῦς ἐσθῆτος*). Cf. *Herm. Gr. Alter.* ii. 1,³ § 18.

473 c. *εὐδαιμονέστερος*: cod. S. *εὐδαιμονέστατος* B T.

473 d. *διδούς δίκην*: cod. *δίκην δούς* S after Schmidt. *διδούς* B T. The pres. is better than the aor. because the punishment is kept up.

473 e. *διαφεύγων*: B T. *διαφυγών* cod. S. Socrates is speaking generally.

473 e. *ἐροῦ τινα*: Stallbaum. *ἐρου τινα* B T. *ἐροῦ τινα* S.

474 b. *ἀδικεῖν*: S as Heindorf and Ast, following Ficinus, demanded. *ἀδικεῖν*; the eds.

474 c. *εἶναι, τὸ εἶναι τὸ* S and eds. Cron regards *πότερον* as an adj. with *τὸ ἀδικεῖν κτέ.* in apposition.

474 c. *τί δὲ δὴ*; *αἰσχίων*: Heindorf. *τί δὲ δὴ αἰσχίων* S after Aldus.

474 c. *αἰσχίων*; eds. *αἰσχίων* S.

474 e. *τὰ καλὰ, ἤ*: B S. *τὰ καλὰ τοῦ* T. *τὰ* omitted, cod. *καλὰ τοῦ* Thompson.

475 a. *θάτερον*: is said to be a Doric form, adopted into Attic, but this is doubtful. Attic inscriptions always have *έτερος*. Reinach, *Epig.* p. 249, thinks that originally in Attic *έτερον* may have been pronounced *ήτερον*. But Smyth, *The Vowel System of the Ionic Dialects* (*Trans. Am. Phil. Assoc.* 1889), p. 20, claims *ήτερος* itself for Attic. This claim, if true, would imply that old Attic has two forms, *ήτερος* and *έτερος*, the former of which became fixed in the form *θάτερον*, dying out otherwise. Others hold the very reasonable view that *θάτερον* was a familiar form and *θήτερον* carelessly taken for the singular.

475 b. *κακῶ*: B T. *κακῶ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις* S after Hirschig. Perhaps it is easier to bear with the inexactness than to explain the omission.

475 d. *χρόνω*: B T. Cron would either omit this word as not agreeing with the connexion, or change it to *λόγω* after Findeisen. But the usage is phraseological, and for that reason defensible.

476 c. *καί . . . κείσθαι*: codd. S. *καίει . . . κείσθαι* B T. So also in the following examples; but in 479 a, B T both have *κείσθαι*. The spelling of this verb is still an open question. Only two inscriptions contain present forms, and they are both before 400 B.C., and both show the diphthong. Meisterhans, § 63, 24.

477 a. *ᾤδε*: S eds. *ᾤδε* B Cron.

477 d. *ὀμφότερα*: Rid., § 17, classes this with such expressions as *καὶ ταῦτα*, under the head of acc. in apposition. See another example in 524 c.

478 b. *τί*: B Stobaeus S. *τί οὖν* T. *ὡν λέγεις*, which follows *ἐστιν* in B T, is bracketed by S after Bekker and Ficinus.

478 c. *καὶ ὕγι εἶναι*: is bracketed by S after Morstadt. It is true that the addition is unnecessary, and even illogical, but it serves to emphasize the result of the endurance.

478 c. *ἔοικε*: B. *ἔοικεν* T S.

479 a. *μη διδόναι δίκην κτέ.*: this passage shows well the narrow line which sometimes separates the tendential from the substantival acc. with the inf. and may help to explain the way in which *ῥοτε*, which with the inf. is post-Homeric, came to be introduced to fix the idea of tendency. See Gildersleeve, *The Consecutive Sentence in Greek*, *Am. Jour. Phil.* vii. 161 ff.

479 b. *οὕτω*: B T. *οὕτως* S and eds.

479 c. *εἰ μή σοί γε ἄλλως*: codd. eds. *εἰ σοί γε ἄλλως* B T. *εἰ σοί γε* S, who compares *Hipp.* ii. 367 d *εἰ γε σὺ βούλει*. But the interpolation of *ἄλλως* is hard to explain, while *μή* could easily have dropped out, under the influence of itacism.

479 d. *ἀδικεῖν*: B T. *ἀδικούντα διδόναι δίκην* S after Hirschig.

480 a. *ἀδικήσει*: S after Heindorf. *ἀδικέσῃ* B T.

480 b. *ποιήσῃ*: S after Heindorf. *ποιήσῃ* B T.

480 b. *λέγουμεν*: B T. *λέγουμεν* codd. S.

480 c. *τοῦναντίον*: Deuschle. *ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον* B T S Cron. Cron, following Heindorf, thinks that we must supply *χρήσιμον εἶναι*, which would make *ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον* correspond to *ἐπὶ τὸ ἀπολογεῖσθαι*. But this would leave *δεῖν* unaccounted for. Thompson supposes *ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον* to be a phrase equivalent to *εἰς τοῦναντίον* *Soph.* 221 a, or *κατὰ τοῦναντίον* *Tim.* 36 d, or *ἐξ ἐναντίας*, which is common enough. And if the *ἐπὶ* is kept, this is the only way of regarding it. But it is the sole example in such a phrase, and Deuschle bracketed it for that reason.

480 c. *δεῖ*: B T. *τε* S with codd. and Heindorf.

480 e. *ἡ κἀκεῖνα* (*κακεῖνα* B T). *ἡ κεῖνα* S after Hirschig.

481 a. *ἡ ἥρπακώς*: S. *ἥρπακώς* B T. *ἥρπακώς* ᾤ cod.

481 a. *ἀναλίσκη*: S after L, Dindorf, and Coraes. *ἀναλίσκηται* B T.

481 c. *φῶμεν*: B T. *θῶμεν* S after Madvig, who declares (*Adversaria*, i. 410) the connexion of a participle with *φάναι* not to be Greek. But *λέγειν* can be so construed, and we find *φάναι* followed by *μή* as if it were a verb of asseveration, which latter could take a participle.

481 d. *Ἦσιν*: according to Rid. § 173, Plato combines with *ἡ* the following: *διπλοῦς*, *πολλαπλάσιος*, *διαφερόντως* (*διαφέρειν*), *ἀνομοῖος*, *ἐναντίος*, *τίς*.

481 d. *ὅτι* (*ὅ τι*) *ἀν φῆ*: S with cod. and Ast. *ὅτι ὅπως ἀν φῆ* B. *ὅτι ὅπως ἀν ἀντιφῆ* T. *ὅτι ὁπὸς ἀν φῆ* eds. after Bekker. It is a good example to show how variations might arise.

482 a. *ἀ νῦν*: Cron, who claims the authority of B T for the omission of *ἀεί*. But S (with the eds.) reads *ἀεί* without noting any change in B T, and it is perhaps better to restore it to the text here before *ἀ νῦν*.

482 a. *ἐμπληκτος*: is explained by the scholiasts and grammarians by *ἄστατος*, *εὐμετάβολος* (*inconstans*), with which agrees *Lysis* 214 c *μηδέποτε ὁμοίους αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς εἶναι*, ἀλλ' *ἐμπλήκτους τε καὶ ἄσταθμήτους*.

482 a. *ἀεί τῶν αὐτῶν*: cod. S. *τῶν αὐτῶν* B T.

482 b. Αἰγυπτίων: B T. Αἰγύπτιον S after Stallbaum, following Olympiodorus, to obviate the omission of the art.; but see Reinach, *Epig.* p. 275: 'Jusqu'au IV^e siècle et même jusqu'au III^e on ne trouve que rarement le nom d'un peuple, d'un dème etc. précédé de l'article.'

482 b. κρείττον εἶναι ἀνάρμοστον τε: S after Van Heusde. κρείττον εἶναι ἀνάρμοστον τε B T. κρείττον ἀνάρμοστον τε εἶναι Ast after Heindorf.

482 d. διδάξαι: B T. διδάξει codd.

482 e. ἐναντ': S on the basis of the reading of B, which according to S is ἐναντι. ἐναντία T.

483 a. τοῦτο τὸ σοφόν: Rid., § 15, considers this and similar cases as acc. in apposition to the sentence. Cf. *Theaet.* 167 b & δὴ τινες τὰ φαντασματὰ ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν, and other examples, *Prot.* 352 e, *Theaet.* 158 b.

483 a. κάκιον, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι: B T. κάκιον . . . ἀδικεῖσθαι S after H. Stephanus, — perhaps correctly.

483 c. τὸ ἴσον: on the principles of democratic government as conceived by the Greeks, the equality of the individuals as well as their subservience to law, see Busolt, *Gr. Alter.* i. § 45 (Müller's *Handbuch*, iv.).

483 e. τὴν τοῦ δικαίου: is bracketed by S after Schleiermacher.

483 e. τὸν τῆς φύσεως: eds. τὸν φύσεως S (B T?).

483 e. τιθέμεθα: is bracketed by S after Hermann.

484 a. διαφυγών: is bracketed by S after Naber, καὶ διαφυγών by Morstadt. Cron prefers the latter, but καταπατήσας would continue the metaphor of the escaping beast much better as a co-ordinate participle than it could as a subordinate.

484 c. διαφθορά: the speech of Callicles affords a good example of the *σεμνότης* which Aristides (*Rhet. Gr.* ed. Spengel, ii. 468) says is caused by the employment of *ονομαστικὰ λέξεις ἀντὶ ῥηματικῶν*.

484 e. καὶ ἐπὶ: B T S. καὶ eds.

484 e. τυγχάνει: T S. τυγχάνη B.

485 b. καὶ παλζοντας: is bracketed by S after Morstadt.

485 b. ψελλιζόμενον καὶ παλζον: is bracketed by S after Cobet.

485 c. ἢ παλζοντα ὀρά: is bracketed by Morstadt.

485 e. ψυχῆς ἔχων: Nauck. ψυχῆς B T S.

485 e. διαπρέπει: B T. διατρέπει S after Grotius. It can hardly be said that the emendation of Schanz is any more satisfactory than the text. I have followed Nauck in inserting ἔχων to make the construction better Greek. But most likely the correct reading of the passage is beyond the efforts of the eds. The trouble with *διαπρέπει* is that while not unknown to Euripides' vocabulary, it is never used transitively; hence Nauck's insertion, for which Cron suggests *λαχών*, which would serve as well. In this way *διαπρέπειν* would be used just as we find it in Eur. *Alc.* 602, where Admetus says to his father, with bitter irony, ἢ τὰρα πάντων διαπρέπεις ἀψυχία.

485 e. οὗτ' ἄν . . . λόγον: these words are shown by the metre, οὗτ' ἄν δίκης βουλαῖσι, as well as by the form βουλαῖσι, to have belonged in some form to Euripides. This has led Hartung to add them to the fg. with slight changes, though Nauck and Schanz do not feel justified in so doing.

486 a. λάκοις: S after Bonitz. λάβοις B T. λάκοις is not a prose word, but is very common in Euripides.

486 b. ἐλιγγιφής: B T S. ἐλιγγιφής b t Cron. Schanz, vii. Prolegg. § 1, compares all the passages, and refers to the note of Suidas: ἐλιγγιῶ· τὸ μὲν ῥῆμα διὰ διφθόγγου, ἀντὶ τοῦ σκοτοδινῶ — τὸ δὲ ὄνομα ἑλιγγος διὰ τοῦ i.

486 b. εὐφύα: S. εὐφύῃ B T. Cf. crit. note on 467 b.

486 c. κόρρη: the retention of η after the ρ in the words given in the note is explained as due to the fact that the older forms were κόρση, δέρση, etc., and that afterwards assimilation took place, as in the case of θάρσος to θάρρος. Curt. Stud. i. a 248.

486 c. πίθου: S after Cobet. πείθου B T Cron.

486 c. ταῦτ' ἄφελς: eds. ταῦτα ἄφελς S (B T?).

486 d. ἄσμενον: B S. ἄσμενον eds.

486 d. ἡ: B T. αἷς S after Stallbaum. αἷ cod. This deviation from the more rigid construction is quite comprehensible in the freedom of conversation. Cf. 521 b.

486 e. ἄν: B T. ἄν S after Bekker.

486 e. ταῦτ' ἦδη: eds. ταῦτα ἦδη S (B T?).

487 c. Τίσανδρον: S with inscriptions. Τίσανδρον B T Cron.

487 d. ταῦτά: S after Ficinus. ταῦτα B T. Cron remarks that ἐμοί makes for the first reading, for with ταῦτα we would more usually find ταῦτά μοι.

487 e. ἡ σή: B T S. σή eds.

488 a. ἔστιν: S Thompson. ἐστιν B Cron. ἐστὶ T.

488 a. ταῦτά: B S. ταῦτα T eds.

488 b. πλείον: S after Heindorf. πλείων B T.

488 b. ἔλεγον: is omitted by S, following common Greek usage. Both the position and the sense make for the omission.

489 a. τοῦτο, Καλλικλείς: B T. τοῦτ' ὦ Καλλίκλεις S after Heindorf.

489 c. ἐρμαιοῖν: B S. ἔρμαιον T.

489 c. συλλεγῇ: T b S. συλλέγῃ B.

489 c. φῶσιν κτέ.: the omission of an object to φῶσιν has caused a great deal of trouble, and it is certainly harsh to consider the word as used absolutely in the sense "declare," "speak"; but such must be done as yet, for the emendations and other explanations are not satisfactory. Schanz changes αὐτά to ἄττα. Cron construes αὐτά . . . νόμιμα with φῶσιν, and translates: 'Or do you think I mean (by the statement that τὸ βέλτιον and τὸ κρείττον are the same) that (i.e. the case) when . . . and these say that this and nothing else is lawful,' viz. ἂν φῶσιν. But this is too trying a species of mental gymnastics for conversation.

489 c. *αὐτὰ*: B T. *ἄττα* S after Heindorf, possibly with right. Some eds. insert comma after *αὐτὰ*. Cron omits comma both after *φῶσιν* and *αὐτὰ*.

489 d. *τί*: B T eds. *τίνας* S after Routh.

490 a. *ῥήματα*: cod. *ῥήματι* (defended by Winckelmann) B T. *ῥήμὰ τι* Deuschle. *ῥημάτια* S after Badham.

490 a. *ἔστιν*: S and eds. *ἐστίν* B. *ἐστὶν* T Cron.

490 b. *ἄθροοι*: T S. *ἄθροοι* B Cron.

490 c. *ἐν δὲ τῷ*: codd. *ἐν τῷ δὲ* B T S, referring to Kr. 68, 5, 1.

490 c. *περὶ συνία*: B T. Thompson follows Hirschig in bracketing the words, which certainly are here a violation of usage. Cf. his note *ad loc.*

491 a. *ὥς*: B T S. *ὥσπερ* Baiter.

491 d. *ἐταῖρε*;: cod. Bekker S. *ἐταῖρε τί ἢ τί ἀρχομένους* B. *ἐταῖρε τί ἢ τί ἀρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους* T. Many attempts have been made to emend this passage. Schanz gives the emendations of Stephanus, Cron, Bernardakes, Ast, Hermann, Stallbaum, Schuster, Madvig, Kratz, Kleanthes, Heindorf, Beck, E. Jahn, Findeisen, Baiter.

492 b. *εἰεν*: S. *εἶησαν* B T Cron.

492 c. *ταὐτ' ἐστίν*: B. *ταὐτ' ἐστὶ* T. *ταὐτ' ἔρα* S.

492 d. *ἀμόθεν*: S after Bekker. *ἄλλοθεν* B T.

492 e. *ἦδη*: B T S. *ἦ δὴ* Hermann, Cron. *δπερ ἦδη* cod. Thompson.

493 a. *πιστικόν*: Iamblichus, S. *πιστικὸν* B T Stobaeus. Cf. 455 a.

493 a. *τῶν δ' ἀμνήτων*: B T. *τῶν ἀμνήτων* S after Madvig. But the passage offers an additional difficulty in *αὐτοῦ* where we desire *αὐτῆς*. If *αὐτοῦ* is genuine, we must conceive the clause *τὸ . . . στεγανόν* as in part. opposition to *τοῦτο*. This would make *αὐτοῦ* partitive genitive instead of possessive, which Cron insists upon calling it.

493 c. *ἀπῆκασε*: T (in the margin) S. *ἀπείκασε* B T.

493 c. *μετατίθεται*: cod. eds. *μετατίθεσθαι* B T S. Ast attempts to defend the reading of the Mss. by translating, 'Do I also persuade you to change your opinion to this, that,' etc. But, as Cron remarks, this gives an utterly impossible construction for *καί*, and besides there is no meaning in "also."

494 c. *πληροῦν*: S after Stephanus. *πληροῦντα* B T. *πληροῦν, πληροῦντα καὶ χαίροντα* Heindorf.

494 e. *κνησιώη*: S after Heindorf. *κνησιῶ* B T. *κνησιῶ* Bekker, Cron. *κνησιῶ* Coraë.

494 e. *ἐχόμενα*: is bracketed by S.

495 a. *ἀγαθαί*: codd. S. *αὶ ἀγαθαί* B T. Heindorf appeals to 501 b; but since Bekker that has been read *ἢ βελτίων*, instead of *ἢ βελτίων*.

495 d. *ἀγαθοῦ*: B T. *ἡδέος* H. Schmidt, to make the clause correspond more accurately with the previous discussion. See the discussion in Cron, *Beiträge*, p. 166, 209.

496 a. *ἄνθρωπος*: S after Bekker. *ἄνθρωπος* B T Cron.

496 b. ἀπολλύει: B according to Gaisford. ἀπόλλυσι S after Cobet's dictum that forms in -ύω are not Attic. Thompson quotes Porson on Eur. *Medea*, 744: 'Observandum est hac forma, ea nempe ubi ύω pro υμι in fine verbi ponitur nunquam uti Tragicos; rariissime veteres Comicos; saepius mediae, saepissime novae Comoediae poetas. Paullatim et parce adhiberi coepta est sub mediam fere Aristophanis aetatem; tantum enim occurrit δμνῆ Av. 1610, συμπαραμινύων in ultima eius fabula Pluto 719. Cetera loca, ubi usurpari videtur, aut emendata sunt aut emendanda.' The evidence of the inscriptions seems to substantiate this. Meisterhans, § 74, 14, says: 'Regarding the transition of verbs in -νυμι to the -ω conjugation, we find in 5th cent. B.C. δμνύτω, δμνύντων, δμνύναι. The 4th cent. still shows δμνύναι, but also ὤμνυον (336 B.C.). Only after the 2d cent. does the inf. take the -ω ending; στρωννύειν, δμνύειν.'

496 c. ἀνθρωπος: S after Bekker. ἄνθρωπος B T Cron.

496 d. καὶ ἐγὼ μανθάνω: Hermann. καὶ ἐγὼ μανθάνω B T. Μανθάνω S after Ast.

496 e. φῆς: S after Baiter and Deuschle. ἐφης B T Cron. Cf. critical note on 466 e.

497 a. ἀκκίζει: the scholiasts connect the word with a certain woman named Ἀκκώ, who was so foolish that she took from the loom a half-finished garment, and, clad in it, conversed with her own image in a mirror. The story is varied in the different accounts, and the connexion between Ἀκκώ and this verb is very uncertain. We learn from Plutarch that Ἀκκώ was used like Μορμώ, etc., as a bugbear to terrify children, and we find its employment as early as Pindar, *fg.* 127, — which makes the loom story highly improbable.

497 a. ἐμπροσθεν —: Cron. ἐμπροσθεν; S. The interrogation after the inv. is difficult to account for.

497 a. τί ἔχων ληρεῖς;: S after Badham. ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς B T, without any division of persons.

497 d. ὡς ἐτέρων ὄντων: is bracketed by S after Deuschle.

497 e. ἄφρονας: B T. τοὺς ἄφρονας cod. S after Heindorf, who holds, however, the addition of the article to be unnecessary.

498 b. ἐμοιγε μάλλον: B T. ἐμοιγε, μάλλον δ' ἴσως οἱ δειλοὶ S after a conjecture of Hermann. This addition would, however, make superfluous the following questions, ἀπιδόντων δ' οὐ μάλλον κτέ.

498 c. ἀγαθοί: Routh. ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ B T. S brackets the words ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ εἰσιν.

499 b. ἰὼ ἰὼ: T. ἰοῦ ἰοῦ B S. According to Cron, the authority seems to be on the side of the first accentuation, even when the expression is a joyful one.

499 d. ἄρα: S with Hermann after Heindorf. εἴ ἄρα B T.

499 e. ἔνεκα: S. ἔνεκεν B T Cron. See critical note on 468 a.

500 a. ἀγαθὰ — τῶν ἡδέων — ἔστιν: this reading follows a suggestion of Professor Gildersleeve in regard to the recitation of the passage. ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων ἔστιν B T eds.

500 a. ἀναμνησθῶμεν: S. ἀναμνησθῶμεν B eds.

500 c. ἐπὶ: is bracketed by S after Findeisen.

500 d. εἰ ἔστιν κτέ.: an example of the Schema Pindaricum, on which see Thompson *ad loc.* Gildersleeve on Pindar, *Ol.* xi(x) 61, and R. S. Haydon, *Am. Jour. Phil.* xi. No. 2.

501 a. ἡ δ' ἐτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς κτέ.: it is impossible to look upon τῆς ἡδονῆς as a "free gen.," because the τούτου of the preceding clause has given the key to this, neither can Cron's explanation of it as 'gen. of belonging' ('angehörigkeit connexion'), with the translation "that which is directed to," be deemed satisfactory. Hirschig inserts ἡ before τῆς, supplying, and, as it seems, necessarily, τέχνη, in which case there would be a tacit acknowledgment of a τέχνη τῆς ἡδονῆς — an admission the very opposite of what Socrates intends, for he emphatically insists that the παρασκευὴ τῆς ἡδονῆς rests on ἐμπερία only.

501 c. ἵνα σοὶ καὶ περανθῇ ὁ λόγος καὶ κτέ.: Cron, referring to Kr. 69, 32, 16, 17, considers this a case of the use of καὶ in clauses of purpose to add emphasis in the sense 'ja,' 'doch.' But while this use of καὶ is undoubted (*cf.* *Rep.* i. 346 a ἡ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα τι καὶ περαινῶμεν) it seems much more natural here to make it correlative with the following καὶ, "both . . . and."

501 d. ἀθρώαι: T S Cron. ἀθρώαι B eds.

502 a. ἡύρησθαι: S. εὐρήσθαι B T.

502 b. τί δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ . . . ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακεν; πότερον: S places the mark of interrogation after δὴ, construes with Hermann, ἡ σεμνὴ . . . with πότερον and brackets ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακεν after Cobet. The remedy is violent and perhaps needless.

502 b. ἐσπούδακέναι: Curtius, *Verb.* ii. p. 154 ff., distinguishes five classes of perfects which are used originally as presents, viz. perfects of sound (κράγα), of sight and smell (ὄσναι), of gesture (δεῖδεσθαι, η 72), of emotion (δέδουκα), and intensive perfects. Under the same categories fall all those perfects which, though originally full perfects, have acquired a present meaning; e.g. ἐργήγορα, τέθηκα, πεφύκαμαι, ἐσπούδακα, πέφυκα, etc.

502 b. ὥς σοι (ὥς σοι T) δοκεῖ: B T. ὥς μοι δοκεῖ, ὥς σοι δοκεῖν, Kratz.

502 c. σοι: S. σοι Cron and eds.

502 d. ῥητορικῇ: codd. S after Heindorf. ἡ ῥητορικὴ B T.

502 d. ἡύρηκαμεν: S. εὐρήκαμεν B T.

503 a. εἰ γὰρ καὶ: according to Kr. 65, 5, 15, καὶ εἰ implies that the statement of the leading clause is absolutely unassailable, even in the extreme case which καὶ εἰ introduces; with εἰ καὶ the realization of the condition, which may easily happen, is still a matter of no importance, as far as the statement of the leading clause is concerned. *Cf.* also *Madv. Syn.* § 194 d.

503 a. *τοῦτο*: codd. Aristides, Heindorf, S. *τοῦτο* δ B T.

503 d. *εἶναι τοιοῦτον*: B T. § marks a gap after *εἶναι*, and omits the weakly attested *ἔχεις εἰπεῖν* after *γεγονέναι*. Heindorf thinks that some word like *ἐφάνη*, *ὡμολόγηται* is to be added, or *εἶναι* changed into *εἶη ἄν*. See the numerous conjectures in S.

503 e. *προσφέρει δ προσφέρει*: this reading of cod. has been adopted by the eds. since Heindorf. It is not certainly Plato's, of course, but it fills the space and makes sense. *προσφέρει* B T. S marks a gap after this word.

503 e. *αὐτοῦ*: codd. S. *αὐτῶν* B. *αὐτῶν* T.

504 c. *ἐκείνῳ*: S after Heindorf. *ἐκείνο* B T.

504 e. *αὐτοῦ*: B T. *αὐτῷ* Deuschle. *δι' αὐτοῦ* conjectured, but not adopted by S.

504 e. *πλέον, ἢ τοῦναντίον κατά γε*: B T. *πλέον ἢ τοῦναντίον, κατά γε* S after Schleiermacher's first edition. This passage has given a good deal of trouble, and the explanation given in the note is only the lesser of two evils. The second construction, that of S., Schleiermacher, and others, is thus paraphrased by Thompson: "What is the use of administering to a diseased body a variety of dishes when these will frequently be of no more service to it than abstinence and mortification (*τοῦναντίον πολλῶν σιτίων κτέ.*), nay, rightly considered will do it even less good than abstinence?" This view makes excellent sense, but is open to several objections. 1. The use of *τοῦναντίον* is harsh and probably unexampled. 2. There is a case of asyndeton before *κατά* which Woolsey, a good critic, pronounced intolerable, and which Heindorf was moved to avoid by the insertion of *ἢ*, an impossible remedy owing to the preceding *ἢ* (*than*). 3. This view involves the supplying of the positive *ὀνήσει* from the preceding *μὴ ὀνήσει*. No complete collection of examples of this usage seems to have been made. Kühner, ii. § 597 n., cites the following cases where a positive verb is supplied from a negative. Hom. E 819 *οὐ μ' εἶας μακαρέσει θεοῖς ἀντικρὺ μάχεσθαι, ἀτὰρ* (sc. *ἐκέλευες*), Eur. Ph. 1217 *τί μ' οὐκ εἶσας ἐξ εὐαγγέλου φήμης ἀπελθεῖν ἀλλὰ* (sc. *ἐκέλευες*), Soph. O. R. 236 *τὸν ἄνδρ' ἀπαυδῶ τούτον . . . ὥθειν δ' ἀπ' οἴκων* (sc. *αὐδῶ*), Eur. Supp. 467 *ἐγὼ δ' ἀπαυδῶ Ἀδραστον εἰς γῆν τῇδε μὴ παριέναι εἰ δ' ἔστιν κτέ.* (sc. *αὐδῶ*), Soph. E. 71 f. *καὶ μὴ μ' ἔτιμον τῇσδ' ἀποστείλῃτε γῆς, ἀλλ'* (sc. *στέλλετε*), Hdt. vii. 104 *ὁ νόμος . . . οὐκ ἔων φεύγειν ἀλλὰ* (sc. *κελεύων*), ix. 2 *οὐδὲ ἔων ἰέναι ἀλλὰ* (sc. *κελεύων*), Pl. Apol. 36 b *ἀμελήσας, ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ* (sc. *ἐπιμελοῦνται*). Add Soph. O. R. 818 *ὧν μὴ ἔξεστι . . . ὥθειν δ' ἀπ' οἴκων* (sc. *χρή*), Hdt. v. 82 *ἢ δὲ Πυθίη οὐδέτερα τούτων ἔα ἀλλὰ* (sc. *ἐκέλευε*), vii. 143 *οἱ οὐκ ἔων . . . ἀλλὰ* (sc. *ἐκέλευον*). It will be noticed that the range in these passages is limited, and in every case (except Apol. 36 b) the positive is to be supplied after a disjunctive conjunction. A few cases are cited where adjs. are involved, but here also we find the conjunction. The peculiar passage Eur. O. 717 is different. No example, accordingly, is cited to support the usage of the text (according to Thompson's view). On the other hand the interpretation

advocated in the text is not free from objections. *τοὐναντίον* seems an unnecessarily strong adversative. Perhaps it would be better to consider the passage as a case of colloquial inexactness.

505 a. *ἐμπίπλασθαι*: T S. *ἐμπίπλασθαι* B. See Schanz, vol. xii. *praef.* § 15.

505 c. *καταλύομεν*: B T. *καταλύσομεν* S after Stephanus.

506 a. *ἄν τι*: S. *ἄν τι* B T Cron. See note on 472 a.

506 b. *ἔως . . . ἀπέδωκα*: the construction employed here must be carefully distinguished from the common use of the aor. indic. after *ἔως* of a definite past fact. See GMT. 613, 2 and *Am. Jour. Phil.* iv. 416 n.

506 c. *ἀχθεσθήσομαι*: B T eds. *ἀχθέσομαι* Thompson after Hirschig, on the ground that the longer form is not Attic.

506 c. *ὦ ἀγαθέ*: B. *ὦγαθέ* T. *ὦγαθέ* S.

506 d. *οὐ τῷ εἰκῇ*: B T. *οὐτοι εἰκῇ* cod. Sauppe S. That *εἰκῇ* can be used with an article is proven by the passages quoted by Stallbaum: *Phileb.* 28 d *τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ εἰκῇ δύναμιν*, *Tim.* 34 c *μετέχοντες τοῦ προστυχόντος τε καὶ εἰκῇ*. A kindred expression is found *Phileb.* 45 d *ἡδονάς . . . τῷ σφόδρα καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον ὑπερεχούσας*.

506 d. *κᾶλλιστα*: is bracketed by S after Coraës. We could very easily do without it.

508 b. *οἱ ἄθλιοι ἄθλιοι*: S after Heindorf. *οἱ ἄθλιοι* B T. *ἄθλιοι οἱ ἄθλιοι* Bekker. Ast and Vahlen both defend the Mss. reading, but unsuccessfully.

508 c. *ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ*: is bracketed by S after Morstadt, *τοῦ ἐθέλοντος* by Hirschig. On the ground of meaning and usage the latter is to be preferred.

508 d. *ἀποκτείναι*: B T. *ἀποκτείνουσαι* S, to avoid change of tense.

509 a. *ἔστιν*: B T. *ἔστιν* S after Hermann (*ἔστι*).

509 a. *ὥσπερ νῦν*: B T. *ὥσπερ νῦν ὑμῖν* Coraës.

509 b. *τίνα ἄν*: B T. *τίνα δὲ* S after Hirschig.

509 b. *τὴν αἰσχίστην βοήθειαν*: B T. *τὴν αἰσχίστην* † *βοήθειαν* S. Morstadt brackets *τὴν αἰσχίστην* — *οἰκείως*, Cobet even more.

509 c. *τοῦ ἀδικεῖν κτέ.*: on the gen. abs. with the articular inf. see *Am. Jour. Phil.* iii. 201, where *Crito* 44 d, *Polit.* 310 e, *Euthyd.* 285 d, are cited as being, in addition to the present passages, the only cases in Plato.

510 a. *ἔστι*: B. *ἔστιν* T S.

510 a. *ἀδικήσομεν*: S after Heindorf. *ἀδικήσωμεν* B T.

510 b. *ἐτοιμός*: S according to the rule of Herodian and other grammarians. *ἐτοιμός* B T.

510 b. *ἔστιν ἄρχων*: Cron seems to consider this a case of participial periphrasis for the verb; but Alexander, in his article, *Am. Jour. Phil.* iv. 291, does not so regard, or at least does not mention it, and it is more likely from the following adjs. that *ἄρχων* is substantival.

510 b. *ὁμοῖος*: S. *ὁμοῖος* B T. See on *ἐτοιμός* above.

510 c. οὕτως: S. οὕτος B T eds.

510 d. ταύτη: cod. S. αὐτῇ B T, defended by Ast.

510 d. ἀδικοῖη, αὐτῇ: S with the second Basle ed. ἀδικοῖ ἢ αὐτῇ B T.

511 c. συμβουλευόν: cod. S after Wyttenbach and Heindorf. συμβουλεύει B T.

511 d. τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα: Packard (*Trans. Am. Phil. Assoc.* 1877) considers σώματα an emphatic repetition of ψυχὰς, the variation in the words being due to the frequency of the phrase σώματα καὶ χρήματα. He translates: "The art of navigation, which saves not only lives, but both lives and property."

511 e. γυναῖκας: B T. γυναῖκα S after Naber. Morstadt brackets καὶ παῖδας and καὶ γυναῖκας, and it must be said that ἀ ρυνδῇ ἐλεγον, which refers back to σώματα in d above, seems to favor this course.

512 a. οἱ: B T S with Ast and Winckelmann. οἱοι t codd.

512 a. ὀνήσει: S after Deuschle. ὀνήσειεν B T. ὀνήσειεν ἂν Heindorf.

512 c. αὐ τῷ σαντοῦ: αὐτὸς τῷ σαντοῦ codd. Cron. αὐτὸς B T. αὐ S. But there seems to be some need of an antithesis to τῷ δεῖ αὐτοῦ.

512 d. ἔστιν: T S and eds. ἐστιν B Cron. Cron defends his manner of accentuation on the ground that the emphasis is on δ ἐγὼ λέγω.

512 d. ἧ ἢ τὸ: S after Heindorf. ἡ τὸ B. ἧ τὸ T. ἧ τοῦ eds.

512 d. μὴ γὰρ: B T. ἡ γὰρ S following a suspicion of Ast. καὶ γὰρ Buttmann. ἡδὲ γὰρ Hermann. εἴη γὰρ Madvig.

512 e. ὅποσονδῇ (ὁπόσον δῇ): codd. Antoninus S. ὁπόσον δὲ B T.

512 e. βιοῇ: S. βιόῃ B T Cron.

513 a. σὺν τοῖς φιλάτοις: the prep. σὺν is intensely personal, and always involves in the action of the verb the case it governs. In the classic Attic there seems to be no difference in meaning, only one in frequency, between it and μετὰ. It is regularly retained in legal phrases and in old formulae, as here, where the personal idea was originally predominant. Cf. Gildersleeve, μετὰ and σὺν, *Am. Jour. Phil.* viii. 218; Meisterhans,² § 83, 35. 47. 48.

513 b. πολιτικός: is bracketed by S after Heindorf and Ast, probably rightly.

513 c. τῷ αὐτῶν γὰρ ἦθαι: this dat. (equiv. to 'according to,') is probably an extension of the dat. of interest; though Cron, following Kr. 48, 15, 4, looks at it as developed from the side of means.

513 c. πολλάκις ἴσως: is bracketed by S; ἴσως, Schaefer. Ast conjectures that ἴσως is to be put before πεισθήσει.

513 d. ἀναμνήσθητι: S. ἀναμνήσθητι B Cron.

513 d. θεραπεύειν καὶ: θεραπεύειν, καὶ S after Stallbaum. This would make ἕκαστον the object to θεραπεύειν, and καὶ σῶμα κτέ. in apposition with it, — a view which is held by Schleiermacher and Ast. On the other hand, Kratz agrees with Cron in making ἕκαστον the subj. of θεραπεύειν.

513 e. σοι: B T. σοι S and eds. with comma before and after εἰ βούλει.

513 e. *θεραπεύομεν*: B T. *θεραπεύομεν* . . . S, on the basis of a free rendering of Aristides which adds *σπουδαῖον καὶ καλόν*.

514 a. *θῶμεν*: B T. *φῶμεν* S after Madvig. Cf. 481 c.

514 a. *πράξοντες*: b S with eds. *πράξαντες* B T Stallbaum, Cron. *τάξαντες* Madvig. This passage has given a great deal of trouble. The Mss. reading seems to be utterly indefensible. Stallbaum, followed by Cron, regards the aor. as ingressive and equiv. to *ἐπιχειρήσαντες* *πράξει*, but it is very doubtful whether the aor. of *πράττειν* can be thus used. No example is cited for it. On the other hand the fut. is not free from criticism.

514 b. *τὴν τέχνην ἣ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα*: is omitted by S, being only found on the margin of B T. Heindorf reads *ἐπιστάμεθα* in both cases, while Cobet omits *ἣ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα*.

514 c. *ἰδίᾳ διὰ ἡμῶν*: S after Madvig (*δι' ἡμῶν*). *ἰδίᾳ ἡμῶν* B T (defended by Ast). *διὰ ἡμῶν* Voemel. *ἰδια ἡμῶν* Heindorf.

514 c. *ἄν που*: S. *δήπου* B T Cron.

515 c. *πολιταί*: S after Hirschig. *οἱ πολῖται* B T. The apposition seems too harsh to be natural.

515 d. *ναί*: B T S after Stallbaum. *ἐποίει* the eds. after Aldus.

515 d. *ἀνάγκη*: S. *ἀνάγκη* B T Cron, eds.

516 a. *ἐαυτόν*: is bracketed by S after cod. and Ast, but retained by Cron.

516 b. *ἐπεμέλετο*: so B T eds. This is the only passage cited for Plato where this form of the imperf. is found. The evidence of the inscriptions is not conclusive. Meisterhans,² § 63, 4, says that after 380 B.C. the form *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι* is almost universal (*ἐπιμέλεσθαι*: *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*: 4:34); in regard to the usage before this time, owing to the uncertainty of the orthography, no certain conclusion can be reached. It seems likely, however, that Plato would hardly have varied his usage within six lines (cf. *ἐπεμελεῖτο* 18 below). In any case, L. Dindorf's claim that forms of *ἐπιμέλεσθαι* should be everywhere written in Plato is not borne out by inscriptions.

516 d. *προσεξημίωσαν*: B T. *πρὸς ἐξημίωσαν* S after Hermann. Cf. *Prot.* 311 d καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων προσαναλίσκοντες.

516 e. *ἐν Μαθαῶνι*: B T. *Μαθαῶνι*. S.

517 b. *μή*: B T. *οὐ μή* S after Madvig. But Schanz repudiates this emendation in *Grammatische Bemerkungen Rhein. Mus.* xli 162 ff., and now agrees with Ast, who (p. 432) regards *πολλοῦ δεῖ μή* as equivalent to *οὐ μή* with the subjunctive. The similar case in *Epist.* vii. 344 c he regards as an imitation, and therefore a confirmation, of a manner of expression not found elsewhere in Plato. *Rid.* § 60 also regards *πολλοῦ γε δεῖ* as a substitute for *οὐ*, giving (in § 259) other examples where *πολλοῦ γε δεῖ* fill the place of a negative. Cron in his latest edition accedes to this view although in his third edition he looked upon *μή* with the subjv. as an unusual const. for the simple inf. after *δεῖ*, *δεῖ* taking the place of a negated verb of fear. Kühner § 589, 1, n. 1, says the passage is elliptical, "aber wahrlich es fehlt

viel daran, dasz man *besorgt sein sollte, ob nicht Einer der jetzt Lebenden solche Werke ausführen werde.*" Goodwin does not treat the question. In spite of the agreement of later editions, Cron seems to have been on the right track in his earlier edition. In the first place the position is against the explanation that πολλοὺ γε δεῖ is equivalent to οὐ. Then there is no occasion here for the strong οὐ μή construction. Callicles wants merely to say, "But at least you will admit that the men of the present day are far from being able to accomplish such acts." The usual const. (itself very rare) after δεῖ in this sense is the infinitive; but the inf. denies the fact, while Callicles would deny the likelihood merely. We have then a shift from the object construction to the final. Similar but not entirely parallel are passages like *Phaedo* 70 a τὰ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πολλὰν ἀπιστίαν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, μὴ ἐπειδὴν ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος, οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ᾖ, and the use of ἀδελον μὴ in *Phaedo* 91 d.

517 d. ἔστιν: B T. ἔστιν S after Vögelin.

517 d. ἄλλ' ὦν: codd. S. ἄλλων ὦν B T (defended by Ast). τέλλα Heindorf after Ficinus.

518 a. περὶ σώμα πραγματείας: S after Cobet. περὶ σώματος πραγματεῖαν B T Cron. Cron admits that the change is desirable, but contends that it is not necessary. If the traditional reading is kept, σώματος must depend on πραγματεῖαν, the whole clause meaning, "as regards the treatment of the body."

518 a. τότε: B T S. τότε the eds.

518 a. ὅτε: S after Madvig (Heindorf had already suggested it). ὅτι B T.

518 d. δῆ: S after Heindorf. δὲ B T.

519 d. καί: B T. καίτοι S after Heindorf. The τοι might easily have fallen out before τούτου.

521 a. Καλλίκλεις: B T. ὁ Καλλίκλεις S after codd. and Bekker.

521 b. εἰ σοι Μυσὸν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν κτέ.: since Bekker, this passage has been explained as in the text. Before him, the editors vexed themselves greatly over it. Heindorf remarks: Locum mendosissimum 'verisimillima, opinor, emendatione sanavit Cornarius, corrigens, Εἰ μὴ σοι Μυσῶν γίνεσθαι ἥδιον λείαν . . . Unus tamen in hac lectione verborum ordo non satis placet, propiusque etiam videtur ad veritatem accessisse magnus ille Casaubonus, cuius ex notulis hanc correctionem protulit Routhius: Εἰ μὴ σοι Μυσῶν γε ἥδιον εἶναι λείαν. . . Λεία inter Platonicas voces laudatus a Timaeo *Lex.* p. 174, ubi hanc vocem in Platone reperisse se negat Ruhnkenius. Huic igitur sedem suam inventam putamus.' The sense would then be: "If you do not prefer to fall a prey to the worst of mankind."

521 b. χρήσεται: B T. χρήσεται S.

521 c. δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες: Stephanus. δοκεῖ Σώκρατες B T. δοκεῖ Σωκράτης S. δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, πιστεύεις (for πιστεύειν) Heindorf with Aldus and the two Basle editions.

521 d. δ: B T. δν S with cod. and Heindorf. Cf. 486 d.

521 e. ἄνθρωπος: B T. ἄνθρωπος S after Bekker.

521 e. καὶ αὐτοὺς . . . διαφθείρει: is bracketed by S after Cobet.

522 a. ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ: is bracketed by S after Madvig and Cobet. By means of these omissions the connexion is made more exact, but there is also a loss to the description of several points which could hardly have been added by an interpolator. Madvig declares ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ to be an idea entirely foreign to medical theory; but while this may be technically true, the phrase is well adapted to describe that state of feeling into which the patient comes after taking nauseous medicines, the result of which is often choking and gasping. Cf. *Rep.* viii. 556 d ἁσθματός τε καὶ ἀπορίας μεστόν. As opposed to this, διαφθείρει applies to heroic treatment which leaves traces or scars behind. The addition of these two varieties to κακὰ εἰργασταὶ certainly gives color to the picture.

522 a. πάματα: S after Bekker. πάματα B T. In his collection of examples, vol. xii. *praef.* § 2, Schanz shows that πάματα is found everywhere except in *Phaedo* 117 b, *Gorg.* 522 a.

522 a. ἡνώχουν: S. εὐώχουν B T Cron.

522 a. εἰ εἴποι: S after codd. Stephanus. εἴποι B T.

522 a. πόσον: S after codd. Dobree. ὅσον B T Cron. Schanz conjectures τί.

522 a. οἶσθαι γε χρή: has been transferred perhaps to the wrong place in the course of the tradition. It would suit much better at the close of the preceding words of Socrates, but is hardly appropriate in the mouth of Calicles after ἴσως. Hence Heindorf and Ast unite it closely with ἴσως. Hirschig and Cobet omit it.

522 c. εἶναι: S after Heindorf and Coraë. εἶναι B T.

522 d. γὰρ τις: B T. γὰρ ἡ S after Cobet.

523 b. οἱ ἐκ μακάρων: S after Plutarch. ἐκ μακάρων B T.

523 b. σφίσι: S after Stobaeus, Plutarch. σφίν B. σφίν T.

523 c. ἐρήμον: S. ἐρημον B T. See 510 b.

524 c. οὐλὰς: is bracketed by S after Heindorf.

524 c. καὶ κατεαγότα: S. κατεαγότα B T. κατεαγότα τε Cron, Thompson.

524 e. 'Ραδάμανθυν: 'Ραδάμανθυν, οἱ δ' ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης παρὰ τὸν Αἰακὸν cod.

524 e. οὐλῶν μεστήν ὑπὸ ἐπιτορκίων καὶ ἀδικίας: Lucian probably had this passage in mind in *Cataplus* c. 24 ὅποσα ἂν τις ὕμῶν πονηρὰ ἐργάσθῃ παρὰ τὸν βίον, καθ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀφανῆ στίγματα ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς περιφέρει. See Kitzredge, *Am. Jour. Phil.* vi. 165, and Gildersleeve, *Essays and Studies*, p. 344. The idea that after death the soul retains marks and scars resulting from evil deeds done in the body is said by Josephus to have been common among the Jews in his day.

525 b. παραδείγματι: S after cod. and Forster. παραδείγματι τι B T. παράδειγμα Eusebius, approved by Cobet.

525 d. *τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων*: Eusebius, Thompson. *τοὺς τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων* B. *τοὺς τῶν παραδειγμάτων* T. *τούτων* S after Heindorf. *τύπους τῶν παραδειγμάτων* Madvig.

525 e. *οὐ γὰρ . . . οἷς ἐξήν*: is bracketed by S after Morstadt. In favor of the omission is the rather difficult ellipsis, as well as the disagreement of the remark with 473 d *δυοῖν ἀθλοῖν εὐδαιμονέστερος οὐκ ἂν εἴη*, according to which we should have *ἦττον ἄθλιος* instead of *εὐδαιμονέστερος*.

526 b. *ἀρετὴν τήν*: cod. S. *ἀρετὴν* B T.

527 a. *ἐλιγγιάσεις*: B S. *ἱλλιγγιάσεις* T Cron. See on 486 b.

527 a. *καὶ ἐπὶ κόρρης ἀτίμως*: B T. *ἐπὶ κόρρης* S after Cobet.

527 c. *ὁ λόγος*: cod. S. *ὁ σὸς λόγος* B T.

527 d. *πατάξαι*: B T eds. The insertion *σύ γε θαρρῶν* has caused the editors some trouble in the construction of *πατάξαι*. It is easiest and most natural to supply *ἑασὸν τινα*. Stephanus, however, wrote *πάταξαι*. This was objected to by Routh and championed by Van Heusde. It is doubtful whether there is any authority for using the middle in the sense "allow yourself to be," etc. Cobet also feeling some difficulty proposes to insert *πάρεχε*. But the explanation offered in the note, renders emendations unnecessary.

527 d. *ὡς τὶ ὄντας*: S. *ὡς τι ὄντας* Cron and eds. Cf. 472 a.

GREEK INDEX.

[References in brackets are to the Appendix.]

ἀγασθαι constructions with 526 a.
 ἀγορά 447 a.
 ἀγορά πλήθους local 469 d.
 ἀγοικία 461 c.
 ἀγόν of the human life 526 e.
 ἀδικία 478 c.
 ἀδύνατος 507 e.
 αἰ distributive 486 a.
 αἰρεῖν construction with 495 b.
 αἰσθάνεσθαι distinguished from γινώσκειν 464 c; with gen. of partic. 481 d.
 αἰσχρόν with μή 458 d.
 αἰτία 503 b.
 ἀκκιζεσθαι 497 a.
 ἀκολασταίνεαι rare 478 a.
 ἀκολουθεῖν 477 e.
 ἀλλά, well, then 462 b; where γάρ is expected 448 d; in asseverations 481 b.
 ἀλλά γε 470 d.
 ἀλλά οὖν 496 d.
 ἄλλος excludes 447 c, 473 c; generic in sing. 486 a.

ἄλλο τι, ἄλλο τι ἢ 467 d.
 ἄμα with partic. 520 c.
 ἀμύητος 493 a.
 ἀμφισβητεῖν 452 c.
 ἀν repeated 447 d, 475 e, 514 d; omitted 452 a, 471 a.
 ἀναβαίνειν legal 486 b.
 ἀναγκάζειν 472 b.
 ἀναγκάσιος personal constr. 449 c.
 ἀναλαβεῖν, ἐπαναλαβεῖν 488 b.
 ἀναρροστεῖν 482 b.
 ἀναθίσθαι 'take back' 461 d.
 ἀνδρεῖος 494 d.
 ἀνέδην 494 e.
 ἀνία, ἀνιάρως 477 d.
 ἀνομολογουμένως 495 a.
 ἀνόςσιος form 505 b.
 ἀντ' εὖ ποιεῖν 520 e.
 ἀντί for ἡ after μάλλον 475 d.
 ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι 506 a.
 ἀντίστροφος 464 b.
 ἀντιτιθεῖναι 461 d.
 ἀνω καὶ κάτω 481 e.
 ἀπαγωγή 486 a.
 ἀπλοῦς 503 a.
 ἀπλῶς οὕτως 468 c.
 ἀποβλέπειν εἰς 474 d.
 πρὸς 503 d.

ἀποκαλεῖν 512 c.
 ἀποκαλύπτειν of rhetorical treatment 455 d.
 ἀποκτείνεσθαι form [456 d].
 ἀπολαμβάνειν 495 e.
 ἀπορεῖν, εὐπορεῖν 478 a.
 ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ charge against Socrates 521 e.
 ἀποσείεσθαι 484 a.
 ἀποφανείσθαι deponent 526 d.
 ἀποφοιτῶν 489 d.
 ἄρα inferential 448 a, 487 a, 492 e; postposition, 519 b.
 ἄρα 'whether' 476 a; position 467 e, 472 d.
 ἄρα, ἄρα οὐ, ἄρ' οὖν 450 a, 479 c.
 ἀρετῇ 492 d, 504 c, 506 d.
 ἀριθμητικῇ 450 d.
 ἄρχειν and πλεόν ἔχειν 483 d; constructions with 488 a.
 ἀρχή 492 b.
 ὁστέως 447 a, 462 e.
 ὁτιμῆ, ὁτιμῶς 486 c.
 αὖ 468 a, 480 e, 500 a.
 αὐλητικῇ 501 d.

αὐτίκα 'for example'
472 d, 483 a.

αὐτός 'the master'
447 c, 511 e; καὶ
αὐτός 'et ipse'
452 b; gives em-
phasis 452 b; re-
peats the subj.
482 d; αὐτό neut.
emphatic 447 b,
458 a.

αὐτόθεν 470 e.

βαλλάντιον 508 e.

βαλλαντιστομοί 508 e.

βεβαιοῦσθαι 489 a.

βίαιος 505 d.

βίος 486 d.

γάρ gives basis for a
following question
449 c; resumes
an interrupted
thought [454 c].

γὰ position in *ἥ . . . ἥ*
clauses 460 a; em-
phasizes pronoun
487 b.

γένος gens 483 d.

γεωμέτρης 'mathemati-
cian' 465 b.

γεωμετρία 508 a.

γίγνεσθαι passive of
ποιεῖν 515 e.

γινώσκειν distin-
guished from *αἰ-
σθάνεσθαι* 464 c.

γοητεύειν 483 e.

γράμματα 'written laws'
484 a.

γυμνάσιον 493 d.

δαιμόνιος 456 a.

δέ 'although' 467 d.

δ' οὖν 'but then'
513 d.

ἔδει, ἔδει ἄν 458 b, 514 a,
516 b.

δαινός 481 d, 499 b.

οὐδὲν δαινὸν μὴ 520 d.

δεύτερος 'second best'
478 e.

δὴ 'just' 466 b, 485 c.

δηλοῦν = *δῆλον εἶναι*
483 d.

δῆλος personal constr.
with 449 c.

δημηγορεῖν, δημηγόρος
482 c.

δημιουργός 447 d, 452 a,
517 d.

δημοσιεύειν 514 d.

δῆτα with imv. 452 c.

διά forms adv. phrase
449 c.

διαλέγεσθαι 447 c, 448 d,
457 c.

διאלύνειν, λύνει 480 e

διαμάχεσθαι 513 d.

διάνοια 514 a.

διαπεραίνειν 451 a.

διαρρηγνύναι 484 a.

διατριβή 484 e.

διαφερόντως construc-
tion with 479 e.

διαφεύγειν 473 c, 484 a.

διαφθείρειν 521 e.

διαφωνεῖν 482 b.

διδασκαλία 501 e.

διδασκαλικός with gen.
455 a.

δικαίως, ὀρθῶς 476 e.

δικαιοσύνη for *δικα-
στική* 464 c.

δικαιοτής 508 a.

δικαστική 464 c.

δική, τιμωρία, ζημία
472 d.

διομολογείσθαι 500 e.

διορίζεσθαι 457 c.

δοξάζειν 486 e.

δουλεύειν 491 e.

δοῦλος used by Gorgias
452 e.

δύναμις vis 447 c.

δυναστεία, τυραννίς
492 b.

δυναστής 525 d.

δυσχεραίνειν 450 e.

εἰάν 'whether' 452 c.
and *εἰ* after *σκοπεῖ*
510 b.

ἐγχειρῖδιον 469 d.

ἔθνος 455 b.

εἰ δὲ μη phraseological
470 a; reg. follows
ἐὰν μὲν 502 b.

εἰ δὴ 'if really' 449 a.

εἰ καὶ, καὶ εἰ [503 a],
509 a.

εἰ μὴ διά 516 e.

εἰ μὴ εἰ nisi si 480 b.

εἰ μὴ, εἴπερ with fut.
indic. 495 a, 509 a.

οὐκ οἶδ' *εἰ* haud scio
an non 458 d.

οἶσθ' *εἰ* parentheti-
cal 486 a.

εἶδος 503 e.

εἰδωλον 463 d.

εἶναι in phrases 499 c.

εἰεν 'very well' 486 c.

ἦ Attic form 488 b.

ἔθι, φέρε δὴ 451 a.

εἰπεῖν for *λέγειν* 456 c;
inf. with 473 a.

εἰς with *παιδεύειν* 519 e;
with *τελευτᾶν* 453 a.

ἐκ of origin 523 e.

ἐκ τρίτων 'of the
third part' 500 a.

ἐκβάλλειν, ἐκπίπτειν
517 a.

ἐκέισε of life beyond
the grave, 527 b.

ἐκλάμπειν poetic 484 a.

ἐκροή rare 494 b.

ἐλέγχειν 486 c.

ἐμβραχυ 457 a.

ἐμπειρία, τριβή 462 c,
463 b.

ἐμπληκτος [482 a].

ἐμπορος, κάπηλος 517 d.

ἐν with τελευτᾶν 453 a.

ἐν Πιυθίου [472 d].

ἐνδεικνύειν, ἀποδεικνύ-
ναι 484 b.

ἐνεκα 'so far as' 493 e;
forms [468 a].

ἐνθάδε of life here 527 b.

ἐνταῦθα with verb of
motion 527 c.

ἐξαίφνης with partic.
523 e.

ἐξελέγγχειν pregnant use
of 467 a; with par-
tic. 522 d.

ἔξις 524 b.

ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι 'adver-
tise' 447 c, 458 d.

ἐπατεῖν poetic 464 d.

ἐπαναλαβεῖν, ἀναλαβεῖν
488 b.

ἐπαναστήναι 484 a.

ἐπεὶ 'whereas' 471 d.

ἔπειτα 461 d.

ἐπεξέρχεσθαι 492 d.

ἐπὶ of immediate suc-
cession, 512 e; with

παιδεύειν 519 e.

ἐπιδείκνυσθαι 447 a, b.

ἐπιδιακρίνειν 524 a.

ἐπιεικῶς 493 c.

ἐπικουρεῖν, ἐπικουρία,
ἐπικούρος 492 c.

ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἀντι-
λαμβάνεσθαι 506 a.

ἐπιπλήττειν with dat.
478 e.

ἐπιπρεῖν 494 b.

ἐπίστασθαι 484 b.

ἐπιστήμη equiv. to
τέχνη 449 d; for
μάθησις 454 d.

ἐπιτιγδευμα, ἐπιτιγδουσιν
463 b.

ἐπιτρέπειν 504 c, 517 b.

ἐπιχειρεῖν 492 d, 495 c.

ἐπωδή 'incantation'
484 a.

έρμαιον 486 e.

έρρωμένως compared
483 c.

ἐταιρεία 'club' 510 a.

ἐταῖρος 510 a; com-
pared 487 d.

ἔτερος generic in sing.
486 a.

εὐ- augmented to ηὐ-
[448 c], [459 c].

εὐ γε 494 c.

εὐ ἔχει 'it is in order'
455 c.

εὐ ἴσθ' ὅτι with inf.
453 a.

εὐεργέτης 506 c.

εὐμουσία 486 c.

εὐπορεῖν, ἀπορεῖν 478 a.

εὐφήμει fave lingua
469 a.

ἔχε δὴ 400 a, 490 b.

ἔσχον ingressive 503
e, 519 d.

ἔχων in phrases 490 e.

ἐκτέον, σχετέον 490 c.

ἔχεσθαι with gen.
499 b.

τὰ ἐχόμενα 494 d.

ἐχθές, χθές [470 d].

ἔως constructions with
506 b.

ζημία, τιμωρία, δίκη
472 d.

ζημοῦσθαι for over-
eating 490 c.

ζῶον 453 c.

ἦδη 'at once,' jam
486 e.

ἡδονή, χάρις 462 c.

ἡδύς 'naive' 491 e.

ἦθος 484 d.

ἦκεις ἔχων 491 c.

φέρουσα 518 d.

ἡλικία for philosophy
484 c.

θάτερον form [475 a].

θεαταί 'audience' 502 a.
θέμις 505 d.

θεραπεία 464 a.

θεράπευμα, πάθημα 524
b, d.

θηρεύεσθαι 464 d.

λατρεῖν transitive
478 c.

λατρική 465 d.

ἴσιος followed by ἤ
481 d.

ἰδιώτης 507 d.

ἱκανός 480 a, 484 a.

λοῦ λοῦ 499 b.

ἰσότης, γεωμετρική 508 a.

ἴσως of understatement
473 a.

καθอรᾶν, ὁρᾶν 457 c.

καί in questions 455 a;
doubled in com-
parison 457 e; cli-
mactic 511 b; 'and
therefore' 471 a.

καί εἰ, εἰ καί [503 a],
509 a.
καί ταῦτα 'and that
too' 508 a, 526 b.
equiv. to καίτοι 519
c.
κακία, πονηρία 477 b.
κακουργεῖν 483 a.
καλλωπίσματα 492 c.
καλὸς κάγαθός [484 d],
518 c.
κάπηλος, ἔμπορος 517 d.
κατά of the scale 474 d,
512 b.
κᾶτα with partic. 457 b.
καταδύνειν 485 d.
καταθεωρεῖσθαι 465 d.
καταπατεῖν 484 a.
καταπιττοῦν [473 c].
καταριθμεῖν 451 e.
κατασκευή, παρασκευή
477 b.
καταχαρίζεσθαι 513 d.
καταχρησθαι 'use up'
490 c.
καταχωννύναι, obru-
ere 512 c.
κατεπᾶδειν 483 e.
κεφάλαιον without art.
494 d.
κήδεσθαι 462 a.
κιθαριστική 502 a.
κιθαρφεδία 486 c.
κιθαρφεδική 502 a.
κοινωνήματα 484 d.
κοινωνία 507 e.
κολάζειν 'discipline'
491 e.
κολακεία 463 b.
divisions of 464 a.
κολασις, ζημία 472 d.
κομᾶν 524 c.
κομωτική 463 c.
κομψός 486 c, 493 a.

κόρη [486 c].
κοσμεῖν, κόσμος 504 a.
κύρος, κυροῦν, κύρωσις
450 b.

λαμβάνειν, παραλαμβάνειν 483 c.

λογιστική 450 d.
λόγος in general 457 c;
'story' 522 e.

λόγος, μῦθος 523 a.
τό λοιπόν 458 d.
λύειν, διαλύειν 480 e.
λύπη 475 c.

-μα termination 524 b.
μά 489 e.

μαγγανεύματα 484 a.
μάθησις, ἐπιστήμη
454 d.

πίστις 454 e.
μάκαρ, μακάριος 523 b.
ὦ μακάριε 469 c.
μάλιστα 'yes' 496 d.
μᾶλλον after comp.
482 c.

μειράκιον 485 c, d.
μέλλειν tenses with
484 d.

ἔμελλον after unreal
cond. 486 d.

μέλος, ρυθμός 502 c.
μέν almost equiv. to
μήν 466 b.

μέν οὖν 465 e.
μεταβιβάζειν 517 b.
μεταλαγχάνειν rare
447 a.

μεταπίπτειν 493 a.
μεταστρέφειν absolute
457 a.

μετατίθεσθαι 493 c.
μέχρι 487 c.
μή with inf. in appos.

[449 c]; with
subs. inf. 456 e;
'whether' [458 c];
generic 459 a; ab-
solute with subjv.
462 e; redundant
with ὥστε 465 a;
with pres. indic.
458 c, 512 d; with
opt. in question
510 d; with imv.
489 a.

μὲ οὐ after αἰσχύने-
σθαι 461 b; after
neg. 509 a.

μήν equiv. to μέντοι
493 c.

μηχανοποιός 512 b.
μισθοφορία 515 e.
μορμολύντειν, μορμώ
473 d.

μυθολογεῖν 493 a.
μῦθος, λόγος 523 a.
μύσαντα 480 c.

νεανιεύεσθαι 482 c.
νεανικός 482 c, 485 e.
νεωστί 503 c, 523 b.
νικᾶν with acc. 456 a.
νομίζεσθαι 466 b.

νομίζεσθαι, κρίνεσθαι
483 d.
νόμιμος, νόμος 504 d.
νόμος 'usage' 512 b.
νόμοι 'constitution'
484 d.

ζυμβόλαια 484 d.

ὅδε deictic 447 a.
οἶδειν 518 e.
οἶμαι softens 483 e.
οἶος with inf. 457 d.
οἶος, οἶός τε 452 e.

ὄλιγου 'almost' 472 a.
 ὅπη for ὅποι 456 b.
 ὅπλομαχα [456 d].
 ὅπως constructions with
 481 a; with fut. in-
 dic. 495 d; Dawes'
 canon 510 a.
 ὅπως ἔχει with part.
 gen. 470 e.
 ὁρθῶς, δικαίως 476 e.
 ὁρθῶς γὰρ οἷε force
 of 451 a.
 ὅς (δοτις) βούλει qui-
 vis 517 b.
 ὅσον . . . χάριν 485 a.
 ὅπερ for ὄνπερ 448 b.
 ὅπερ λέγω 465 c.
 ὅστις, ὅς after neg. 447
 d, 453 b; condi-
 tional 483 b.
 ὅστις βούλει quivis
 517 b.
 ὅτι introduces direct
 speech 521 b.
 οἷσθ' ὅτι 486 e.
 οὐχ ὅτι 'not but
 that' [450 e].
 οὐ adhaerent 450 d,
 459 a; instead of
 μή after ὥστε with
 inf. 458 e; shifts
 to μή 459 a.
 οὐκ οἷδ' εἰ haud
 scio an non
 458 d.
 οὐ πάνν [457 e].
 οὐ φημί nego 466 e.
 οὐχ ὅτι 'not but
 that' [450 e].
 οὐδαμοῦ ἄν φανῆται
 456 c.
 οὐδεῖς separated 512 e,
 519 b, 521 c.
 οὐκ οὖν [466 e].

οὐλή, ὠτελή 524 c.
 οὐτός scornful 452 e,
 489 b; art. omitted
 with 467 b; posi-
 tion gives empha-
 sis 471 a.
 οὕτως 'under the
 circumstances' 461
 a, 464 b, 503 d.
 ὄχλος 'assembly' 454 b.
 παγκρατίζειν 456 d.
 παθήματα, θεραπεύματα
 524 b, d.
 πάθος 481 c.
 παιδεία 470 e.
 παιδεύειν εἰς, ἐπί 519 e.
 παιδοτρίβης, γυμναστής
 [452 a].
 πάλαι jam diu with
 pres. 456 a.
 παλαίειν 456 d.
 πανούργος 499 b.
 οὐ πάνν [457 e].
 παρά 'at the hands of'
 467 c; 'the com-
 panion of' 485 c;
 with βεβαιοῦσθαι
 489 a.
 παραδιδόναι tradere
 456 e.
 παραλαμβάνειν 483 e,
 516 a.
 παρασκευάζεσθαι with
 inf. 524 d.
 παρεσκευάσθαι εἰς
 448 d.
 παρασκευαστέον mid-
 dle 507 d.
 παρασκευή, κατασκευή
 477 b.
 παύειν construction
 with 523 d.
 παῖθ passive 453 a.

πειστικός 455 a, 493 a;
 construction with,
 455 a.
 περί with gen. and acc.
 449 d; with acc.
 after a verb not of
 action 490 c; with
 gen. instead of
 acc. 451 d, 491 a.
 περιμέναι 490 d.
 περιπατεῖν 490 d.
 περισυλᾶσθαι 486 c.
 περιφέρεισθαι εἰς ταυτό
 517 c.
 πεττενικῇ 450 d; the
 λόγος element in
 [450 d].
 πίστις, μάθησις 454 e.
 πλάττειν 483 e.
 πλεονεκτεῖν 483 c.
 οἱ πλείοντες 'mer-
 chants' 467 d.
 πλήθος equiv. to ἐκκλη-
 σία 456 c.
 πλὴν with ἢ instead of
 gen. 489 c.
 ποικιλία of Plato 451 b.
 ποῖος contemptuous
 490 d; equiv. to
 τίς 453 c.
 πολίτης 'statesman'
 515 c.
 πολλοῦ γε δεῖ followed
 by μή [517 a].
 πονηρία, κακία 477 b.
 πορίζεσθαι middle 493 e.
 πρᾶγμα 'business' 512 c.
 πράγματα ἔχειν, πα-
 ρέχειν 467 d.
 τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν 526 c.
 πρὶν constructions with
 463 c.
 προδιδάσκειν 489 d.
 προέσθαι 520 c.

πρὸς final 457 e; 'to the advantage of' 459 c; adverbial, 469 b; 'at the hands of' 482 c; pregnant 483 b; with τελευτῶν 453 a.

προσεισταμένη 511 d.
πυκτεύειν 456 d.

ράβδος, σκήπτρον 526 c.
ῥήμα 489 b, 490 a.
ῥητορικὴ a species of art 449 a; πειθοῦς δημιουργός [453 a]; a more complete definition of 455 a; a kind of ἀγωνία 456 d.

ῥυθμός, μέλος 502 c.

σαθρός 479 b.
σεμνός 502 a.
σκήπτρον, ῥάβδος 526 c.
σκολιόν [451 e].
σκόπει with εἰ, ἐάν 510 b.

σκυτοδεψός 517 e.
σοφίζεσθαι 497 a.
σοφόν 483 a.
σπουδαῖεν pf. equiv. to pres. [502 b]; ἐπὶ τινι 502 b.

στεγανός 493 b.
στενά 497 c.
στοχάζεσθαι 465 a.
στοχαστικὴ 463 a.
συγκατατίθεσθαι 501 c.
συλλογίζεσθαι 479 c.
συμβαίνειν 484 e.

τά συμβαίνοντα 'the results' 479 c.
σύμψηφος 500 a.

σύν 'at the risk of' 513 a.

συνεῖναι 461 a.
συνίστασθαι 504 a.
συνοικεῖν 479 b.
συνουσία 'meeting' 461 b.

συντείνειν 507 d.
σύρφετος 489 c.
σφῶς αὐτοῦς indir. ref. 519 c.
σφάττειν, ἀποκτείναναι 468 c.

σφόδρα γέ 496 d.
σχεδόν τι softens 472 c.
τινός σχεδόν καὶ συχνοῦς 455 c.
σχέτλιος 467 b.
σχῆμα καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος 524 a, 525 c.
ἐσχηματισμένη 511 d.
σωφρονίζειν 478 d.
σωφροσύνη 507 b.
σώφρων 526 c.

τᾶν equiv. to τοὶ ἄν 452 b.

τέ postscript [470 a].
τε . . . καὶ connect opposites 450 a.

τελευτῶν εἰς, ἐν, πρὸς 453 a.

τέμνεσθαι secari 508 e.

τέχνη for δημιουργός 454 a.

τεχνικός 500 a.
τίθεσθαι, τίθεναι νόμον 483 b.

τιμή 497 b.
τιμωρία, δίκη 472 d.

τις 'a sort of' 491 c, 520 a.

τι adv. acc. 453 a, 459 c.

τίς, ποῖος 453 c.

τί δὲ τόδε 474 d.
τί δὲ τοῦτο [448 b].
τί τοῦτο 473 e.
τί οὐ with aor. 503 b.
τί τάχα δράσεις 466 a.
τό, τά with gen. 450 c, 453 e.

τοιγάροι 494 d.
τριβή, ἐμπερία 463 b.
τυραννίς, δυναστεία 492 b.

ύγις 493 e; form [467 b].

ύός forms of [461 b].
ύπάρχειν 456 e, 492 b.
ύπέρ 'in the name of' 515 c.

ύπερφυής 467 b; form [467 b].

ύπερφυής οἷς 477 d.
ύπερωτῶν 483 a.
ύποσχέιν λόγον 465 a.
ύπηρετεῖν 492 a.
ύπό with γίγνεσθαι 515 e.

τι 'somewhat' 493 c.
ύποδύσα 464 c.
ύπόθεσις 454 c.
ύποκείσθαι 465 b.
ύπονοεῖν 454 c.
ύποταίνεσθαι 448 e.
ύπουλος 480 b, 518 e.
ύφαντικώτατος 490 d.
ύφηγεσθαι 458 b.

φανείσθαι, ἀποφανείσθαι 526 a.

φημί with ὅτι 487 d; with partic. [481 c]; ἔφη, ἔφησα [466 e].

οὐ φημι nego 466 e.

φαρμακίς, φαρμακεύειν
513 a.

φέρει δὴ 449 c, 451 a.

φιλονικεῖν 457 d.

φίλη κεφαλὴ 515 c.

φλυαρεῖς ἔχων 490 d.

φοβεῖσθαι constructions
with 457 e.

φοιτᾶν 'to go to school'
456 d.

φόροι 519 a.

φορτικός 482 e.

φρόνιμος 489 e.

φύσις 465 c.

χαραδριός 494 b.

χάρις, ἡδονή 462 c.

χρῆν, ἔδει construction
with 458 b.

ψελλίζεσθαι 485 b.

ψεῦδος 505 e.

ὦ ἀγαθὲ 506 c.

βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν
515 a.

καλλιστε 461 c.

μακάριε 469 c.

σοφώτατε σύ 495 d.

φίλη κεφαλὴ 515 c.

ὥς causal 509 e, 521 b;
with gen. abs. 484
c; with acc. abs.
488 c; 491 a.

ὥς γε . . . εἶναι 517 b.

ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖν 482 d.

ὥς δὴ σὺ οὐκ ἂν δέ-
ξαιο [468 e].

ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν 450 b.

ὥς . . . εἰρησθαι 462 b.

ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ 453 c, 479 a;
with nom. instead
of oblique case
464 d.

οὐχ ὥσπερ condensed
522 a.

ὥστε with indic. 447 b,
[458 d]; omitted
479 a; with inf.
[479 a].

ὥτειλή, οὐλή 524 c.

ENGLISH INDEX.

- Accusative, adverbial
452 c, 459 c, 477 d,
494 a; absolute
491 a; agent with
verbals 481 a, 507 c;
in apposition [477
d]; cognate with
ὡκῶν 456 a; specifi-
cation, 464 a; 'free'
509 d; for gen. after
πρὸ 490 c, 521 d;
with inf. substan-
tival, tendential
[479 a].
- Active and passive des-
ignations of the
same idea 457 c,
524 d.
- Adjective, personal con-
str. of with inf.
449 c; agrees with
a following gen. in
gender 519 e.
- Adverb, place where for
place whither 456 b,
527 c; as adj. 520 a;
of time (ᾄμα) with
partic. 520 c, 523 e;
with art. 506 d.
- Adverbial acc. 452 c,
459 c, 477 d, 494 a.
- Aeacus 523 e.
- Afterthought 499 b,
513 e.
- Alcibiades 481 d.
- Amendment to a bill
451 b.
- Amphion 485 e, 506 b.
- Anacoluthon 454 b, 470 a,
500 c, 501 a, 503 c.
- Anaphora 464 b.
- Anaxagoras 465 d.
- Andron 487 c.
- Anticipation of the
subj. 449 e, 453 b.
- Antisthenes 492 e.
- Aorist and imperf. of
same sphere of time
447 d; gnomíc 484 a,
511 d, 524 e; and
pf. in verbs of per-
ception 497 e; par-
tic. not antecedent,
491 c.
- Apodosis omitted 456 a,
510 d.
- Aposiopesis 467 b.
- Apposition to sentence
447 a, 507 e; parti-
tive 450 c, 503 d,
524 d.
- Archelaus, life 470 d;
disregard of moral
obligations 471 b;
strength of will
471 c.
- Arion 501 e.
- Aristides 503 c, 526 b
- Aristocrates 472 a.
- Aristophon 448 b.
- Article, omission of
452 d, 453 e, 469 e,
470 e, [482 b]; in
enumerations 450 d,
508 a; inserted
464 a, 470 d; re-
peated 479 a; with
οὗτος 502 b; with
incorporated antec.
469 a; classifies
490 e, 497 e; de-
fines subj. 476 d;
with adv. 506 d;
neut. with gen. 450 c,
453 e; dual form,
524 a.
- Asphodelmeadow 524 a.
- Assimilation, case 491 a;
'neglect of 503 c.
- Assonance 492 b.
- Asyndeton [456 e], 496 d,
520 a; explanatory
450 b, 477 a, 513 a;
of opposites 456 e;
in question 489 b, e;
with ἔπειτα 461 b;
with ὥσπερ 448 e.
- Athenian judicial sys-
tem 451 a, 471 e.
- Athenians, lazy, timid,
loquacious, merce-
nary 515 e.
- Athens, πόλις φιλολο-
γος 461 e; walls
and navy - yards
[455 d].
- Attraction of case 464 d,
477 d, 509 a; of
subj. 483 d; of
mood 521 c.

- Brachylogy 465 a, 493 d, 515 d.
- Callicles, character 481 b; irritation 491 a; irony 492 c; rudeness 497 b, 498 b.
- Case, same with different verbs 493 c, 527 d; assimilation 491 a; attraction 464 d, 477 d, 509 a.
- Chiasmus, 453 d, 474 c, 493 c, 498 d, 508 b, 509 e.
- Choregia 472 a, 482 b.
- Chorus 501 e.
- Cimon 516 d.
- Cinesias 501 e.
- Cithara-playing 501 e.
- Cognate acc. with *νικῶν* 456 a.
- Comparison with *ἄνευ* 464 d; with *πρός*, copula omitted 465 b; omission of second member 468 b; to a child 479 a, 485 b, 499 b; to a wild beast 483 e; body to tomb 493 a, to a jar 493 b, to a sieve 493 c; *λόγος* to a guide 527 e.
- Compression 455 e, 456 a, 522 a. See Brachylogy.
- Conditional, variation in 458 a; doubling of one member 453 c, 468 d; unreal 471 a; minatory 509 a; negative 490 a.
- Construction, ad sensum 451 c, 460 e, 467 e; shift in 483 e.
- Cookery 518 b.
- Co-ordination for subordination 460 d, 525 b.
- Copula omitted 465 b, 472 d, 502 b; in first and second person 487 d.
- Cynic school 492 e.
- Dative with nouns 513 b; instrumental 469 c; cause 490 c; accompaniment 492 d; ethical 480 e, 515 c; predicate 525 b.
- Dawes' canon 510 a.
- Dead, judgment of 523 b.
- Death 522 e, 524 b.
- Demonstrative for rel. 468 d.
- Demus 481 d.
- Dionysion 472 a.
- Dithyrambic poetry 501 e.
- Double expressions, general precedes special 447 a; adjectives 465 b; negatives 461 b.
- Dual, artistic use of 464 b; forms of art. 524 a.
- Earth, two parts 523 e.
- Eleusinian Mysteries 497 c.
- Empedocles 493 a, 507 e.
- Epicharmus 505 e.
- Epiphora 500 a.
- Euripides quoted 484 e, 485 e, 492 e.
- Explanatory equiv. to causal 449 d.
- Fate, belief in 512 e.
- Figure of the hunt 464 d.
- Flute-playing 501 d.
- Future, two sides of 447 b; in neg. questions 466 e; middle as passive 509 d, 521 e; optative 482 d.
- Future perfect, 469 d, 510 e.
- Genitive comparative 479 b; characteristic 482 a; epexegetic 521 a, 526 a; free 509 d; of part affected 469 d; partitive with phrases 470 e, 480 c, 507 d; with *πρόσω* 486 a, *εἰθὺς* 525 a; with *τιθέμαι* 500 b; possessive 500 a, 504 e; terminal 487 e; with adverbs 507 d; with verbs of perception 519 b; with *ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι* 469 c, 519 a; with *θανυμίζειν* 523 d.
- Gorgias, boastfulness 449 b; mannerisms [448 c]; oaths 463 d; as mediator 497 b, 506 a.
- Herodicus 448 b.
- Hippias of Elis 482 e.

- Homer quoted 485 d,
516 c, 523 a, 526 d.
Homoiooteleuton 473 c.
Hoplomachia [456 d].
Hyperbaton 469 d.
Hysteron proteron 474a.
- Imperative, positive,
negative 470 c, 489a.
Imperfect, distributes
447 c; of awaken-
ing 478 c; resolved
453 d.
Indicative after *σκοπεῖν*
458 c; absolute
with *μή* 512 d.
Infinitive with *τοῦ* 457 c;
epexegetic 486 c,
493 c; articular
447 c; after *εὖ ἰσθ'*
ὅτι 453 a.
Interrogative veils state-
ment 470 a; lost in
affirmation, 470 a.
Intransitive used pas-
sively 472 a.
Isles of the Blessed
523 b.
- Law, natural, conven-
tional 482 e.
Litotes 457 a.
- Marathon, victors at
516 d.
Mathematics 465 b.
Medicine 455 b.
Meles 501 e.
Menelaus 523 b.
Metaphor of a horse
482 e; hunt 489 b;
mysteries 497 c;
bow 507 d; bank-
ruptcy 518 d;
games 526 e.
- Middle for active, 484 b.
Miltiades 516 d.
Minos 523 e.
Mithaecus 518 b.
Musical terms 457 e.
Mysian slaves 521 b.
- Nausicydes 487 c.
Neuter for masc. fem.
448 b, 465 d, 478 c;
plural for two fems.
509 e; generalizes
520 b.
Nicias 472 a.
- Oaths of Socrates 449
d, 461 b, 463 d;
Gorgias, Polus, Cal-
licles 463 d.
Odd and even numbers
451 c.
Optative 447 c; in em-
phatic denial 458 c;
by attraction 521 c.
Oratory, three divisions
of 452 e.
Ostracism 516 d.
Oxymoron 487 b.
- Participial clause as
addendum 479 b;
periphrases 525 d.
Participle contains lead-
ing idea 453 b, 459
e, 486 d; a real
adj. 470 d; apposi-
tional 507 d; acc.
abs. in apposition
501 b; omitted in
acc. abs. 495 c;
epexegetic 513 e;
predicate 500 c;
connected with verb
of preceding clause
511 c; supplement-
ary 470 c; heaping
up of [471 b], 483
e; gives result of
the verb 510 d;
with verbs of per-
ception 519 b.
- Perdiccas 471 c.
Perfect for pres. 502 b;
and aor. of verbs of
perception 497 e.
Pericles 472 a, 503 c,
515 e, 516 a.
Personal, shift to ma-
terial 469 a, 482 b.
Personal constr. of adj.
448 d, 449 c.
Personal pronoun for
reflexive 468 d;
emphasizes reflex-
ive 480 a.
- Philolaus 493 a.
Philosophy deals with
principles 465 c.
Phrase *εἰ δὲ μή* 470 a;
ἐχθές τε καὶ πρῶην
470 d; *ὑπερφυῖς ὡς*
477 d; *ἄνω καὶ*
κάτω 481 e; *ἦκεῖς*
ἔχων 491 c; *εὖ ἰσθ'*
ὅτι 453 a; *σώματα*
καὶ χρήματα 511 d.
- Physicians [455 b],
456 b.
Pindar quoted 484 b.
Plural follows sing.
457 d; followed by
sing. 480 c; by dual
481 d; indefinite,
484 c; of neuter
adj. 512 b.
- Polus, book of, 448 c;
desires admiration
448 b; pushing na-

- ture of, 448 a, 461 b; name 463 e, [471 b]; oaths 463 d; laughter 473 e; attempts proof 471 c; self-assurance 473 a; evades answer 470 b; champion of the masses 475 d.
- Position, rhetorical 484 c.
- Possessive pron. for personal gen. 486 a.
- Preposition omitted with rel. 453 e.
- Present, habit, aor., case 462 d; in accusations 486 a; with verbs of perception 503 c; for fut. 505 c.
- Prolepsis 449 e, 453 b, 491 a, 513 e.
- Prometheus 523 d.
- Pronoun, same with different references 468 c; need not be repeated with a series of verbs, 493 c, 527 d; neut. possessive with art. equiv. to pers. 458 d; possessive followed by gen. 515 b; personal for refl. 468 d; personal emphasizes refl. 480 a; possessive equiv. to pers. gen. 486 a; indef. with numeral 471 e.
- Protagoras 520 c.
- Proverbs, *κατόπιν ἑορ-* τῆς 447 a; *δὲς καὶ τρεῖς* 498 e; *τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν* 499 c; *δέχασθαι τὸ διδόμενον* 499 c; *ὁ ὁμοῖος τῷ ὁμοίῳ* 510 b; *τὸν κολοφῶνα ἐπιτιθέναι* 505 d; *ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν ἄθλος* 527 a; *Μινυῶν ἔσχατος* 521 b; *ἐν τῷ πύθῳ τὴν κεραμείαν* 514 e.
- Punishments [473 c]; terror theory of 525 b.
- Pythagoras 507 e, 525 b.
- Question, rhetorical 453 b, 480 b; gives challenge 468 c; has neg. force 471 d; postponed for emphasis 496 c.
- Relative, shift to dem. 452 d, 482 b, 507 d; *ὅστις* after indef. 483 b; as a connective 492 b; clause precedes antecedent 511 c.
- Rhadamanthys 523 b.
- Right, positive, conventional 482 e.
- Sarambus 518 b.
- Scolion [451 e].
- Shift from rel. to dem. 452 d, 482 b, 507 d; from impersonal to pers. 492 b; from masc. to neut. 448 b, 460 a, 482 b; from indic. to inf. (indir. disc.) 517 d; from inf. to partic. 521 a.
- Singular verb after pl. subj. 480 c; of *ἄλλος, ἕτερος, τις* used generically 486 a; for pl. 486 d, 508 b.
- Sisyphus 525 e.
- Slaves, treatment of sick 514 d.
- Socrates' life principle 469 b; faith in truth 473 b; oaths 449 d, 461 b, 463 d; story of senatorship 473 e; courtesy, 447 c, 462 e; irony 486 d, 487 a, 490 d, 497 c.
- Sophists claim wisdom, 527 a.
- Soul, three parts 493 a; immoral condition, 525 a; incurable 525 c.
- Spartan party at Athens 515 e.
- Subject, change of 464 a; unexpressed 465 c.
- Superlative compared, 509 a; with gen. 484 e.
- Surgery 456 b; analogous to justice 476 c.
- Tacitus quotes 524 e.
- Tantalus 525 e.
- Thearion 518 b.

Themistocles [455 d], 503 c, 516 d.	Understatement[472 a], 473 a, 480 a.	Verbal in mid. sense 507 d.
Theodorus 465 b.		Voyage, cost of 511 d.
Theogony of Socrates 523 a.	Verb, intr. with pers. pass. 472 a; com- pound often meta- phorical, 473 c; simple follows com- pound 526 a; omitted 524 b.	Women, conservatism of 512 e; in theatre 502 d.
Thessalian soothsayers 513 a.		Zeugma 471 d, 504 a, 520 b.
Tisander 487 c.		Zeuxis 453 c.
Tityus 525 e.		
Tmesis 506 a.		

COLLEGE SERIES OF GREEK AUTHORS

EDITED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF

JOHN WILLIAMS WHITE, PH.D., *Professor of Greek in Harvard University,*

AND

THOMAS D. SEYMOUR, M.A., *Hillhouse Professor of the Greek Language
and Literature in Yale College.*

With the coöperation of eminent scholars, each of whom is responsible for the details of the work in the volume which he edits.

THIS series is intended to include the works either entire or selected of all the Greek authors suitable to be read in American colleges. The volumes contain an Introduction, Text, Notes, Rhythmical Schemes where necessary, an Appendix including a brief bibliography and critical notes, and a full Index. In accordance with the prevailing desire of teachers, the notes are placed below the text; but in order to accommodate all, and, in particular, to provide for examinations, the text is printed and bound separately. All except text editions are bound both in cloth and in paper. Large Person type and clear diacritical marks emphasize distinctions and minimize the strain upon the student's eyes.

The publishers no longer supply the text editions free of charge with the text-and-note editions, but send free of charge to any teacher of Greek, on his application, as many copies of the text as he may desire for use in the class-room and in examinations, in number not to exceed the copies of the text-and-note edition purchased by the class. Copies of the text edition may still be had separately, bound only in paper, at the uniform price of forty cents each.

The following Volumes are ready:

Aeschines against Ctesiphon ("*On the Crown*"). Edited on the basis of Weidner's edition, by Professor Rufus B. Richardson, Ph.D., of *Dartmouth College.*

Edition with Text and Notes: 279 pp. Cloth, \$1.40. Paper, \$1.10.

Text Edition: 76 pp. Paper, 40 cents.

Aristophanes, *Clouds*. Edited on the basis of Kock's edition, by Professor M. W. Humphreys, Ph.D., LL.D., of the *University of Virginia.*

Edition with Text and Notes: 252 pp. Cloth, \$1.40. Paper, \$1.10.

Text Edition: 88 pp. Paper, 40 cents.

COLLEGE SERIES OF GREEK AUTHORS

Euripides, *Bacchantes*. Edited on the basis of Wecklein's edition, by Professor I. T. Beckwith, Ph.D., of *Trinity College*.

Edition with Text and Notes: 146 pp. Cloth, \$1.25. Paper, 95 cents.

Text Edition: 64 pp. Paper, 40 cents.

Euripides, *Iphigenia among the Taurians*. Edited by Professor Isaac Flagg, Ph.D.

Edition with Text and Notes: 197 pp. Cloth, \$1.40. Paper, \$1.10.

Text Edition: 69 pp. Paper, 40 cents.

Homer. *Introduction to the Language and Verse of Homer*. By Professor Seymour.

104 pp. Cloth, 75 cents. Paper, 60 cents.

Homer, *Iliad, Books I.-III*. Edited on the basis of the Ameis-Hentze edition, by Professor Seymour.

Edition with Text and Notes: 235 pp. Cloth, \$1.40. Paper, \$1.10.

Text Edition: 66 pp. Paper, 40 cents.

Homer, *Iliad, Books IV.-VI*. Edited on the basis of the Ameis-Hentze edition, by Professor Seymour.

Edition with Text and Notes: 220 pp. Cloth, \$1.40. Paper, \$1.10.

Text Edition: 66 pp. Paper, 40 cents.

Homer, *Odyssey, Books I.-IV*. Edited on the basis of the Ameis-Hentze edition, by Professor B. Perrin, Ph.D., of *Adelbert College of Western Reserve University*.

Edition with Text and Notes: 229 pp. Cloth, \$1.40. Paper, \$1.10.

Text Edition: 75 pp. Paper, 40 cents.

Plato, *Apology and Crito*. Edited on the basis of Cron's edition, by Professor L. Dyer, B.A. (Oxon.).

Edition with Text and Notes: 204 pp. Cloth, \$1.40. Paper, \$1.10.

Text Edition: 60 pp. Paper, 40 cents.

Plato, *Gorgias*. Edited on the basis of the Deuschle-Cron edition, by Gonzalez Lodge, Ph.D., *Associate in Bryn Mawr College*.

Edition with Text and Notes: 308 pp. Cloth, \$1.65. Paper, \$1.35.

Text Edition: 118 pp. Paper, 40 cents.

Plato, *Protagoras*. The commentary of Sauppe translated with additions, by Professor J. A. Towle, B.A., of *Iowa College*.

Edition with Text and Notes: 179 pp. Cloth, \$1.25. Paper, 95 cents.

Text Edition: 69 pp. Paper, 40 cents.

COLLEGE SERIES OF GREEK AUTHORS

Sophocles, *Antigone*. Edited on the basis of Wolff's edition, by Professor M. L. D'Ooge, Ph.D., LL.D., of the University of Michigan.

Edition with Text and Notes: 196 pp. Cloth, \$1.40. Paper, \$1.10.

Text Edition: 59 pp. Paper, 40 cents.

Thucydides, *Book I*. Edited on the basis of Classen's edition, by the late Professor C. D. Morris, M.A. (Oxon.), of Johns Hopkins University.

Edition with Text and Notes: 350 pp. Cloth, \$1.65. Paper, \$1.35.

Text Edition: 91 pp. Paper, 40 cents.

Thucydides, *Book V*. Edited on the basis of Classen's edition, by Harold North Fowler, Ph.D., of Phillips Academy, Exeter.

Edition with Text and Notes: 214 pp. Cloth, \$1.40. Paper, \$1.10.

Text Edition: 67 pp. Paper, 40 cents.

Thucydides, *Book VII*. Edited on the basis of Classen's edition, by Professor Charles Forster Smith, Ph.D., of Vanderbilt University.

Edition with Text and Notes: 202 pp. Cloth, \$1.40. Paper, \$1.10.

Text Edition: 68 pp. Paper, 40 cents.

Xenophon, *Hellenica I.-IV*. Edited on the basis of Büchschütz's edition, by Professor Irving J. Manatt, Ph.D., LL.D.

Edition with Text and Notes: 286 pp. Cloth, \$1.65. Paper, \$1.35.

Text Edition: 138 pp. Paper, 40 cents.

The following Volumes are in preparation:

Aeschylus, *Persians* and *Prometheus*; Andocides; Aristophanes, *Birds* and *Knights*; Demosthenes, *Private Orations*; Euripides, *Alceste*; Herodotus; Homer, *Iliad* and *Odyssey*; Lucian, *Selected Dialogues*; Lycurgus; Lysias, *Selected Orations*; Plato, *Laches* and *Euthyphro*; Plutarch, *Selected Lives*; Theocritus; Thucydides; Xenophon, *Hellenica V.-VII.* and *Memorabilia*; New Testament, *The Gospel of John* and *Acts of the Apostles*.

October, 1890.

GINN & COMPANY, Publishers,

BOSTON, NEW YORK, AND CHICAGO.

3) Expressions

